



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





600039122N







A
HISTORY OF GREECE;


FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,
D.C.L. OXON. AND LL.D. CAMB.,
VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

A NEW EDITION.

IN TWELVE VOLUMES.—VOL. VIII.

WITH PORTRAIT AND PLANS.



LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1869.

The right of Translation is reserved.

221. g 58.

PLAN

	PAGE
Illustrating the Marches before and after the Battle of Kunaxa to face	352

CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII.

PART II.—CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE
DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

	Page		Page
Alleged propositions of peace from Sparta to Athens—doubtful	1	The Athenian fleet supposed to have been betrayed by its own commanders	11.
Eteonikus at Chios—distress of his seamen—conspiracy suppressed	2	Distress and agony at Athens, when the defeat of Ægospotami was made known there	12
Solicitations from Chios and elsewhere that Lysander should be sent out again . .	3	Proceedings of Lysander . . .	13
Arrival of Lysander at Ephesus—zeal of his partisans—Cyrus	ib.	Miserable condition of the Athenian Kleruchs, and of the friends of Athens in the allied dependencies. Sufferings in Athens	14.
Violent revolution at Milētus by the partisans of Lysander	4	Amnesty proposed by Patrokleidēs, and adopted . . .	15.
Cyrus goes to visit his dying father—confides his tributes to Lysander	5	Oath of mutual harmony sworn in the acropolis	16.
Inaction of the Athenian fleet after the battle of Arginusæ. Operations of Lysander . .	6	Arrival of Lysander. Athens is blocked up by sea and land	17
Both fleets at the Hellespont	7	Resolute holding-out of the Athenians—their propositions for capitulating are refused	ib.
Athenian fleet at Ægospotami	ib.	Pretences of Theramēnēs—he is sent as envoy—his studied delay	18:
Battle of Ægospotami—surprise and capture of the entire Athenian fleet	8	Misery and famine in Athens—death of Kleophon	ib.
Capture of the Athenian commanders, all except Konon	9	The famine becomes intolerable—Theramēnēs sent to obtain	
Slaughter of the captive generals and prisoners	10		

CHAPTER LXV.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
peace on any terms—debate about the terms at Sparta ..	19	duced—multiplied executions by Kritias and the Thirty ..	83
Peace is granted by Sparta, against the general sentiment of the allies	20	Opposition of Theraménès to these measures—violence and rapacity still farther increased—rich and oligarchical men put to death	<i>ib.</i>
Surrender of Athens—extreme wretchedness—number of deaths from famine	<i>ib.</i>	Plan of Kritias to gain adherents by forcing men to become accomplices in deeds of blood—resistance of Sokratès ..	34
Lysander enters Athens—return of the exiles—demolition of the Long Walls—dismantling of Peiræus—fleet given up ..	21	Terror and discontent in the city—the Thirty nominate a body of Three Thousand as partisan hoplites	36
The exiles and the oligarchical party in Athens—their triumphant behaviour and devotion to Lysander	22	They disarm the remaining hoplites of the city	37
Kritias and other exiles—past life of Kritias	23	Murders and spoiliations by the Thirty. Seizure of the metics	38
Kritias at the head of the oligarchs at Athens	24	Seizure of Lysias the rhetor and his brother Polemarchus. The former escapes—the latter is executed	39
Oligarchical leaders named at Athens	25	Increased exasperation of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against Theraménès ..	40
Seizure of Strombichidès and other eminent democrats ..	26	Theraménès is denounced by Kritias in the senate—speech of Kritias	<i>ib.</i>
Nomination of the Thirty, under the dictation of Lysander ..	27	Reply of Theraménès	42
Conquest of Samos by Lysander—oligarchy restored there ..	28	Extreme violence of Kritias and the Thirty	43
Triumphant return of Lysander to Sparta—his prodigious ascendancy throughout Greece	29	Condemnation of Theraménès	44
Proceedings of the Thirty at Athens—feelings of oligarchical men like Plato	<i>ib.</i>	Death of Theraménès—remarks on his character	45
The Thirty begin their executions—Strombichidès and the imprisoned generals put to death—other democrats also	30	Increased tyranny of Kritias and the Thirty	46
Senate appointed by the Thirty—is only trusted to act under their intimidation. Numerous executions without trial ..	31	The Thirty forbid intellectual teaching	47
The senate began by condemning willingly every one brought before them .. .	32	Sokratès and the Thirty .. .	<i>ib.</i>
Discord among the Thirty—dissentient views of Kritias and Theraménès	<i>ib.</i>	Growing insecurity of the Thirty	<i>ib.</i>
Lacedæmonian garrison intro-		Gradual alteration of feeling in Greece since the capture of Athens	50
		Demand by the allies of Sparta to share in the spoils of the war—refused by Sparta .. .	<i>ib.</i>
		Unparalleled ascendancy of Lysander	51

CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII.

v

CHAPTER LXV.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
His overweening ambition—oppressive dominion of Sparta	52	Arrival of Lysander in Attica with a Spartan force	64
Disgust excited in Greece by the enormities of the Thirty	53	Straitened condition of the exiles in Peiræus	65
Opposition to Lysander at Sparta—King Pausanias	ib.	Spartan King Pausanias conducts an expedition into Attica: opposed to Lysander	ib.
Kallikratidas compared with Lysander	54	His dispositions unfavourable to the oligarchy: reaction against the Thirty	66
Sympathy at Thebes and elsewhere with the Athenian exiles	55	Pausanias attacks Peiræus: his partial success	67
Thrasybulus seizes Phylé—repulses the Thirty in their attack	ib.	Peace-party in Athens—sustained by Pausanias	68
Farther success of Thrasybulus—the Thirty retreat to Athens	56	Pacification granted by Pausanias and the Spartan authorities	69
Discord among the oligarchy at Athens—seizure of the Eleusinians	57	The Spartans evacuate Attica—Thrasybulus and the exiles are restored—harangue of Thrasybulus	70
Thrasybulus establishes himself in Peiræus	59	Restoration of the democracy	71
The Thirty attack him and are defeated—Kritias is slain	ib.	Capture of Eleusis—entire reunion of Attica—flight of the survivors of the Thirty	ib.
Colloquy during the burial-truce—language of Kleokritus	61	Summary relating to the rise and fall of the Athenian empire	71
Discouragement of the oligarchs at Athens—deposition of the Thirty and appointment of the Ten—the Thirty go to Eleusis	62	Appendix in explanation of the Plan of Syracuse and the operation during the Athenian siege	81
The Ten carry on the war against the exiles	63		
Increasing strength of Thrasybulus	ib.		

CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

Miserable condition of Athens during the two preceding years	92	Disfranchising proposition of Phormisius	96
Immediate relief caused by the restoration—unanimous sentiment towards the renewed democracy	93	The proposition rejected—speech composed by Lysias against it	ib.
Amnesty—treatment of the Thirty and the Ten	94	Revision of the laws—the Nomothetæ	97
		Decree that no criminal inquiries should be carried back	

CHAPTER LXVI.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
beyond the archonship of Eukleidēs— <i>a.c.</i> 403	98	Attid, for writing up the laws	109
Oath taken by the senate and the dikasts modified	100	Memorable epoch of the archonship of Eukleidēs. The rhetor Lysias	110
Farther precautions to ensure the observance of the amnesty <i>ib.</i>		Other changes at Athens—abolition of the Board of Hellenotamiae—restriction of the right of citizenship	111
Absence of harsh reactionary feeling, both after the Thirty and after the Four Hundred	101	Honorary reward to Thrasylus and the exiles	112
Generous and reasonable behaviour of the Demos—contrasted with that of the oligarchy	103	Position and views of Alkibiadēs in Asia	<i>ib.</i>
Care of the people to preserve the rights of private property	105	Artaxerxēs Mnemon the new king of Persia. Plans of Cyrus—Alkibiadēs wishes to reveal them at Susa	113
Repayment to the Lacedæmonians	106	The Lacedæmonians conjointly with Cyrus require Pharnabazus to put him to death	114
The Horsemen or Knights	<i>ib.</i>	Assassination of Alkibiadēs by order of Pharnabazus	115
Revision of the laws—Nikomachus	107	Character of Alkibiadēs	116
Adoption of the fuller Ionic alphabet, in place of the old			

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE DRAMA.—RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS.—THE SOPHISTS.

Athens immediately after Eukleidēs—political history little known	118	Comic poets before Aristophanēs—Kratinos, etc.	123
Extraordinary development of dramatic genius	<i>ib.</i>	Exposure of citizens by name in Comedy—forbidden for a time—then renewed—Kratēs and the milder Comedy	129
Gradual enlargement of tragedy	119	Aristophanēs	<i>ib.</i>
Abundance of new tragedy at Athens	120	Comedy in its affect on the Athenian mind	131
Accessibility of the theatre to the poorer citizens	121	Mistaken estimate of the comic writers, as good witnesses or just critics	132
Theōrikon or festival-pay	122	Aversion of Solon to the drama when nascent	135
Effect of the tragedies on the public mind of Athens	<i>ib.</i>	Dramatic poetry as compared with the former kinds of poetry	136
Æschylus, Sophoklēs and Euripidēs—modifications of tragedy	123	Ethical sentiment, interest and debate, infused into the drama	137
Popularity arising from expenditure of money on the festivals	125	The drama formed the stage of	
Growth and development of Comedy at Athens	126		

CHAPTER LXVII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
transition to rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical philosophy	139	different points of view—the reformer and theorist against the practical teacher	158
Practical value and necessity of rhetorical accomplishments	ib.	The Sophists were professional teachers for active life, like Isokratēs and Quintilian	162
Rhetoric and dialectics	141	Misinterpretations of the dialogues of Plato as carrying evidence against the Sophists	164
Empedoklēs of Agrigentum—first name in the rhetorical movement	ib.	The Sophists as paid teachers—no proof that they were greedy or exorbitant—proceeding of Protagoras	165
Zeno of Elea—first name in the dialectical movement	142	The Sophists as rhetorical teachers—groundless accusations against them in that capacity, made also against Sokratēs, Isokratēs and others	167
Eleatic school—Parmenidēs	ib.	Thrasymachus—his rhetorical precepts—Prodikus—his discrimination of words analogous in meaning	168
Zeno and Melissus—their dialectic attacks upon the opponents of Parmenidēs	143	Protagoras—his treatise on Truth—his opinions about the Pagan gods	169
Zeno at Athens—his conversation both with Periklēs and with Sokratēs	144	His view of the cognitive process and its relative nature	171
Early manifestation, and powerful efficacy, of the negative arm in Grecian Philosophy	145	Gorgias—his treatise on physical subjects—misrepresentations of the scope of it	173
Rhetoric and dialectics—men of active life and men of speculation—two separate lines of intellectual activity	147	Unfounded accusations against the Sophists	174
Standing antithesis between these two intellectual classes—vein of ignorance at Athens, hostile to both	148	They were not a sect or school, with common doctrines or method: they were a profession, with strong individual peculiarities	ib.
Gradual enlargement of the field of education at Athens—increased knowledge and capacity of the musical teachers	150	The Athenian character was not really corrupted, between 480 B.C. and 405 B.C.	175
The Sophists—true Greek meaning of that word—invincible sentiment implied in it	151	Prodikus—The Choice of Hercules	179
The name Sophist applied by Plato in a peculiar sense, in his polemics against the eminent paid teachers	153	Protagoras—real estimate exhibited of him by Plato	181
Misconceptions arising from Plato's peculiar use of the word Sophist	156	Hippias of Elis—how he is represented by Plato	185
Paid teachers or Sophists of the Sokratic age—Protagoras, Gorgias, &c.	157	Gorgias, Pōlus, and Kalliklēs	187
Plato and the Sophists—two		Doctrine advanced by Pōlus	ib.

CHAPTER LXVII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Doctrine advanced by Kalliklès		cusation comprehends all	
—anti-social	188	society, with all the poets	
Kalliklès is not a Sophist . .	189	and statesmen	198
The doctrine put into his mouth		It is unjust to try either the	
could never have been laid		Sophists, or the statesmen	
down in any public lecture		of Athens, by the standard	
among the Athenians	191	of Plato	200
Doctrine of Thrasymachus in		Plato distinctly denies that	
the 'Republic' of Plato . . .	194	Athenian corruption was to	
Such doctrine not common to		be imputed to the Sophists	201
all the Sophists—what is		The Sophists were not teachers	
offensive in it is the manner		of mere words, apart from	
in which it is put forward	195	action	ib.
Opinion of Thrasymachus after-		General good effect of their	
wards brought out by Glaukon		teaching upon the youth . .	202
—with less brutality and much		Great reputation of the So-	
greater force of reason . . .	196	phists—evidence of respect	
Plato against the Sophists gen-		for intellect and a good state	
erally. His category of ac-		of public sentiment	208

CHAPTER LXVIII.

SOKRATÈS.

Different spirit shown towards		Oracle from Delphi declaring	
Sokratès and towards the		that no man was wiser than he	217
Sophists	205	His mission to test the false	
Birth and family of Sokratès	206	conceit of wisdom in others	218
His physical and moral qualities	ib.	Confluence of the religious	
Xenophon and Plato as witnes-		motive with the inquisitive	
ses	208	and intellectual impulse in	
Their pictures of Sokratès are		his mind—numerous enemies	
in the main accordant	209	whom he made	219
Habits of Sokratès	210	Sokratès a religious missionary,	
Leading peculiarities of Sokra-		doing the work of philosophy	220
tès	211	Intellectual peculiarities of So-	
His constant publicity of life		kratès	221
and indiscriminate conversa-		He opened ethics as a new sub-	
tion	ib.	ject of scientific discussion	ib.
Reason why Sokratès was		Circumstances which turned the	
shown up by Aritophanès on		mind of Sokratès towards	
the stage	213	ethical speculations	223
His persuasion of a special re-		Limits of scientific study as	
ligious mission	ib.	laid down by Sokratès . . .	224
His Dæmon or Genius—other		He confines study of human	
inspirations	215		

CHAPTER LXVIII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
affairs, as distinguished from divine—to man and society	226	out science, belonged at that time to astronomy and physics, as well as to the subjects of man and society—it is now confined to the latter	243
Importance of the innovation—multitude of new and accessible phenomena brought under discussion	227	Sokratēs first lays down the idea of ethical science, comprising the appropriate ethical end with theory and precepts	244
Innovations of Sokratēs as to method—dialectic method—inductive discourses—definitions	228	Earnestness with which Sokratēs inculcated self-examination—effect of his conversation upon other	247
Commencement of analytical consciousness of the mental operations—genera and species	229	Preceptorial and positive exhortation of Sokratēs chiefly brought out by Xenophon	250
Sokratēs compared with previous philosophers	231	This was not the peculiarity of Sokratēs—his powerful method of stirring up the analytical faculties	251
Great step made by Sokratēs in laying the foundation of formal logic, afterwards expanded by Plato, and systematised by Aristotle	233	Negative and indirect scrutiny of Sokratēs produced strong thirst, and active efforts for the attainment of positive truth	252
Dialectical process employed by Sokratēs—essential connexion between method and subject	234	Inductive process of scrutiny, and Baconian spirit of Sokratēs	253
Essential connection also between the dialectic process and the logical distribution of subject-matter—One in Many and Many in One	236	Socratic method tends to create minds capable of forming conclusions for themselves—not to plant conclusions ready-made	257
Persuasion of religious mission in Sokratēs, prompting him to extend his colloquial cross-examination to noted men	237	Grecian dialectics—their many-sided handling of subjects—force of the negative arm	<i>ib.</i>
His cross-examining purpose was not confined to noted men, but of universal application	238	The subjects to which they were applied—man and society—essentially required such handling—reason why	258
Leading ideas which directed the scrutiny of Sokratēs—contrast between the special professions and the general duties of social life	239	Real distinction and variance between Sokratēs and the Sophists	260
Platonic dialogues—discussion whether virtue is teachable	240	Prodigious efficacy of Sokratēs in forming new philosophical minds	261
Conceit of knowledge without real knowledge—universal prevalence of it	241	General theory of Sokratēs on	
Such confident persuasion, with-			

CHAPTER LXVIII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
ethics—he resolved virtue into knowledge or wisdom	262	fective point of the Sokratic Ethical theory	279
This doctrine defective as stating a part for the whole	263	His political strictures . . .	ib.
He was led to this general doctrine by the analogy of special professions	264	The verdict against Sokratēs was brought upon him partly by his own concurrence . .	280
Constant reference of Sokratēs to duties of practice and detail	265	Small majority by which he was condemned	281
The derivative reasonings of Sokratēs were of larger range than his general doctrine . .	266	Sokratēs defended himself like one who did not care to be acquitted	282
Political opinions of Sokratēs	267	The 'Platonic Apology' . . .	283
Long period during which So- kratēs exercised his vocation as a public converser	268	Sentiment of Sokratēs about death	285
Accusation against him by Me- lētus, Anytus, and Lykon . .	269	Effect of his defence upon the Dikasts	286
The real ground for surprise is, that that accusation had not been preferred before . .	ib.	Assertion of Xenophon that Sokratēs might have been acquitted if he had chosen it	287
Inevitable unpopularity incur- red by Sokratēs in his mission	270	The sentence—how passed in Athenian procedure	289
It was only from the general toleration of the Athenian democracy and population, that he was allowed to go on so long	ib.	Sokratēs is called upon to pro- pose some counter-penalty against himself—his behavi- our	ib.
Particular circumstances which brought on the trial of So- kratēs	271	Aggravation of feeling in the Dikasts against him in con- sequence of his behaviour . .	290
Private offence of Anytus . .	272	Sentence of death—resolute ad- herence of Sokratēs to his own convictions	291
Unpopularity arising to Sokra- tēs from his connexion with Kritias and Alkibiadēs . . .	273	Satisfaction of Sokratēs with the sentence, on deliberate conviction	ib.
Enmity of the poets and rhetors to Sokratēs	275	Sokratēs in prison for thirty days—he refuses to accept the means of escape—his serene death	292
Indictment—grounds of the ac- cusers—effect of the 'Clouds' of Aristophanēs, in creating prejudice against Sokratēs . .	ib.	Originality of Sokratēs . . .	293
Accusation of corruption in teaching was partly founded on political grounds	276	Views taken of Sokratēs as a moral preacher and as a scep- tic—the first inadequate—the second incorrect	294
Perversion of the poets alleged against him	277	Sokratēs, positive and practical in his end—negative only in his means	297
Remarks of Xenophon upon these accusations	278	Two points on which Sokratēs is systematically negative . .	ib.
The charges touch upon the de-			

CHAPTER LXVIII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Method of Sokratēs, of universal application	298	ment recognised generally in ancient times	299
Condemnation of Sokratēs—one of the misdeeds of intolerance	ib.	Number of personal enemies made by Sokratēs	300
Extenuating circumstances—principle of orthodox enforce-		His condemnation brought on by himself	ib.
		The Athenians did not repent it	302

CHAPTER LXIX.

CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

Spartan empire	303	Ikonium—Lykaonia—Tyana	321
March of the Ten Thousand Greeks	ib.	Pass over Taurus into Kilikia	322
Persian kings—Xerxes—Artaxerxes Longimanus	304	Syennesis of Kilikia—his duplicity—he assists Cyrus with money	323
Darius Nothus	305	Cyrus at Tarsus—mutiny of the Greeks—their refusal to go farther	ib.
Cyrus the younger in Ionia—his vigorous operations against Athens	306	Klearchus tries to suppress the mutiny by severity—he fails	324
Youth and education of Cyrus	ib.	He tries persuasion—his discourse to the soldiers	325
His esteem for the Greeks—his hopes of the crown	307	His refusal to march farther—well received	ib.
Death of Darius Nothus—succession of Artaxerxes Mnemon	308	Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the soldiers round to Cyrus	ib.
Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking his brother	309	The soldiers agree to accompany Cyrus farther—increase of pay	327
Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of Cyrus	310	March onward—from Tarsus to Issus	ib.
Strict administration, and prudent behaviour, of Cyrus	311	Flight of Abrokomas—abandonment of the passes	328
Cyrus collects his army at Sardis	312	Gates of Kilikia and Syria	ib.
The Ten Thousand Greeks—their position and circumstances	313	Desertion of Xenias and Pasion—prudence of Cyrus	329
Xenophon	314	Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the Euphratēs	330
How Xenophon came to join the Cyrelian army	ib.	Practical reluctance of the army—they ford the Euphratēs	331
Cyrus marches from Sardis—Kolossæ—Kelenæ	316	Separate manœuvre of Menon	332
Peltæ—Keramôn—Agora, Kaystru—Pedion	318	Abrokomas abandons the defence of the river—his double dealing	ib.
Distress of Cyrus for money—Epyaxa supplies him	319	Cyrus marches along the left	
Thymbrium—Tyræum—review of the Greeks by Cyrus	320		

CHAPTER LXIX.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
bank of the Euphratès—the Desert—privations of the army	333	Kunaxa—sudden appearance of the King's army—preparation of Cyrus for battle	343
Pylæ—Charmandê—dangerous dispute between the soldiers of Klearchus and those of Menon	336	Last orders of Cyrus	345
Entry into Babylonia—treason of Orontès—preparation for battle	337	Battle of Kunaxa—easy victory of the Greeks on their side	346
Discourse of Cyrus to his officers and soldiers	338	Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother—Cyrus is slain . .	347
Conception formed by Cyrus of Grecian superiority	340	Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus	348
Present of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus	341	Plunder of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxès. Victorious attitude of the Greeks . . .	349
Cyrus passes the undefended trench	343	Character of Cyrus	350
		If Cyrus had succeeded, he would have been the most formidable enemy to Greece	352

CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus offers the throne to Ariæus	353	Visit of Tissaphernès—negotiations	361
Artaxerxès summons the Greeks to surrender—their reply—language of Phalinos . . .	354	Convention concluded with Tissaphernès, who engages to conduct the Greeks home . .	362
Ariæus refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him for retreat	355	Motives of the Persians—favourable dispositions of Parysatis towards Cyrus . . .	356
The Greeks rejoin Ariæus—interchange of oaths—resolution to retreat together . . .	356	Long halt of the Greeks—their quarrel with Ariæus . . .	363
Position of the Greeks—to all appearance hopeless . . .	357	Secret despair of Klearchus . .	364
Commencement of the retreat, along with Ariæus—disorder of the army	358	Retreating march begun, under Tissaphernès—they enter within the Wall of Media—march to Sittakê	359
Heralds from the Persians to treat about a truce . . .	359	Alarm and suspicion of the Greeks—they cross the Tigris	366
The heralds conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with provisions. March over the canals	360	Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris—to the Great Zab	370
Abundant supplies obtained in the villages	361	Suspensions between the Greeks and Tissaphernès	371
		Klearchus converses with Tissaphernès—and is talked over	372
		Klearchus, with the other	

CHAPTER LXX.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Grecian generals, visit Tissaphernès in his tent	373	resume their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry	390
Tissaphernès seizes the Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court, and there put to death <i>ib.</i>		Sufferings of the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful precautions taken	391
Menon is reserved to perish in torture—sentiments of Queen Parysatis	374	Tissaphernès renews the attack, with some effect	392
How Klearchus came to be imposed upon	<i>ib.</i>	Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward	393
Plans of Tissaphernès—impotence and timidity of the Persians	376	Victory of the Greeks—prowess of Xenophon	395
The Persians summon the Grecian army to surrender	378	The Greeks embarrassed as to their route—impossibility either of following the Tigris farther, or of crossing it	396
Indignant refusal of the Greeks—distress and despair prevalent among them	<i>ib.</i>	They strike into the mountains of the Karduchians	397
First appearance of Xenophon—his dream	379	They burn much of their baggage—their sufferings from the activity and energy of the Karduchians	<i>ib.</i>
He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and appoint new officers	380	Extreme danger of their situation	398
Address of Xenophon to the officers. New generals are named, Xenophon being one	381	Xenophon finds out another road to turn the enemy's position	399
The army is convened in general assembly—speech of Xenophon	382	The Karduchians are defeated and the road cleared	<i>ib.</i>
Favourable augury from a man sneezing	383	Danger of Xenophon with the rear division and baggage	400
Encouraging topics insisted on by Xenophon	<i>ib.</i>	Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the slain	401
Great impression produced by his speech—the army confirm the new generals proposed	385	They reach the river Kentritès, the northern boundary of Karduchia	<i>ib.</i>
Great ascendancy acquired over the army at once by Xenophon—qualities whereby he obtained it	<i>ib.</i>	Difficulties of passing the Kentritès—dream of Xenophon	<i>ib.</i>
Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like resource and bravery	387	They discover a ford and pass the river	402
Approach of the Persian Mithridatès—the Greeks refuse all parley	389	Xenophon with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his passage	403
The Greeks cross the Zab and		March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe cold	404
		They ford the Eastern Euphratès or Murad	405

CHAPTER LXX.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Distressing marches—extreme misery from cold and hunger	<i>ib.</i>	bravest fighters whom they had yet seen—the Skythini	<i>ib.</i>
Rest in good quarters—subterranean villages well stocked with provisions	406	They reach the flourishing city of Gymnias	412
After a week's rest, they march onward—their guide runs away	408	First sight of the sea from the mountain-top Théchés—extreme delight of the soldiers	<i>ib.</i>
They reach a difficult pass occupied by the Chalybes—rallies exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus about stealing	<i>ib.</i>	Passage through the Makrónes	413
They turn the pass by a flank-march, and force their way over the mountain	410	Through the Kolchians—who oppose them and are defeated	414
March through the country of the Taochi—exhaustion of provisions—capture of a hill-fort	411	Kolchian villages—unwholesome honey	<i>ib.</i>
Through the Chalybes, the		Arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond)	415
		Joy of the Greeks—their discharge of vows to the Gods—their festivals and games	<i>ib.</i>
		Appendix on the Geography of the Retreat, between the Tigris and the Karduchian Mountains	417

CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

Greek cities on the Euxine—Sinôpe with her colonies Kerasus, Kotyôra, and Trapezus	422	Adopted by the army—their intense repugnance to further marching	427
Indigenous inhabitants—their relations with the Greek colonists	423	Measures for procuring transports. Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchians and the Drilæ	<i>ib.</i>
Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine when the Ten Thousand descended among them	424	The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along the coast to Kerasus	425
Uncertainty and danger of what they might do	<i>ib.</i>	Acts of disorder and outrage committed by various soldiers near Kerasus	<i>ib.</i>
Plans of the army—Cheirisophus is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them	425	March to Kotyôra—hostilities with the Mosynœki	429
Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during his absence	426	Long halt at Kotyôra—remonstrance from the Sinopians	430
		Speech of Hekatonymus of	

CHAPTER LXXI.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Sinôpè to the army—reply of Xenophon	430	captains. Satisfaction of the army with Xenophon	442
Success of the reply—good understanding established with Sinôpè	431	Manner in which discipline was upheld by the officers	443
Consultation of the army with Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea	ib.	Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory . .	444
Envoys sent by the army to Sinôpè to procure vessels . .	432	Improved feeling of the army—peace with the Paphlagonian Korylas	445
Poverty and increasing disorganization of the army	433	The army pass by sea to Sinôpè .	446
Ideas of Xenophon about founding a new city in the Euxine, with the army . . .	ib.	Return of Cheirisophus—resolution of the army to elect a single general—they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines—Cheirisophus is chosen . . .	ib.
Sacrifice of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods—treachery of the prophet Silanus	434	The army pass by sea to Herakleia—they wish to extort money from the Herakleots—opposition of Cheirisophus and Xenophon	447
Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies against Xenophon—general assembly of the army	435	Dissatisfaction of the army—they divide in three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division under Cheirisophus. 3. A division under Xenophon	448
Accusations against Xenophon—his speech in defence . .	436	Arcadian division start first and act for themselves—they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon—the army reunited at Kalpè—old board of generals re-elected, with Neon in place of Cheirisophus	449
He carries the soldiers with him—discontent and flight of Silanus	437	Distress for provisions at Kalpè—unwillingness to move in the face of unfavourable sacrifices—ultimate victory over the troops of the country . .	ib.
Fresh manœuvres of Timasion—fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon—renewed discontent of the army . . .	ib.	Halt at Kalpè—comfortable quarters—idea that they were about to settle there as a colony	450
Xenophon convenes the assembly again	438	Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium, together with Dexippus . . .	451
His address in defence of himself	439	Disorder in the army: mutiny	
His remonstrance against the disorders in the army	ib.		
Vote of the army unanimously favourable to Xenophon—disapproving the disorders and directing trial	441		
Xenophon's appeal to universal suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of his appeal	ib.		
Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before a tribunal formed of the lochages or			

CHAPTER LXXI.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
against Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus ..	451	all within it—conduct of Xenophon ..	460
Indignation and threats of Kleander—Xenophon persuades the army to submit—fear of Sparta ..	452	Xenophon musters the soldiers in military order and harangues them ..	461
Satisfaction given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with the mutinous soldiers ..	453	Xenophon calms the army, and persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town—message sent by them to Anaxibius—they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Kœratadas as their commander ..	462
Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is completely soothed ..	454	Remarkable effect produced by Xenophon—evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind to persuasive influences ..	463
Kleander takes, the command, expressing the upmost friendship both towards the army and towards Xenophon ..	ib.	Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Kœratadas is dismissed from the command ..	465
Unfavourable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the command and sail away ..	455	Dissension among the commanders left ..	ib.
March of the army across the country from Kalpé to Chalkédon ..	ib.	Distress of the army—Aristarchus arrives from Sparta to supersede Kleander—Polus on his way to supersede Anaxibius ..	466
Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across the Bosphorus into Europe—false promises of Anaxibius to the army ..	456	Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia ..	467
Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home—first proposition addressed to him by Seuthês of Thrace ..	ib.	Aristarchus hinders the crossing—his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzantium ..	ib.
The army cross over to Byzantium—fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out of the town ..	ib.	His treacherous scheme for entrapping Xenophon ..	469
Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were going out of the gates ..	457	Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of the army—he opens negotiations with Seuthês ..	ib.
Wrath and mutiny of the soldiers, in going away—they rush again into the gates, and muster within the town ..	458	Position of Seuthês—his liberal offers to the army ..	470
Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town ..	459	Xenophon introduces him to the army, who accept the offers ..	ib.
The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium—danger of		Service of the army with	

CHAPTER LXXI.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Southês, who cheats them of most of their pay	471	The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron—Xenophon leaves the army, depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus	477
The army suspect the probity of Xenophon—unjust calumnies against him—he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their confidence . .	ib.	His subsequent return to Asia, to take command of the Cyreians as a part of the Lacedæmonian army	ib.
Change of interest in the Lacedæmonians, who become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in order to make war against the satraps	472	Xenophon in the Spartan service, with Agesilaus against Athens—he is banished . .	478
Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia—his poverty—he is advised to sacrifice to Zeus Mellichios—beneficial effects	473	He settles at Skillus near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis . . .	479
He conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus . .	474	Charms of the residence—good hunting—annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon . .	ib.
His unsuccessful attempt to surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidatês	475	Later life of Xenophon—expelled from Skillus after the battle of Leuktra—afterwards restored at Athens	480
In a second attempt he captures Asidatês—valuable booty secured	476	Great impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousand upon the Greek mind	482
General sympathy expressed for Xenophon—large share personally allotted to him	ib.		



HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

THE victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement is open to much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made.¹ Great as the victory was, we look in

B.C. 406.
Alleged propositions of peace from Sparta to Athens—doubtful.

¹ The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the *Ranæ* of Aristophanes. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 406) says that Æschinès (*De Fals. Legat.* p. 38. c. 24) mentions the overtures of peace—I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it we may observe—

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something though far from being conclusive when stand-

ing alone.

2. Diodorus does not mention it.

3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, viz.—

To evacuate Dekeleia—and each party to stand as they were. Not only the terms are the same—but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same—*Kleophon*. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus.

vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by labouring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw or reed. Informed of the design, Eteonikus was at the same time intimidated by the number of these straw-bearers: he saw that if he dealt with the conspirators openly and ostensibly, they might perhaps rush to arms and succeed in plundering the town: at any rate a conflict would arise in which many of the allies would be slain, which would produce the worst effect upon all future operations. Accordingly, resorting to stratagem, he took with him a guard of fifteen men armed with daggers, and marched through the town of Chios. Meeting presently one of these straw-bearers—a man with a complaint in his eyes, coming out of a surgeon's house—he directed his guards to put the man to death on the spot. A crowd gathered round, with astonishment as well as sympathy, and inquired on what ground the man was put to death;

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are left unnoticed by Xenophon—appears to me highly improbable. In reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgement, the silence of Xenophon; but here Diodorus is

silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by far the more decisive of the two.

upon which Eteonikus ordered his guards to reply, that it was because he wore a straw. The news being diffused, the remaining persons who wore straws became so alarmed as to throw their straws away.¹

Eteonikus availed himself of such panic to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away his starving and perilous armament. Having obtained from them a month's pay, he immediately put the troops on ship-board, taking pains to encourage them and make them fancy that he was unacquainted with the recent conspiracy.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the Ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time as admiral. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless the Ephors complied with the request substantially; sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Solicitations from Chios and elsewhere that Lysander should be sent out again.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigour to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The partisans in the various allied cities, whose favour he had assiduously cultivated during his last year's command—the clubs and factious combinations which he had organized and stimulated into a partnership of mutual ambition—all hailed his return with exultation.

B.C. 405.

Arrival of Lysander at Ephesus—zeal of his partisans—Cyrus.

Discountenanced and kept down by the generous patriotism of his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The young prince said in reply that all the funds which he had received from Susa had already been expended, with much more besides; in testimony of which he exhibited a specification of the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 1—4.

sums furnished to each Peloponnesian officer. Nevertheless such was his partiality for Lysander, that he complied even with the additional demand now made, so as to send him away satisfied. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen—constituted new trierarchs—summoned Eteonikus with the fleet from Chios together with all the other scattered squadron—and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.¹

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander's second advent felt more violently than at Milêtus. He had there a powerful faction or association of friends, who had done their best to hamper and annoy Kallikratidas on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal, by the straightforward resolution of that noble-minded admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined (if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited) to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we cannot believe that there could have existed a democracy at Milêtus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents—and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent himself to the scheme—fanned the ambition of the conspirators, who were at one time disposed to a compromise—and even betrayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government—confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating, the insurgents—made but a faint resistance. The three

Violent revolution at Milêtus by the partisans of Lysander.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 10—12.

hundred and forty leaders thus seized, probably men who had gone heartily along with Kallikratidas, were all put to death; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than 1000, fled into exile. Milêtus thus passed completely into the hands of the friends and partisans of Lysander.¹

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milêtus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia; placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendancy among the allies, Lysander received a summons from Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was both old and dangerously ill in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, with which he had only recently contracted acquaintance—and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, attested as it had been by the conduct of the latter in the first visit and banquet at Sardis—Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee. At the same time that he handed over all his tributes and his reserved funds to Lysander, he assured him of his steady friendship both towards himself and towards the Lacedæmonians; and concluded by entreating that he would by no means engage in any general action with the Athenians, unless at great advantage in point of numbers. The defeat of Arginusæ having strengthened his preference for this dilatory policy, he promised that not only the Persian treasures but also the Phenician fleet, should be brought into active employment for the purpose of crushing Athens.²

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendant factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the

Cyrus goes to visit his dying father—confides his tributes to Lysander.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 104; Plutarch, Lysander. c. 8.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 14; Plutarch, Lysander. c. 9.

commencement of the war. Having his fleet well-paid, he could keep it united and direct it whither he chose without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos: for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon—together with Philoklēs and Adeimantus; to whom were added, during the spring of 405 B.C., three generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Theramēnēs also was put up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the *Dokimasy*.¹ The fleet comprised 180 triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander; to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus—stormed and plundered a semi-Hellenic town in the Kerameikan Gulf, named Kedreïæ, which was in alliance with Athens—and thence proceeded to Rhodes.² He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast.³ The Athenians were preparing to follow him thither when they learnt that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, occupied by Thorax as harmost with a land-force; and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighbouring town of Lampsakus, which was taken by storm. It was wealthy in every way, and abundantly stocked with bread and wine,

¹ Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 15, 16.

³ This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of

Attica and Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii. 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9).

so that the soldiers obtained a large booty; but Lysander left the free inhabitants untouched.¹

The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hellespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Both fleets
at the Hel-
lespont.

Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were partly inactive, partly behindhand with Lysander, throughout all this summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, sailing out on the sea-side of Chios and Lesbos, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elæus, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of 180 triremes, just in time to hear, while at their morning meal, that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus; upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up—to a place called Ægospotami.²

Ægospotami or Goat's River—a name of fatal sound to all subsequent Athenians—was a place which had nothing to recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. Athenian
fleet
at Ægos-
potami. It was an open beach, without harbour, without good anchorage, without either houses or inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly inconvenient and dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; for the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was at Lampsakus in a harbour, with a well-furnished town in his rear and a land-force to cooperate, had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 18, 19; sand. c. 9.

Diodor. xiii. 101; Plutarch, Ly- ² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 20, 21.

their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned,—the men having already taken their morning meal,—and ranged in perfect order of battle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend assistance; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, yet unable to draw him out by manœuvring all the day, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami. But Lysander directed a few swift sailing vessels to follow them, nor would he suffer his own men to disembark until he thus ascertained that their seamen had actually dispersed ashore.¹

For four successive days this same scene was repeated; the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadēs—who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing—rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore; urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, where they would be both close to their own supplies and safe from attack, as Lysander was at Lampsakus—and from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he.² Continuing thus in their exposed position, the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more and more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 22-24; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 40; Diodor. xiii. 105.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 25; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii. 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 8) represent Alkibiadēs as wishing to be re-admitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch

(Alkib. c. 37) alludes also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadēs.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadēs should have talked of anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander's fleet?

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

back to their own shore. At length, on the fifth day, Lysander ordered the scout ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami, while Thorax marched along the strand with the land-force in case of need. Nothing could be more complete or decisive than the surprise of the Athenian fleet. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. Out of all the total of 180, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation;¹ the trireme of Konon himself, together with a squadron of seven under his immediate orders—and the consecrated ship called *Paralus*, always manned by picked Athenian seamen, being among them. It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance. The attempt was desperate, and the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve, including the *Paralus*. All the remaining triremes nearly 170 in number, were captured by Lysander on the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighbouring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man.²

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander—which must have been very great, since the total crews of 180 triremes were not less than 36,000 men³—we hear only of 3000 or 4000 native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian

Capture of the Athenian commanders, all except Konon.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 29; Lysias, Orat. xxi. (Ἀπολ. Δωρεδ.) s. 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 28; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 8; Polyæn. i. 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii. 106) gives a different representation of this important military operation; far less clear and trustworthy than that of Xenophon.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 28. τὰς

generals Philoklēs and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which however surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else; for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that it would be the sooner starved out. Konon too was well-aware that to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in a doomed city; and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow-citizens, so well-deserved by the generals collectively. Accordingly he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Cyprus, sending the Paralus with some others of the twelve fugitive triremes to make known the fatal news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait—with singular daring under the circumstances—to Cape Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander's triremes (always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting) lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy's powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus.¹

On the very day of the victory, Lysander sent off the Milesian privateer Theopompus to proclaim it at Sparta, who, by a wonderful speed of rowing, arrived there and made it known on the third day after starting. The captured ships were towed off, and the prisoners carried across, to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine in what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly the most bitter inculpations were put forth against the Athenians, as to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklēs, having captured a Corinthian and an Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurling them headlong from a precipice. It was not difficult, in Grecian warfare, for each of the belligerents to cite precedents of cruelty against the

δ' ἄλλας πάσας (ναῦς) Λύσανδρος
ἔλαβε πρὸς τῇ γῇ τοὺς δὲ πλείστους
ἀνδρας ἐν τῇ γῇ ξυνέλεξεν οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἔφυγον εἰς τὰ τευχύδια.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 29;
Diodor. xiii. 106: the latter is dis-
cordant, however, on many points.

other. In this debate some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had deliberated what they should do with their prisoners, in case they had been victorious at Ægospotami; and that they had determined—chiefly on the motion of Philoklès, but in spite of the opposition of Adeimantus—that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. Whatever opinion Philoklès may have expressed personally, it is highly improbable that any such determination was ever taken by the Athenians.¹ In this assembly of the allies, however, besides all that could be said against Athens with truth, doubtless the most extravagant falsehoods found ready credence. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Ægospotami, 3000 or 4000 in number, were massacred forthwith—Philoklès himself at their head.² The latter, taunted by Lysander with his cruel execution of the Corinthian and Andrian crews, disdained to return any answer, but placed himself in conspicuous vestments at the head of the prisoners led out to execution. If we may believe Pausanias, even the bodies of the prisoners were left unburied.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for the general belief afterwards—not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also—held that the Athenian fleet had been sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of such a suspicion both Konon and Philoklès stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him.³ Konon even preferred an accusation

The Athenian fleet supposed to have been betrayed by its own commanders.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 31. This story is given with variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9, and by Cicero de Offic. iii. 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off—and the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to the Æginetans.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 32; Pausan. ix. 32, 6; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 32; Lysias cent. Alkib. A. s. 38; Pausan. iv. 17, 2; x. 9, 5; Isokratès ad Philipp. Or. v. sect. 70. Lysias, in his *Λόγος*

Ἐντάφιος (s. 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty. We cannot make out distinctly how many of the Athenian generals were captured at Ægospotami.

Cornelius Nepos (Lysand. c. 1; Alcib. c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii. 105).

Both these authors seem to have

against Adeimantus to this effect,¹ probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards, when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 B.C., conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander, master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting one or more of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

The great defeat of *Ægospotami* took place about September 405 B.C. It was made known at *Peiræus* by the *Paralus*, which arrived there during the night, coming straight from the *Hellespont*. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The terrible disaster in Sicily had become known to the people by degrees, without any authorized reporter; but here was the official messenger, fresh from the scene, leaving no room to question the magnitude of the disaster or the irreparable ruin impending over the city. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in *Peiræus*, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up the city. "On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate with which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the *Æginetans*, *Melians*, *Skionæans*, and others." After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of the three ports.¹ For

B.C. 405,
Sept.
Distress
and agony
at Athens
when the
defeat of
Ægospotami
was
made
known
there.

copied from Theopompus, in describing the battle of *Ægospotami*. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (*Theopomp. Fragm. 2*, ed. Didot).

¹ Demosthen. de Fals. Legat. p. 401. c. 57.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 3; Diodor. xiii. 107.

Athens thus to renounce her maritime action, the pride and glory of the city ever since the battle of Salamis—and to confine herself to a defensive attitude within her own wall—was a humiliation which left nothing worse to be endured except actual famine and surrender.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited; the more limited, the greater the numbers accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else.¹ His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkêdon and Byzantium, where he placed the Lacedæmonian Sthenelaus as harmost with a garrison. Next he passed to Lesbos, where he made similar arrangements at Mitylênê and other cities. In them, as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring and unscrupulous partisans, and called a Dekarchy, or Dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens to introduce similar changes. In Thasus, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed: there was a numerous philo-Athenian party whom Lysander caused to be allured out of their place of concealment into the temple of Heraklê's, under the false assurance of an amnesty; when assembled under this pledge, they were all put to death.² Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself, together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new dekarchies, signalized everywhere the substitution of Spartan for Athenian ascendancy.³ But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 2; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

² Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i. 45, 4. It would appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand. c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasians, were the parties suffering.

It cannot well be the Milesians, however—if we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch's Life of Lysander.

³ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλὰς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, &c.

party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander's entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos they still held out: the people had too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled in the insurrection of 412 B.C., to yield without a farther struggle.¹ With this single reserve, every city in alliance or dependence upon Athens submitted without resistance both to the supremacy and the subversive measures of the Lacedæmonian admiral.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful—all her Kleruchs or out-citizens whom she had formerly planted in Ægina, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home.² The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasus, Byzantium, and other dependent cities,³ were forced to abandon their homes in the like state of destitution, and

Miserable condition of the Athenian Kleruchs and of the friends of Athens in the allied dependencies. sufferings in Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 6. εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς ἀφειστήκει Ἀθηναίων, πλὴν Σαμίων· οὗτοι δὲ, σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

I interpret the words σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες to refer to the violent revolution at Samos described in Thucyd. viii. 21—whereby the oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical government established. The word σφαγὰς is used by Xenophon (Hellen. v. 4, 14) in a subsequent passage to describe the conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the preterite participle πεποιήκοτες than the aorist ποιήσαντες. But this employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is not uncommon with Xenophon: see κατηγορήσας, δόξας—i. 1, 31; γενομένου—i. 7, 11; ii. 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should have chosen this occasion to make a massacre of their oligarchical

citizens, as Mr. Mitford represents. The democratical Samians must have been now humbled and intimidated, seeing their subjugation approaching; and only determined to hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised through the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did when he had them substantially in his power (ii. 3, 6), if they had now committed any fresh political massacre.

² Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 8, 1; ii. 10, 4; Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 31. Compare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24. p. 491.

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 8, 5).

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14. p. 474.

to seek shelter at Athens. Everything thus contributed to aggravate the impoverishment, and the manifold suffering, physical as well as moral within her walls. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared as best they could for an honourable resistance.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. Accordingly Patrokleidês—having first obtained special permission from the people, without which it would have been unconstitutional to make any proposition for abrogating sentences judicially passed, or releasing debtors regularly inscribed in the public registers—submitted a decree such as had never been mooted since the period when Athens was in a condition equally desperate, during the advancing march of Xerxes. All debtors to the state, either recent or of long standing—all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office—all persons who were liquidating by instalment debts due to the public, or had given bail for sums thus owing—all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disqualification or disability—nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties—all these persons were pardoned and released; every register of the penalty or condemnation being directed to be destroyed. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted—Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their trial—Those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under

Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of ἀτιμία, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.

severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes.¹

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty and forgiveness adopted by the people in this decree of Patrokleidēs, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis.² The reconciliation thus introduced enabled them the better to bear up under their distress;³ especially as the persons relieved by the amnesty were for the most part not men politically disaffected, like the exiles. To restore the latter, was a measure which no one thought of: indeed a large proportion of them had been and were still at Dekeleia, assisting the Lacedæmonians in their warfare against Athens.⁴ But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty—that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia: she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami, nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peiræus supplied,⁵ in spite of the menacing prohibitions of Lysander, preceding his arrival to block it up effectually; but to accumulate any stock for a siege was utterly impossible.

¹ This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidēs is given at length in the Oration of Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 76—80—"Α δ' εἰρηται ἐξαλειφαι, μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἰδίᾳ μηδὲν εἶναι, μηδὲ μνησιμαχῆσαι μηδέποτε.

² Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πιστὴν ἀλλήλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας δοῦναι ἐν ἀκροπόλει.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιήσαντες ἐκάρτερον.

⁴ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 80—101; Lysias, Orat. xviii. De Bonis Nipis Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the severe condemnatory decree had been passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia—we do not know. The decree is mentioned by Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. sect. 122, 123. p. 164.

⁵ Isokratēs adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71: compare Andokidēs de Reditu suo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogeiton. Or. xxxii. sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens.

At length, about November 405 B.C., Lysander reached the Saronic Gulf, having sent intimation beforehand both to Agis and to the Lacedæmonians that he was approaching with a fleet of 200 triremes. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under King Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped in the precinct of Akadêmus, at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of 150 sail,—next, ravaging Salamis,—blocked up completely the harbour of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed; and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.¹

Arrival of Lysander. Athens is blocked up by sea and land.

Though all hope had now fled, the pride, the resolution, and the despair of Athens, still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger that they sent propositions to entreat peace. Even then their propositions were not without dignity. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbour of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the Ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the Ephors, not deigning even to admit the envoys to an interview, sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible—and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. With this gloomy reply the envoys returned. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the senate and people would not consent even to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A senator named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in custody, and a general vote was passed,² on the proposition of Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

Resolute holding-out of the Athenians—their propositions for capitulating are refused.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 9; Diodor. xiii. 107.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 12—15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 10—12.

Such a vote demonstrates the courageous patience both of the senate and the people; but unhappily it supplied no improved prospects, while the suffering within the walls continued to become more and more aggravated. Under these circumstances, Theramenês offered to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the Ephors was in regard to Athens,—whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them as slaves. He pretended farther to possess personal influence, founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such as would very probably ensure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate of Areopagus and others; yet with no express powers to conclude, but simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander, who (he alleged) had detained him thus long, and had only acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that no one but the Ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenês, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of his departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer.¹

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last moments of imperial Athens. We find only an heroic endurance displayed, to such a point that numbers actually died of starvation, without any offer to surrender on humiliating conditions.² Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for pro-

Misery
and famine
in Athens—
death of
Kleophon.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 12; Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Erastosthen. sect. 65—71.

See an illustration of the great

suffering during the siege, in Xenophon, Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 15—21: compare Isokratês, Areopagit. Or. vii. sect. 73.

longed resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the senate, whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the *Dikastery* which tried him—contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures.¹ Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

By the time that Theramenês returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the Ephors that he brought with him unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, which would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been for the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves; who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a

The famine becomes intolerable—Theramênês is sent to obtain peace on any terms—debate about the terms at Sparta.

¹ Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agor. rat. sect. 15, 16, 37; Orat. xxx. cont. Nikomach. sect. 13—17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i. 7, 35), is not to be reconciled with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (στάσις τινος γενομένης ἐν τῇ Κλεοφῶν ἀπέθανε), before the flight of

Kallixenus from his recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering between the battle of Egospotami and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison, before trial—nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognizance—were at all in Athenian habits.

city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians.¹

Peace is granted by Sparta, against the general sentiment of the allies. Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens, as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power, to Sparta apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: That the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed: That the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory: That they should surrender all their ships of war: That they should readmit all their exiles: That they should become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognising the same enemies and friends.²

With this document, written according to Lacedæmonian practice on a Skytalê (or roll intended to go round a stick, of which the Lacedæmonian commander had always one, and the Ephors another, corresponding), Theramenês went back to Athens. As he entered the city, a miserable crowd flocked round him, in distress and terror

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 19; vi. 5, 35—46; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the Boeotian contingent serving under Lysander at Ægospotami, honoured in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x. 9, 4).

It is one of the exaggerations frequent with Isokratês, to serve a present purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the only parties among all the Peloponnesian confederates, who gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratês, Orat. Plataia. Or. xiv. sect.

Demosthenês says that the Phokians gave their vote in the same synod against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fals. Legat. c. 22. p. 361).

It seems from Diodor. xv. 63, and Polyæn. i. 45, 5, as well as from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor. xiii. 107. Plutarch gives the express words of the Lacedæmonian decree, some of which words are very perplexing. The conjecture of G. Hermann—αὶ χρεῖδους instead of ἀ χρεῖ δόους—has been adopted into the text of Plutarch by Sintenis, though it seems very uncertain.

lest he should have failed altogether in his mission. The dead and the dying had now become so numerous, that peace at any price was a boon; nevertheless, when he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open—there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority however accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander.¹

It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion² (about the beginning of April) that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus—twenty-seven years (almost exactly) after that surprise of Plateæ by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appeared to have been serving with his army,³ and assisting him with their counsel. To the population of Athens generally, his entry was an immediate relief, in spite of the cruel degradation, or indeed political extinction, with which it was accompanied. At least it averted the sufferings and horrors of famine, and permitted a decent interment of the many unhappy victims who had already perished. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the Ephors in their Skytalê had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow.⁴ The unfinished ships in the dockyards were burnt, and the arsenals themselves ruined.⁵ To demolish

B.C. 404.
Lysander enters Athens—return of the exiles—demolition of the Long Walls—dismantling of Peiræus—fleet given up.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theramenes, who plainly ought not to be required to bear it: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. s. 12–20.

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. He says however that this was also the day on which the Athenians

gained the battle of Salamis. This is incorrect; that victory was gained in the month Boedromion.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 18.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 20–ii. 3, 8; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.

⁵ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 50. ἔτι δὲ τὰ τείχη ὡς κατεσάφη, καὶ αἱ νῆες τοῖς πολέμοις παρεδόθησαν, καὶ τὰ νηώρια καθήρηθη, &c.

the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, was however a work of some time; and a certain number of days were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancers crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Grecian freedom.¹ How many days were allowed for the humiliating duty imposed upon Athenian hands, of demolishing the elaborate, tutelary, and commanding works of their forefathers—we are not told. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore by strict construction forfeited their title to the peace granted.² The interval seems however to have been prolonged; probably considering that for the real labour, as well as the melancholy character, of the work to be done, too short a time had been allowed at first.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, and making such a breach as left Athens without any substantial means of resistance—did not remain to complete the work, but withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos, which still held out, leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled.³ After so long an endurance of extreme misery, doubtless the general population thought of little except relief from famine and its accompaniments, without any disposition to contend against the fiat of their conquerors. If some high-spirited men formed an exception to the pervading depression, and still kept up their courage against better days—there was at the same time a party of totally opposite character, to whom the prostrate condition of Athens was a source of revenge for the past,

The exiles and the oligarchical party in Athens—their triumphant behaviour and devotion to Lysander.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 23. Καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ' αὐλητριδῶν πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντας ἑκαίνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. sect. 75. p. 431 R; Plutarch, Lysand.

c. 15; Diodor. xiv. 3.

³ Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênâ in the acropolis—which is recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess.

See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Insc. Attic. Nos. 150-152. p. 235.

exultation for the present, and ambitious projects for the future. These were partly the remnant of that faction which had set up (seven years before) the oligarchy of Four Hundred—and still more, the exiles, including several members of the Four Hundred,¹ who now flocked in from all quarters. Many of them had been long serving at Dekeleia, and had formed a part of the force blockading Athens. These exiles now revisited the acropolis as conquerors, and saw with delight the full accomplishment of that foreign occupation at which many of them had aimed seven years before, when they constructed the fortress of Eetioneia, as a means of ensuring their own power. Though the conditions imposed extinguished at once the imperial character, the maritime power, the honour, and the independence of Athens, these men were as eager as Lysander to carry them all into execution; because the continuance of the Athenian democracy was now entirely at his mercy, and because his establishment of oligarchies in the other subdued cities plainly intimated what he would do in this great focus of Grecian democratical impulse.

Among these exiles were comprised Aristodemus and Aristotelês,—both seemingly persons of importance, the former having at one time been one of the Hellenotamiæ, the first financial office of the imperial democracy, and the latter an active member of the Four Hundred;² also Chariklês, who had been so distinguished for his violence in the investigation respecting the Hermæ—and another man, of whom we now for the first time obtain historical knowledge in detail—Kritias, son of Kallæschrus. He had been among the persons accused as having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ, and seems to have been for a long time important in the political, the literary, and the philosophical world of Athens. To all three, his abilities qualified him to do honour. Both his poetry, in the Solonian or moralising vein,—and his eloquence, published specimens of

Kritias and
other exiles
—past life
of Kritias.

¹ Lysias, Or. xiii. cont. Agorat. s. 80.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 18-ii. 3, 40; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. Vit. Lycurg. init.

M. E. Meier, in his Commentary on Lykurgus, construes this passage of Plutarch differently, so

that the person therein specified as exile would be, not Aristodemus, but the grandfather of Lykurgus. But I do not think this construction justified: see Meier, Comm. de Lycurg Vitâ, p. iv. (Halle, 1847). Respecting Chariklês, see Isokratês, Orat. xvi. De Bigis, s. 52.

which remained in the Augustan age,—were of no ordinary merit. His wealth was large, and his family among the most ancient and conspicuous in Athens: one of his ancestors had been friend and companion of the lawgiver Solon. He was himself maternal uncle of the philosopher Plato,¹ and had frequented the society of Sokratēs so much as to have his name intimately associated in the public mind with that remarkable man. We know neither the cause, nor even the date of his exile, except so far, as that he was not in banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred—and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ.² He had passed the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly, where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried on among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced, along with a leader named (or surnamed) Prometheus, what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly; arming the Penestæ or serfs against their masters.³ What the conduct and dispositions of Kritias had been before this period, we are unable to say. But he brought with him now, on returning from exile, not merely an unmeasured and unprincipled lust of power, but also a rancorous impulse towards spoliation and bloodshed⁴ which outran even his ambition, and ultimately ruined both his party and himself.

Of all these returning exiles, animated with mingled vengeance and ambition, Kritias was decidedly the leading man, like Antiphon among the Four Hundred; partly from his abilities, partly from the superior violence with which he carried out

¹ See Stallbaum's Preface to the *Charmidēs* of Plato, his note on the *Timæus* of Plato, p. 20, E, and the Scholia on the same passage.

Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues — *Protagoras*, *Charmidēs*, *Timæus*, and *Kritias* (the last, as it now exists, only a fragment) — not to mention the *Eryxias*.

The small remains of the elegiac poetry of Kritias are to be found in Schneidewin, *Delect. Poet. Græc.* p. 186 seq. Both Cicero (*De Orat.*

ii. 23, 93) and Dionys. Hal. (*Judic. de Lysiā*, c. 2. p. 454; *Jud. de Isæo*, p. 627) notice his historical compositions.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the *Hermæ*, as affirmed by Diognētus, see *Andokidēs de Mysteriis*, s. 47. He was first cousin of *Andokidēs* by the mother's side.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 3, 35.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 3, 35; *Memorab.* i. 2, 24.

⁴ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 2. *ἐναι δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν* (Kritias) *προπητῆς ἦν ἐν*

the common sentiment. At the present juncture, he and his fellow-exiles became the most important persons in the city, as enjoying most the friendship and confidence of the conquerors. But the oligarchical party at home were noway behind them, either in servility or in revolutionary fervour, and an understanding was soon established between the two. Probably the old faction of the Four Hundred, though put down, had never wholly died out. At any rate, the political Hetæries or clubs, out of which it was composed, still remained, prepared for fresh cooperation when a favourable moment should arrive; and the catastrophe of Ægospotami had made it plain to every one that such moment could not be far distant. Accordingly a large portion, if not the majority, of the senators, became ready to lend themselves to the destruction of the democracy, and only anxious to ensure places among the oligarchy in prospect: 'while the supple Theramenês—resuming his place as oligarchical leader, and abusing his mission as envoy to wear out the patience of his half-famished countrymen—had, during his three months' absence in the tent of Lysander, concerted arrangements with the exiles for future proceedings.'²

As soon as the city surrendered, and while the work of demolition was yet going on, the oligarchical party began to organise itself. The members of the political clubs again came together, and named a managing committee of Five, called Ephors in compliment to the Lacedæmonians, to direct the general proceedings of the party—to convene meetings when needful—to appoint subordinate managers for the various tribes—and to determine what propositions were to be submitted to the public assembly.³ Among these five Ephors were Kritias and Eratosthenês; probably Theramenês also.

τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποκτείναι, ἄτε καὶ φυγῶν
ὕπὸ τοῦ δήμου, &c.

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xlii.
s. 23. p. 132.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xlii.
s. 78. p. 128. Theramenês is described (in his subsequent defence) ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν κατέλθοιεν, &c.

The general narrative of Xenophon, meagre as it is, harmonises

with this.

³ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xlii.
s. 44. p. 124. 'Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, δημοκρατίας ἐτε οὐσας, ὅθεν τῆς στάσεως ἤρξαν, πάντες ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλούμενων ἑταίρων, συναγωγὰς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄρχοντες δὲ τῶν συνουσιῶν, ἐναντία δὲ τῇ ὑμετέρῃ κλήθει πρότερον.

oligarchical
leaders
named at
Athens.

But the oligarchical party, though thus organized and ascendant, with a compliant senate and a dispirited people, and with an auxiliary enemy actually in possession—still thought themselves not powerful enough to carry their intended changes without seizing the most resolute of the democratical leaders. Accordingly a citizen named Theokritus tendered an accusation to the senate against the general Strombichidēs, together with several others of the democratical generals and taxiarchs; supported by the deposition of a slave or lowborn man, named Agoratus. Although Nikias and several other citizens tried to prevail upon Agoratus to leave Athens, furnished him with the means of escape, and offered to go away with him themselves from Munychia until the political state of Athens should come into a more assured condition—yet he refused to retire, appeared before the senate, and accused the generals of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace; pretending to be himself their accomplice. Upon his information, given both before the senate and before an assembly at Munychia, the generals, the taxiarchs, and

¹ Lysias, cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 28. (p. 132)—s. 35. p. 133. Καὶ περιρμίσαντες δύο κλοῖα Μουνυχιάσιν, εἰδόντο αὐτοῦ (Ἀγοράτου) παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀπελθεῖν Ἀθήνηθεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔπασαν συνεπλευσεῖσθαι ἕως τὰ πρᾶγματα κατασταίῃ, &c.

Lysias represents the accusation of the generals, and this behaviour of Agoratus, as having occurred *before* the surrender of the city, but *after* the return of Theramenes bringing back the final terms imposed by the Lacedæmonians. He thus so colours it, that Agoratus, by getting the generals out of the way, was the real cause why the degrading peace brought by Theramenes was accepted. Had the generals remained at large (he affirms), they would have prevented the acceptance of this degrading peace, and would have been able to obtain better terms from the Lacedæmonians (see Lysias cont.

Agor. s. 16-20).

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see s. 80), I believe that he *misdates* them, and represents them as having occurred *before* the surrender, whereas they really occurred *after* it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramenes came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible: the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 22). Besides, how could Agoratus be conveyed with two vessels out of Munychia, when the harbour was closely blocked up? and what is the meaning of ἕως τὰ πρᾶγματα κατασταίῃ, referred to a moment just *before* the surrender?

several other citizens, men of high worth and courageous patriots, were put into prison, as well as Agoratus himself to stand their trial afterwards before a dikastery consisting of 2000 members. One of the parties thus accused, Menestratus, being admitted by the public assembly (on the proposition of Hagnodôrus the brother-in-law of Kritias) to become accusing witness, named several additional accomplices, who were also forthwith placed in custody.¹

Though the most determined defenders of the democratical constitution were thus eliminated, Kritias and Theramenês still farther ensured the success of their proposition by invoking the presence of Lysander from Samos. The demolition of the walls had been completed, the main blockading army had disbanded, and the immediate pressure of famine had been removed—when an assembly was held to determine on future modifications of the constitution. A citizen named Drakontidês² moved that a Board of Thirty should be named, to draw up laws for the future government of the city, and to manage provisionally the public affairs, until that task should be completed. Among the Thirty persons proposed, pre-arranged by Theramenês and the oligarchical five Ephors, the most prominent names were those of Kritias and Theramenês: there were, besides, Drakontidês himself—Onomaklês, one of the Four Hundred who had escaped—Aristotelês and Chariklês, both exiles newly returned—Eratosthenês—and others whom we do not know, but of whom probably several had also been exiles or members of the Four Hundred.³ Though this was a complete abrogation of the constitution, yet so conscious were the conspirators of their own strength, that they did not deem it necessary to propose the formal suspension of the *Graphê Paranomôn*, as had been done prior to the installation of the former oligarchy. Still, notwithstanding the seizure of the leaders and the general intimidation prevalent, a loud murmur of repugnance was heard in the assembly at the motion of Drakontidês. But Theramenês rose up to defy the murmur, telling the assembly that the proposition numbered many partisans even among the citizens themselves, and that it had farther the

Nomina-
tion of the
Thirty,
under the
dictation
of
Lysander.

¹ *Lysias* cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 74; compare Aristotle ap. Schol. s. 38, 60, 68. ad Aristophan. Vesp. 167.

² *Lysias* cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. ³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 8, 2.

approbation of Lysander and the Lacedæmonians. This was presently confirmed by Lysander himself, who addressed the assembly in person. He told them, in a menacing and contemptuous tone, that Athens was now at his mercy, since the walls had not been demolished before the day specified, and consequently the conditions of the promised peace had been violated. He added that if they did not adopt the recommendation of Theramênês, they would be forced to take thought for their personal safety instead of for their political constitution. After a notice at once so plain and so crushing, farther resistance was vain. The dissentients all quitted the assembly in sadness and indignation; while a remnant—according to Lysias, inconsiderable in number as well as worthless in character—stayed to vote acceptance of the motion.¹

Seven years before, Theramênês had carried, in conjunction with Antiphon and Phrynichus, a similar motion for the installation of the Four Hundred; extorting acquiescence by domestic terrorism as well as by multiplied assassinations. He now, in conjunction with Kritias and the rest, a second time extinguished the constitution of his country, by the still greater humiliation of a foreign conqueror dictating terms to the Athenian people assembled in their own Pnyx. Having seen the Thirty regularly constituted, Lysander retired from Athens to finish the siege of Samos, which still held out. Though blocked up both by land and sea, the Samians obstinately defended themselves for some months longer until the close of the summer. It was not until the last extremity that they capitulated; obtaining permission for every freeman to depart in safety, but with no other property except a single garment. Lysander handed over the city and the properties to the ancient citizens—that is, to the oligarchy and their partisans who had been partly expelled, partly disfranchised, in the revolution eight years before. But he placed the government of Samos, as he had dealt with the other cities, in the hands of one of his Dekarchies, or oligarchy of Ten Samians chosen by himself; leaving Thorax as Lacedæmonian harmost, and doubtless a force under him.²

Conquest of
Samos by
Lysander—
oligarchy
restored
there.

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosth. [Or. xii. s. 74-77.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 6-8.

Having thus finished the war, and trodden out the last spark of resistance, Lysander returned in triumph to Sparta. So imposing a triumph never fell to the lot of any Greek, either before or afterwards. He brought with him every trireme out of the harbour of Peiræus, except twelve left to the Athenians as a concession: he brought the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere: he was loaded with golden crowns, voted to him by the various cities: and he farther exhibited a sum of money not less than 470 talents, the remnant of those treasures which Cyrus had handed over to him for the prosecution of the war.¹ That sum had been greater, but is said to have been diminished by the treachery of Gylippus, to whose custody it had been committed, and who sullied by such mean speculation the laurels which he had so gloriously earned at Syracuse.² Nor was it merely the triumphant evidences of past exploits which now decorated this returning admiral. He wielded besides an extent of real power greater than any individual Greek either before or after. Imperial Sparta—as she had now become—was as it were personified in Lysander, who was master of almost all the insular Asiatic and Thracian cities, by means of the harmosts and the native Dekarchies named by himself and selected from his creatures. To this state of things we shall presently return, when we have followed the eventful history of the Thirty at Athens.

Triumphant return of Lysander to Sparta—his prodigious ascendancy throughout Greece.

These Thirty men—the parallel of the Dekarchies whom Lysander had constituted in the other cities—were intended for the same purpose, to maintain the city in a state of humiliation and dependence upon Lacedæmon, and upon Lysander as the representative of Lacedæmon. Though appointed, in the pretended view of drawing up a scheme of laws and constitution for Athens, they were in no hurry to commence this duty. They appointed a new senate, composed of compliant, assured, and oligarchical persons; including many of the returned exiles who had been formerly in the Four Hundred, and many also of the preceding senators

Proceedings of the Thirty at Athens—feelings of oligarchical men like Plato.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 8.

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 16; Diodor. xiii. 106.

who were willing to serve their designs.¹ They farther named new magistrates and officers; a new Board of Eleven, to manage the business of police and the public force, with Satyrus, one of their most violent partisans, as chief; a Board of Ten, to govern in Peiræus;² an archon to give name to the year, Pythodôrus—and a second or King-Archon, Patroklês,³ to offer the customary sacrifices on behalf of the city. While thus securing their own ascendancy, and placing all power in the hands of the most violent oligarchical partisans, they began by professing reforming principles of the strictest virtue; denouncing the abuses of the past democracy, and announcing their determination to purge the city of evil-doers.⁴ The philosopher Plato—then a young man about twenty-four years old, of anti-democratical politics, and nephew of Kritias—was at first misled, together with various others, by these splendid professions. He conceived hopes, and even received encouragement from his relations, that he might play an active part under the new oligarchy.⁵ Though he soon came to discern how little congenial his feelings were with theirs, yet in the beginning doubtless such honest illusions contributed materially to strengthen their hands.

In execution of their design to root out evil-doers, the Thirty first laid hands on some of the most obnoxious politicians under the former democracy—"men (says Xenophon) whom every one knew to live by making calumnious accusations (called Sycophancy), and who were pronounced in their enmity to the oligarchical citizens." How far most of these men had been honest or dishonest in their previous political conduct under the democracy, we have no means of determining. But among them were comprised Strombichidês and the

The Thirty begin their executions—Strombichidês and the imprisoned generals put to death—other democrats also.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 11; Lysias cont. Agorat. Orat. xiii. sect. 23—80.

Tisias, the brother-in-law of Chariklês, was a member of this senate (Isokratês, Or. xvi. De Bigis, s. 53).

² Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 B; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 54.

³ Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or.

xviii. s. 6. p. 372.

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Erastoth. s. 5. p. 121. 'Επειδὴ δ' οἱ τριάκοντα πονηροὶ μὲν καὶ συκοφαντοὶ ὄντες εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, φάσκοντες χρῆναι τῶν ἀδίκων καθαρὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπέσθαι, &c.

⁵ Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 B. C.

other democratical officers who had been imprisoned under the information of Agoratus; men whose chief crime consisted in a strenuous and inflexible attachment to the democracy. The persons thus seized were brought to trial before the new senate appointed by the Thirty—contrary to the vote of the people, which had decreed that Strombichidēs and his companions should be tried before a dikastery of 2000 citizens.¹ But the dikastery, as well as all the other democratical institutions, were now abrogated, and no judicial body was left except the newly constituted senate. Even to that senate, though composed of their own partisans, the Thirty did not choose to entrust the trial of the prisoners, with that secrecy of voting which was well known at Athens to be essential to the free and genuine expression of sentiment. Whenever prisoners were tried, the Thirty were themselves present in the senate-house, sitting on the benches previously occupied by the Prytanes: two tables were placed before them, one signifying condemnation—the other, acquittal; and each senator was required to deposit his pebble, openly before them, either on one or on the other.² It was not merely judgement by the senate—but judgement by the senate under pressure and intimidation by the all-powerful Thirty. It seems probable that neither any semblance of defence, nor any exculpatory witnesses, were allowed; but even if such formalities were not wholly dispensed with, it is certain that there was no real trial, and that condemnation was assured beforehand. Among the great numbers whom the Thirty brought before the senate, not a single man was acquitted except the informer Agoratus, who was brought to trial as an accomplice along with Strombichidēs and his companions, but was liberated in recompense for the information which he had given against them.³ The statement of Isokratēs, Lysias, and others—that the victims of the Thirty, even when brought before the senate, were put to death untried—is authentic and trustworthy: many were even put to death by simple order from the Thirty themselves, without any cognizance of the senate.⁴

Senate appointed by the Thirty—is only trusted to act under their intimidation. Numerous executions without trial.

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 38.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 40.

³ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 41.

⁴ Lysias cont. Eratosth s. 18; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 51; Isokrat. Orat. xx. cont. Lochit. s. 15. p. 397.

In regard to the persons first brought to trial, however,—whether we consider them, as Xenophon intimates, to have been notorious evil-doers, or to have been innocent sufferers by the reactionary vengeance of returning oligarchical exiles, as was the case certainly with Strombichidês and the officers accused along with him,—there was little necessity for any constraint on the part of the Thirty over the senate. That body itself partook of the sentiment which dictated the condemnation, and acted as a willing instrument; while the Thirty themselves were unanimous,—Theramenês being even more zealous than Kritias in these executions, to demonstrate his sincere antipathy towards the extinct democracy.¹ As yet too, since all the persons condemned (justly or unjustly) had been marked politicians,—so, all other citizens who had taken no conspicuous part in politics, even if they disapproved of the condemnations, had not been led to conceive any apprehension of the like fate for themselves. Here then Theramenês, and along with him a portion of the Thirty as well as of the senate, were inclined to pause. While enough had been done to satiate their antipathies, by the death of the most obnoxious leaders of the democracy—they at the same time conceived the oligarchical government to be securely established, and contended that farther bloodshed would only endanger its stability, by spreading alarm, multiplying enemies, and alienating friends as well as neutrals.

But these were not the views either of Kritias or of the Thirty generally, who surveyed their position with eyes very different from the unstable and cunning Theramenês, and who had brought with them from exile a long arrear of vengeance yet to be appeased. Kritias knew well that the numerous population of Athens were devotedly attached, and had good reason to be attached, to their democracy; that the existing government had been imposed upon them by force, and could only be upheld by force; that its friends were a narrow minority, incapable of sustaining it against the multitude around them all

¹ Xenoph. Hellen ii 3, 12, 28, τοὺς ὑπαγομένους εἰς ἡμᾶς δίκην ἐπι-
38. Αὐτὸς (Theramenês) μέλι-
στα ἐξορμήσας ἡμᾶς, τοὺς πρῶ-
τιθέμεναι, &c.

armed; that there were still many formidable enemies to be got rid of, so that it was indispensable to invoke the aid of a permanent Lacedæmonian garrison in Athens, as the only condition not only of their stability as a government, but even of their personal safety. In spite of the opposition of Theramenês—Æschinês and Aristotelês, two among the Thirty, were despatched to Sparta to solicit aid from Lysander; who procured for them a Lacedæmonian garrison under Kallibius as harmost, which they engaged to maintain without any cost to Sparta, until their government should be confirmed by putting the evil-doers out of the way.¹ Kallibius was not only installed as master of the acropolis—full as it was of the mementos of Athenian glory—but was farther so caressed and won over by the Thirty, that he lent himself to everything which they asked. They had thus a Lacedæmonian military force constantly at their command, besides an organized hand of youthful satellites and assassins, ready for any deeds of violence; and they proceeded to seize and put to death many citizens, who were so distinguished for their courage and patriotism, as to be likely to serve as leaders to the public discontent. Several of the best men in Athens thus successively perished, while Thrasybulus, Anytus, and many others, fearing a similar fate, fled out of Attica, leaving their property to be confiscated and appropriated by the oligarchs;² who passed a decree of exile against them in their absence, as well as against Alkibiadês.³

Lacedæmonian garrison introduced—multiplied executions by Kritias and the Thirty.

These successive acts of vengeance and violence were warmly opposed by Theramenês, both in the Council of Thirty and in the senate. The persons hitherto executed (he said) had deserved their death because they were not merely noted politicians under the democracy, but also persons of marked hostility to oligarchical men. But to inflict the same fate on others, who had manifested no such hostility, simply because they had enjoyed influence under the democracy

Opposition of Theramenês to these measures—violence and rapacity still farther increased—rich and oligarchical men put to death.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 18. ἕως 42; Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. δὴ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἐκποδῶν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαντο τὴν πολιτείαν. xviii. s. 30. p. 375.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 42—ii. 4,

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 15, 23, 14. οἱ δὲ καὶ οὕχ ὅπως ἀδικούντες,

would be unjust: "Even you and I (he reminded Kritias) have both said and done many things for the sake of popularity." But Kritias replied—"We cannot afford to be scrupulous; we are engaged in a scheme of aggressive ambition, and must get rid of those who are best able to hinder us. Though we are Thirty in number, and not one—our government is not the less a despotism, and must be guarded by the same jealous precautions. If you think otherwise, you must be simple-minded indeed." Such were the sentiments which animated the majority of the Thirty not less than Kritias, and which prompted them to an endless string of seizures and executions. It was not merely the less obnoxious democratical politicians who became their victims, but men of courage, wealth, and station, in every vein of political feeling: even oligarchical men, the best and most high-principled of that party, shared the same fate. Among the most distinguished sufferers were, Lykurgus,¹ belonging to one of the most eminent sacred Gentes in the state; a wealthy man named Antiphon, who had devoted his fortune to the public service with exemplary patriotism during the last years of the war, and had furnished two well-equipped triremes at his own cost; Leon, of Salamis; and even Nikeratus (son of Nikias, who had perished at Syracuse), a man who inherited from his father not only a large fortune, but a known repugnance to democratical politics, together with his uncle Eukratês, brother of the same Nikias.² These were only a few among the numerous victims, who were seized—pronounced to be guilty by the senate or by the Thirty themselves—handed over to Satyrus and the Eleven—and condemned to perish by the customary draught of hemlock.

The circumstances accompanying the seizure of Leon deserve particular notice. In putting to death him and the other victims, the Thirty had several objects in view, all tending to the stability of their dominion. First, they thus got rid of citizens generally known and esteemed, whose abhorrence they knew themselves to deserve, and whom they feared as likely to head the public sentiment against them. Secondly, the

Plan of Kritias to gain adherents by forcing men to become accomplices in deeds of blood—resistance of Sokratês.

ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπιδημοῦντας ἐφυγαδεύομεθα, &c.

Isokratês, Orat. xvi. De Bigis, s. 46. p. 865.

¹ Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 838.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 39—41;

Lysias, Orat. xviii. De Bonis Nicis Fratris, s. 5—8.

property of these victims, all of whom were rich, was seized along with their persons, and was employed to pay the satellites whose agency was indispensable for such violences—especially Kallibius and the Lacedæmonian hoplites in the acropolis. But besides murder and spoliation, the Thirty had a farther purpose, if possible, yet more nefarious. In the work of seizing their victims, they not only employed the hands of these paid satellites, but also sent along with them citizens of station and respectability, whom they constrained by threats and intimidation to lend their personal aid in a service so thoroughly odious. By such participation, these citizens became compromised and imbrued in crime, and as it were, consenting parties in the public eye to all the projects of the Thirty;¹ exposed to the same general hatred as the latter, and interested for their own safety in maintaining the existing dominion. Pursuant to their general plan of implicating unwilling citizens in their misdeeds, the Thirty sent for five citizens to the Tholus or Government-house, and ordered them, with terrible menaces, to cross over to Salamis and bring back Leon as prisoner. Four out of the five obeyed: the fifth was the philosopher Sokratês, who refused all concurrence and returned to his own house, while the other four went to Salamis and took part in the seizure of Leon. Though he thus braved all the wrath of the Thirty, it appears that they thought it expedient to leave him untouched. But the fact that they singled him out for such an atrocity—an old man of tried virtue, both private and public, and intellectually commanding, though at the same time intellectually unpopular—shows to what an extent they carried their system of forcing unwilling participants;

¹ Plato, *Apol. Socr.* c. 20. p. 32. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάντων αὐτὸν μεταπεμφόμενοι μετὰ πύκτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἢ ἀποθάνου· οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπαίνοι πολλοῖς προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὥς κλειστοῦς ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν.

Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii. s. 23. p. 374. ἐνίοις καὶ προσέταττον ἀσφαρτάνειν. Compare also Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth.

s. 32.

We learn, from Andokidês de *Myster.* s. 94, that Melêtus was one of the parties who actually arrested Leon, and brought him up for condemnation. It is not probable that this was the same person who afterwards accused Sokratês. It may possibly have been his father, who bore the same name; but there is nothing to determine the point.

while the farther circumstance that he was the only person who had the courage to refuse, among four others who yielded to intimidation, shows that the policy was for the most part successful.¹ The inflexible resistance of Sokratēs on this occasion stands as a worthy parallel to his conduct as Prytanis in the public assembly held on the conduct of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ (described in the preceding chapter), wherein he obstinately refused to concur in putting an illegal question.

Such multiplied cases of execution and spoliation naturally filled the city with surprise, indignation, and terror. Groups of malcontents got together, and voluntary exiles became more and more numerous. All these circumstances furnished ample material for the vehement opposition of Theramenēs, and tended to increase his party; not indeed among the Thirty themselves, but to a certain extent in the senate, and still more among the body of the citizens. He warned his colleagues that they were incurring daily an increased amount of public odium, and that their government could not possibly stand, unless they admitted into partnership an adequate number of citizens, having direct interests in its maintenance. He proposed that all those competent by their property to serve the state either on horseback or with heavy armour, should be constituted citizens; leaving all the poorer freemen, a far larger number, still disfranchised.² Kritias and the Thirty rejected this proposition; being doubtless convinced—as the Four Hundred had felt seven years before, when Theramenēs demanded of them to convert their fictitious total of Five Thousand into a real list of as many living persons—that “to enrol so great a number of partners, was tantamount to a downright democracy.”³ But they were at the same time not insensible to the soundness of his advice: moreover they began to be afraid of him personally, and to suspect

Terror and
discontent
in the city
—the Thirty
nominate a
body of
Three
Thousand
as partisan
hoplites.

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sokrat. ut sup.*; Xenoph. *Hellen. ii. 4, 9–23.*

² Xenoph. *Hellen. ii. 3, 17, 19, 48.* From s. 48, we see that Theramenēs actually made this proposition—τὸ μέντοι σὺν τοῖς δυναμένοις καὶ μεθ' ἑκαστῶν καὶ μετ' ἀσπίδων ὡφελεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν, πρόσθεν ἀριστον ἡγοῦμεν εἶναι, καὶ

νῦν οὐ μεταβάλλομαι.

This proposition, made by Theramenēs and rejected by the Thirty, explains the comment which he afterwards made when they drew up their special catalogue or roll of 3000 which comment otherwise appears unsuitable.

³ Thucyd. *viii. 89–92.* τὸ μὲν

that he was likely to take the lead in a popular opposition against them, as he had previously done against his colleagues of the Four Hundred. They therefore resolved to comply in part with his recommendations, and accordingly prepared a list of 3000 persons to be invested with the political franchise; chosen, as much as possible, from their own known partisans and from oligarchical citizens. Besides this body they also counted on the adherence of the Horsemen, among the wealthiest citizens of the state. These Horsemen or Knights, taking them as a class—the thousand good men of Athens, whose virtues Aristophanês sets forth in hostile antithesis to the alleged demagogic vices of Kleon—remained steady supporters of the Thirty throughout all the enormities of their career.¹ What privileges or functions were assigned to the chosen 3000, we do not hear, except that they could not be condemned without the warrant of the senate, while any other Athenian might be put to death by the simple fiat of the Thirty.²

A body of partners thus chosen—not merely of fixed number, but of picked oligarchical sentiments—^{They} was by no means the addition which Theramênês ^{disarm the} desired. While he commented on the folly of ^{remaining} supposing that there was any charm in the ^{hoplites of} number 3000—as if it embodied all the merit of the city, and nothing else but merit—he admonished them that it was still insufficient for their defence: their rule was one of pure force, and yet inferior in force to those over whom it was exercised. Again the Thirty acted upon his admonition, but in a way very different from that which he contemplated. They proclaimed a general muster, and examination of arms, to all the hoplites in Athens. The 3000 were drawn up in arms altogether in the market-place; but the remaining hoplites were disseminated in small scattered companies and in different places. After the review was over, these scattered companies went home to their meal, leaving their arms piled at the various places of muster. But adherents of the Thirty, having been forewarned and kept together, were sent at the proper moment, along with the Lacedæmonian mercenaries, to seize the deserted arms, which were deposited under the

καταστήσαι μετόχους τούτου, ἀν-
τιπρὸς ἄν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 18, 19;
ii. 4, 2, 8, 24.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 51.

custody of Kallibius in the acropolis. All the hoplites in Athens, except the Three Thousand and the remaining adherents of the Thirty, were disarmed by this crafty manœuvre, in spite of the fruitless remonstrance of Theramenês.¹

Kritias and his colleagues, now relieved from all fear either of Theramenês, or of any other internal opposition, gave loose, more unsparingly than ever, to their malevolence and rapacity; putting to death both many of their private enemies, and many rich victims for the purpose of spoliation. A list of suspected persons was drawn up, in which each of their adherents was allowed to insert such names as he chose, and from which the victims were generally taken.² Among informers who thus gave in names for destruction, Batrachus and Æschylidês³ stood conspicuous. The thirst of Kritias for plunder as well as for bloodshed only increased by gratification;⁴ and it was not merely to pay their mercenaries, but also to enrich themselves separately, that the Thirty stretched everywhere their murderous agency, which now mowed down metics as well as citizens. Theognis and Peison, two of the Thirty, affirmed that many among the metics were hostile to the oligarchy, besides being opulent men. Accordingly, the resolution was adopted that each of the rulers should single out any of these victims that he pleased, for execution and pillage; care being taken to include a few poor persons in the seizure, so that the real purpose of the spoilers might be faintly disguised.

It was in execution of such scheme that the orator Lysias and his brother Polemarchus were both taken into custody. Both were metics, wealthy men, and engaged in a manufactory of shields, wherein they employed 120 slaves. Theognis and Peison, with some others, seized Lysias

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 20, 41: compare Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 41.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 21; Isokratês adv. Euthynum, s. 5. p. 401; Isokratês cont. Kallimach. s. 23. p. 375; Lysias, Or. xxv. Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. s. 21. p. 173.

The two passages of Isokratês sufficiently designate what this list

or κατάλογος must have been; but the name by which he calls it—ὁ μετὰ Λυσάνδρου (or Παισάνδρου) κατάλογος—is not easy to explain.

³ Lysias, Orat. vi. cont. Andokid. s. 46; Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 49.

⁴ Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 12. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων κλεπτικωτάτος τε καὶ βιαιοτάτος ἕνετο, &c.

in his house, while entertaining some friends at dinner; and having driven away his guests, left him under the guard of Peison, sending their attendants to register and appropriate his valuable slaves. Lysias tried to prevail on Peison to accept a bribe and let him escape, which the latter at first promised to do; and having thus obtained access to the money-chest of the prisoner, laid hands upon all its contents, amounting to between three and four talents. In vain did Lysias implore that a trifle might be left for his necessary subsistence: the only answer vouchsafed was, that he might think himself fortunate if he escaped with life. He was then conveyed to the house of a person named Damnippus, where Theognis already was, having other prisoners in charge. At the earnest entreaty of Lysias, Damnippus tried to induce Theognis to connive at his escape, on consideration of a handsome bribe; but while this conversation was going on, the prisoner availed himself of an unguarded moment to get off through the back door,—which fortunately was open, together with two other doors through which it was necessary to pass. Having first obtained refuge in the house of a friend in Peiræus, he took boat during the ensuing night for Megara. Polemarchus, less fortunate, was seized in the street by Eratosthenês, one of the Thirty, and immediately lodged in the prison, where the fatal draught of hemlock was administered to him, without delay, without trial, and without liberty of defence. While his house was plundered of a large stock of gold, silver, furniture and rich ornaments—while the golden earrings were torn from the ears of his wife—and while 700 shields, with 120 slaves, were confiscated, together with the workshop and the two dwelling-houses;—the Thirty would not allow even a decent funeral to the deceased, but caused his body to be carried away on a hired bier from the prison, with covering and a few scanty appurtenances supplied by the sympathy of private friends.¹

Amidst such atrocities, increasing in number and turned more and more to shameless robbery, the party of

Seizure of
Lysias the
rhetor and
his brother
Pole-
marchus.
The former
escapes—
the latter is
executed.

¹ Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosthen. s. 8, 21. Lysias prosecuted Eratosthenês before the dikastery some years afterwards, as having

caused the death of Polemarchus. The foregoing details are found in the oration spoken as well as composed by himself.

Theramènes daily gained ground, even in the senate; many of whose members profited nothing by satiating the private cupidity of the Thirty, and began to be weary of so revolting a system, as well as alarmed at the host of enemies which they were raising up. In proposing the late seizure of the metics, the Thirty had desired Theramènes to make choice of any victim among that class, to be destroyed and plundered for his own personal benefit. But he rejected the suggestion emphatically, denouncing the enormity of the measure in the indignant terms which it deserved. So much was the antipathy of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against him, already acrimonious from the effects of a long course of opposition, exasperated by this refusal—so much did they fear the consequences of incurring the obloquy of such measures themselves, while Theramènes enjoyed all the credit of opposing them—so satisfied were they that their government could not stand with this dissension among its own members—that they resolved to destroy him at all cost. Having canvassed as many of the senators as they could, to persuade them that Theramènes was conspiring against the oligarchy, they caused the most daring of their satellites to attend one day in the senate-house, close to the railing which fenced in the senators, with daggers concealed under their garments. So soon as Theramènes appeared, Kritias rose and denounced him to the senate as a public enemy, in an harangue which Xenophon gives at considerable length, and which is so full of instructive evidence, as to Greek political feeling, that I here extract the main points in abridgement:—

“If any of you imagine, Senators, that more people are perishing than the occasion requires, reflect, that this happens everywhere in a time of revolution—and that it must especially happen in the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens, the most populous city in Greece, and where the population has been longest accustomed to freedom. You know as well as we do, that democracy is to both of us an intolerable government, as well as incompatible with all steady adherence to our protectors the Lacedæmonians. It is under their auspices that we are establishing the present oligarchy, and that we destroy, as far as we can, every man who stands in the way of it;

Increased
exaspera-
tion of
Kritias and
the majority
of the
Thirty
against
Thera-
menès.

Thera-
menès is
denounced
by Kritias
in the
senate—
speech of
Kritias.

which becomes most of all indispensable, if such a man be found among our own body. Here stands the man—Theramenês—whom we now denounce to you as your foe not less than ours. That such is the fact, is plain from his unmeasured censures on our proceedings; from the difficulties which he throws in our way whenever we want to despatch any of the demagogues. Had such been his policy from the beginning, he would indeed have been our enemy, yet we could not with justice have proclaimed him a villain. But it is he who first originated the alliance which binds us to Sparta—who struck the first blow at the democracy—who chiefly instigated us to put to death the first batch of accused persons; and now, when you as well as we have thus incurred the manifest hatred of the people, he turns round and quarrels with our proceedings, in order to ensure his own safety, and leave us to pay the penalty. He must be dealt with not only as an enemy, but as a traitor to you as well as to us; a traitor in the grain, as his whole life proves. Though he enjoyed through his father Agnon a station of honour under the democracy, he was foremost in subverting it, and getting up the Four Hundred: the moment he saw that oligarchy beset with difficulties, he was the first to put himself at the head of the people against them; always ready for change in both directions, and a willing accomplice in those executions which changes of government bring with them. It is he, too, who—having been ordered by the generals after the battle of Arginusæ to pick up the men on the disabled ships, and having neglected the task—accused and brought to execution his superiors, in order to get himself out of danger. He has well earned his surname of The Buskin, fitting both legs, but constant to neither: he has shown himself reckless both of honour and friendship, looking to nothing but his own selfish advancement; and it is for us now to guard against his doublings, in order that he may not play us the same trick. We cite him before you as a conspirator and a traitor, against you as well as against us. Look to your own safety, and not to his. For depend upon it, that if you let him off, you will hold out powerful encouragement to your worst enemies; while if you condemn him, you will crush their best hopes, both within and without the city.”

Theramenês was probably not wholly unprepared for

some such attack as this. At any rate he rose up to reply to it at once:—

“First of all, Senators, I shall touch upon the charge against me which Kritias mentioned last—the charge of having accused and brought to execution the generals. It was not I who began the accusation against them, but they who began it against me. They said that they had ordered me upon the duty, and that I had neglected it: my defence was, that the duty could not be executed in consequence of the storm: the people believed and exonerated me, but the generals were rightfully condemned on their own accusation, because *they* said that the duty might have been performed—while yet it had remained unperformed. I do not wonder indeed that Kritias has told such falsehoods against me; for at the time when this affair happened, he was an exile in Thessaly, employed in raising up a democracy, and arming the Penestæ against their masters. Heaven grant that nothing of what he perpetrated *there* may occur at Athens! I agree with Kritias indeed, that whoever wishes to cut short your government, and strengthens those who conspire against you, deserves justly the severest punishment. But to whom does this charge best apply? To him, or to me? Look at the behaviour of each of us, and then judge for yourselves. At first we were all agreed, so far as the condemnation of the known and obnoxious demagogues. But when Kritias and his friends began to seize men of station and dignity, then it was that I began to oppose them. I knew that the seizure of men like Leon, Nikias, and Antiphon, would make the best men in the city your enemies. I opposed the execution of the metics, well-aware that all that body would be alienated. I opposed the disarming of the citizens, and the hiring of foreign guards. And when I saw that enemies at home and exiles abroad were multiplying against you, I dissuaded you from banishing Thrasybulus and Anytus, whereby you only furnished the exiles with competent leaders. The man who gives you this advice, and gives it you openly, is he a traitor—or is he not rather a genuine friend? It is you and your supporters, Kritias, who by your murders and robberies strengthen the enemies of the government and betray your friends. Depend upon it, that Thrasybulus and Anytus are much better pleased with your policy than they would be with mine. You

accuse me of having betrayed the Four Hundred; but I did not desert them until they were themselves on the point of betraying Athens to her enemies. You call me the Buskin, as trying to fit both parties. But what am I to call *you*, who fit neither of them? who under the democracy were the most violent hater of the people—and who under the oligarchy have become equally violent as a hater of oligarchical merit? I am, and always have been, Kritias, an enemy both to extreme democracy and to oligarchical tyranny. I desire to constitute our political community out of those who can serve it on horseback and with heavy armour:—I have proposed this once, and I still stand to it. I side not either with democrats or despots, to the exclusion of the dignified citizens. Prove that I am now, or ever have been, guilty of such crime, and I shall confess myself deserving of ignominious death.”

This reply of Theramenês was received with such a shout of applause by the majority of the senate, as showed that they were resolved to acquit him. To the fierce antipathies of the mortified Kritias, the idea of failure was intolerable: indeed he had now carried his hostility to such a point, that the acquittal of his enemy would have been his own ruin. After exchanging a few words with the Thirty, he retired for a few moments, and directed the Eleven with the body of armed satellites to press close on the railing whereby the senators were fenced round,—while the court before the senate-house was filled with the mercenary hoplites. Having thus got his force in hand, Kritias returned and again addressed the senate:—“Senators (said he), I think it the duty of a good president, when he sees his friends around him duped, not to let them follow their own counsel. This is what I am now going to do: indeed these men, whom you see pressing upon us from without, tell us plainly that they will not tolerate the acquittal of one manifestly working to the ruin of the oligarchy. It is an article of our new constitution, that no man of the Select Three Thousand shall be condemned without your vote; but that any man not included in that list may be condemned by the Thirty. Now I take upon me, with the concurrence of all my colleagues, to strike this Theramenês out of that list; and we, by our authority, condemn him to death.”

Extreme
violence
of Kritias
and the
Thirty.

Though Theramenês had already been twice concerned in putting down the democracy, yet such was the habit of all Athenians to look for protection from constitutional forms, that he probably accounted himself safe under the favourable verdict of the senate, and was not prepared for the monstrous and despotical sentence which he now heard from his enemy. He sprang at once to the Senatorial Hearth—the altar and sanctuary in the interior of the senate-house—and exclaimed,—“I too, Senators, stand as your suppliant, asking only for bare justice. Let it be not in the power of Kritias to strike out me or any other man whom he chooses:—let my sentence as well as yours be passed according to the law which these Thirty have themselves prepared. I know but too well, that this altar will be of no avail to me as a defence; yet I shall at least make it plain, that these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards men. As for you, worthy Senators, I wonder that you will not stand forward for your own personal safety, since you must be well-aware that your own names may be struck out of the Three Thousand just as easily as mine.”

But the senate remained passive and stupified by fear, in spite of these moving words; which perhaps were not perfectly heard, since it could not be the design of Kritias to permit his enemy to speak a second time. It was probably while Theramenês was yet speaking, that the loud voice of the herald was heard, calling the Eleven to come forward and take him into custody. The Eleven advanced into the senate, headed by their brutal chief Satyrus, and followed by their usual attendants. They went straight up to the altar, from whence Satyrus, aided by the attendants, dragged him by main force, while Kritias said to them—“We hand over to you this man Theramenês, condemned according to the law. Seize him, carry him off to prison, and there do the needful.” Upon which, Theramenês was dragged out of the senate-house and carried in custody through the market-place, exclaiming with a loud voice against the atrocious treatment which he was suffering. “Hold your tongue (said Satyrus to him), or you will suffer for it.”—“And if I *do* hold my tongue (replied Theramenês), shall not I suffer for it also?”

He was conveyed to prison, where the usual draught of hemlock was speedily administered. After he had

swallowed it, there remained a drop at the bottom of the cup, which he jerked out on the floor (according to the playful convivial practice called the Kottabus, which was supposed to furnish an omen by its sound in falling, and after which the person who had just drunk handed the goblet to the guest whose turn came next)—“Let this (said he) be for the gentle Kritias.”¹

Death of
Thera-
menês—
remarks on
his char-
acter.

The scene just described, which ended in the execution of Theramenês, is one of the most striking and tragical in ancient history; in spite of the bald and meagre way in which it is recounted by Xenophon, who has thrown all the interest into the two speeches. The atrocious injustice by which Theramenês perished—as well as the courage and self-possession which he displayed at the moment of danger, and his cheerfulness even in the prison, not inferior to that of Sokratês three years afterwards—naturally enlist the warmest sympathies of the reader in his favour, and have tended to exalt the positive estimation of his character. During the years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy,² he was extolled and pitied as one of the first martyrs to oligarchical violence: later authors went so far as to number him among the chosen pupils of Sokratês.³ But though Theramenês here became the victim of a much worse man than himself, it will not for

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 56.

² See Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Erastoth. s. 66.

³ Diodor. xiv. 5. Diodorus tells us that Sokratês and two of his friends were the only persons who stood forward to protect Theramenês, when Satyrus was dragging him from the altar. Plutarch (Vit. X. Orat. p. 836) ascribes the same act of generous forwardness to Isokratês. There is no good ground for believing it, either of one or of the other. None but senators were present; and as this senate had been chosen by the Thirty, it is not likely that either Sokratês, or Isokratês, were among its members. If Sokratês had been a member of it, the fact would have been noticed and brought out in con-

nection with his subsequent trial.

The manner in which Plutarch (Consolat. ad Apollon. c. 6. p. 105) states the death of Theramenês—that he was “tortured to death” by the Thirty—is an instance of his loose speaking.

Compare Cicero about the death of Theramenês (Tuscul. Disp. i. 40, 96). His admiration for the manner of death of Theramenês doubtless contributed to make him rank that Athenian with Themistoklês and Periklês (De Orat. iii. 16, 59). Aristotle too (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2) speaks with esteem of Theramenês, ranking him in the same general category with Nikias and Thucydides (son of Melesias), though with considerable deduction and blame on the score of duplicity.

that reason be proper to accord to him our admiration, which his own conduct will not at all be found to deserve. The reproaches of Kritias against him, founded on his conduct during the previous conspiracy of the Four Hundred, were in the main well founded. After having been one of the foremost originators of that conspiracy, he deserted his comrades as soon as he saw that it was likely to fail. Kritias had doubtless present to his mind the fate of Antiphon, who had been condemned and executed under the accusation of Theraménès—together with a reasonable conviction that the latter would again turn against his colleagues in the same manner, if circumstances should encourage him to do so. Moreover, Kritias was not wrong in denouncing the perfidy of Theraménès with regard to the generals after the battle of Arginusæ; the death of whom he was partly instrumental in bringing about, though only as an auxiliary cause, and not with that extreme stretch of nefarious stratagem which Xenophon and others have imputed to him. He was a selfish, cunning, and faithless man—ready to enter into conspiracies, yet never foreseeing their consequences—and breaking faith to the ruin of colleagues whom he had first encouraged, when he found them more consistent and thorough-going in crime than himself.¹

Such high-handed violence, by Kritias and the majority of the Thirty—carried through, even against a member of their own Board, by intimidation of the Senate—left a feeling of disgust and dissension among their own partisans from which their power never recovered. Its immediate effect, however, was to render them, apparently and in their own estimation, more powerful than ever. All open manifestation of dissent being now silenced, they proceeded to the uttermost limits of cruel and licentious tyranny. They made proclamation that every one not included in the list of Three Thousand should depart without the walls, in order that they might be undisturbed masters within the city: a policy before resorted to by Periander of Corinth and other Grecian despots.² The numerous fugitives

¹ The epithets applied by Aristophanes to Theraménès (*Ran.* 541-966) coincide pretty exactly with those in the speech (just noticed)

which Xenophon ascribes to Kritias against him.

² Xenophon. *Hellen.* ii. 4, 1; Lysias, *Orat.* xii. cont. Eratosth.

expelled by this order distributed themselves partly in Peiræus, partly in the various demes of Attica. Both in one and the other, however, they were seized by order of the Thirty, and many of them put to death, in order that their substance and lands might be appropriated either by the Thirty themselves or by some favoured partisan.¹ The denunciations of Batrachus, Æschylidēs, and other delators, became more numerous than ever, in order to obtain the seizure and execution of their private enemies; and the oligarchy were willing to purchase any new adherent by thus gratifying his antipathies or his rapacity.² The subsequent orators affirmed that more than 1500 victims were put to death without trial by the Thirty:³ on this numerical estimate little stress is to be laid, but the total was doubtless prodigious. It became more and more plain that no man was safe in Attica, so that Athenian emigrants, many in great poverty and destitution, were multiplied throughout the neighbouring territories—in Megara, Thebes, Orôpus, Chalkis, Argos &c.⁴ It was not everywhere that these distressed persons could obtain reception, for the Lacedæmonian government, at the instance of the Thirty, issued an edict prohibiting all the members of their confederacy from harbouring fugitive Athenians; an edict which these cities generously disobeyed,⁵ though probably the smaller Peloponnesian cities complied. Without doubt this decree was procured by Lysander, while his influence still continued unimpaired.

But it was not only against the lives, properties, and liberties, of Athenian citizens that the Thirty made war. They were not less solicitous to extinguish the intellectual force and education of the city; a project so perfectly in harmony

The Thirty forbid intellectual teaching.

s. 97; Orat. xxxi. cont. Philon. s. 8, 9; Herakleid. Pontic. c. 5; Diodor. Laert. i. 98.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. c. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων, ἱπ' αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τοῦτων ἀγροὺς ἔχουσιν φευγόντων δὲ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐνταῦθεν πολλοὺς ἀγοντας, ἐνέκλησαν Μάγαρα καὶ Θήβας τῶν ὑποχωρούντων.

² Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 49; Or. xxv. Democrat. Subvers. Apolog. s. 20; Or. xxvi. cont. Evandr. s. 28.

³ Æschinēs, Fals. Legat. c. 24. p. 266, and cont. Ktesiph. c. 86. p. 455; Isokratēs, Or. iv. Panegy. c. 131; Or. vii. Areopag. s. 76.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 1; Diodor. xiv. 6; Lysias, Or. xxiv. s. 28; Or. xxxi. cont. Philon. s. 10.

⁵ Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 98, 99—πανταχόθεν ἀναρχοῦντο; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 99; Diodor. xiv. 6; Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. c. 10.

both with the sentiment and practice of Sparta, that they counted on the support of their foreign allies. Among the ordinances which they promulgated was one, expressly forbidding every one¹ "to teach the art of words;" if I may be allowed to translate literally the Greek expression, which bore a most comprehensive signification, and denoted every intentional communication of logical, rhetorical, or argumentative improvement—of literary criticism and composition—and of command over those political and moral topics which formed the ordinary theme of discussion. Such was the species of instruction which Sokratês and other Sophists, each in his own way, communicated to the Athenian youth. The great foreign Sophists (not Athenian), such as Prodikus and Protagoras had been (though perhaps neither of these two was now alive), were doubtless no longer in the city, under the calamitous circumstances which had been weighing upon every citizen since the defeat of *Ægospotami*. But there were abundance of native teachers or Sophists, inferior in merit to these distinguished names, yet still habitually employed, with more or less success, in communicating a species of instruction held indispensable to every liberal Athenian. The edict of the Thirty was in fact a general suppression of the higher class of teachers or professors, above the rank of the elementary (teacher of letters or) grammarist. If such an edict could have been maintained in force for a generation, combined with the other mandates of the Thirty—the city out of which Sophoklês and Euripidês had just died, and in which Plato and Isokratês were in vigorous age (the former twenty-five, the latter twenty-nine), would have been degraded to the intellectual level of the meanest community in Greece. It was not uncommon for a Grecian

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.—Isokratês, cont. Sophist. Or. xiii. s. 12. τὴν παιδαύειν τὴν τῶν λόγων.

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 19) affirms that the Thirty oligarchs during their rule altered the position of the rostrum in the Pnyx (the place where the democratical public assemblies were held): the rostrum had before looked towards

the sea, but they turned it so as to make it look towards the land, because the maritime service and the associations connected with it were the chief stimulants of democratical sentiment. This story has been often copied and reasserted as if it were an undoubted fact; but M. Forchhammer (Topographie von Athen, p. 289, in Kieler Philol. Studien. 1841) has shown it to be untrue and even absurd.

despot to suppress all those assemblies wherein youths came together for the purpose of common training, either intellectual or gymnastic; as well as the public banquets and clubs or associations,—as being dangerous to his authority, tending to elevation of courage, and to a consciousness of political rights among the citizens.¹

The enormities of the Thirty had provoked severe comments from the philosopher Sokratês, whose life was spent in conversation on instructive subjects with those young men who sought his society, though he never took money from any pupil. Such comments having excited attention, Kritias and Chariklês sent for him, reminded him of the prohibitive law, and peremptorily commanded him to abstain for the future from all conversation with youths. Sokratês met the order by putting some questions, to those who gave it, in his usual style of puzzling scrutiny; destined to expose the vagueness of the terms—and to draw the line, or rather to show that no definite line could be drawn—between that which was permitted and that which was forbidden. But he soon perceived that his interrogations produced only a feeling of disgust and wrath, menacing to his own safety. The tyrants ended by repeating their interdict in yet more peremptory terms, and by giving Sokratês to understand, that they were not ignorant of the censures which he had cast upon them.²

Though our evidence does not enable us to make out the precise dates of these various oppressions of the Thirty, yet it seems probable that this prohibition of teaching must have been among their earlier enactments; at any rate, considerably anterior to the death of Theramenês, and the general expulsion, out of the walls, of all except the privileged Three Thousand. Their dominion continued, without any armed opposition made to it, for about eight months from the capture of Athens by Lysander—that is, from about April to December 404 B.C. The measure of their iniquity then became full. They had accumulated against themselves, both in Attica and among the exiles in the circumjacent territories, suffering and exasperated enemies; while they had lost the sympathy of Thebes, Megara, and Corinth—and were less heartily supported by Sparta.

¹ Aristot. Polit. v. 9, 2.

² Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 33-39.

During these important eight months, the general feeling throughout Greece had become materially different both towards Athens and towards Sparta. At the moment when the long war was first brought to a close—fear, antipathy, and vengeance against Athens had been the reigning sentiments, both among the confederates of Sparta and among the revolted members of the extinct Athenian empire; a sentiment which prevailed among them indeed to a greater degree than among the Spartans themselves—who resisted it, and granted to Athens a capitulation at a time when many of their allies pressed for the harshest measures. To this resolution they were determined partly by the still remaining force of ancient sympathy—partly by the odium which would have been sure to follow the act of expelling the Athenian population, however it might be talked of beforehand as a meet punishment—partly too by the policy of Lysander, who contemplated the keeping of Athens in the same dependence on Sparta and on himself, and by the same means, as the other outlying cities in which he had planted his Dekarchies.

So soon as Athens was humbled, deprived of her fleet and walled port, and rendered innocuous—the great bond of common fear which had held the allies to Sparta disappeared; and while the paramount antipathy on the part of those allies towards Athens gradually died away, a sentiment of jealousy and apprehension of Sparta sprang up in its place, on the part of the leading states among them. For such a sentiment there was more than one reason. Lysander had brought home not only a large sum of money, but valuable spoils of other kinds, and many captive triremes, at the close of the war. As the success had been achieved by the joint exertions of all the allies, so the fruits of it belonged in equity to all of them jointly—not to Sparta alone. The Thebans and Corinthians preferred a formal claim to be allowed to share; and if the other allies abstained from openly backing the demand, we may fairly presume that it was not from any different construction of the equity of the case, but from fear of offending Sparta. In the testimonial erected by Lysander at Delphi, commemorative of the triumph, he had included

Gradual alteration of feeling in Greece, since the capture of Athens.

Demand by the allies of Sparta to share in the spoils of the war—refused by Sparta.

not only his own brazen statue, but that of each commander of the allied contingents; thus formally admitting the allies to share in the honorary results, and tacitly sanctioning their claim to the lucrative results also. Nevertheless the demand made by the Thebans and Corinthians was not only repelled, but almost resented as an insult; especially by Lysander, whose influence was at that moment almost omnipotent.¹

That the Lacedæmonians should have withheld from the allies a share in this money, demonstrates still more the great ascendancy of Lysander—because there was a considerable party at Sparta itself, who protested altogether against the reception of so much gold and silver, as contrary to the ordinances of Lykurgus, and fatal to the peculiar morality of Sparta. An ancient Spartan, Skiraphidas or Phlogidas, took the lead in calling for exclusive adherence to the old Spartan money—heavy iron difficult to carry. It was not without difficulty that Lysander and his friends obtained admission for the treasure into Sparta; under special proviso, that it should be for the exclusive purposes of the government, and that no private citizen should ever circulate gold or silver.² The existence of such traditionary repugnance among the Spartans would have seemed likely to induce them to be just towards their allies, since an equitable distribution of the treasure would have gone far to remove the difficulty; yet they nevertheless kept it all.

But besides such special offence given to the allies, the conduct of Sparta in other ways showed that she intended to turn the victory to her own account. Lysander was at this moment all-powerful, playing his own game under the name of Sparta. His position was far greater than that of the

Unparalleled ascendancy of Lysander.

¹ Justin (vi. 10) mentions the demand thus made and refused. Plutarch (Lysand. c. 27) states the demand as having been made by the Thebans *alone*, which I disbelieve. Xenophon, according to the general disorderly arrangement of facts in his Hellenika, does not mention the circumstance in its proper place, but alludes to it on a subsequent occasion as having

before occurred (Hellen. iii. 5, 5). He also specifies by name no one but the Thebans as having actually made the demand; yet there is a subsequent passage, which shows that not only the Corinthians, but other allies also, sympathised in it (iii. 5, 12).

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17; Plutarch, Institut. Læcon. p. 239.

regent Pausanias had been after the victory of Plataea; and his talents for making use of the position incomparably superior. The magnitude of his successes, as well as the eminent ability which he had displayed, justified abundant eulogy; but in his case, the eulogy was carried to the length of something like worship. Altars were erected to him; pæans or hymns were composed in his honour; the Ephesians set up his statue in the temple of their goddess Artemis, while the Samians not only erected a statue to him at Olympia, but even altered the name of their great festival—the *Heræa*—to *Lysandria*.¹ Several contemporary poets—Antilochus, Choerilus, Nikêratus, and Antimachus—devoted themselves to sing his glories and profit by his rewards.

Such excess of flattery was calculated to turn the head even of the most virtuous Greek. With Lysander, it had the effect of substituting, in place of that assumed smoothness of manner with which he began his command, an insulting harshness and arrogance corresponding to the really unmeasured ambition which he cherished.² His ambition prompted him to aggrandise Sparta separately, without any thought of her allies, in order to exercise dominion in her name. He had already established Dekarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, in many of the insular and Asiatic cities, and an oligarchy of Thirty in Athens; all composed of vehement partisans chosen by himself, dependent upon him for support, and devoted to his objects. To the eye of an impartial observer in Greece, it seemed as if all these cities had been converted into dependencies of Sparta, and were intended to be held in that condition; under Spartan authority, exercised by and through Lysander.³ Instead

¹ Pausanias, vi. 3, 6. The Samian oligarchical party owed their recent restoration to Lysander.

² Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 18, 19.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 4, 30. Οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων, Πausanίας ὁ βασιλεὺς (of Sparta), φρονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ εἰ κατειργασμένους ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκίμησιν, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίας ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, κείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἀξάγει φρουράν. Συνέποντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἑξήμαχοι πάντες,

πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων. Οὗτοι δ' ἔλεγον μὲν ὅτι οὐ νομιζοῖεν εὐορκεῖν ἂν στρατευόμενοι ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους, μηδὲν παράσπονδον ποιοῦντας· ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐγγίγνωσκον Λακεδαιμονίους βουλομένους τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων χώραν οἰκεῖαν καὶ πιστὴν ποιήσασθαι. Compare also iii. 5, 12, 13, respecting the sentiments entertained in Greece about the conduct of the Lacedæmonians.

of that general freedom which had been promised as an incentive to revolt against Athens, a Spartan empire had been constituted in place of the extinct Athenian: with a tribute, amounting to 1000 talents annually, intended to be assessed upon the component cities and islands.¹

It is easy to see that under such a state of feeling on the part of the allies of Sparta, the enormities perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens and by the Lysandrian dekharchies in the other cities, would be heard with sympathy for the sufferers; and without that strong anti-Athenian sentiment which had reigned a few months before. But—what was of still greater importance—even at Sparta itself, opposition began to spring up against the measures and the person of Lysander. If the leading men at Sparta had felt jealous even of Brasidas, who offended them only by unparalleled success and merit as a commander²—much more would the same feeling be aroused against Lysander, who displayed an overweening insolence, and was worshipped with an ostentatious flattery, not inferior to that of Pausanias after the battle of Platæa. Another Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, was now king of Sparta, in conjunction with Agis. Upon him the feeling of jealousy against Lysander told with especial force, as it did afterwards upon Agesilaus the successor of Agis; not unaccompanied probably with suspicion (which subsequent events justified) that Lysander was aiming at some interference with the regal privileges. Nor is it unfair to suppose that Pausanias was animated by motives more patriotic than mere jealousy; and that the rapacious cruelty, which everywhere dishonoured the new oligarchies, both shocked his better feelings and inspired him with fears for the stability of the system. A farther circumstance which weakened the influence of Lysander at Sparta was the annual change of Ephors, which took place about the end of September or beginning of October. Those Ephors, under whom his grand success and the capture of Athens had been consummated, and who had lent themselves entirely to his views, passed out of office in September 404 B.C., and gave place to others more disposed to second Pausanias.

Disgust
excited in
Greece by
the enormities of
the Thirty.

Opposition
to Lysander
at Sparta—
King Pausanias.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 10-13.

² Thucyd. iv.

I remarked, in the preceding chapter, how much more honourable for Sparta, and how much less unfortunate for Athens and for the rest of Greece, the close of the Peloponnesian war would have been—if Kallikratidas had gained and survived the battle of Arginusæ, so as to close it then, and to acquire for himself that personal ascendancy which the victorious general was sure to exercise over the numerous re-arrangements consequent on peace. We see how important was the personal character of the general so placed, when we follow the proceedings of Lysander during the year after the battle of Ægospotami. His personal views were the grand determining circumstance throughout Greece; regulating both the measures of Sparta and the fate of the conquered cities. Throughout the latter, rapacious and cruel oligarchies were organized—of Ten in most cities, but of Thirty in Athens—all acting under the power and protection of Sparta, but in real subordination to his ambition. Because he happened to be under the influence of a selfish thirst for power, the measures of Sparta were divested not merely of all Pan-Hellenic spirit, but even to a great degree, of reference to her own confederates—and concentrated upon the acquisition of imperial preponderance for herself. Now if Kallikratidas had been the ascendent person at this critical juncture, not only such narrow and baneful impulses would have been comparatively inoperative, but the leading state would have been made to set the example of recommending, of organizing, and if necessary, of enforcing, arrangements favourable to Pan-Hellenic brotherhood. Kallikratidas would not only have refused to lend himself to Dekarchies governing by his force and for his purposes, in the subordinate cities—but he would have discountenanced such conspiracies, wherever they tended to arise spontaneously. No ruffian like Kritias, no crafty schemer like Theramenês, would have reckoned upon his aid as they presumed upon the friendship of Lysander. Probably he would have left the government of each city to its own natural tendencies, oligarchical or democratical; interfering only in special cases of actual and pronounced necessity. Now the influence of an ascendent state, employed for such purposes and emphatically discarding all private ends for the accomplishment of a stable Pan-Hellenic sentiment

Kallikratidas compared with Lysander.

and fraternity—employed too thus, at a moment when so many of the Greek towns were in the throes of re-organization, having to take up a new political course in reference to the altered circumstances—is an element of which the force could hardly have failed to be prodigious as well as beneficial. What degree of positive good might have been wrought, by a noble-minded victor under such special circumstances—we cannot presume to affirm in detail. But it would have been no mean advantage, to have preserved Greece from beholding and feeling such enormous powers in the hands of a man like Lysander; through whose management the worst tendencies of an imperial city were studiously magnified by the exorbitance of individual ambition. It was to him exclusively that the Thirty in Athens, and the Dekarchies elsewhere, owed both their existence and their means of oppression.

It has been necessary thus to explain the general changes which had gone on in Greece and in Grecian feeling during the eight months succeeding the capture of Athens in March 404 B.C., in order that we may understand the position of the Thirty oligarchs or Tyrants at Athens, and of the Athenian population both in Attica and in exile, about the beginning of December in the same year—the period which we have now reached. We see how it was that Thebes, Corinth, and Megara, who in March had been the bitterest enemies of the Athenians, had now become alienated both from Sparta and from the Lysandrian Thirty, whom they viewed as viceroys of Athens for separate Spartan benefit. We see how the basis was thus laid of sympathy for the suffering exiles who fled from Attica; a feeling which the recital of the endless enormities perpetrated by Kritias and his colleagues inflamed every day more and more. We discern at the same time how the Thirty, while thus incurring enmity both in and out of Attica, were at the same time losing the hearty support of Sparta, from the decline of Lysander's influence, and the growing opposition of his rivals at home.

In spite of formal prohibition from Sparta—obtained doubtless under the influence of Lysander—the Athenian emigrants had obtained shelter in all the states bordering on Attica. It was from Bœotia that they struck the first blow. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus, starting from

Sympathy
at Thebes
and else-
where with
the Athe-
nian exiles.

Thrasybu-
lus seizes
Phylæ—
repulses the
Thirty in
their
attack.

Thebes with the sympathy of the Theban public and with substantial aid from Ismenias and other wealthy citizens—at the head of a small band of exiles stated variously at 30, 60, 70, or somewhat above 100 men,¹—seized Phylê, a frontier fortress in the mountains north of Attica, lying on the direct road between Athens and Thebes. Probably it had no garrison; for the Thirty, acting in the interest of Lacedæmonian predominance, had dismantled all the outlying fortresses in Attica;² so that Thrasybulus accomplished his purpose without resistance. The Thirty marched out from Athens to attack him, at the head of a powerful force, comprising the Lacedæmonian hoplites who formed their guard, the Three Thousand privileged citizens, and all the Knights or Horsemen. Probably the small company of Thrasybulus was reinforced by fresh accessions of exiles, as soon as he was known to have occupied the fort. For by the time that the Thirty with their assailing force arrived, he was in condition to repel a vigorous assault made by the younger soldiers, with considerable loss to the aggressors.

Disappointed in their direct attack, the Thirty laid plans for blockading Phylê, where they knew that there was no stock of provisions. But hardly had their operations commenced, when a snowstorm fell, so abundant and violent, that they were forced to abandon their position and retire to Athens, leaving much of their baggage in the hands of the garrison at Phylê. In the language of Thrasybulus, this storm was characterized as providential, since the weather had been very fine until the moment preceding—and since it gave time to receive reinforcements which made him 700 strong.³ Though the weather was such, that the Thirty did not choose to keep their main force in the neighbourhood of Phylê, and perhaps the Three Thousand themselves were not sufficiently hearty in the cause to allow it—yet they sent their Lacedæmonians

Farther
success of
Thrasybulus—the
Thirty
retreat to
Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 2; Diodor. xiv. 32; Pausan. i. 29, 8; Lysias, Or. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 84; Justin, v. 9; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphon. c. 62. p. 437; Demosth. cont. Timokrat. c. 34. p. 742. Æschinês allots more than 100 followers to the captors of Phylê.

The sympathy which the Athenian exiles found at Thebes is attested in a fragment of Lysias—ap. Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysia, p. 594 (Fragm. 47, ed. Bekker).

² Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 41. p. 124.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 2, 5, 14.

and two tribes of Athenian Horsemen to restrain the excursions of the garrison. This body Thrasybulus contrived to attack by surprise. Descending from Phylê by night, he halted within a quarter of a mile of their position until a little before daybreak, when the nightwatch had just broken up,¹ and when the grooms were making a noise in rubbing down the horses. Just at that moment the hoplites from Phylê rushed upon them at a running pace—found every man unprepared, some even in their beds—and dispersed them with scarcely any resistance. One hundred and twenty hoplites and a few horsemen were slain, while abundance of arms and stores were captured and carried back to Phylê in triumph.² News of the defeat was speedily conveyed to the city, from whence the remaining Horsemen immediately came forth to the rescue, but could do nothing more than protect the carrying off of the dead.

This successful engagement sensibly changed the relative situation of parties in Attica; encouraging the exiles as much as it depressed the Thirty. Even among the partisans of the latter at Athens, dissension began to arise. The minority which had sympathised with Theramenês, as well as that portion of the Three Thousand who were least comprised as accomplices in the recent enormities, began to waver so manifestly in their allegiance, that Kritias and his colleagues felt some doubt of being able to maintain themselves in the city. They resolved to secure Eleusis and the island of Salamis, as places of safety and resource in case of being compelled to evacuate Athens. They accordingly went to Eleusis with a considerable number of the Athenian Horsemen; under pretence of examining into the strength of the place and the number of its defenders, so as to determine what amount of farther garrison would be necessary. All the Eleusinians disposed and qualified for armed service were ordered to come in person and give in their names to the Thirty,³ in a building

Discord among the oligarchy at Athens—seizure of the Eleusinians.

¹ See an analogous case of a Lacedæmonian army surprised by the Thebans at this dangerous hour—Xenoph. Hellen. vii. i. 16: compare Xenoph. Magistr. Equit. vii. 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 5, 7. Dio-

dorus (xiv. 32, 33) represents the occasion of this battle somewhat differently. I follow the account of Xenophon.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 8. I apprehend that ἀπογράφεσθαι here refers to prospective military ser-

having its postern opening on to the seabeach; along which were posted the Horsemen and the attendants from Athens. Each Eleusinian hoplite, after having presented himself and returned his name to the Thirty, was ordered to pass out through this exit, where each man successively found himself in the power of the Horsemen, and was fettered by the attendants. Lysimachus, the Hipparch or commander of the Horsemen, was directed to convey all these prisoners to Athens, and hand them over to the custody of the Eleven.¹ Having thus seized and carried away from Eleusis every citizen whose sentiments or whose energy they suspected, and having left a force of their own adherents in the place, the Thirty returned to Athens. At the same time, it appears, a similar visit and seizure of prisoners was made by some of them in Salamis.² On the next day, they convoked at Athens their Three Thousand privileged hoplites—together with all the remaining horsemen who had not been employed at Eleusis or Salamis—in the Odeon, half of which was occupied by the Lacedæmonian garrison under arms. "Gentlemen (said Kritias, addressing his countrymen), we keep up the government not less for your benefit than for our own. You must therefore share with us in the danger, as well as in the honour, of our position. Here are these Eleusinian prisoners awaiting sentence: you must pass a vote condemning them all to death, in order that your hopes and fears may be identified with ours." He then pointed to a spot immediately before him and in his view, directing each man to deposit upon it his pebble of condemnation visibly to every one.³ I have before remarked that at Athens, open voting was well known to be the same thing as voting

vice; as in vi. 5, 29, and in *Cyropsæd.* ii. 1, 18, 19. The words in the context—*πόσης φυλακῆς προσδεήσονται*—attest that such is the meaning; though the commentators, and Sturz in his *Lexicon Xenophonteum*, interpret differently.

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 4, 8.

² Both *Lysias* (*Orat.* xii. cont. *Eratoth.* s. 53; *Orat.* xiii. cont. *Agorat.* s. 47) and *Diodorus* (xiv. 32) connect together these two

similar proceedings at Eleusis and at Salamis. Xenophon mentions only the affair at Eleusis.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 4, 9. *Δαίτας δὲ τὸ χωρίον, ἐς τοῦτο ἐπέλευσε φανεράν φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον.* Compare *Lysias*, *Or.* xiii. cont. *Agorat.* s. 40, and *Thucyd.* iv. 74, about the conduct of the Megarian oligarchical leaders—*καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερόν διεσπείναι, &c.*

under constraint: there was no security for free and genuine suffrage except by making it secret as well as numerous. Kritias was obeyed, without reserve or exception: probably any dissentient would have been put to death on the spot. All the prisoners, seemingly three hundred in number,¹ were condemned by the same vote, and executed forthwith.

Though this atrocity gave additional satisfaction and confidence to the most violent friends of Kritias, it probably alienated a greater number of others, and weakened the Thirty instead of strengthening them. It contributed in part, we can hardly doubt, to the bold and decisive resolution now taken by Thrasybulus, five days after his late success, of marching by night from Phylê to Peiræus.² His force, though somewhat increased, was still no more than 1000 men; altogether inadequate by itself to any considerable enterprise, had he not counted on positive support and junction from fresh comrades, together with a still greater amount of negative support from disgust or indifference towards the Thirty. He was indeed speedily joined by many sympathising countrymen, but few of them, since the general disarming manœuvre of the oligarchs, had heavy armour. Some had light shields and darts, but others were wholly unarmed, and could merely serve as throwers of stones.³

Peiræus was at this moment an open town, deprived of its fortifications as well as of those Long Walls which had so long connected it with Athens. It was also of large compass, and required an ampler force to defend it than Thrasybulus could muster. Accordingly, when the Thirty marched out of Athens the next morning to attack him, with their full force of Athenian hoplites and Horsemen, and with the Lacedæmonian garrison besides—he in vain attempted to maintain against them the great carriage-road which led down to Peiræus. He was compelled to concentrate his forces in Munychia—the easternmost portion of the aggregate called Peiræus, nearest to the Bay of Phalêrum, and comprising one of those three ports which

Thrasybulus establishes himself in Peiræus.

The Thirty attack him and are defeated—Kritias is slain.

¹ Lysias (Orat. xli. cont. Eratosth. ἡμέραν πέμπτην, &c. s. 53) gives this number.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 12.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 10, 13.

had once sustained the naval power of Athens. Thrasybulus occupied the temple of Artemis Munychia, and the adjoining Bendideion, situated in the midst of Munychia, and accessible only by a street of steep ascent. In the rear of his hoplites, whose files were ten deep, were posted the darters and slingers; the ascent being so steep that these latter could cast their missiles over the heads of the hoplites in their front. Presently Kritias and the Thirty, having first mustered in the market-place of Peiræus (called the Hippodamian Agora), were seen approaching with their superior numbers; mounting the hill in close array, with hoplites not less than fifty in depth. Thrasybulus—after an animated exhortation to his soldiers, reminding them of the wrongs which they had to avenge, and dwelling upon the advantages of their position, which exposed the close ranks of the enemy to the destructive effect of missiles and would force them to crouch under their shields so as to be unable to resist a charge with the spear in front—waited patiently until they came within distance, standing in the foremost rank with the prophet (habitually consulted before a battle) by his side. The latter, a brave and devoted patriot, while promising victory, had exhorted his comrades not to charge until some one on their own side should be slain or wounded: he at the same time predicted his own death in the conflict. When the troops of the Thirty advanced near enough in ascending the hill, the light-armed in the rear of Thrasybulus poured upon them a shower of darts over the heads of their own hoplites, with considerable effect. As they seemed to waver, seeking to cover themselves with their shields, and thus not seeing well before them—the prophet, himself seemingly in arms, set the example of rushing forward, was the first to close with the enemy, and perished in the onset. Thrasybulus with the main body of hoplites followed him, charged vigorously down the hill, and after a smart resistance, drove them back in disorder, with the loss of seventy men. What was of still greater moment—Kritias and Hippomachus, who headed their troops on the left, were among the slain; together with Charmidês son of Glaukon, one of the ten oligarchs who had been placed to manage Peiræus.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 12, 20.

This great and important advantage left the troops of Thrasybulus in possession of seventy of the enemy's dead, whom they stripped of their arms, but not of their clothing, in token of respect for fellow-countrymen.¹ So disheartened, lukewarm, and disunited were the hoplites of the Thirty, in spite of their great superiority of number, that they sent to solicit the usual truce for burying the dead. Such request being of course granted, the two contending parties became intermingled with each other in the performance of the funereal duties. Amidst so impressive a scene, their common feelings as Athenians and fellow-countrymen were forcibly brought back, and many friendly observations were interchanged among them. Kleokritus—herald of the Mysts or communicants in the Eleusinian mysteries, belonging to one of the most respected Gentes in the state—was among the exiles. His voice was peculiarly loud, and the function which he held enabled him to obtain silence while he addressed to the citizens serving with the Thirty a touching and emphatic remonstrance:—"Why are you thus driving us into banishment, fellow-citizens? Why are you seeking to kill us? We have never done you the least harm: we have partaken with you in religious rites and festivals: we have been your companions in chorus, in school, and in army: we have braved a thousand dangers with you by land and sea in defence of our common safety and freedom. I adjure you by our common gods, paternal and maternal—by our common kindred and companionship—desist from thus wronging your country in obedience to these nefarious Thirty, who have slain as many citizens in eight months, for their own private gains, as the Peloponnesians in ten years of war. These are the men who have plunged us into wicked and odious war one against another, when we might live together in peace. Be assured that your slain in this battle have cost us as many tears as they have cost you."²

Such affecting appeals, proceeding from a man of respected station like Kleokritus and doubtless from others also, began to work so sensibly on the minds of the citizens from Athens, that the Thirty were obliged to give

Colloquy
during the
burial-
truce—
language
of Kleo-
kritus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 19; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 22.

orders for immediately returning: which Thrasybulus did not attempt to prevent, though it might have been in his power to do so.¹ But their ascendancy had received a shock from which it never fully recovered. On the next day they appeared downcast and dispirited in the senate, which was itself thinly attended; while the privileged Three Thousand, marshalled in different companies on guard, were everywhere in discord and partial mutiny. Those among them who had been most compromised in the crimes of the

Discourage-
ment of the
oligarchs at
Athens—
deposition
of the
Thirty and
appoint-
ment of the
Ten—the
Thirty go to
Eleusis.

Thirty, were strenuous in upholding the existing authority; but such as had been less guilty protested against the continuance of so unholy a war, declaring that the Thirty could not be permitted to bring Athens to utter ruin. And though the Knights or Horsemen still continued steadfast partisans, resolutely opposing all accommodation with the exiles,² yet the Thirty were also seriously weakened by the death of Kritias—the ascendent and decisive head, and at the same time the most cruel and unprincipled among them; while that party, both in the senate and out of it, which had formerly adhered to Theramenês, now again raised its head. A public meeting among them was held, in which what may be called the opposition party among the Thirty—that which had opposed the extreme enormities of Kritias—became predominant. It was determined to depose the Thirty, and to constitute a fresh oligarchy of Ten, one from each tribe.³ But the members of the Thirty were held to be individually re-eligible; so that two of them, Eratosthenês and Pheidon, if not more—adherents of Theramenês and unfriendly to Kritias and Chariklês⁴—with others of the same vein of sentiment, were chosen among the Ten. Chariklês and the more violent members, having thus lost their ascendancy, no longer deemed themselves safe at Athens, but retired to Eleusis, which they had had the precaution to occupy beforehand. Probably a number of their partisans, and the Lacedæmonian garrison also, retired thither along with them.

The nomination of this new oligarchy of Ten was

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 22; Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 55—οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πειραιέως χρεῖττους ὄντας εἰσάσαν αὐτοὺς ἀπελθεῖν, &c.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 24.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 23.

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 55, 56—οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρίκλει καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοῦτων ἐταιρίᾳ, &c.

plainly a compromise, adopted by some from sincere disgust at the oligarchical system and desire to come to accommodation with the exiles—by others, from a conviction that the only way of maintaining the oligarchical system, and repelling the exiles, was to constitute a new oligarchical Board, dismissing that which had become obnoxious. The latter was the purpose of the Horsemen, the main upholders of the first Board as well as of the second; and such also was soon seen to be the policy of Eratosthenês and his colleagues. Instead of attempting to agree upon terms of accommodation with the exiles in Peiræus generally, they merely tried to corrupt separately Thrasybulus and the leaders, offering to admit ten of them to a share of the oligarchical power at Athens, provided they would betray their party. This offer having been indignantly refused, the war was again resumed between Athens and Peiræus—to the bitter disappointment, not less of the exiles, than of that portion of the Athenians who had hoped better things from the new Board of Ten.¹

But the forces of oligarchy were more and more enfeebled at Athens,² as well by the secession of all the more violent spirits to Eleusis, as by the mistrust, discord, and disaffection, which now reigned within the city. Far from being able to abuse power like their predecessors, the Ten did not even fully confide in their Three Thousand hoplites, but were obliged to take measures for the defence of the city in conjunction with the Hipparch and the Horsemen, who did double duty—on horseback in the daytime, and as hoplites with their shields along the walls at night, for fear of surprise—employing the Odeon as their head-quarters. The Ten sent envoys to Sparta to solicit farther aid; while the Thirty sent envoys thither also, from Eleusis, for the same purpose; both representing that the Athenian people had revolted from Sparta, and required farther force to reconquer them.³

Such foreign aid became daily more necessary to them, since the forces of Thrasybulus in Peiræus grew stronger, before their eyes, in numbers, in arms, and in hope of success; exerting themselves,

The Ten
carry on the
war against
the exiles.

Increasing
strength of
Thrasy-
bulus.

¹ The facts which I have here set down result from a comparison of Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 53, 59, 94—Θεῖδων, αἰρεθεὶς ὑμᾶς διαλλάξαι καὶ καταγαγεῖν. Diodor.

xiv. 32; Justin. v. 9.

² Isokrates, Or. xviii. cont. Kallimach. s. 25.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 24, 28.

with successful energy, to procure additional arms and shields—though some of the shields, indeed, were no better than wood-work or wicker-work whitened over.¹ Many exiles flocked in to their aid: others sent donations of money or arms. Among the latter the orator Lysias stood conspicuous, transmitting to Peiræus a present of 200 shields as well as 2000 drachms in money, and hiring besides 300 fresh soldiers; while his friend Thrasydæus, the leader of the democratical interest at Elis, was induced to furnish a loan of two talents.² Others also lent money; some Bœotians furnished two talents, and a person named Gelarchus contributed the large sum of five talents, repaid in aftertimes by the people.³ Proclamation was made by Thrasybulus, that all metics who would lend aid should be put on the footing of isotely or equal payment of taxes with citizens, exempt from the metic-tax and other special burthens. Within a short time he had got together a considerable force both in heavy-armed and light-armed, and even seventy horsemen; so that he was in condition to make excursions out of Peiræus, and to collect wood and provisions. Nor did the Ten venture to make any aggressive movement out of Athens, except so far as to send out the Horsemen, who slew or captured stragglers from the force of Thrasybulus. Lysimachus the Hipparch (the same who had commanded under the Thirty at the seizure of the Eleusinian citizens) having made prisoners some young Athenians bringing in provisions from the country for the consumption of the troops in Peiræus, put them to death—in spite of remonstrances from several even of his own men; for which cruelty Thrasybulus retaliated, by putting to death a horseman named Kallistratus, made prisoner in one of their marches to the neighbouring villages.⁴

In the established civil war which now raged in Attica, Thrasybulus and the exiles in Peiræus had decidedly the advantage; maintaining the offensive, while the Ten in Athens, and the remainder of the Thirty at Eleusis, were each thrown upon

Arrival of
Lysander in
Attica with
a Spartan
force.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 25.

² Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 835;
Lysias, Or. xxxi. cont. Philon. s.
19-34.

Lysias and his brother had carried
on a manufactory of shields at
Athens. The Thirty had plundered

it; but some of the stock may prob-
ably have been saved.

³ Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 32.
p. 502; Lysias cont. Nikomach. Or.
xxx. s. 29.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 27.

their defence. The division of the oligarchical force into these two sections doubtless weakened both, while the democrats in Peiræus were hearty and united. Presently however the arrival of a Spartan auxiliary force altered the balance of parties. Lysander, whom the oligarchical envoys had expressly requested to be sent to them as general, prevailed with the Ephors to grant their request. While he himself went to Eleusis and got together a Peloponnesian land-force, his brother Libys conducted a fleet of forty triremes to block up Peiræus, and 100 talents were lent to the Athenian oligarchs out of the large sum recently brought from Asia into the Spartan treasury.¹

The arrival of Lysander brought the two sections of oligarchs in Attica again into cooperation, restrained the progress of Thrasybulus and even reduced Peiræus to great straits by preventing all entry of ships or stores. Nothing could have prevented it from being reduced to surrender, if Lysander had been allowed free scope in his operations. But the general sentiment of Greece had by this time become disgusted with his ambitious policy, and with the oligarchies which he had everywhere set up as his instruments; a sentiment not without influence on the feelings of the leading Spartans, who, already jealous of his ascendancy, were determined not to increase it farther by allowing him to conquer Attica a second time, in order to plant his own creatures as rulers at Athens.²

Straitened condition of the exiles in Peiræus.

Under the influence of these feelings, King Pausanias obtained the consent of three out of the five Ephors to undertake himself an expedition into Attica, at the head of the forces of the confederacy, for which he immediately issued proclamation. Opposed to the political tendencies of Lysander, he was somewhat inclined to sympathise with the democracy; not merely at Athens, but elsewhere also—as at Mantinea.³ It was probably understood

Spartan King Pausanias conducts an expedition into Attica; opposed to Lysander.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 28; Diodor. xiv. 33; Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 60.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 29. Οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων, Πausανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς, φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ, εἰ καταργησάμενος ταῦτα ἔμα μὲν εὐδοκίμησιν, ἔμα δὲ ἰδίᾳ κινήσειτο τὰς Ἀθήνας,

πέλας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν.

Diodor. xiv. 33. Πausανίας δὲ . . . , φθονῶν μὲν τῷ Λυσάνδρῳ, θεωρῶν δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ἀδοξοῦσαν κατὰ τοὺς Ἕλλησι, &c.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 3.

that his intentions towards Athens were lenient and anti-Lysandrian, so that the Peloponnesian allies obeyed the summons generally. Yet the Boeotians and Corinthians still declined, on the ground that Athens had done nothing to violate the late convention; a remarkable proof of the altered feelings of Greece during the last year, since down to the period of that convention, these two states had been more bitterly hostile to Athens than any others in the confederacy. They suspected that even the expedition of Pausanias was projected with selfish Lacedæmonian views, to secure Attica as a separate dependency of Sparta, though detached from Lysander.¹

On approaching Athens, Pausanias, joined by Lysander and the forces already in Attica, encamped in the garden of the Academy near the city gates. His sentiments were sufficiently known beforehand to offer encouragement; so that the vehement reaction against the atrocities of the Thirty, which the presence of Lysander had doubtless stifled, burst forth without delay. The surviving relatives of the victims slain beset him even at the Academy in his camp, with prayers for protection and cries of vengeance against the oligarchs. Among those victims (as I have already stated) were Nikêratus the son, and Eukratês the brother, of Nikias who had perished at Syracuse, the friend and proxenus of Sparta at Athens. The orphan children, both of Nikêratus and Eukratês, were taken to Pausanias by their relative Diognêtus, who implored his protection for them, recounting at the same time the unmerited execution of their respective fathers, and setting forth their family claims upon the justice of Sparta. This affecting incident, which has been specially made known to us,² doubtless did not stand alone, among so many families suffering from the same cause. Pausanias was furnished at once with ample grounds, not merely for repudiating the Thirty altogether, and sending back the presents which they tendered to him³—but even for refusing

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 30.

² Lysias, Or. xviii. De Bonis Nicis Frat. s. 8-10.

³ Lysias, *ut sup.* s. 11, 12. ὅθεν Παισαίας ἤρξατο εὖνους εἶναι τῷ ἥμῃ, παράδογμα ποιούμενος πρὸς

τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἡμετέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πονηρίας. . . .

ὁδῶν δ' ἡλεούμεθα, καὶ πᾶσι δεινὰ ἔδοκούμεν πεπονθέναι, ὥστε Παισαίας τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν τριάκοντα ξένια

to identify himself unreservedly with the new Oligarchy of Ten which had risen upon their ruins. The voice of complaint—now for the first time set free, with some hopes of redress—must have been violent and unmeasured, after such a career as that of Kritias and his colleagues; while the fact was now fully manifested, which could not well have come forth into evidence before, that the persons despoiled and murdered had been chiefly opulent men, and very frequently even oligarchical men—not politicians of the former democracy. Both Pausanias, and the Lacedæmonians along with him, on reaching Athens, must have been strongly affected by the facts which they learnt, and by the loud cry for sympathy and redress which poured upon them from the most innocent and respected families. The predisposition both of the King and the Ephors against the policy of Lysander was materially strengthened; as well as their inclination to bring about an accommodation of parties, instead of upholding by foreign force an anti-popular Few.

Such convictions would become farther confirmed as Pausanias saw and heard more of the real state of affairs. At first he held a language decidedly adverse to Thrasybulus and the exiles, sending to them a herald, and requiring them to disband and go to their respective homes.¹ The requisition not being obeyed, he made a faint attack upon Peiræus, which had no effect. Next day he marched down with two Lacedæmonian moræ or large military divisions, and three tribes of the Athenian Horsemen, to reconnoitre the place, and see where a line of blockade could be drawn. Some light troops annoyed him, but his troops repulsed them, even as far as the theatre of Peiræus, where all the forces of Thrasybulus were mustered, heavy-armed as well as light-armed. The Lacedæmonians were here in a disadvantageous position, probably in the midst of houses and streets, so that all the light-armed of Thrasybulus were enabled to set upon them furiously from different sides, and drive them out again with loss—two of the Spartan polemarchs being here slain. Pausanias was obliged to retreat to a little eminence about half a mile off, where he

Pausanias attacks Peiræus: his partial success.

οὐκ ἠθέλησε λαβεῖν, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐδέξατο.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 31. This

seems the meaning of the phrase ἀπέναντι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν, as we may see by s. 38.

mustered his whole force, and formed his hoplites into a very deep phalanx. Thrasybulus on his side was so encouraged by the recent success of his light-armed, that he ventured to bring out his heavy-armed, only eight deep, to an equal conflict on the open ground. But he was here completely worsted, and driven back into Peiræus with the loss of 150 men; so that the Spartan King was able to retire to Athens after a victory and a trophy erected to commemorate it.¹

The issue of this battle was one extremely fortunate for Thrasybulus and his comrades; since it left the honours of the day with Pausanias, so as to avoid provoking enmity or vengeance on his part—while it showed plainly that the conquest of Peiræus, defended by so much courage and military efficiency, would be no easy matter. It disposed Pausanias still farther towards an accommodation; strengthening also the force of that party in Athens which was favourable to the same object, and adverse to the Ten Oligarchs. This opposition-party found decided favour with the Spartan King, as well as with the Ephor Naukleidas who accompanied him. Numbers of Athenians, even among those Three Thousand by whom the city was now exclusively occupied, came forward to deprecate farther war with Peiræus, and to entreat that Pausanias would settle the quarrel so as to leave them all at amity with Lacedæmon. Xenophon indeed, according to that narrow and partial spirit which pervades his Hellenica, notices no sentiment in Pausanias except his jealousy of Lysander; and treats the opposition against the Ten at Athens as having been got up by his intrigues.² But it seems plain that this is not a correct account. Pausanias did not create the discord, but found it already existing; and had to choose which of the parties he would adopt. The Ten took up the oligarchical game after it had been thoroughly dishonoured and ruined by the Thirty. They inspired no confidence, nor had they any hold upon the citizens in Athens, except in so far as these latter dreaded reactionary violence, in case Thrasybulus and his companions should re-enter by force. Accordingly, when Pausanias was there

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 31-34.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 35. Ἀντιγόη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄσπρῳ (Pausanias)

καὶ ἐπέλεξε πρὸς σφᾶς προσεῖναι ὡς πλείστοις συλλεγομένους, λέγοντας, &c.

at the head of a force competent to prevent such dangerous reaction, the citizens at once manifested their dispositions against the Ten, and favourable to peace with Peiræus. To second this pacific party was at once the easiest course for Pausanias to take, and the most likely to popularise Sparta in Greece; whereas he would surely have entailed upon her still more bitter curses from without, not to mention the loss of men to herself, if he had employed the amount of force requisite to uphold the Ten, and subdue Peiræus. To all this we have to add his jealousy of Lysander, as an important predisposing motive, but only as auxiliary among many others.

Under such a state of facts, it is not surprising to learn that Pausanias encouraged solicitations for peace from Thrasybulus and the exiles, and that he granted them a truce to enable them to send envoys to Sparta. Along with these envoys went Kephisophon and Melitus, sent for the same purpose of entreating peace, by the party opposed to the Ten at Athens; under the sanction both of Pausanias and of the accompanying Ephors. On the other hand, the Ten, finding themselves discountenanced by Pausanias, sent envoys of their own to outbid the others. They tendered themselves, their walls, and their city, to be dealt with as the Lacedæmonians chose; requiring that Thrasybulus, if he pretended to be the friend of Sparta, should make the same unqualified surrender of Peiræus and Munychia. All the three sets of envoys were heard before the three Ephors remaining at Sparta and the Lacedæmonian assembly; who took the best resolution which the case admitted—to bring to pass an amicable settlement between Athens and Peiræus, and to leave the terms to be fixed by fifteen commissioners, who were sent thither forthwith to sit in conjunction with Pausanias. This Board determined, that the exiles in Peiræus should be re-admitted to Athens; that an accommodation should take place; and that no man should be molested for past acts, except the Thirty, the Eleven (who had been the instruments of all executions), and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. But Eleusis was recognized as a government separate from Athens, and left (as it already was) in possession of the Thirty and their coadjutors; to serve as a refuge for all those who

Pacification
granted by
Pausanias
and the
Spartan
authorities.

might feel their future safety compromised at Athens in consequence of their past conduct.¹

As soon as these terms were proclaimed, accepted, and sworn to by all parties, Pausanias with all the Lacedæmonians evacuated Attica. Thrasybulus and the exiles marched up in solemn procession from Peiræus to Athens. Their first act was to go up to the acropolis, now relieved from its Lacedæmonian garrison, and there to offer sacrifice and thanksgiving. On descending from thence, a general assembly was held, in which—unanimously and without opposition, as it should seem—the democracy was restored. The government of the Ten, which could have no basis except the sword of the foreigner, disappeared as a matter of course. But Thrasybulus, while he strenuously enforced upon his comrades from Peiræus a full respect for the oaths which they had sworn, and an unreserved harmony with their newly acquired fellow-citizens, admonished the assembly emphatically as to the past events. "You city-men (he said), I advise you to take just measure of yourselves for the future; and to calculate fairly, what ground of superiority you have, so as to pretend to rule over us. Are you juster than we? Why, the Demos, though poorer than you, never at any time wronged you for the purposes of plunder; while you, the wealthiest of all, have done many base deeds for the sake of gain. Since then you have no justice to boast of, are you superior to us on the score of courage? There cannot be a better trial, than the war which has just ended. Again—can you pretend to be superior in policy? you, who—having a fortified city, an armed force, plenty of money, and the Peloponnesians for your allies—have been overcome by men who had nothing of the kind to aid them? Can you boast of your hold over the Lacedæmonians? Why, they have just handed you over, like a vicious dog with a clog tied to him, to the very Demos whom you have wronged—and are now gone out of the country. But you have no cause to be uneasy for the future. I adjure you, my friends from Peiræus, in no point to violate the oaths which we have just sworn. Show, in addition to your other glorious exploits, that you are honest and true to your engagements."²

The Spartans evacuate Attica—Thrasybulus and the exiles are restored—harangue of Thrasybulus.

¹ Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 39; Diod. xiv. 33. ² Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 40-42.

The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, the public assembly, and the Dikasteries appear to have been now revived, as they had stood in the democracy prior to the capture of the city by Lysander. This important restoration seems to have taken place some time in the spring of 403 B.C., though we cannot exactly make out in what month. The first archon now drawn was Enkleidês, who gave his name to this memorable year; a year never afterwards forgotten by Athenians.

Eleusis was at this time, and pursuant to the late convention, a city independent and separate from Athens, under the government of the Thirty, and comprising their warmest partisans. It was not likely that this separation would last; but the Thirty were themselves the parties to give cause for its termination. They were getting together a mercenary force at Eleusis, when the whole force of Athens was marched to forestall their designs. The generals at Eleusis came forth to demand a conference, but were seized and put to death; the Thirty themselves, and a few of the most obnoxious individuals, fled out of Attica; while the rest of the Eleusinian occupants were persuaded by their friends from Athens to come to an equal and honourable accommodation. Again Eleusis became incorporated in the same community with Athens; oaths of mutual amnesty and harmony being sworn by every one.¹

Restoration
of the de-
mocracy.

Capture of
Eleusis—
entire re-
union of
Attica—
flight of the
survivors of
the Thirty.

We have now passed that short, but bitter and sanguinary interval, occupied by the Thirty, which succeeded so immediately upon the extinction of the empire and independence of Athens, as to leave no opportunity for pause or reflection. A few words respecting the rise and fall of that empire are now required—summing up as it

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 48; Justin. v. 11. I do not comprehend the allusion in Lysias, Orat. xxv. Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. s. 11—εἰσι δὲ οἱ τινες

τῶν Ἐλευσινιαδῶν ἀπογραφάμενων, ἐξεληθόντες μετ' ἑμῶν, ἐπολιορκούντο μετ' αὐτῶν.

were the political moral of the events recorded in the present and in the preceding volume, between 477 and 405 B.C.

I related in the forty-fifth chapter the steps by which Athens first acquired her empire—raised it to its maximum, including both maritime and inland dominion—then lost the inland portion of it; which loss was ratified by the Thirty years' Truce concluded with Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 445 B.C. Her maritime empire was based upon the confederacy of Delos, formed by the islands in the *Ægean* and the towns on the sea-board immediately after the battles of *Platæa* and *Mykalê*, for the purpose not merely of expelling the Persians from the *Ægean*, but of keeping them away permanently. To the accomplishment of this important object Sparta was altogether inadequate; nor would it ever have been accomplished, if Athens had not displayed a combination of military energy, naval discipline, power of organization, and honourable devotion to a great Pan-Hellenic purpose—such as had never been witnessed in Grecian history.

The Confederacy of Delos was formed by the free and spontaneous association of many different towns, all alike independent; towns which met in synod and deliberated by equal vote—took by their majority resolutions binding upon all—and chose Athens as their chief to enforce these resolutions, as well as to superintend generally the war against the common enemy. But it was, from the beginning, a compact which permanently bound each individual state to the remainder. None had liberty, either to recede or to withhold the contingent imposed by authority of the common synod, or to take any separate step inconsistent with its obligations to the confederacy. No union less stringent than this could have prevented the renewal of Persian ascendancy in the *Ægean*. Seceding or disobedient states were thus treated as guilty of treason or revolt, which it was the duty of Athens, as chief, to repress. Her first repressions, against *Naxos* and other states, were undertaken in prosecution of such duty; in which if she had been wanting, the confederacy would have fallen to pieces, and the common enemy would have reappeared.

Now the only way by which the confederacy was saved from falling to pieces, was by being transformed into an Athenian empire. Such transformation (as *Thucydides*

plainly intimates¹) did not arise from the ambition or deep-laid projects of Athens, but from the reluctance of the larger confederates to discharge the obligations imposed by the common synod, and from the unwarlike character of the confederates generally—which made them desirous to commute military service for money-payment, while Athens on her part was not less anxious to perform the service and obtain the money. By gradual and unforeseen stages, Athens thus passed from consulate to empire; in such manner that no one could point out the precise moment of time when the confederacy of Delos ceased, and when the empire began. Even the transfer of the common fund from Delos to Athens, which was the palpable manifestation of a change already realized, was not an act of high-handed injustice in the Athenians, but warranted by prudential views of the existing state of affairs, and even proposed by a leading member of the confederacy.²

But the Athenian empire came to include (between 460—446 B.C.) other cities not parties to the confederacy of Delos. Athens had conquered her ancient enemy the island of Ægina, and had acquired supremacy over Megara, Bœotia, Phokis and Lokris, and Achaia in Peloponnesus. The Megarians joined her to escape the oppression of their neighbour Corinth: her influence over Bœotia was acquired by allying herself with a democratical party in the Bœotian cities, against Sparta who had been actively interfering to sustain the opposite party and to renovate the ascendancy of Thebes. Athens was, for the time, successful in all these enterprises; but if we follow the details, we shall not find her more open to reproach on the score of aggressive tendencies than Sparta or Corinth. Her empire was now at its maximum; and had she been able to maintain it—or even to keep possession of the Megarid separately, which gave her the means of barring out all invasions from Peloponnesus—the future course of Grecian history would have been materially altered. But her empire on land did not rest upon the same footing as her empire at sea. The exiles in Megara and Bœotia, &c., and the anti-Athenian party generally in those places—combined with the rashness of her general Tolmidês at Koroneia—deprived her of all her land-dependencies near home, and even threatened her with the loss of Eubœa. The peace con-

¹ Thucyd. i. 97.

² See ch. xlv. of this History.

cluded in 445 B.C. left her with all her maritime and insular empire (including Eubœa), but with nothing more; while by the loss of Megara she was now open to invasion from Peloponnesus.

On this footing she remained at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards. I have shown that that war did not arise (as has been so often asserted) from aggressive or ambitious schemes on the part of Athens, but that, on the contrary, the aggression was all on the side of her enemies, who were full of hopes that they could put her down with little delay; while she was not merely conservative and defensive, but even discouraged by the certainty of destructive invasion, and only dissuaded from concessions, alike imprudent and inglorious, by the extraordinary influence and resolute wisdom of Periklês. That great man comprehended well both the conditions and the limits of Athenian empire. Athens was now understood (especially since the revolt and reconquest of the powerful island of Samos in 440 B.C.) by her subjects and enemies, as well as by her own citizens, to be mistress of the sea. It was the care of Periklês to keep that belief within definite boundaries, and to prevent all waste of the force of the city in making new or distant acquisitions which could not be permanently maintained. But it was also his care to enforce upon his countrymen the lesson of maintaining their existing empire unimpaired, and shrinking from no effort requisite for that end. Though their whole empire was now staked upon the chances of a perilous war, he did not hesitate to promise them success, provided that they adhered to this conservative policy.

Following the events of the war, we shall find that Athens did adhere to it for the first seven years; years of suffering and trial, from the destructive annual invasion, the yet more destructive pestilence, and the revolt of Mitylênê—but years which still left her empire unimpaired, and the promises of Periklês in fair chance of being realized. In the seventh year of the war occurred the unexpected victory at Sphakteria and the capture of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. This placed in the hands of the Athenians a capital advantage, imparting to them prodigious confidence of future success, while their enemies were in a proportional degree disheartened. It was in this temper that they first departed from the conservative precept of

Periklēs, and attempted to recover (in 424 B.C.) both Megara and Bœotia. Had the great statesman been alive,¹ he might have turned this moment of superiority to better account, and might perhaps have contrived even to get possession of Megara (a point of unspeakable importance to Athens, since it protected her against invasion) in exchange for the Spartan captives. But the general feeling of confidence which then animated all parties at Athens, determined them (in 424 B.C.) to grasp at this and much more by force. They tried to reconquer both Megara and Bœotia: in the former they failed, though succeeding so far as to capture Nisæa; in the latter they not only failed, but suffered the disastrous defeat of Delium.

It was in the autumn of that same year 424 B.C., too, that Brasidas broke into their empire in Thrace, and robbed them of Akanthus, Stageira, and some other towns, including their most precious possession—Amphipolis. Again it seems that the Athenians—partly from the discouragement caused by the disaster at Delium, partly from the ascendancy of Nikias and the peace party—departed from the conservative policy of Periklēs; not by ambitious overaction, but by inaction—omitting to do all that might have been done to arrest the progress of Brasidas. We must however never forget, that their capital loss—Amphipolis—was owing altogether to the improvidence of their officers, and could not have been obviated even by Periklēs.

But though that great man could not have prevented the loss, he would assuredly have deemed no efforts too great to recover it; and in this respect his policy was espoused by Kleon, in opposition to Nikias and the peace party. The latter thought it wise to make the truce for a year; which so utterly failed of its effect, that Nikias was obliged, even in the midst of it, to conduct an armament to Pallênê in order to preserve the empire against yet farther losses. Still Nikias and his friends would hear of nothing but peace; and after the expedition of Kleon against Amphipolis in the ensuing year (which failed partly through his military incapacity, partly through the want of hearty concurrence in his political opponents), they concluded what is called the *peace of Nikias* in the ensuing spring. In this, too, their calculations are not less signally falsified than in the previous truce: they stipulate that

¹ See ch. III. of this History.

Amphipolis shall be restored, but it is as far from being restored as ever. To make the error still graver and more irreparable, Nikias, with the concurrence of Alkibiadès, contracts the alliance with Sparta a few months after the peace, and gives up the captives, the possession of whom was the only hold which Athens still had upon the Spartans.

We thus have, during the four years succeeding the battle of Delium (424—420 B.C.), a series of departures from the conservative policy of Periklès; departures, not in the way of ambitious over-acquisition, but of languor and unwillingness to make efforts even for the recovery of capital losses. Those who see no defects in the foreign policy of the democracy, except those of over-ambition and love of war, pursuant to the jests of Aristophanès—overlook altogether these opposite but serious blunders of Nikias and the peace party.

Next comes the ascendancy of Alkibiadès, leading to the two years' campaign in Peloponnesus in conjunction with Elis, Argos, and Mantinea, and ending in the complete re-establishment of Lacedæmonian supremacy. Here was a diversion of Athenian force from its legitimate purpose of preserving or re-establishing the empire, for inland projects which Periklès could never have approved. The island of Melos undoubtedly fell within his general conceptions of tenable empire for Athens. But we may regard it as certain that he would have recommended no new projects, exposing Athens to the reproach of injustice, so long as the lost legitimate possessions in Thrace remained unconquered.

We now come to the expedition against Syracuse. Down to that period, the empire of Athens (except the possessions in Thrace) remained undiminished, and her general power nearly as great as it had ever been since 445 B.C. That expedition was the one great and fatal departure from the Periklean policy, bringing upon Athens an amount of disaster from which she never recovered. It was doubtless an error of over-ambition. Acquisitions in Sicily, even if made, lay out of the conditions of permanent empire for Athens; and however imposing the first effect of success might have been, they would only have disseminated her strength, multiplied her enemies, and weakened her in all quarters. But though the expedition itself was thus indisputably ill-advised, and therefore ought

to count to the discredit of the public judgment at Athens—we are not to impute to that public an amount of blame in any way commensurate to the magnitude of the disaster, except in so far as they were guilty of unmeasured and unconquerable esteem for Nikias. Though Periklēs would have strenuously opposed the project, yet he could not possibly have foreseen the enormous ruin in which it would end; nor could such ruin have been brought about by any man existing, save Nikias. Even when the people committed the aggravated imprudence of sending out the second expedition, Demosthenēs doubtless assured them that he would speedily either take Syracuse or bring back both armaments, with a fair allowance for the losses inseparable from failure; and so he would have done, if the obstinacy of Nikias had permitted. In measuring therefore the extent of misjudgement fairly imputable to the Athenians for this ruinous undertaking, we must always recollect, that first the failure of the siege, next the ruin of the armament, did not arise from intrinsic difficulties in the case, but from the personal defects of the commander.

After the Syracusan disaster, there is no longer any question about adhering to, or departing from the Periklean policy. Athens is like Patroklos in the *Iliad*, after Apollo has stunned him by a blow on the back and loosened his armour. Nothing but the slackness of her enemies allowed her time for a partial recovery, so as to make increased heroism a substitute for impaired force, even against doubled and tripled difficulties. And the years of struggle which she now went through are among the most glorious events in her history. These years present many misfortunes, but no serious misjudgement; not to mention one peculiarly honourable moment, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred. I have in the two preceding chapters examined into the blame imputed to the Athenians for not accepting the overtures of peace after the battle of Kyzikus, and for dismissing Alkibiadēs after the battle of Notium. On both points their conduct has been shown to be justifiable. And after all, they were on the point of partially recovering themselves in 408 B.C., when the unexpected advent of Cyrus set the seal to their destiny.

The bloodshed after the recapture of Mitylênê and Skionê, and still more that which succeeded the capture of

Melos, are disgraceful to the humanity of Athens, and stand in pointed contrast with the treatment of Samos when reconquered by Periklês. But they did not contribute sensibly to break down her power; though being recollected with aversion after other incidents were forgotten, they are alluded to in later times as if they had caused the fall of the empire.¹

I have thought it important to recall, in this short summary, the leading events of the seventy years preceding 405 B.C., in order that it may be understood to what degree Athens was politically or prudentially to blame for the great downfall which she then underwent. Her downfall had one great cause—we may almost say, one single cause—the Sicilian expedition. The empire of Athens both was, and appeared to be, in exuberant strength when that expedition was sent forth; strength more than sufficient to bear up against all moderate faults or moderate misfortunes, such as no government ever long escapes. But the catastrophe of Syracuse was something overpassing in terrific calamity all Grecian experience and all power of foresight. It was like the Russian campaign of 1812 to the Emperor Napoleon; though by no means imputable, in an equal degree, to vice in the original project. No Grecian power could bear up against such a death-wound; and the prolonged struggle of Athens, after it, is not the least wonderful part of the whole war.

Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire; taking it as it stood in its completeness, from about 460-413 B.C. (the date of the Syracusan catastrophe), or still more from 460-424 B.C. (the date when Brasidas made his conquests in Thrace). After the Syracusan catastrophe, the conditions of the empire were altogether changed; it was irretrievably broken up, though Athens still continued an energetic struggle to retain some of the fragments. But if we view it as it had stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its working must be pronounced, in my judgement, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organise such a

¹ This I apprehend to have been *ἔγαν δόξασα προστατεύειν ἡ πόλις ἀσπασμένη τῆς ἀρχῆς, &c.* in the mind of Xenophon—*De Re-
ditibus*, v. 6. *Ἐπειτ', ἐκείνῳ μὲν*


system, or to hold, in partial, though regulated, continuous and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion instinctive in the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part, and we shall see still farther, how little qualified Sparta was to perform it: and we shall have occasion hereafter to notice a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes.

As in regard to the democracy of Athens generally, so in regard to her empire—it has been customary with historians to take notice of little except the bad side. But my conviction is, and I have shown grounds for it in Chap. xlvii, that the empire of Athens was not harsh and oppressive, as it is commonly depicted. Under the circumstances of her dominion—at a time when the whole transit and commerce of the *Ægean* was under one maritime system, which excluded all irregular force—when Persian ships of war were kept out of the waters, and Persian tribute-officers away from the seaboard—when the disputes inevitable among so many little communities could be peaceably redressed by the mutual right of application to the tribunals at Athens—and when these tribunals were also such as to present to sufferers a refuge against wrongs done even by individual citizens of Athens herself (to use the expression of the oligarchical Phrynichus¹)—the condition of the maritime Greeks was materially better than it had been before, or than it will be seen to become afterwards. Her empire, if it did not inspire attachment, certainly provoked no antipathy, among the bulk of the citizens of the subject-communities, as is shown by the party-character of the revolts against her. If in her imperial character she exacted obedience, she also fulfilled duties and ensured protection—to a degree incomparably greater than was ever realized by Sparta. And even if she had been ever so much disposed to cramp the free play of mind and purpose among her subjects—a disposition which is no way proved—the very circumstances of her own democracy, with its open antithesis of political parties, universal liberty of speech, and manifold individual energy, would do much to prevent the accomplishment of such an end,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48.

and would act as a stimulus to the dependent communities even without her own intention.

Without being insensible either to the faults or to the misdeeds of imperial Athens, I believe that her empire was a great comparative benefit, and its extinction a great loss, to her own subjects. But still more do I believe it to have been a good, looked at with reference to Pan-Hellenic interests. Its maintenance furnished the only possibility of keeping out foreign intervention, and leaving the destinies of Greece to depend upon native, spontaneous, untrammelled Grecian agencies. The downfall of the Athenian empire is the signal for the arms and corruption of Persia again to make themselves felt, and for the re-enslavement of the Asiatic Greeks under her tribute-officers. What is still worse, it leaves the Grecian world in a state incapable of repelling any energetic foreign attack, and open to the overruling march of "the man of Macedon" half a century afterwards. For such was the natural tendency of the Grecian world to political non-integration or disintegration, that the rise of the Athenian empire, incorporating so many states into one system, is to be regarded as a most extraordinary accident. Nothing but genius, energy, discipline, and democracy of Athens, could have brought it about; nor even she, unless favoured and pushed on by a very peculiar train of antecedent events. But having once got it, she might perfectly well have kept it; and had she done so, the Hellenic world would have remained so organized as to be able to repel foreign intervention, either from Susa or from Pella. When we reflect how infinitely superior was the Hellenic mind to that of all surrounding nations and races—how completely its creative agency was stifled, as soon as it came under the Macedonian dictation—and how much more it might perhaps have achieved, if it had enjoyed another century or half-century of freedom, under the stimulating headship of the most progressive and most intellectual of all its separate communities—we shall look with double regret on the ruin of the Athenian empire, as accelerating, without remedy, the universal ruin of Grecian independence, political action and mental grandeur.



APPENDIX.

IN EXPLANATION OF THE PLAN OF SYRACUSE, AND THE
OPERATIONS DURING THE ATHENIAN SIEGE.

In the description given of this memorable event by Thucydides, there is a good deal which is only briefly and imperfectly explained. He certainly has left us various difficulties, in the solution of which we cannot advance beyond conjecture more or less plausible; but there are some which appear to me to admit of a more satisfactory solution than has yet been offered.

Dr. Arnold, in an Appendix annexed to the third volume of his Thucydides (p. 265 *seq.*), together with two Plans, has bestowed much pains on the elucidation of these difficulties: also Colonel Leake, in his valuable remarks on the Topography of Syracuse (the perusal of which, prior to their appearance in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, I owe to his politeness); Serra di Falco, in the fourth volume of his *Antichità di Sicilia*; and Saverio Cavallari (the architect employed in 1839, in the examination and excavation of the ground which furnished materials for the work of Serra di Falco) in a separate pamphlet—*Zur Topographie von Syrakus*—printed in the *Göttinger Studien* for 1845, and afterwards reprinted at Göttingen. With all the aid derived from these comments, I arrive at conclusions on some points different from all of them, which I shall now proceed shortly to state—keeping closely and exclusively to Thucydides and the Athenian siege, and not professing to meddle with Syracuse as it stood afterwards.

The excavations of M. Cavallari (in 1839) determined one point of some importance which was not before known; the situation and direction of the western wall of the outer city or Achradina. This wall is not marked on the Plan of Dr. Arnold nor alluded to in his Remarks: but it appears in that of Colonel Leake and in Serra di Falco as well as in Cavallari; and will be found noted in the Plan hereunto annexed.

Respecting Achradina, Colonel Leake remarks (p. 7)—“That it was distinctly divided by nature into an upper portion to the north-east, adjacent to the outer sea—and a lower in the opposite direction, adjacent to the two harbours of Syracuse.” Now M. Cavallari, in his Dissertation (p. 15 *seq.*), offers strong reason for believing that the wall just indicated enclosed only the former of these two portions; that it did not reach from the outer sea across to the Great Harbour, but turned eastward by the great stone-quarries of the Capucines and Novanteris, leaving the “lower portion adjacent to the two harbours,” open and unfortified. The inner and the outer city (Ortygia and Achradina) were thus at this time detached from each other, each having its own separate fortification, and not included within any common wall. They were separated from each other by this intermediate low ground,

which is even now full of tombs, and exhibits an extensive Nekropolis. We know that it was the habit, almost universal, among the Greeks, to bury their dead close to the town, but without the walls: Colonel Leake's remarks (p. 6) tend much to confirm the idea that the burial-place of the inner and outer city of Syracuse must originally have been without the walls of both; though he seems not to have been acquainted with M. Cavallari's Dissertation, and conceives the original western wall of Achradina as reaching across all the way to the Great Harbour. As far as we can trust the language of Diodorus, which is certainly loose, he describes the fortifications of Ortygia and Achradina as completely distinct, during the troubles consequent upon the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty—τῆς πόλεως κατελάβοντο τὴν τε Ἀχραδίνην καὶ τὴν Νῆσον ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων τούτων ἔχόντων ἴδιον τείχος, καλῶς κατασκευασμένον (xi. 73). Here Diodorus seems to conceive Achradina and Ortygia as constituting *only a part* of Syracuse; which was certainly true from and after the time of the despot Dionysius, but was not true either at the time which immediately followed the Gelonian dynasty, or at the period of the Athenian siege.

That Ortygia and Achradina must originally have joined, and must have been from the first included in one common fortification, has been assumed without any positive proof, because it seemed natural. But this presumption is outweighed by the fact that the ground between the two constitutes the Nekropolis, which thus raises a stronger counter-presumption that that ground could not originally have been included within the fortifications.

If the inner and the outer city were originally separate towns and separate fortifications, did they ever become united, and at what time? In my fifth volume (ch. xliii. p. 65-88) I expressed myself inaccurately on this subject, being then unacquainted with the Remarks either of Colonel Leake or M. Cavallari. I said that in the pacification which succeeded after the settlement of the troubles consequent on the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, "we may assume as certain, that the separate fortifications of Ortygia and Achradina were abolished, and that from henceforward there was only one fortified city, until the time of the despot Dionysius, more than fifty years afterwards." I now believe that they remained separate at the time when Nikias first arrived in Sicily. But I cannot go along with M. Cavallari in thinking that they continued so permanently, even throughout and after the Athenian siege. It seems clear to me that during that siege, they must have been covered by a common fortification—the new wall built by the Syracusans after the arrival of Nikias in Sicily. The feelings of the Greeks about the propriety of burial without the walls of the town, could not but give way to the necessity of protecting themselves against a besieging enemy; and this necessity was first presented to them by the prospect of a siege from Athens. Having once become familiar with the protection of one common wall, reaching from sea to harbour all across, and covering both inner and outer city, they were not likely to forego it afterwards.

We may thus lay it down that when Nikias first threatened Syracuse, and when the first battle was fought near the Olympieion (October 415 B.C.),—the two towns of which Syracuse was composed were still distinct and separately fortified. Assuming Nikias to land in the Great

Harbour, and to gain a victory rendering him master of the field, he would be able to occupy the open space between them, to cut them off from each other, and to blockade both with comparatively little trouble; either separately by distinct walls—or jointly by one block-ading wall running across from sea to sea westward of the wall of Achradina, but eastward of the Temenites.

As soon as Nikias returned to his winter quarters at Katana, the Syracusans busied themselves in guarding against this danger. "They built during the winter an outer protecting wall along the whole space fronting Epipolæ, comprehending the Temenites within it, in order that the enemy might be hindered from carrying their wall of circumvallation across any space smaller than that which was thus enclosed." Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τὰ τῆ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δὲ ἄλκασσιν εὐπορεῖσιν ὥσιν (vi. 75). It appears to me that the wall thus described began probably at the innermost cleft of Santa Bonagia, was carried in a direction rather west of south, to the outside of Apollo Temenites, and from thence down to the Great Harbour—so as to form an outer covering wall, and materially to increase the difficulties with which the besiegers would have to contend. I have marked on the annexed Plan what I imagine to have been its direction by the letters G, H, I. The commentators, in marking out where they supposed this new wall to have ranged, seem to me to attend only to a part of the sentence of Thucydides, and not to the whole; they conceive an outlying wall carried out from the fortifications of the city just for the purpose of enclosing the Temenites—but they do not advert to the other words of the historian, that the new wall was "carried along the *entire frontage towards Epipolæ*, for the special purpose of rendering an extended and difficult blockade indispensable to the besiegers." The wall, as I have ventured to delineate it, does little more than render the full meaning of all these words taken together, in the way in which the Syracusan purpose could be most easily accomplished. The new wall, starting from the cleft of Santa Bonagia, would not actually join the old wall, but it would nevertheless serve as a new, advanced, and defensible protection to the city, securing both the inner city (Ortygia) and the outer city (Achradina) at once. At this time, probably, Syracusans were more afraid of a second attack from the side of the Great Harbour, since this was the place where Nikias had made his recent disembarkation; and the new wall now constructed was an important additional defence from that side.

They next began to turn their attention to defence from the side of Epipolæ.

In this latter scheme, however, they were forestalled by the Athenians, who started from Katana without their knowledge, disembarked their troops near a place or spot called Leon, and hastened by a forced march up to the summit of Epipolæ called Euryalus—which they approached from the plain of Thapsus, the side farthest removed from Syracuse. Colonel Leake, and Kiepert in his map, place Leon on the sea-shore, south of the peninsula of Thapsus, and about half-way between that point and Achradina—immediately under the steep ascent direct from the sea to Euryalus: and Kiepert draws a line straight from Leon (so placed) to the Euryalus, as if he supposed that the Athenian army

clambered straight up. But this is difficult to suppose: for Thucydides says that the Athenian army ran towards the Euryalus (ἐγὼρῶν δρόμῳ, vi. 97): and it does not seem possible for hoplites to have run straight up the side of the cliff as it stands marked on the map. I agree with Dr. Arnold (ad Thuc. vi. 97) that the words of Thucydides do not necessarily imply that the place called Leon was on the sea, nor intimate what distance it was from the sea. It seems more likely that Leon, as well as the landing place of Nikias, was a place somewhere north of the peninsula of Thapsus, and that the Athenian troops, having come there on ship-board from Katana, were disembarked before the fleet reached that peninsula. There probably was a regular road or mountain path, ascending from the plain of Thapsus and reaching Euryalus from the northern side of Epipolæ—a road good enough, in most parts, for the Athenians to pass over at a run. This ascent, as being the farthest removed from Syracuse, would be the most likely for them to be able to accomplish without the knowledge of the Syracusans.

The position of the fort of Labdalum, built by Nikias, has been differently marked by different authors. Colonel Leake places it (Notes on Syracuse, p. 53) higher up than Mongibellisi, between that point and Belvedere. I incline to think that this is higher than the reality. The words of Thucydides—ἐν' ἄκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα—are translated by him "on the highest rocks of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara," but it appears to me that they rather mean—"on the extremity of the cliffs of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara." The position fixed on by Colonel Leake seems inconveniently distant from the main operations of Nikias lower down on Epipolæ: moreover, if the fort of Labdalum had been there placed, it would have guarded the path from Belvedere down to Epipolæ, and would have obstructed Gylippus in his march by that path into Syracuse—which we shall find hereafter that it did not. I think that the fort of Labdalum must have been on the edge of the cliff somewhat eastward of Mongibellisi, and more to the westward than it stands in the Plan of Gölner: see Gölner's note, ad vi. 97, and the Plan annexed to his Thucydides—and the remarks of Mr. Stanley and Dr. Arnold—in Arnold's Thucyd. p. 267-269.

Two other problems come next. 1. The site of Syké. 2. What is the Athenian Circle?

The Athenians, having finished and garrisoned Labdalum, "descended to Syké, sat down, and fortified the Circle with all speed." Many writers consider Syké as a corruption or local pronunciation of Tychê, designating the hamlet or suburb joining Achradina at its north-western extremity, just at the lower extremity of the northern cliff of Epipolæ. Colonel Leake and others place Syké on the opposite side of the slope of Epipolæ, near upon the southern cliff. But the reason which he gives for placing Syké near the southern cliff, is not adequate. He founds his opinion upon a construction of a passage of Thucydides (vi. 99), which appears to me less correct and convenient than that adopted by Dr. Arnold, with whose note on the passage I perfectly concur.

I think there is no ground for identifying the place called Syké with the Syracusan suburb afterwards known as Tychê, from the Temple of Fortune: and I agree with Dr. Arnold (p. 270) in placing Syké "on

the middle of the slope of Epipolæ, exactly to the southward of Targetta"—or at least *nearly* southward of that point. So also M. Firmin Didot places it, in the Plan prefixed to the fourth volume of his French translation of Thucydides.

I also perfectly agree with Dr. Arnold and M. Firmin Didot, in considering that the expression *The Circle* (ὁ κύκλος) means (—not the entire wall of circumvallation projected by the Athenians, but) a separate walled enclosure, to serve as a central point from whence the wall was to be carried northward towards Trogilus, and southward—first to the southern cliff of Epipolæ, afterwards to the Great Harbour. M. Didot defends this opinion in an elaborate note (ad Thucyd. vi. 98): Dr. Arnold also gives some reasons which (in my judgement) are not so strong as they might have been made. He considers one passage of Thucydides as making against him, which, properly construed, is in his favour; and he therefore proposes a double sense for the word κύκλος—sometimes meaning "the entire circumvallation"—sometimes "the central walled enclosure separately." I think that ὁ κύκλος *always* has the latter meaning, and that the double sense supposed by Dr. Arnold is not to be found in Thucydides.

The next doubt is, about the first counter-wall constructed by the Syracusans to cut and obstruct the intended line of blockade. Göller, M. Didot, and Mr. Dunbar, suppose this counter-wall (ἐπ' ἀπέναντον τείχος) to have been carried across Epipolæ, north of the Athenian Circle or κύκλος. On the other hand, Colonel Leake (p. 56), Dr. Arnold, and Dr. Thirlwall, suppose it to have been carried south of the Athenian Circle, but along the platform of Neapolis under Epipolæ, and not at all on Epipolæ itself. See Dr. Arnold's remarks, p. 270, 271; and the Plans of Göller, and M. Didot, and Colonel Leake.

The first of these suppositions is wholly inadmissible. If it were adopted, the counter-wall would have been carried exactly across the spot where the Athenians were then actually working, and a battle must immediately have ensued, which was what the Syracusans did not desire. The great reason which seems to have induced Göller and others to adopt this supposition, is, a theory about the third or last counter-wall (ἐπ' ἀπέναντον τείχος) constructed by the Syracusans, and its supposed junction with the first. I shall hereafter show that this last-mentioned theory is erroneous, when I come to explain the third or last counter-wall.

The second supposition, whereby this first counter-wall is represented to have been carried along the platform of Neapolis, has not the like force of positive argument against it. Yet it appears to me less probable than that which I have given in the text, and in which I describe this counter-wall as having stretched *upward along the slope of Epipolæ*, south of the Athenian Circle; from a point of the city-wall beneath, to the brink or crest of the southern cliff above.

Respecting the nature and purpose of a counter-wall built by besieged parties such as the Syracusans—there is one point which the expositors are apt to forget. To answer the purpose contemplated by the besieged, such a counter-wall must not only traverse the enemy's intended line of blockade, but it must have something for both its extremities to rest upon. Of course it starts from the city-wall, therefore one of its extremities is perfectly well supported: but unless the

other or farther extremity be supported also, the besiegers will be able to turn it, and get behind it, without taking the trouble to attack it in front. The besiegers are naturally the strongest in the field—otherwise they would not be engaged in constructing a wall of circumvallation. What advantage would the besieged gain, therefore, by carrying out a counter-wall across the besieging line of blockade— if the farther extremity of their counter-wall rested upon mere open space, so that the besiegers would have nothing to do but to march along its front, and get round behind it?

That the counter-wall now built by the Syracusans was not to be thus turned, is sufficiently evident; otherwise the Athenians would not have taken the risk and trouble of storming it in front. It must therefore have had something for its farther extremity to rest upon. Now in the course which I suppose it to have taken, this is provided for. The precipitous southern cliff formed its farther extremity, and prevented the Athenians from turning it, so that they were compelled to attack it in front, wherein they were able and fortunate enough to succeed. What still farther confirms my view, that the steep southern cliff formed the flank support of this first counter-wall, is—that the Athenians, immediately after their victory, take possession of the southern cliff and fortify it, so as to prevent it from ever again serving the Syracusans for the like purpose: vi. 101, 1. Τῇ δὲ ὁσπερ αὖτὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον τὸν κρημὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑλους, &c.

Now if we adopt the supposition of Dr. Arnold and others, that this counterwall ran along the platform of Neapolis, upon what are we to suppose that its farther extremity rested, or what was there to prevent the Athenians from turning it, and getting behind it? If it had been possible for them to turn it, they would not have attacked it in front. Upon the supposition which I am now considering, no satisfactory answer can be given to this question.

Colonel Leake and Dr. Arnold suppose that the Athenians got down the openings in the southern cliff of Epipolæ, in order to attack this counter-wall which was on the lower platform. But in the description which Thucydides gives of the attack, there is nothing to indicate any such descent on the part of the assailants; nothing at all like what he says in describing the attack upon the second Syracusan counter-work, where he expressly mentions the Athenians as descending from Epipolæ to the level ground,—αὐτοὶ περὶ ὄρθρον καταβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν εἰς τὸ ὀμαλὸν (vi. 101), &c. Colonel Leake (p. 56) founds an argument upon the words of Thucydides προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐπόδους, which he interprets to mean the two or three προσβάσεις or practicable openings in the cliff for descent. But I have already remarked in my note that τὰς ἐπόδους seems to me to mean “the attacks of the enemy”—not “the roads by which he might attack.” Besides, if the attack were made in the manner thus supposed—by the Athenians from the cliff, upon the Syracusan counter-wall running along the lower level—this would imply that the Athenians were previously in possession and occupation of the southern brink or edge of the cliff; whereas Thucydides, in his next chapter, tells us that they moved thither *afterwards*, from the Circle (vi. 101, 1).

The words ἐτείχιζον—ἐκτίθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων—(vi. 100) do not necessarily imply that this new counter-wall ran along a plat-

form upon a lower level than Epipolæ. They merely imply that it began at a point lower on the slope and ran up to a higher; the first half of its course being on a lower level than the Athenian Circle. I will here add, that Thucydides, in his description, manifests no knowledge of that intermediate level which expositors speak of as the *platform of Neapolis*. He mentions only the cliff above, and the marsh beneath.

Respecting the second counter-work of the Syracusans—the palisade and ditch dug across the marsh—there is no material difficulty, except that none of the commentators tells us upon what support its farther extremity rested, or what prevented it from being turned. That this was impossible, we know, because the Athenians attacked it in front: and hence I have described this palisade and ditch as reaching to the river Anapus, which prevented the Athenians from turning it. As a confirmation of this idea, we may see that Thucydides (describing the battle which ensued when the Athenians attacked the palisade in front and stormed it) tells us that the defeated Syracusans on the left flank took flight and ran away *“along the banks of the Anapus”*—οἱ μὲν τὸ διέξιον χέρας ἔχοντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔφυγον, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐνύμῳ, κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν (vi. 101). This implies that their position was already close upon the banks of the river, and therefore that the counter-work must have reached as far as the river.

After their defeat, the Syracusans made no farther attempt at constructing counter-works. The Athenians went on with their double wall across the marsh from Epipolæ to the Great Harbour. When Gylippus arrived, this wall was almost finished, except a small portion near the harbour, which was terminated soon afterwards. Besides this, the southern portion of the blockading wall upon the high ground of Epipolæ was also executed; so that the Athenian wall of circumvallation, from the Circle (on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ) southward down to the Great Harbour, was complete. But the portion of Epipolæ north of the Athenian Circle was not yet walled across, though some progress had been made towards it, and stones had been laid along most of the line. By this road Gylippus and his army entered Syracuse.

We have now to follow the proceedings of Gylippus—especially in reference to his third and final counter-wall, about which there is much to be cleared up.

After he had regained superiority in the field—at least apparently, by offering the Athenians battle, and by their refusing to accept it—and after he had surprised and captured the fort of Labdalum—he commenced the construction of a new counter-wall or ἐγκύρσιον τείχος. *He constructed a simple wall from the city across Epipolæ intersecting the line of blockade (which was yet not filled up) to the north of the Athenian Circle.* Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀντείχον οἱ Συραχάσιοι καὶ οἱ ἑμμεγχοὶ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι, ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκύρσιον, τείχος ἀπλοῦν ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἣν μὴ δύναιντο κωλύσαι, μηκέτι οἷός τε ὦσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι (vii. 4). I agree with Dr. Arnold, Col. Leake, and others, in construing πρὸς τὸ ἐγκύρσιον here as itself equivalent to an adjective or adverb. Others construe the passage as if τείχος were understood a second time, and as if two walls were spoken of—ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκύρσιον τείχος, τείχος ἀπλοῦν: thus assuming that two walls

are indicated—one of them, an ἐγχάρσιον τείχος already existing—another, a τείχος ἀπλὸν about to be constructed to meet it. Grammatically speaking, such a construction is at least harsh; but those who adopt it are unable to explain what wall is meant by this ἐγχάρσιον τείχος assumed as pre-existing. Didot and Göller think that it was the first counter-work constructed by the Syracusans: but there are two fatal objections to this—first, that the Athenians had destroyed this counter-work, after their victory (vi. 100)—next that it passed to the south, and not to the north, of the Athenian Circle, and therefore never could have joined the third counter-work now projected.

Gylippus pursued the building of his new counter-wall, and after gaining a victory over Nikias, succeeded in carrying it across the Athenian line of blockade between the Circle and Trogilus: he employed partly the very stones which the Athenians had laid down on that line for their own intended wall (vii. 6, 7). He carried the new wall beyond this Athenian line as far as the northern cliff of Epipolæ, which served as a flank support, and prevented his new wall from being turned. After this important step, the consummation of the projected line of blockade became impossible, unless the Athenians could attack his new wall in front, and take it by storm; for which their present force was inadequate. Even a victory in the field gained by the Athenians would now be insufficient for the success of the siege. Compare vii. 6, and vii. 11. ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἐτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτοὺς, ἣν μὴ τις τὸ παρατειχίσμα τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἔλη—which is the expression of Nikias in his letter to the Athenians, and is rather more precise than the expression of Thucydides himself—ἐκείνους δὲ (the Athenians) καὶ παντάσῃ ἀπεστρηγμέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ δὲ ἐτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι—where we must construe κρατοῖεν as alluding simply to a victory gained in the field—as distinguished from a superiority so marked as to enable the Athenians to storm the counter-wall.

But the defensive plans of Gylippus were not yet completed. He knew that the Athenian army might be materially strengthened, as in fact it afterwards was: and being just now reinforced by twelve Corinthian triremes, he employed them "in assisting to complete the remainder of his scheme of fortifications as far as the (new) counter-wall."

Such are the words of Thucydides—Μετά δὲ τοῦτο αἱ τὰ τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα, λαβοῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακὴν, καὶ ξυνετειχίσαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαταλείψαι τείχους (vii. 7).

This passage has greatly perplexed expositors. Many different interpretations of it have been proposed; but not one of them seems to me satisfactory. And Dr. Arnold, after rejecting various explanations proposed by others, and vainly attempting to elucidate it in a way convincing to his own mind, pronounces it to be unintelligible at least, if not corrupt (Arnold, p. 274, 275). Colonel Leake explains the passage by saying—"The Syracusan cross-wall was now united with the enclosure of Temenitis, and thus largely extended the dimensions of that outwork of Achradina" (Notes on Syracuse, p. 67). And Dr. Arnold (p. 275) inclines to the same supposition. But in the first place, it is difficult to see what the Syracusans gained by carrying out an additional wall, in the manner here described, which gave them no

new security; besides that Colonel Leake (in his Plan) represents the third Syracusan counter-work as if it rose straight up the slope of Epipolæ, which is hardly consistent with the words of Thucydides, διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν. Moreover Nikias in his letter written afterwards to the Athenians describes the new counter-wall, whereby Gylippus had frustrated the scheme of blockade, as being still, even in October, and after all that Gylippus had done to improve it, a *single or simple wall* (οἱ δὲ παρφοδομήχασιν ἡμῖν τείχος ἀπλοῦν, vii. 11). Such a description cannot be held to apply to the counter-wall as it stands delineated in Colonel Leake's Plan.

It appears to me that the words of Thucydides (ἐνερταίισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρπίου τείχους) admit of a different explanation, which will be found both consistent with all the existing circumstances, and explanatory of all which follow.

To find out what is meant by τὸ λοιπὸν—that *remainder* which the Syracusans thus fortified with the help of the Corinthians and others—we have only to compare the fortifications as they stood when Gylippus entered Syracuse, with the fortifications as they stood a few months afterwards, when Dêmostenês and his second armament arrived from Athens. Now three distinct constructions are mentioned as existing at this later period, which had not been in existence at the earlier.

1. A fort (τείχιμα, vii. 43, 3) on the higher ground of Epipolæ, guarding the entrance to Epipolæ from the Euryâlus.

2. A cross-wall (παρτείχιμα, vii. 42, 4; 43, 1-5) which joined this fort at one extremity, and was *carried down the slope of Epipolæ until it joined the counter-wall or ἐγκαρπίον τείχος*—(μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρπίου τείχους).

3. Three strong encampments (πρῶταίισματα), placed at different points up the slope of Epipolæ, along this cross-wall and on the north side of it; that is, *behind it*, speaking with reference to the Athenian camp. These encampments were necessary for the accommodation of those who were to defend the cross-wall, as well as to succour the fort (Nr. 1) in case it were attacked by an enemy from the Euryâlus. For the cross-wall was single (or simple) and therefore had no permanent accommodation except for a few necessary sentries.

All these three works will be found distinctly specified by Thucydides, where he describes the subsequent operations of Dêmostenês. None of them yet existed when Gylippus entered Syracuse: the upper portion of Epipolæ was then unoccupied, except by the Athenian fort of Labdalum. Here then we have the *remainder* (τὸ λοιπὸν ἐνερταίισαν) which the Syracusans and Corinthians are now stated to have jointly constructed.

The words μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρπίου τείχους have here a plain and instructive meaning. First the Syracusans constructed the upper fort to defend the entrance to Epipolæ from Euryâlus; next they carried down the cross-wall or παρτείχιμα continuously from the fort until it joined the counter-wall or ἐγκαρπίον τείχος which had already been extended across the Athenian line of blockade. The παρτείχιμα and the ἐγκαρπίον τείχος—the cross-wall and the counter-wall, were thus made to form one continuous wall—not indeed in the same line, for the former probably met the latter at an angle—yet *still one continuous wall*,

beginning at the fort on the high-ground of Epipolæ, traversing the Athenian line of blockade on the northern side of the slope, and ending at the wall of Syracuse itself. They are in fact spoken of as one wall, and both together are called the παρατείχισμα and the τεῖχος ἀπλοῦν (compare vii. 11, 8; vii. 42, 4; vii. 43, 1-5). That this παρατείχισμα or cross-wall joined the upper fort on the high ground of Epipolæ, Thucydides distinctly intimates, when he tells us that the Athenians under Dêmôsthênês, as soon as they had succeeded in their nocturnal surprise of the fort, began to pull down the adjacent portion of the cross-wall with its battlements (vii. 43, 5). Here then is one terminus of the cross-wall or parateichisma; and the words now under discussion—μέχρι τοῦ ἐνκαταίου τεύχους—inform us what became of the other terminus. The reader will see it marked on the annexed Plan.

I am aware, that in putting this interpretation upon the words, I depart from all the previous commentators; but I venture to assert, that while the words are most literally construed, there is no other interpretation of them which can be rendered consistent with the actual and subsequent course of events.

Gylippus had carried his ἐνκαταίου τεῖχος or counter-wall across the proposed line of Athenian circumvallation: so far Syracuse was safe, as long as the Athenian army continued without reinforcement. But what if a large reinforcement came from Athens, as was very probable? On that supposition Syracuse was not safe; since all the upper portion of Epipolæ, together with the road on to Epipolæ, from the Euryálus, remained unoccupied and undefended. The first thing necessary was to provide a fort for the defence of the entrance upon Epipolæ from Euryálus; in order that this important point might not be seized by a new Athenian army, who, if masters of the upper ground of Epipolæ, would still block up Syracuse, in spite of the recent frustration of the lower line of blockade begun by Nikias. But the fort on the upper ground of Epipolæ could never be maintained unless it were joined by a continuous line of defence with Syracuse itself. Had it not been so joined, Dêmôsthênês with his force, superior in the field, would have marched from the Athenian camp up the slope of Epipolæ, would have cut off the upper fort from all communication with Syracuse, and would have been still able to accomplish an effective blockade of the latter. What hindered him from effecting this, was, the continuous wall down the slope of Epipolæ from the upper fort to the town below, which divided the whole slope of Epipolæ into two parts, confining the Athenians to the southern half and excluding them from the uppermost portion. Without the recognition of this continuous wall, no one can understand the operations of Dêmôsthênês, who found himself completely hampered by it, and after vainly trying to storm and batter it in front, had nothing left except to get round it by a night march over the Euryálus and assail the upper fort where the wall terminated.

By means of this upper fort, guarding the entrance to Epipolæ from Euryálus—combined with the παρατείχισμα, or continuous line of connecting wall, reaching down to the city—Gylippus first provided for Syracuse a complete scheme of defence; which same scheme was afterwards carried out with greater elaboration and cost by the despot Dionysius, when he constructed the continuous lines of wall along both the northern and southern cliffs of Epipolæ, meeting and termin-

ating in his new fort at Euryalus, as the apex of the triangle of which the wall of Achradina was the base.

No objection can be made to the phrase—*ξυνεταίχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοείοις μέχρι τοῦ ἰχθυοῦ τείχους*—when explained according to the above suggestions—except its most vexatious conciseness. Thucydides, having present to his own mind the complete state of defence as it stood when Dêmosthenês arrived, unfortunately presumes the reader to know it also; and therefore contents himself with saying *τὸ λοιπὸν* or *the remainder*—which to any one who possessed that knowledge, would convey a clear meaning. Dr. Arnold says—“*Τὸ λοιπὸν* simply is *obscure*, and to my mind *suspicious*. I cannot but think that the text in this place has sustained some injury, or else that Thucydides wrote carelessly and confusedly” (p. 275). I am the last to deny the obscurity of the passage, after having written so long a note to explain it, and after calling in question the views of so many other expositors. But it is an obscurity, unhappily, frequent enough in Thucydides, and arising out of that extreme parsimony of words which he seems to have thought an excellence. Still the passage construes well; and does not at all deserve to be called “confused.” Nor is there the smallest ground for Dr. Arnold’s suspicion of the text. The phrase *ξυνεταίχισαν αἱ νῆες*, meaning “the men out of the ships,” which he objects to as “not being the way in which Thucydides commonly writes” (p. 275), may be sustained by reference to iii. 17, where *αἱ νῆες* occurs in exactly the same signification.

CHAPTER LXVI

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE
DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

THE period intervening between the defeat of *Ægospotami* (October 405 B.C.), and the re-establishment of the democracy as sanctioned by the convention concluded with Pausanias (some time in the summer of 403 B.C.), presents two years of cruel and multifarious suffering to Athens. For seven years before, indeed, ever since the catastrophe at Syracuse, she had been struggling with hardships—contending against augmented hostile force while her own means were cut down in every way—crippled at home by the garrison of Dekeleia—stripped to a great degree both of her tribute and her foreign trade—and beset by the snares of her own oligarchs. In spite of circumstances so adverse, she had maintained the fight with a resolution not less surprising than admirable; yet not without sinking more and more towards impoverishment and exhaustion. The defeat of *Ægospotami* closed the war at once, and transferred her from her period of struggle to one of concluding agony. Nor is the last word by any means too strong for the reality. Of these two years, the first portion was marked by severe physical privation, passing by degrees into absolute famine, and accompanied by the intolerable sentiment of despair and helplessness against her enemies, after two generations of imperial grandeur—not without a strong chance of being finally consigned to ruin and individual slavery; while the last portion comprised all the tyranny, murders, robberies, and expulsions perpetrated by the Thirty, overthrown only by heroic efforts of patriotism on the part of the exiles—which a fortunate change of sentiment, on the part of Pausanias, and the leading members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, ultimately crowned with success.

After such years of misery, it was an unspeakable relief to the Athenian population to regain possession of Athens and Attica; to exchange their domestic tyrants for a renovated democratical government; and to see their foreign enemies not merely evacuate the country, but even bind themselves by treaty to future friendly dealing. In respect of power, indeed, Athens was but the shadow of her former self. She had no empire, no tribute, no fleet, no fortifications at Peiræus, no long walls, not a single fortified place in Attica except the city itself. Of all these losses, however, the Athenians probably made little account, at least at the first epoch of their re-establishment; so intolerable was the pressure which they had just escaped, and so welcome the restitution of comfort, security, property and independence at home. The very excess of tyranny committed by the Thirty gave a peculiar zest to the recovery of the democracy. In their hands, the oligarchical principle (to borrow an expression from Mr. Burke¹) "had produced in fact and instantly, the grossest of those evils with which it was pregnant in its nature;" realizing the promise of that plain-spoken oligarchical oath, which Aristotle mentions as having been taken in various oligarchical cities—to contrive as much evil as possible to the people.² So much

Immediate relief caused by the restoration—unanimous sentiment towards the renewed democracy.

¹ "I confess, Gentlemen, that this appears to me as bad in the principle, and far worse in the consequences, than an universal suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. . . . Far from softening the features of such a principle, and thereby removing any part of the popular odium or natural terrors attending it, I should be sorry that anything framed in contradiction to the spirit of our constitution did not instantly produce in fact, the grossest of the evils with which it was pregnant in its nature. It is by lying dormant a long time, or being at first very rarely exercised, that arbitrary power steals upon a people. On the next unconstitutional act, all the fashionable world will be ready to say—Your

prophecies are ridiculous, your fears are vain, you see how little of the misfortunes which you formerly foreboded is come to pass. Thus, by degrees, that artful softening of all arbitrary power, the alleged infrequency or narrow extent of its operation, will be received as a sort of aphorism—and Mr. Hume will not be singular in telling us that the felicity of mankind is no more disturbed by it, than by earthquakes or thunder, or the other more unusual accidents of nature." (Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1777: Burke's Works, vol. iii. p. 146—150, oct. edit.).

² Aristot. Polit. v. 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσονται, καὶ βουλεύσω δ,τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.

the more complete was the reaction of sentiment towards the antecedent democracy, even in the minds of those who had been before discontented with it. To all men, rich and poor, citizens and metics, the comparative excellence of the democracy, in respect of all the essentials of good government, was now manifest. With the exception of those who had identified themselves with the Thirty as partners, partisans, or instruments, there was scarcely any one who did not feel that his life and property had been far more secure under the former democracy, and would become so again if that democracy were revived.¹

It was the first measure of Thrasybulus and his companions, after concluding the treaty with Pausanias and thus reentering the city, to exchange solemn oaths, of amnesty for the past, with those against whom they had just been at war. Similar oaths of amnesty were also exchanged with those in Eleusis, as soon as that town came into their power. The only persons excepted from this amnesty were the Thirty, the Eleven who had presided over the execution of all their atrocities, and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. Even these persons were not peremptorily banished: opportunity was offered to them to come in and take their trial of accountability (universal at Athens in the case of every magistrate on quitting office); so that if acquitted, they would enjoy the benefit of the amnesty as well as all others.² We know that Eratosthenês, one of the Thirty, afterwards returned to Athens; since there remains a powerful harangue of Lysias invoking justice against him as having brought to death Polemarchus (the brother of Lysias). Eratosthenês was one of the minority of the Thirty who sided generally with Theramenês, and opposed to a considerable degree the extreme violences of Kritias—although personally concerned in that seizure and execution of the rich metics which Theramenês had resisted, and which was one of the grossest misdeeds even of that dark period. He

The complimentary epitaph upon the Thirty, cited in the Schol. on *Æschinês*—praising them as having curbed, for a short time, the insolence of the accursed Demos of Athens—is in the same spirit: see K. F. Hermann, *Staats-Alter-*

thümer der Griechen, s. 70. note 9..

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 324. Καὶ ὁρῶν δὴπου τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ χρυσὸν ἀποδείξαντας τῇ ἐμ-
προσθεν πολιτείᾳ, &c.

² Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, s. 90.

and Pheidon—being among the Ten named to succeed the Thirty after the death of Kritias, when the remaining members of that deposed Board retired to Eleusis—had endeavoured to maintain themselves as a new oligarchy, carrying on war at the same time against Eleusis and against the democratical exiles in Peiræus. Failing in this, they had retired from the country, at the time when the exiles returned, and when the democracy was first re-established. But after a certain interval, the intense sentiments of the moment having somewhat subsided, they were encouraged by their friends to return, and came back to stand their trial of accountability. It was on that occasion that Lysias preferred his accusation against Eratosthenês, the result of which we do not know, though we see plainly (even from the accusatory speech) that the latter had powerful friends to stand by him, and that the dikasts manifested considerable reluctance to condemn.¹ We learn moreover from the same speech, that such was the detestation of the Thirty among several of the states surrounding Attica, as to cause formal decrees for their expulsion or for prohibiting their coming.² The sons, even of such among the Thirty as did not return, were allowed to remain at Athens, and enjoy their rights of citizens unmolested;³ a moderation rare in Grecian political warfare.

The first public vote of the Athenians, after the conclusion of peace with Sparta and the return of the exiles, was to restore the former democracy purely and simply,

¹ All this may be collected from various passages of the Orat. xii. of Lysias. Eratosthenês did not stand alone on his trial, but in conjunction with other colleagues, though of course (pursuant to the psephism of Kannónus) the vote of the dikasts would be taken about each separately—ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ τῶν τούτου συναρχόντων δίκην λαμβάνειν. . . . μηδ' ἀποῦσι μὲν τοῖς τριάκοντα ἐπιβουλεύετε, παρόντας δ' ἀφῆτε· μηδὲ τῆς τύχης, ἣ τούτους παρέδωκε τῇ πόλει, χάκιον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθήσητε (s. 80, 81): compare s. 36.

The number of friends prepared to back the defence of Eratosthenês, and to obtain his acquittal, chiefly

by representing that he had done the least mischief of all the Thirty—that all that he had done had been under fear of his own life—that he had been the partisan and supporter of Theramenês, whose memory was at that time popular—may be seen in sections 51, 56, 65, 87, 88, 91.

There are evidences also of other accusations brought against the Thirty before the senate of Areopagus (Lysias, Or. xi. cont. Theomnest. A. s. 31, B. s. 12).

² Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 36.

³ Demosth. adv. Bœotum de Dota Matern. c. 6. p. 1018.

to choose by lot the nine Archons and the Senate of Five Hundred, and to elect the generals—all as before. It appears that this restoration of preceding constitution was partially opposed by a citizen named Phormisius, who, having served with Thrasybulus in Peiræus, now moved that the political franchise should for the future be restricted to the possessors of land in Attica. His proposition was understood to be supported by the Lacedæmonians, and was recommended as calculated to make Athens march in better harmony with them. It was presented as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, excluding both the poorer freemen and those whose property lay either in moveables or in land out of Attica; so that the aggregate number of the disfranchised would have been five thousand persons. Since Athens now had lost her fleet and maritime empire, and since the importance of Peiræus was much curtailed not merely by these losses, but by demolition of its separate walls and of the long walls—Phormisius and others conceived the opportunity favourable for striking out the maritime and trading multitude from the roll of citizens. Many of these men must have been in easy and even opulent circumstances; but the bulk of them were poor; and Phormisius had of course at his command the usual arguments, by which it is attempted to prove that poor men have no business with political judgment or action. But the proposition was rejected; the orator Lysias being among its opponents, and composing a speech against it which was either spoken, or intended to be spoken, by some eminent citizen in the assembly.¹

Unfortunately we have only a fragment of the speech remaining, wherein the proposition is justly criticised as mischievous and unseasonable, depriving Athens of a large portion of her legitimate strength, patriotism, and harmony, and even of substantial men competent to serve as hoplites or horsemen—at a moment when she was barely rising from absolute prostration. Never certainly was the fallacy which connects political depravity or incapacity with a poor station, and political virtue or judgement with wealth—more conspicuously unmasked than in reference to the recent experience of Athens. The remark of Thra-

Disfranchising proposition of Phormisius.

The proposition rejected—speech composed by Lysias against it.

¹ Dion. Hal. Jud. de Lysiâ, c. 32. p. 526; Lysias, Orat. xxxiv., Bekk.

sybulus was most true¹—that a greater number of atrocities, both against person and against property, had been committed in a few months by the Thirty, and abetted by the class of Horsemen, all rich men—than the poor majority of the Demos had sanctioned during two generations of democracy. Moreover we know, on the authority of a witness unfriendly to the democracy, that the poor Athenian citizens, who served on ship-board and elsewhere, were exact in obedience to their commanders; while the richer citizens who served as hoplites and horsemen and who laid claim to higher individual estimation, were far less orderly in the public service.²

The motion of Phormisius being rejected, the antecedent democracy was restored without qualification, together with the ordinances of Drako, and the laws, measures, and weights of Solon. But on closer inspection, it was found that the latter part of the resolution was incompatible with the amnesty which had been just sworn. According to the laws of Solon and Drako, the perpetrators of enormities under the Thirty had rendered themselves guilty, and were open to trial. To escape this consequence, a second psephism or decree was passed, on the proposition of Tisamenus, to review the laws of Solon and Drako, and re-enact them with such additions and amendments as might be deemed expedient. Five Hundred citizens had just been chosen by the people as Nomothetæ or Law-makers, at the same time when the Senate of Hundred was taken by lot: out of these Nomothetæ. the Senate now chose a select few, whose duty it was to consider all propositions for amendment or addition to the laws of the old democracy, and post them up for public inspection before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes, within the month then running.³

Revision of
the laws—
the Nomo-
thetæ.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 41.

² Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 19.

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 83.

Ὅπως δ' ἂν προσδῇ (νόμων), οἷδε ἡρρημένοι νομοθέται ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναγράφοντες ἐν σάνισιν ἐπιτιθέντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπωνύμους, σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ, καὶ παραδιδόντων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ μηνί. Τοὺς δὲ παραδιδόμενους νόμους δοκιμασάτω πρότερον ἢ βουλῇ καὶ

οἱ νομοθέται οἱ πενταχόσιοι, οὓς οἱ δημόται εἴλυντο, ἐπειδὴ δωμοκόασιν.

Putting together the two sentences in which the Nomothetæ are here mentioned, Reiske and F. A. Wolf (Prolegom. ad Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. cxxix.) think that there were two classes of Nomothetæ; one class chosen by the senate, the other by the

The Senate, and the entire body of Five Hundred Nomothetæ, were then to be convened, in order that each might pass in review, separately, both the old laws and the new propositions; the Nomothetæ being previously sworn to decide righteously. While this discussion was going on, every private citizen had liberty to enter the senate, and to tender his opinion with reasons for or against any law. All the laws which should thus be approved, (first by the senate, afterwards by the Nomothetæ) but no others—were to be handed to the magistrates, and inscribed on the walls of the Portico called Pœkilê, for public notoriety, as the future regulators of the city. After the laws were promulgated by such public inscription, the Senate of Areopagus was enjoined to take care that they should be duly observed and enforced by the magistrates. A provisional committee of twenty citizens was named, to be generally responsible for the city during the time occupied in this revision.¹

As soon as the laws had been revised and publicly inscribed in the Pœkilê pursuant to the above decree, two concluding laws were enacted which completed the purpose of the citizens.

The first of these laws forbade the magistrates to act upon, or permit to be acted upon, any law not among those inscribed; and declared that no psephism, either of the senate or of the people should overrule any law.² It renewed

people. This appears to me very improbable. The persons chosen by the senate were invested with no final or decisive function whatever; they were simply chosen to consider what new propositions were fit to be submitted for discussion, and to provide that such propositions should be publicly made known. Now any persons simply invested with this character of a preliminary committee, would not (in my judgement) be called Nomothetæ. The reason why the persons here mentioned were so called, was, that they were a portion of the Five Hundred Nomothetæ, in whom the power of peremptory decision ultimately

rested. A small committee would naturally be entrusted with this preliminary duty; and the members of that small committee were to be chosen by one of the bodies with whom ultimate decision rested, but chosen out of the other.

¹ Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 81—85.

² Andokidês de Myster. s. 87. φήγισμα δὲ μηδὲν μῆτε βουλῆς μῆτε δήμου (νόμου), κυριώτερον εἶναι.

It seems that the word νόμου ought properly to be inserted here: see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 23. p. 649.

Compare a similar use of the phrase—μηδὲν κυριώτερον εἶναι—in

Decree that no criminal inquiries should be carried back beyond the archonship of Eukleïdês—B.C. 403.

also the old prohibition (dating from the days of Kleisthenês and the first origin of the democracy), to enact a special law inflicting direct hardship upon any individual Athenian apart from the rest, unless by the votes of 6000 citizens voting secretly.

The second of the two laws prescribed, that all the legal adjudications and arbitrations which had been passed under the antecedent democracy should be held valid and unimpeached—but formally annulled all which had been passed under the Thirty. It farther provided that the laws now revised and inscribed, should only take effect from the archonship of Eukleidês; that is, from the nominations of archons made after the recent return of Thrasybulus and renovation of the democracy.¹

Demosthen. cont. Lakrit. c. 9. p. 937.

¹ Andokidês de Myst. s. 87. We see (from Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 15. p. 718) that Andokidês has not cited the law fully. He has omitted these words—ὅσα δ' ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐπράχθη, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ ἄκυρα εἶναι—these words not having any material connection with the point at which he was aiming. Compare Æschines cont. Timarch. c. 9. p. 25—καὶ ἔστω ταῦτα ἄκυρα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, ἢ τὰ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου, ἢ εἰ τις ἄλλη πώποτε τοιαύτη ἐγένετο προθεσμία. . . .

Tisamenus is probably the same person of whom Lysias speaks contemptuously—Or. xxx. cont. Nikomach. s. 36.

Meier (De Bonis Damnatorum, p. 71) thinks that there is a contradiction between the decree proposed by Tisamenus (Andok. de Myst. s. 83), and another decree proposed by Dioklês, cited in the Oration of Demosth. cont. Timokr. c. 11. p. 713. But there is no real contradiction between the two, and the only semblance of contradiction that is to be found, arises from the fact that the law of Dioklês is not correctly given

as it now stands. It ought to be read thus:—

Διοκλῆς εἶπε, τοὺς νόμους τοὺς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντας ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου ἐτέθησαν, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι, [ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου] κυρίου εἶναι· τοὺς δὲ μετ' Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τῶλοιον τιθεμένους, κυρίου εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἰ τῷ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ ἄρχειν. Ἐπιγράφει δὲ, τοῖς μὲν νῦν καί μενόντες, τὸν γραμματεῖα τῆς βουλῆς, τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν, ὅς ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματεῶν, προσγραφέτω παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη.

The words ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου, which stand between brackets in the fourth line, are inserted on my own conjecture; and I venture to think that any one who will read the whole law through and the comments of the orator upon it, will see that they are imperatively required to make the sense complete. The entire scope and purpose of the law is to regulate clearly the time *from which* each law shall begin to be valid.

As the first part of the law reads now, without these words, it has no pertinence—no bearing on the main purpose contemplated by

By these ever-memorable enactments, all acts done prior to the nomination of the archon Eukleidês and his colleagues (in the summer of 403 B.C.) were excluded from serving as grounds for criminal process against any citizen. To ensure more fully that this should be carried into effect, a special clause was added to the oath taken annually by the senators, as well as to that taken by the Heliastic dikasts. The senators pledged themselves by oath not to receive any impeachment, or give effect to any arrest, founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês, excepting only against the Thirty and the other individuals expressly shut out from the amnesty, and now in exile.¹ To the oath annually taken by the Heliasts, also, was added the clause—"I will not remember past wrongs, nor will I abet any one else who shall remember them; on the contrary,² I will give my vote pursuant to the existing laws:" which laws proclaimed themselves as only taking effect from the archonship of Eukleidês.

A still farther precaution was taken to bar all actions for redress or damages founded on acts done prior to the archonship of Eukleidês. On the motion of Archinus (the principal colleague of Thrasybulus at Phylê), a law was passed, granting leave to any defendant against whom such an action might be brought, to plead an exception in bar (or Paragraphê) upon the special ground of

Dioklês in the second part, nor on the reasonings of Demosthenês afterwards. It is easy to understand how the words ἐκ' Εὐκλείδου should have dropt out, seeing that ἐκ' Εὐκλείδου immediately precedes: another error has been in fact introduced, by putting ἐκ' Εὐκλείδου in the former case instead of ἐκ' Εὐκλείδου—which error has been corrected by various recent editors, on the authority of some MSS.

The law of Dioklês, when properly read, fully harmonises with that of Tisamenus. Meier wonders that there is no mention made of the δοκιμασία νόμων by the Nomothetæ, which is prescribed in

the decree of Tisamenus. But it was not necessary to mention this expressly, since the words ὅσοι εἰσὶν ἀναγγραμμένοι presuppose the foregone δοκιμασία.

¹ Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, s. 91. καὶ οὐ δέξομαι ἐνδοξῆσιν οὐδὲ ἀπαγωγὴν ἕνεκα τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων, πλὴν τῶν φευγόντων.

² Andokid. de *Mysteriis*, s. 91. καὶ οὐ μνησικαχήσω, οὐδὲ ἄλλῃ (sc. ἄλλῃ μνησικαχοῦντι) κείσομαι, ψηφιοῦμαι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους.

This clause does not appear as part of the Heliastic oath given in Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 36. p. 746. It was extremely significant and valuable for the few

the amnesty and the legal prescription connected with it. The legal effect of this Paragraphê or exceptional plea, in Attic procedure, was to increase both the chance of failure, and the pecuniary liabilities in case of failure, on the part of the plaintiff; also to better considerably the chances of the defendant. This enactment is said to have been moved by Archinus, on seeing that some persons were beginning to institute actions at law, in spite of the amnesty; and for the better prevention of all such claims.¹

By such additional enactments, security was taken that the proceedings of the courts of justice should be in full conformity with the amnesty recently sworn, and that, neither directly nor indirectly, should any person be molested for wrongs done anterior to Eukleidês. And in fact the amnesty was faithfully observed: the re-entering exiles from Peiræus, and the Horsemen with other partisans of the Thirty in Athens, blended again together into one harmonious and equal democracy.

Eight years prior to these incidents, we have seen the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred, for a moment successful, and afterwards overthrown; and we have had occasion to notice, in reference to that event, the wonderful absence of all reactionary violence on the part of the victorious people, at a moment of severe provocation for the past and extreme apprehension for the future. We noticed that Thucydides,

Absence of harsh reactionary feeling, both after the Thirty and after the Four Hundred.

years immediately succeeding the renovation of the democracy. But its value was essentially temporary, and it was doubtless dropt within twenty or thirty years after the period to which it specially applied.

¹ The Orat. xviii. of Isokratês—Paragraphê cont. Kallimachus—informs us on these points—especially sections 1-4.

Kallimachus had entered an action against the client of Isokratês for 10,000 drachmæ (s. 15-17), charging him as an accomplice of Patroklês (the King-Archon under the Ten who immediately succeeded the Thirty, prior to the return of the exiles), in seizing and confis-

cating a sum of money belonging to Kallimachus. The latter, in commencing this action, was under the necessity of paying the fees called *prytaneia*; a sum proportional to what was claimed, and amounting to 30 drachmæ, when the sum claimed was between 1000 and 10,000 drachmæ. Suppose that action had gone to trial directly, Kallimachus, if he lost his cause, would have to forfeit his *prytaneia*, but he would forfeit no more. Now according to the Paragraphê permitted by the law of Archinus, the defendant is allowed to make oath that the action against him is founded upon a fact prior to the archonship of Euklei-

no friend to the Athenian democracy, selected precisely that occasion—on which some manifestation of vindictive impulse might have been supposed likely and natural—to bestow the most unqualified eulogies on their moderate and gentle bearing. Had the historian lived to describe the reign of the Thirty and the restoration which followed it, we cannot doubt that his expressions would have been still warmer and more emphatic in the same sense. Few events in history, either ancient or modern, are more astonishing than the behaviour of the Athenian people, on recovering their democracy after the overthrow of the Thirty: and when we view it in conjunction with the like phenomenon after the deposition of the Four Hundred, we see that neither the one nor the other arose from peculiar caprice or accident of the moment; both depended upon permanent attributes of the popular character. If we knew nothing else except the events of these two periods, we should be warranted in dismissing, on that evidence alone, the string of contemptuous predicates,—giddy, irascible, jealous, unjust, greedy, &c.—one or other of which Mr. Mitford so frequently pronounces, and insinuates even when he does not pronounce them, respecting the Athenian people.¹ A people whose habitual temper and morality

dés; and a cause is then tried first, upon that special issue, upon which the defendant is allowed to speak first, before the plaintiff. If the verdict, on this special issue, is given in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff is not only disabled from proceeding farther with his action, but is condemned besides to pay to the defendant the forfeit called Epobely; that is, one sixth part of the sum claimed. But if, on the contrary, the verdict on the special issue be in favour of the plaintiff, he is held entitled to proceed farther with his original action, and to receive besides at once, from the plaintiff, the like forfeit or epobely. Information on these regulations of procedure in the Attic dikasteries may be found in Meier and Schömann, *Attischer Prozess*, p. 647, Platner, *Prozess und Klagen*, vol. i. p. 158–162.

¹ Wachsmuth—who admits into his work, with little or no criticism, everything which has ever been said against the Athenian people, and indeed against the Greeks generally—affirms, contrary to all evidence and probability, that the amnesty was not really observed at Athens. (Wachsm. *Hellen. Alterth.* ch. ix. s. 71. vol. ii. p. 267).

The simple and distinct words of Xenophon—coming as they do from the mouth of so very hostile a witness—are sufficient to refute him—καὶ ὁμῶσαντες ὄρκους ἡμῖν μὴ μνησικαχῆσθαι, ἐτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ γε πολιτεύονται, καὶ τοῖς ὄρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος (Hellen. ii. 4, 43).

The passages to which Wachsmuth makes reference do not in the least establish his point. Even if actions at law or accusations

merited these epithets, could not have acted as the Athenians acted both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Particular acts may be found in their history which justify severe censure; but as to the permanent elements of character, both moral and intellectual, no population in history has ever afforded stronger evidence than the Athenians on these two memorable occasions.

If we follow the acts of the Thirty, we shall see that the Horsemen and the privileged Three Thousand hoplites in the city had made themselves partisans in every species of flagitious crime which could possibly be imagined to exasperate the feelings of the exiles. The latter on returning saw before them men who had handed in their relations to be put to death without trial—who had seized upon and enjoyed their property—who had expelled them all from the city, and a large portion of them even from Attica—and who had held themselves in mastery not merely by the overthrow of the constitution, but also by inviting and subsidizing foreign guards. Such atrocities, conceived and ordered by the Thirty, had been executed by the aid, and for the joint benefit (as Kritias justly remarked¹) of those occupants of the city whom the exiles found on returning. Now Thrasybulus, Anytus, and the rest of these exiles, saw their property all pillaged and appropriated by others during the few months of their absence: we may presume that their lands—which had probably not been sold, but granted

Generous
and
reasonable
behaviour
of the
Demos—
contrasted
with that
of the
oligarchy.

had been brought, in violation of the amnesty, this would not prove that the people violated it; unless we also knew that the dikastery had affirmed those actions. But he does not refer to any actions or accusations preferred on any such ground. He only notices some cases in which, accusation being preferred on grounds subsequent to Eukleides, the accuser makes allusion in his speech to other matters anterior to Eukleides. Now every speaker before the Athenian dikastery thinks himself entitled to call up before the dikasts the whole past life of

his opponent, in the way of analogous evidence going to attest the general character of the latter, good or bad. For example, the accuser of Sokratēs mentions, as a point going to impeach the general character of Sokratēs, that he had been the teacher of Kritias; while the philosopher in his defence alludes to his own resolution and virtue as Prytanis in the assembly by which the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ. Both these allusions come out as evidences to general character.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 9.

to individual members or partisans of the Thirty¹—were restored to them; but the moveable property could not be reclaimed, and the losses to which they remained subject were prodigious. The men who had caused and profited by these losses²—often with great brutality towards the wives and families of the exiles, as we know by the case of the orator Lysias—were now at Athens, all individually well known to the sufferers. In like manner, the sons and brothers of Leon and the other victims of the Thirty, saw before them the very citizens by whose hands their innocent relatives had been consigned without trial to prison and execution.³ The amount of wrong suffered had been infinitely greater than in the time of the Four Hundred, and the provocation, on every ground public and private, violent to a degree never exceeded in history. Yet with all this sting fresh in their bosoms, we find the victorious multitude, on the latter occasion as well as on the former, burying the past in an indiscriminate amnesty, and anxious only for the future harmonious march of the renovated and all-comprehensive democracy. We see the sentiment of commonwealth in the Demos, twice contrasted with the sentiment of faction in an ascendent oligarchy;⁴ twice triumphant

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 1. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων (οἱ τριάκοντα) ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τοῦτων ἀγροὺς ἔχουσιν.

² Isokratēs cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii. s. 30.

Θρασύβουλος μὲν καὶ Ἄνυτος, μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀπογράφαντας, ὅμως οὐ τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκας λαγχάνειν οὐδὲ μνησικακεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἐτέρων δύνανται διακράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὖν περὶ γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἴσον ἔχουσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξιοῦσιν.

On the other hand, the young Alkibiadēs (in the Orat. xvi. of Isokratēs, De Bigis, s. 56) is made to talk about others recovering their property—τῶν ἄλλων κομιζομένων τὰς οὐσίας. My statement in the text reconciles these two. The young Alkibiadēs goes on to state that the people had passed a vote

to grant compensation to him for the confiscation of his father's property, but that the power of his enemies had disappointed him of it. We may well doubt whether such vote ever really passed.

It appears however that Batrachus, one of the chief informers who brought in victims for the Thirty, thought it prudent to live afterwards out of Attica (Lysias cont. Andokid. Or. vi. s. 46), though he would have been legally protected by the amnesty.

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 94. Μέλητος δ' αὐ οὕτως ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα Λέοντα, ὡς ὅμοις ἄπαντες ἴσα, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκείνος ἄκριτος. . . . Μέλητον τοίνυν τοῖς παισὶ τοῖς τοῦ Λέοντος οὐκ ἔστι φόνου διώκειν, ὅτι τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἐπ' ἑὴν αἰδου ἀρχοντος· ἐπεὶ ὡς γε οὐκ ἀπήγαγεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγει.

⁴ Thucyd. vi. 39. ὅημον, ἔμπαρ ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρος.

over the strongest counter-motives, over the most bitter recollections of wrongful murder and spoliation, over all that passionate rush of reactionary appetite which characterises the moment of political restoration. "Bloody will be the reign of that king who comes back to his kingdom from exile"—says the Latin poet: bloody indeed had been the rule of Kritias and those oligarchs who had just come back from exile: "harsh is a Demos (observes Æschylus) which has just got clear of misery."¹ But the Athenian Demos, on coming back from Peiræus, exhibited the rare phenomenon of a restoration after cruel wrong suffered, sacrificing all the strong impulse of retaliation to a generous and deliberate regard for the future march of the commonwealth. Thucydides remarks that the moderation of political antipathy which prevailed at Athens after the victory of the people over the Four Hundred, was the main cause which revived Athens from her great public depression and danger.² Much more forcibly does this remark apply to the restoration after the Thirty, when the public condition of Athens was at the lowest depth of abasement, from which nothing could have rescued her except such exemplary wisdom and patriotism on the part of her victorious Demos. Nothing short of this could have enabled her to accomplish that partial resurrection—into an independent and powerful single state, though shorn of her imperial power—which will furnish material for the subsequent portion of our history.

While we note the memorable resolution of the Athenian people to forget that which could not be remembered without ruin to the future march of the democracy—we must at the same time observe that which they took special pains to preserve from being forgotten. They formally recognized all the adjudged cases and all the rights of property as existing under the democracy anterior to the Thirty. "You pronounced, fellow-citizens (says Andokides), that all the judicial verdicts and all the decisions of arbitrators passed under the democracy should remain valid; in order that there might be no abolition of debts, no reversal of private rights, but that every man might have the means of enforcing contracts due to him by

Care of the
people to
preserve
the rights
of private
property.

¹ Æschylus, Sept. ad Thebas, v. Τραγὸς γε μέντοι δῆμος ἐκφυγὼν κακῶ.
1047.

² Thucyd. viii. 97.

others."¹ If the Athenian people had been animated by that avidity to despoil the rich, and that subjection to the passion of the moment, which Mr. Mitford imputes to them in so many chapters of his history—neither motive nor opportunity was now wanting for wholesale confiscation; of which the rich themselves, during the dominion of the Thirty, had set abundant example. The amnesty as to political wrong, and the indelible memory as to the rights of property, stand alike conspicuous as evidences of the real character of the Athenian Demos.

If we wanted any farther proof of their capacity of taking the largest and soundest views on a difficult political situation, we should find it in another of their measures at this critical period. The ten who had succeeded to oligarchical presidency of Athens after the death of Kritias and the expulsion of the Thirty, had borrowed from Sparta the sum of one hundred talents, for the express purpose of making war on the exiles in Peiræus. After the peace, it was necessary that such sum should be repaid, and some persons proposed that recourse should be had to the property of those individuals and that party who had borrowed the money. The apparent equity of the proposition was doubtless felt with peculiar force at a time when the public treasury was in the extreme of poverty. But nevertheless both the democratical leaders and the people decidedly opposed it, resolving to recognize the debt as a public charge; in which capacity it was afterwards liquidated, after some delay arising from an unsupplied treasury.²

All that was required from the Horsemen or Knights who had been active in the service of the Thirty, was that they should repay the sums which had been advanced to them by the latter as outfit. Such advance to the Horsemen, subject to subsequent repayment, and seemingly distinct from the regular military pay—appears to have been customary practice under the previous democracy;³ but we may easily believe

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 88. Τὰς μὲν δίκας, ὡς ἄνδρες, καὶ τὰς διαίτας ἐποιήσατε κυρίας εἶναι, ὅπως ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ τῇ πόλει ἐγένοντο, ὅπως μὴτε χρεῶν ἀποκοπαὶ εἴεν μῆτε δίκαι ἀνάδικοι γένοιτο,

ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων αἱ πράξεις εἴεν.

² Isokratēs, Areopagit. Or. vii. s. 77; Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 5. p. 460.

³ Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi.

that the Thirty had carried it to an abusive excess, in their anxiety to enlist or stimulate partisans—when we recollect that they resorted to means more nefarious for the same end. There were of course great individual differences among these Knights, as to the degree in which each had lent himself to the misdeeds of the oligarchy. Even the most guilty of them were not molested, and they were sent four years afterwards to serve with Agesilaus in Asia, at a time when the Lacedæmonians required from Athens a contingent of cavalry;¹ the Demos being well-pleased to be able to provide for them an honourable foreign service. But the general body of Knights suffered so little disadvantage from the recollection of the Thirty, that many of them in after-days became senators, generals, hipparchs, and occupants of other considerable posts in the state.²

Although the decree of Tisamenus—prescribing a revision of the laws without delay, and directing that the laws when so revised should be posted up for public view, to form the sole and exclusive guide of the Dikasteries—had been passed immediately after the return from Peiræus and the confirmation of the amnesty, yet it appears that considerable delay took place before such enactment was carried into full effect. A person named Nikomachus, being charged

Revision of the laws—
Niko-
machus.

s. 6—8. I accept substantially the explanation which Harpokration and Photius give of the word *κατάστασις*, in spite of the objections taken to it by M. Boeckh, which appear to me not founded upon any adequate ground. I cannot but think that Reiske is right in distinguishing *κατάστασις* from the pay—*μισθός*.

See Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, b. ii. sect. 19. p. 250. In the Appendix to this work (which is not translated into English along with the work itself) he farther gives the Fragment of an Inscription which he considers to bear upon this resumption of *κατάστασις* from the Horsemen or Knights after the Thirty. But the Fragment is so very imperfect, that nothing can be affirmed with

any certainty concerning it: see the *Staatshaush. der Athener*, Appendix, vol. ii. pp. 207, 208.

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* iii. 1, 4.

² Lysias, Or. xvi. pro Mantitheo, s. 9, 10; Lysias, cont. Evander. Or. xxvi. s. 21—25.

We see from this latter oration (s. 26) that Thrasybulus helped some of the chief persons, who had been in the city and had resisted the return of the exiles, to get over the difficulties of the Dokimasy (or examination into character, previously to being admitted to take possession of any office, to which a man had been either elected or drawn by lot) in after-years. He spoke in favour of Evander, in order that the latter might be accepted as King-Archon.

with the duty, stands accused of having performed it tardily as well as corruptly. He as well as Tisamenus¹ was a scribe or secretary; under which name were included a class of paid officers, highly important in the detail of business at Athens, though seemingly men of low birth, and looked upon as filling a subordinate station, open to sneers from unfriendly orators. The boards, the magistrates, and the public bodies were so frequently changed at Athens, that the continuity of public business could only have been maintained by paid secretaries of this character, who devoted themselves constantly to the duty.²

Nikomachus had been named, during the democracy anterior to the Thirty, for the purpose of preparing a fair transcript, and of posting up afresh (probably in clearer characters and in a place more convenient for public view) the old laws of Solon. We can well understand that the renovated democratical feeling—which burst out after the expulsion of the Four Hundred and dictated the vehement psephism of Demophantus—might naturally also produce such a commission as this, for which Nikomachus, both as one of the public scribes or secretaries, and as an able speaker,³ was a suitable person. His accuser (for whom Lysias composed his thirtieth oration now remaining) denounces him as having not only designedly lingered in the business, for the purpose of prolonging the period of remuneration—but even as having corruptly tampered with the old laws, by new interpolations as well as by omissions. How far such charges may have been merited, we have no means of judging; but even assuming Nikomachus to have

¹ I presume confidently that Tisamenus the scribe, mentioned in Lysias cont. Nikomach. s. 37, is the same person as Tisamenus named in Andokidēs de Mysteriis (s. 83) as the proposer of the memorable psephism.

² See M. Boeckh's Public Economy of Athens, b. ii. c. 8. p. 186, Eng. Tr., for a summary of all that is known respecting these γρᾶμματῆς or secretaries.

The expression in Lysias cont. Nikomach. s. 38—ὅτι ὑπογρᾶμματεῦσαι οὐκ ἔστιν διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ αὐτῇ—is correctly explained by M.

Boeckh as having a very restricted meaning, and as only applying to two successive years. And I think we may doubt whether in practice it was rigidly adhered to; though it is possible to suppose that these secretaries alternated among themselves from one board or office to another. Their great usefulness consisted in the fact, that they were constantly in the service, and thus kept up the continuous march of the details.

³ Lysias, Or. xxx. cont. Nikomach. s. 32.

been both honest and diligent, he would find no small difficulty in properly discharging his duty of *Anagrapheus*¹ or "Writer-up" of all the old laws of Athens, from Solon downward. Both the phraseology of these old laws and the alphabet in which they were written, were in many cases antiquated and obsolete;² while there were doubtless also cases in which one law was at variance, wholly or partially, with another. Now such contradictions and archaisms would be likely to prove offensive, if set up in a fresh place and with clean, new characters; yet Nikomachus had no authority to make the smallest alteration, and might naturally therefore be tardy in a commission which did not promise much credit to him in its result.

These remarks tend to show that the necessity of a fresh collection and publication (if we may use that word) of the laws, had been felt prior to the time of the Thirty. But such a project could hardly be realised without at the same time revising the laws, as a body, removing all flagrant contradictions, and rectifying what might glaringly displease the age either in substance or in style. Now the psephism of Tisamenus, one of the first measures of the renewed democracy after the Thirty, both prescribed such revision and set in motion a revising body; but an additional decree was now proposed and carried by Archinus, relative to the alphabet in which the revised laws should be drawn up. The Ionic alphabet—that is, the full Greek alphabet of twenty-four letters, as now written and printed—had been in use at Athens universally, for a considerable time, apparently for two generations; but from tenacious adherence to ancient custom, the laws had still continued to be consigned to writing in the old Attic alphabet of only sixteen or eighteen letters. It was now ordained that this scanty alphabet should be discontinued, and that the revised laws, as well as all future public acts, should be written up in the full Ionic alphabet.³

Adoption
of the fuller
Ionic
alphabet, in
place of
the old
Attic, for
writing up
the laws.

¹ Lysias, Or. xxx. cont. Nikomach, s. 33. Wachsmuth calls him erroneously *Antigrapheus* instead of *Anagrapheus* (*Hellen. Alterth.* vol. ii. ix. p. 269).

It seems by Orat. vii. of Lysias (s. 20, 36, 39) that Nikomachus was at enmity with various persons

who employed Lysias as their logograph or speech-writer.

² Lysias, Or. x. cont. Theomnest. A. s. 16-20.

³ See Taylor, *Vit. Lysie*, p. 53, 54; Franz, *Element. Epigraphic.* Græc. Introd. p. 18-24.

Partly through this important reform, partly through the revising body, partly through the agency of Nikomachus, who was still continued as Anagrapheus—the revision, inscription, and publication of the laws in their new alphabet was at length completed. But it seems to have taken two years to perform—or at least two years elapsed before Nikomachus went through his trial of accountability.¹ He appears to have made various new propositions of his own, which were among those adopted by the Nomothetæ: for these his accuser attacks him, on the trial of accountability, as well as on the still graver allegation of having corruptly falsified the decisions of that body—writing up what they had not sanctioned, or suppressing that which they had sanctioned.²

The archonship of Eukleidês, succeeding immediately to the Anarchy, (as the archonship of Pythodôrus, or the period of the Thirty, was denominated,) became thus a cardinal point or epoch in Athenian history. We cannot doubt that the laws came forth out of this revision considerably modified, though unhappily we possess no particulars on the subject. We learn that the political franchise was, on the proposition of Aristophon, so far restricted for the future, that no person could be a citizen by birth except the son of citizen parents on both sides; whereas previously, it had been sufficient if the father alone was a citizen.³ The rhetor Lysias, by station a metic, had not only suffered great loss, narrowly escaping death from the Thirty (who actually put to death his brother Polemarchus)—but had contributed a large sum to assist the armed efforts of the exiles under Thrasybulus in Peiræus. As a reward and compensation for such antecedents, the latter proposed that the franchise of citizen should be conferred upon him; but we are told that this decree, though adopted by the people, was afterwards

¹ Lysias, cont. Nikom. s. 3. His employment had lasted six years altogether: four years before the Thirty—two years after them—s. 7. At least this seems the sense of the orator.

² I presume this to be the sense of s. 21 of the Oration of Lysias against him—*εἰ μὲν νόμους ἐτίθη*

καὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς, &c.: also s. 33-45—*παρκαλούμεν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τιμωρεῖσθαι τοὺς τὴν ὑμετέραν νομοθεσίαν ἀφανίζοντας, &c.*

The tenor of the oration, however, is unfortunately obscure.

³ Isæus, Or. viii. De Kiron. Sort. s. 61; Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 10. p. 1307.

indicted by Archinus as illegal or informal, and cancelled. Lysias, thus disappointed of the citizenship, passed the remainder of his life as an *Isotelês*, or non-freeman on the best condition, exempt from the peculiar burdens upon the class of metics.¹

Such refusal of citizenship to an eminent man like Lysias, who had both acted and suffered in the cause of the democracy, when combined with the decree of Aristophon above noticed, implies a degree of augmented strictness which we can only partially explain. It was not merely the renewal of her democracy for which Athens had now to provide. She had also to accommodate her legislation and administration to her future march as an isolated state, without empire or foreign dependencies. For this purpose material changes must have been required: among others, we know that the Board of *Hellenotamiæ* (originally named for the collection and management of the tribute at Delos, but attracting to themselves gradually more extended functions, until they became ultimately, immediately before the Thirty, the general paymasters of the state) was discontinued, and such among its duties as did not pass away along with the loss of the foreign empire, were transferred to two new officers—the treasurer at war, and the manager of the *Theôrikon*, or religious festival-fund.²

Other changes at Athens—abolition of the Board of *Hellenotamiæ*—restriction of the right of citizenship.

Respecting these two new departments, the latter of which especially became so much extended as to comprise most of the disbursements of a peace-establishment, I shall speak more fully hereafter; at present I only notice them as manifestations of the large change in Athenian administration consequent upon the loss of the empire. There were doubtless many other changes arising from the same cause, though we do not know them in detail; and I incline to number among such the alteration above noticed respecting the right of citizenship. While the Athenian empire lasted, the citizens of Athens were spread over the *Ægean* in every sort of capacity—as settlers, merchants, navigators, soldiers, &c., which must have tended materially to encourage intermarriages between them and the women

¹ Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. (*Lysias*) p. 836; Taylor, Vit. *Lysias*, p. 53. Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens* ii. 7. p. 180 seq., Eng. Tr.

² See respecting this change

of other Grecian insular states. Indeed we are even told that an express permission of *connubium* with Athenians was granted to the inhabitants of Eubœa¹—a fact (noticed by Lysias) of some moment in illustrating the tendency of the Athenian empire to multiply family ties between Athens and the allied cities. Now, according to the law which prevailed before Eukleidês, the son of every such marriage was by birth an Athenian citizen; an arrangement at that time useful to Athens, as strengthening the bonds of her empire—and eminently useful in a larger point of view, among the causes of Pan-Hellenic sympathy. But when Athens was deprived both of her empire and her fleet, and confined within the limits of Attica—there no longer remained any motive to continue such a regulation, so that the exclusive city-feeling, instinctive in the Grecian mind, again became predominant. Such is perhaps the explanation of the new restrictive law proposed by Aristophon.

Thrasybulus and the gallant handful of exiles who had first seized Phylê, received no larger reward than 1000 drachmæ for a common sacrifice and votive offering, together with wreaths of olive as a token of gratitude from their countrymen.² The debt which Athens owed to Thrasybulus was indeed such as could not be liquidated by money. To his individual patriotism, in great degree, we may ascribe not only the restoration of the democracy, but its good behaviour when restored. How different would have been the consequences of the restoration and the conduct of the people, had the event been brought about by a man like Alkibiadês, applying great abilities principally to the furtherance of his own cupidity and power!

At the restoration of the democracy, however, Alkibiadês was already no more. Shortly after the catastrophe at Ægospotami, he had sought shelter in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, no longer thinking himself safe from Lacedæmonian persecution in his forts on the Thracian Chersonese. He carried with him a good deal of property, though he left still more behind him in these forts; how acquired, we do not know.

¹ Lysias, Fragm. Or. xxxiv. De non dissolvendâ Republicâ, s. 3—² Æschinês, cont. Ktesiphon. c. 62. p. 437; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasy-
ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐβοιεύειν ἐπιγαμίαν bul. c. 4.
ἐπεισομένῃ, &c.

But having crossed apparently to Asia by the Bosphorus, he was plundered by the Thracians in Bithynia, and incurred much loss before he could reach Pharnabazus in Phrygia. Renewing the tie of personal hospitality which he had contracted with Pharnabazus four years before,¹ he now solicited from the satrap a safe conduct up to Susa. The Athenian envoys—whom Pharnabazus, after his former pacification with Alkibiadês 408 B.C., had engaged to escort to Susa, but had been compelled by the mandate of Cyrus to detain as prisoners—were just now released from their three years' detention, and enabled to come down to the Propontis;² and Alkibiadês, by whom this mission had originally been projected, tried to prevail on the satrap to perform the promise which he had originally given, but had not been able to fulfil. The hopes of the sanguine exile, reverting back to the history of Themistoklês, led him to anticipate the same success at Susa as had fallen to the lot of the latter; nor was the design impracticable, to one whose ability was universally renowned, and who had already acted as minister to Tissaphernês.

The court of Susa was at this time in a peculiar position. King Darius Nothus, having recently died, had been succeeded by his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon;³ but the younger son Cyrus, whom Darius had sent for during his last illness, tried after the death of the latter to supplant Artaxerxes in the succession—or at least was suspected of so trying. Being seized and about to be slain, the queen-mother Parysatis prevailed upon Artaxerxes to pardon him, and send him again down to his satrapy along the coast of Ionia, where he laboured strenuously, though secretly, to acquire the means of dethroning his brother; a memorable attempt, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. But his schemes, though carefully masked, did not escape the observation of Alkibiadês, who wished to make a merit of revealing them at Susa, and to become the instrument of defeating them. He communicated his suspicions as well as his purpose to Pharnabazus; whom he tried to awaken by alarm of danger

Artaxerxes
Mnemon
the new
king of
Persia.
Plans of
Cyrus—
Alkibiadês
wishes to
reveal them
at Susa.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 12. τὸν
τε κοινὸν ἔχον καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀλλήλους
πίστεως ἐποιεῦντο.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 7.

³ Xenoph. Anab. i. 1; Diodor.
xiii. 108.

to the empire, in order that he might thus get himself forwarded to Susa as informant and auxiliary.

Pharnabazus was already jealous and unfriendly in spirit towards Lysander and the Lacedæmonians (of which we shall soon see plain evidence)—and perhaps towards Cyrus also, since such were the habitual relations of neighbouring satraps in the Persian empire. But the Lacedæmonians and Cyrus were now all powerful on the Asiatic coast, so that he probably did not dare to exasperate them, by identifying himself with a mission so hostile, and an enemy so dangerous, to both. Accordingly he refused compliance with the request of Alkibiadês; granting him nevertheless permission to live in Phrygia, and even assigning to him a revenue. But the objects at which the exile was aiming soon became more or less fully divulged, to those against whom they were intended. His restless character, enterprise, and capacity, were so well known as to raise exaggerated fears as well as exaggerated hopes. Not merely Cyrus—but the Lacedæmonians, closely allied with Cyrus—and the Dekarchies, whom Lysander had set up in the Asiatic Grecian cities, and who held their power only through Lacedæmonian support—all were uneasy at the prospect of seeing Alkibiadês again in action and command, amidst so many unsettled elements. Nor can we doubt that the exiles whom these Dekarchies had banished, and the disaffected citizens who remained at home under their government in fear of banishment or death, kept up correspondence with him, and looked to him as a probable liberator. Moreover the Spartan king Agis still retained the same personal antipathy against him, which had already (some years before) procured the order to be despatched, from Sparta to Asia, to assassinate him. Here are elements enough, of hostility, vengeance, and apprehension, afloat against Alkibiadês—without believing the story of Plutarch, that Kritias and the Thirty sent to apprise Lysander that the oligarchy at Athens could not stand, so long as Alkibiadês was alive. The truth is, that though the Thirty had included him in the list of exiles,¹ they had much less to dread from his assaults or plots, in Attica, than the Lysandrian Dekarchies in the cities of Asia. Moreover his name was

The Lacedæmonians conjointly with Cyrus require Pharnabazus to put him to death.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 42; Isokratês, Or. xvi. De Bigis, s. 46.

not popular even among the Athenian democrats, as will be shown hereafter when we come to recount the trial of Sokratês. Probably therefore the alleged intervention of Kritias and the Thirty, to procure the murder of Alkibiadês, is a fiction of the subsequent encomiasts of the latter at Athens, in order to create for him claims to esteem as a friend and fellow-sufferer with the democracy.

A special despatch (or *Skytalê*) was sent out by the Spartan authorities to Lysander in Asia, enjoining him to procure that Alkibiadês should be put to death. Accordingly Lysander communicated this order to Pharnabazus, within whose satrapy Alkibiadês was residing, and requested that it might be put in execution. The whole character of Pharnabazus shows that he would not perpetrate such a deed, towards a man with whom he had contracted ties of hospitality, without sincere reluctance and great pressure from without; especially as it would have been easy for him to connive underhand at the escape of the intended victim. We may therefore be sure that it was Cyrus, who, informed of the revelations contemplated by Alkibiadês, enforced the requisition of Lysander; and that the joint demand of the two was too formidable even to be evaded, much less openly disobeyed. Accordingly Pharnabazus despatched his brother Magæus and his uncle Sisamithres, with a band of armed men, to assassinate Alkibiadês in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, not daring to force their way into his house, surrounded it and set it on fire. Yet Alkibiadês, having contrived to extinguish the flames, rushed out upon his assailants with a dagger in his right-hand, and a cloak wrapped round his left to serve as a shield. None of them dared to come near him; but they poured upon him showers of darts and arrows until he perished, undefended as he was either by shield or by armour. A female companion with whom he lived—Timandra—wrapped up his body in garments of her own, and performed towards it all the last affectionate solemnities.¹

Assassination of Alkibiadês by order of Pharnabazus.

¹ I put together what seems to me the most probable account of the death of Alkibiadês from Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 38, 39; Diodorus, *xiv.* 11. (who cites Ephorus, compare

Ephor. *Fragm.* 126, ed. Didot); Cornelius Nepos, *Alkibiad.* c. 10; Justin, *v.* 8; Isokratês, *Or.* *xvi.* *De Bigis*, s. 50.

There were evidently different

Such was the deed which Cyrus and the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to enjoin, nor the uncle and brother of a Persian satrap to execute; and by which this celebrated Athenian perished before he had attained the age of fifty. Had he lived, we cannot doubt that he would again have played some conspicuous part—for neither his temper nor his abilities would have allowed him to remain in the shade—but whether to the advantage of Athens or not is more questionable. Certain it is, that taking his life throughout, the good which he did to her bore no proportion to the far greater evil. Of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he was more the cause than any other individual; though that enterprise cannot properly be said to have been caused by any individual: it emanated rather from a national impulse. Having first, as a counsellor, contributed more than any other man to plunge the Athenians into this imprudent adventure, he next, as an exile, contributed more than any other man (except Nikias) to turn that adventure into ruin, and the consequences of it into still greater ruin. Without him, Gylippus would not have been sent to Syracuse—Dekeleia would not have been fortified—Chios and Miletus would not have revolted—the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred would not have been originated. Nor can it be said that his first three years of political action as Athenian leader, in a speculation peculiarly his own—the alliance with Argos, and the campaigns in Peloponnesus—proved in any way advantageous to his country. On the contrary, by playing an offensive game where he had hardly sufficient force for a defensive, he enabled the Lacedæmonians completely to recover their injured reputation and ascendancy through the important victory of Mantinea. The period of his life really serviceable to his country, and really glorious to himself, was that of three years ending with his return to Athens in 407 B.C. The results of these three years of success were frustrated by the unexpected coming down of Cyrus as satrap: but just at the moment when it behoved Alkibiadês to put forth a higher measure of excellence, in order to realise his own promises in the face of

stories, about the antecedent causes to Pharnabazus appears to me not and circumstances, among which a at all in the character of that selection must be made. The extreme satrap. perfidy ascribed by Ephorus

this new obstacle—at that critical moment we find him spoiled by the unexpected welcome which had recently greeted him at Athens, and falling miserably short even of the former merit whereby that welcome had been earned.

If from his achievements we turn to his dispositions, his ends, and his means—there are few characters in Grecian history who present so little to esteem, whether we look at him as a public or as a private man. His ends are those of exorbitant ambition and vanity; his means rapacious as well as reckless, from his first dealing with Sparta and the Spartan envoys, down to the end of his career. The manoeuvres whereby his political enemies first procured his exile were indeed base and guilty in a high degree. But we must recollect that if his enemies were more numerous and violent than those of any other politician in Athens, the generating seed was sown by his own overweening insolence, and contempt of restraints, legal as well as social.

On the other hand, he was never once defeated either by land or sea. In courage, in ability, in enterprise, in power of dealing with new men and new situations, he was never wanting; qualities, which, combined with his high birth, wealth, and personal accomplishments, sufficed to render him for the time the first man in every successive party which he espoused—Athenian, Spartan, or Persian—oligarchical or democratical. But to none of them did he ever inspire any lasting confidence; all successively threw him off. On the whole, we shall find few men in whom eminent capacities for action and command are so thoroughly marred by an assemblage of bad moral qualities as Alkibiadēs.¹

¹ Cornelius Nepos says (Alcib. c. 11) of Alkibiadēs—"Hunc infamatum a plerisque tres gravissimi historici summis laudibus extulerunt: Thucydides quieiusdemætatis fuit; Theopompus, qui fuit post aliquando natus; et Timæus: qui quidem duo maledicentissimi, nescio quo modo, in illo uno laudando conscierunt."

We have no means of appreciating what was said by Theopompus and Timæus. But as to Thucydides, it is to be recollected that he extols only the capacity and warlike enterprise of Alkibiadēs—

nothing beyond; and he had good reason for doing so. His picture of the dispositions and conduct of Alkibiadēs is the reverse of eulogy.

The Oration xvi. of Isokratēs, De Bigis, spoken by the son of Alkibiadēs, goes into a laboured panegyric of his father's character, but is prodigiously inaccurate, if we compare it with the facts stated in Thucydides and Xenophon. But he is justified in saying—οὐδέποτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγουμένου τρώπειον ὁμῶς ἔστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι (s. 23).

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE DRAMA.—RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS.—THE SOPHISTS.

RESPECTING the political history of Athens during the few years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy, we have unfortunately little or no information. But in the spring of 399 B.C., between three and four years after the beginning of the archonship of Eukleidês, an event happened of paramount interest to the intellectual public of Greece as well as to philosophy generally—the trial, condemnation, and execution of Sokratês. Before I recount that memorable incident, it will be proper to say a few words on the literary and philosophical character of the age in which it happened. Though literature and philosophy are now becoming separate departments in Greece, each exercises a marked influence on the other; and the state of dramatic literature will be seen to be one of the causes directly contributing to the fate of Sokratês.

During the century of the Athenian democracy between Kleisthenês and Eukleidês, there had been produced a development of dramatic genius, tragic and comic, never paralleled before or afterwards. Extraordi- nary de- velopment of dramatic genius. Æschylus, the creator of the tragic drama, or at least the first composer who rendered it illustrious, had been a combatant both at Marathon and Salamis; while Sophoklês and Euripidês, his two eminent followers (the former one of the generals of the Athenian armament against Samos in 440 B.C.) expired both of them only a year before the battle of Ægospotami—just in time to escape the bitter humiliation and suffering of that mournful period. Out of the once numerous compositions of these poets we possess only a few, yet sufficient to enable us to appreciate in some degree the grandeur of Athenian tragedy; and when we learn that they were frequently beaten, even with the best of their dramas now remaining, in fair competition for the prize against other poets whose names only have reached us—we seem

warranted in presuming that the best productions of these successful competitors, if not intrinsically finer, could hardly have been inferior in merit to theirs.¹

The tragic drama belonged essentially to the festivals in honour of the god Dionysus; being originally a chorus sung in his honour, to which were ^{Gradual enlargement} successively superadded—first, an Iambic monologue,—next, a dialogue with two actors,—lastly, a regular plot with three actors, and the chorus itself interwoven into the scene. Its subjects were from the beginning, and always continued to be, persons either divine or heroic, above the level of historical life and borrowed from what was called the mythical past. The *Persæ* of *Æschylus*, indeed, forms a splendid exception; but the two analogous dramas of his contemporary, *Phrynichus*,—the *Phœnissæ* and the capture of *Milētus*—were not successful enough to invite subsequent tragedians to meddle with contemporary events. To three serious dramas or a trilogy—at first connected together by sequence of subject more or less loose, but afterwards unconnected and on distinct subjects, through an innovation introduced by *Sophoklēs*, if not before—the tragic poet added a fourth or satyrical drama; the characters of which were satyrs, the companions of the god Dionysus, and other heroic or mythical persons exhibited in farce. He thus made up a total of four dramas or a tetralogy, which he got up and brought forward to contend for the prize at the festival. The expense of training the chorus and actors was chiefly furnished by the *Chorēgi*, wealthy citizens, of whom one was named for each of the ten tribes, and whose honour and vanity were greatly interested in obtaining the prize. At first, these exhibitions took place on a temporary stage, with nothing but wooden supports and scaffolding; but shortly after the year 500 B.C., on an occasion when the poets *Æschylus* and *Pratinas* were contending for the prize, this stage gave way during the ceremony, and lamentable mischief was the result. After that misfortune, a permanent theatre of stone was provided. To what extent the project was realised before

¹ The *Œdipus Tyrannus* of *Sophoklēs* was surpassed by the rival composition of *Philoklēs*. The *Medea* of *Euripidēs* stood only third for the prize; *Euphorion*,

son of *Æschylus*, being first, *Sophoklēs* second. Yet these two tragedies are the masterpieces now remaining of *Sophoklēs* and *Euripidēs*.

the invasion of Xerxes, we do not accurately know; but after his destructive occupation of Athens, the theatre, if any existed previously, would have to be rebuilt or renovated along with other injured portions of the city.

It was under that great development of the power of Athens which followed the expulsion of Xerxes, that the theatre with its appurtenances attained full magnitude and elaboration, and attic tragedy its maximum of excellence. Sophoklēs gained his first victory over Æschylus in 468 B.C.: the first exhibition of Euripidēs was in 455 B.C. The names, though unhappily the names alone, of many other competitors have reached us: Philoklēs, who gained the prize even over the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklēs; Euphron, son of Æschylus, Xenoklēs and Nikomachus, all known to have triumphed over Euripidēs; Neophron, Achæus, Ion, Agathon, and many more. The continuous stream of new tragedy, poured out year after year, was something new in the history of the Greek mind. If we could suppose all the ten tribes contending for the prize every year, there would be ten tetralogies (or sets of four dramas each, three tragedies and one satyrical farce) at the Dionysiac festival, and as many at the Lenæan. So great a number as sixty new tragedies composed every year,¹ is not to be

¹ The careful examination of Welcker (*Griech. Tragödie*, vol. i. p. 76) makes out the titles of eighty tragedies unquestionable belonging to Sophoklēs—over and above the satyrical dramas in his Tetralogies. Welcker has considerably cut down the number admitted by previous authors, carried by Fabricius as high as 178, and even by Boeckh as high as 109 (Welcker, *ib. sup.* p. 68).

The number of dramas ascribed to Euripidēs is sometimes 92, sometimes 76. Elmsley (in his remarks on the *Argument to the Medes*, p. 73) thinks that even the larger of these numbers is smaller than what Euripidēs probably composed; since the poet continued composing for fifty years, from 465

to 405 B.C., and was likely during each year to have composed one, if not two, tetralogies; if he could prevail upon the archon to grant him a chorus, that is, the opportunity of representing. The *Didas-kalies* took no account of any except such as gained the first, second or third prize. Welcker gives the titles, and an approximative guess at the contents, of 51 lost tragedies of the poet, besides the 17 remaining (p. 448).

Aristarchus the tragedian is affirmed by Suidas to have composed 70 tragedies, of which only two gained the prize. As many as 120 compositions are ascribed to Neophron, 44 to Achæus, 40 to Ion (Welcker, *ib.* p. 889).

thought of; yet we do not know what was the usual number of competing tetralogies: it was at least three—since the first, second, and third are specified in the *Didaskalies* or *Theatrical Records*—and probably greater than three. It was rare to repeat the same drama a second time, unless after considerable alterations, nor would it be creditable to the liberality of a *Chorégus* to decline the full cost of getting up a new tetralogy. Without pretending to determine with numerical accuracy how many dramas were composed in each year, the general fact of unexampled abundance in the productions of the tragic muse is both authentic and interesting.

Moreover—what is not less important to notice—all this abundance found its way to the minds of the great body of the citizens, not excepting even the poorest. For the theatre is said to have accommodated 30,000 persons:¹ here again it is unsafe to rely upon numerical accuracy, but we cannot doubt that it was sufficiently capacious to give to most of the citizens, poor as well as rich, ample opportunity of profiting by these beautiful compositions. At first, the admission to the theatre was gratuitous; but as the crowd, of strangers as well as freemen, was found both excessive and disorderly, the system was adopted of asking a price seemingly at a time when the permanent theatre was put in complete order after the destruction caused by Xerxes. The theatre was let by contract to a manager who engaged to defray (either in whole or part) the habitual cost incurred by the state in the representation, and who was allowed to sell tickets of admission. At first it appears that the price of tickets was not fixed, so that the poor citizens were overbid, and could not get places. Accordingly Periklês introduced a new system, fixing the price of places at three oboli (or half a drachma) for the better, and one obolus for the less good. As there were two days of representation, tickets covering both days were sold respectively for a drachma and two oboli. But in order that the poor citizens might be enabled to attend, two oboli were given out from the public treasure to each citizen (rich as well as poor, if they chose to receive it) on the occasion of the festival. A poor man was thus furnished with the means of purchasing his place and going

Accessi-
bility of
the theatre
to the
poorest
citizens.

¹ Plato, *Symposion*, c. 3. p. 175.

to the theatre without cost, on both days, if he chose; or, if he preferred it, he might go on one day only—or might even stay away altogether and spend both the two oboli in any other manner. The higher price obtained for the better seats purchased by the richer citizens, is here to be set against the sum disbursed to the poorer; but we have no data before us for striking the balance, nor can we tell how the finances of the state were affected by it.¹

Such was the original *Theôrikon* or festival-pay introduced by Periklês at Athens; a system of distributing the public money, gradually extended to other festivals in which there was no theatrical representation, and which in latter times reached a mischievous excess; having begun at a time when Athens was full of money from foreign tribute,—and continuing, with increased demand, at a subsequent time when she was comparatively poor and without extraneous resources. It is to be remembered that all these festivals were portions of the ancient religion, and that, according to the feelings of that time, cheerful and multitudinous assemblages were essential to the satisfaction of the god in whose honour the festival was celebrated. Such disbursements were a portion of the religious, even more than of the civil, establishment. Of the abusive excess which they afterwards reached, however, I shall speak hereafter: at present I deal with the *Thêorikon* only in its primitive function and effect, of enabling all Athenians indiscriminately to witness the representation of the tragedies.

We cannot doubt that the effect of these compositions upon the public sympathies, as well as upon the public judgement and intelligence, must have been beneficial and moralizing in a high degree. Though the subjects and persons are legendary, the relations between them are all human and simple—exalted above the level of humanity, only in such measure as to present a stronger claim to the hearer's admiration or pity. So powerful

¹ For these particulars, see chiefly a learned and valuable compilation—G. C. Schneider, *Das Attische Theater-Wesen*, Weimar 1835—furnished with copious notes; though I do not fully concur in all his details, and have differed from him on some points. I can-

not think that more than two oboli were given to any one citizen at the same festival; at least, not until the distributions became extended, in times posterior to the Thirty: see M. Schneider's Book, p. 17; also Notes, 29—196.

a body of poetical influence has probably never been brought to act upon the emotions of any other population; and when we consider the extraordinary beauty of these immortal compositions, which first stamped tragedy as a separate department of poetry, and gave to it a dignity never since reached, we shall be satisfied that the tastes, the sentiments, and the intellectual standard, of the Athenian multitude, must have been sensibly improved and exalted by such lessons. The reception of such pleasures through the eye and the ear, as well as amidst a sympathising crowd, was a fact of no small importance in the mental history of the people. It contributed to exalt their imagination, like the grand edifices and ornaments added during the same period to their acropolis. Like them too, and even more than they—tragedy was the monopoly of Athens; for while tragic composers came thither from other parts of Greece (Achæus from Eretria, and Ion from Chios, at a time when the Athenian empire comprised both those places) to exhibit their genius,—nowhere else were original tragedies composed and acted, though hardly any considerable city was without a theatre.¹

The three great tragedians—Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês—distinguished above all their competitors, as well by contemporaries as by subsequent critics, are interesting to us, not merely from the positive beauties of each, but also from the differences between them in handling, style, and sentiment, and from the manner in which these differences illustrate the insensible modification of the Athenian mind. Though the subjects, persons, and events of tragedy always continued to be borrowed from the legendary world, and were thus kept above the level of contemporaneous life²—yet the dramatic manner of handling them is sensibly modified, even in Sophoklês as compared with Æschylus—and still more in Euripidês, by the atmosphere of democracy, political and judicial contention, and philosophy, encompassing and acting upon the poet.

In Æschylus, the ideality belongs to the handling no less than to the subjects: the passions appealed to are the

¹ See Plato, *Lachês*, c. 6. p. 183 B.; and Welcker, *Griech. Tragöd.* p. 330.

² Upon this point, compare Welcker, *Griech. Tragöd.* vol. ii. p. 1102.

Æschylus,
Sophoklês,
and Euripidês—
modifications of
tragedy.

masculine and violent, to the exclusion of Aphroditê and her inspirations:¹ the figures are vast and majestic, but exhibited only in half-light and in shadowy outline: the speech is replete with bold metaphor and abrupt transition,—“grandiloquent even to a fault” (as Quintilian remarks), and often approaching nearer to Oriental vagueness than to Grecian perspicuity. In Sophoklês, there is evidently a closer approach to reality and common life: the range of emotions is more varied, the figures are more distinctly seen, and the action more fully and conspicuously worked out. Not only we have a more elaborate dramatic structure, but a more expanded dialogue, and a comparative simplicity of speech like that of living Greeks: and we find too a certain admixture of rhetorical declamation, amidst the greatest poetical beauty which the Grecian drama ever attained. But when we advance to Euripidês, this rhetorical element becomes still more prominent and developed. The ultra-natural sublimity of the legendary characters disappears: love and compassion are invoked to a degree which Æschylus would have deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the heroic person: moreover there are appeals to the reason, and argumentative controversies, which that grandiloquent poet would have despised as petty and forensic cavils. And—what was worse still, judging from the Æschylean point of view—there was a certain novelty of speculation, an intimation of doubt on reigning opinions, and an air of scientific refinement, often spoiling the poetical effect.

Such differences between these three great poets are doubtless referable to the working of Athenian politics and Athenian philosophy on the minds of the two latter. In Sophoklês, we may trace the companion of Herodotus²—in Euripidês, the hearer of Anaxagoras, Sokratês,

¹ See Aristophan. *Ran.* 1046. The *Antigone* (780 seq.) and the *Trachinise* (498) are sufficient evidence that Sophoklês did not agree with Æschylus in this renunciation of Aphroditê.

² The comparison of Herodot. iii. 119 with Soph. *Antig.* 908 proves a community of thought which seems to me hardly explicable in any other way. Which of the two

obtained the thought from the other, we cannot determine.

The reason given, by a woman whose father and mother were dead, for preferring a brother either to husband or child—that she might find another husband and have another child, but could not possibly have another brother—is certainly not a little far-fetched.

and Prodikus;¹ in both, the familiarity with that widespread popularity of speech, and real, serious debate of politicians and competitors before the dikastery, which both had ever before their eyes, but which the genius of Sophoklēs knew how to keep in due subordination to his grand poetical purpose.

The transformation of the tragic muse from Æschylus to Euripidēs is the more deserving of notice, as it shows us how Attic tragedy served as the natural prelude and encouragement to the rhetorical and dialectical age which was approaching. But the democracy, which thus insensibly modified the tragic drama, imparted a new life and ampler proportions to the comic; both the one and the other being stimulated by the increasing prosperity and power of Athens during the half century following 480 B.C. Not only was the affluence of strangers and visitors to Athens continually augmenting, but wealthy men were easily found to incur the expense of training the chorus and actors. There was no manner of employing wealth which seemed so appropriate to Grecian feeling, or tended so much to procure influence and popularity to its possessors, as that of contributing to enhance the magnificence of the national and religious festivals.² This was the general sentiment both among rich and among poor; nor is there any criticism more unfounded than that which represents such an obligation as hard and oppressive

Popularity arising from expenditure of money on the festivals.

¹ See Valckenaer, *Diatribe in Eurip. Frag.* c. 23. Quintilian, who had before him many more tragedies than those which we now possess, remarks how much more useful was the study of Euripidēs, than that of Æschylus or Sophoklēs, to a young man preparing himself for forensic oratory:—

“Illud quidem nemo non fateatur, iis qui se ad agendum comparaverint, utiliore longe Euripidem fore. Namque is et vi et sermone (quo ipsum reprehendunt quibus gravitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis videtur esse sublimior) magis accedit oratorio generi: et sententiis densus, et

rebus ipsis; et in iis quæ a sapientibus tradita sunt, pæne ipsis par; et in dicendo et respondendo cuilibet eorum, qui fuerunt in foro disertis, comparandus. In affectibus vero tum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui miseratione constant, facile præcipuus.” (Quintil. Inst. Orat. x. 1.)

² Aristophan. *Plutus*, 1160:—
Πλούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο συμπορώ-
τατον,
Ποιεῖν ἀγῶνας γυμνικοὺς καὶ μου-
σικοὺς.

Compare the speech of Alkibiadēs, *Thuc.* vi. 16, and Theophrastus ap. *Cic. de Officiis*, ii. 16.

upon rich men. Most of them spent more than they were legally compelled to spend in this way, from the desire of exalting their popularity. The only real sufferers were, the people, considered as interested in a just administration of law; since it was a practice which enabled many rich men to acquire importance who had no personal qualities to deserve it,—and which provided them with a stock of factitious merits to be pleaded before the *Dikastery*, as a set-off against substantive accusations.

The full splendor of the comic Muse was considerably later than that of the tragic. Even down to 460 B.C. (about the time when *Periklès* and *Ephialtès* introduced their constitutional reforms), there was not a single comic poet of eminence at Athens; nor was there apparently a single undisputed Athenian comedy before that date, which survived to the times of the Alexandrine critics. *Magnès*, *Kratès*, and *Kratinus*—probably also *Chionidès* and *Ekphantidès*¹—all belong to the period beginning about (Olympiad 80 or) 460 B.C.; that is, the generation preceding *Aristophanès*, whose first composition dates in 427 B.C. The condition and growth of attic comedy before this period seems to have been unknown even to Aristotle, who intimates that the archon did not begin to grant a chorus for comedy, or to number it among the authoritative solemnities of the festival, until long after the practice had been established for tragedy. Thus the comic chorus in that early time consisted of volunteers, without any chorègus publicly assigned to bear the expense of teaching them or getting up the piece—so that there was little motive for authors to bestow care or genius in the preparation of their song, dance, and scurrilous monody or dialogue. The exuberant revelry of the phallic festival and procession—with full license of scoffing at any one present, which the god *Dionysus* was supposed to enjoy—and with the most plain-spoken grossness as well in language as in ideas—formed the primitive germ, which under Athenian genius ripened into the old comedy.² It resembled in many respects the

¹ See *Meineke*, *Hist. Critic. Comicor. Græcor.* vol. i. p. 26 *seq.*

Grysar and *Mr. Clinton*, following *Suidas*, place *Chionidès* before the Persian invasion; but the words

of Aristotle rather countenance the later date (*Poetic.* c. 3).

² See respecting these licentious processions, in connexion with the *Iambus* and *Archilochus*, vol.

satyric drama of the tragedians, but was distinguished from it by dealing not merely with the ancient mythical stories and persons, but chiefly with contemporary men and subjects of common life—dealing with them often, too, under their real names, and with ridicule the most direct, poignant, and scornful. We see clearly how fair a field Athens would offer for this species of composition, at a time when the bitterness of political contention ran high—when the city had become a centre for novelties from every part of Greece—when tragedians, rhetors, and philosophers, were acquiring celebrity and incurring odium—and when the democratical constitution laid open all the details of political and judicial business, as well as all the

iv. of this History, ch. xxix. p. 8.

Aristotle (Poetic. c. 4) tells us that these phallic processions, with liberty to the leaders (οἱ ἐξάρχοντες) of scoffing at every one, still continued in many cities of Greece in his time: see Herod. v. 83, and Sémus apud Athenæum, xiv. p. 622; also the striking description of the rural Dionysia in the *Acharnæis* of Aristophanês, 235, 255, 1115. The scoffing was a part of the festival, and supposed to be agreeable to Dionysus—ἐν τοῖς Διονυσίοις ἱεραιμένον αὐτὸ δρᾶν καὶ τὸ σκώμμα μέρος τι ἐδόκει τῆς ἐορτῆς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἴσως χαίρει, φιλογέλως τις ὢν (Lucian, *Piscator*. c. 25). Compare Aristophanês, *Ranæ*, 367, where the poet seems to imply that no one has a right to complain of being ridiculed in the πατρίοις τελευταῖς Διονύσου.

The Greek word for comedy—κωμῳδία, τὸ κωμῳδεῖν—at least in its early sense, had reference to a bitter, insulting, criminatione ridicule: κωμῳδεῖν καὶ κακῶς λέγειν (Xenophon, *Repub.* Ath. ii. 23)—κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας (Plato de *Repub.* iii. 8. p. 332). A remarkable definition of κωμῳδία appears in Bekker's *Anecdota Græca*, ii. 747, 10—Κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν μίση

λαοῦ κατηγορία, ἥθουν δημοκρίσεις—“public exposure to scorn before the assembled people:” and this idea of it as a penal visitation of evil-doers is preserved in Platonius and the anonymous writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês. The definition which Aristotle (Poetic. c. 11) gives of it, is too mild for the primitive comedy: for he tells us himself that Kratês, immediately preceding Aristophanês, was the first author who departed from the ἱαμβικὴ ἰδέα: this “iambic vein” was originally the common character. It doubtless included every variety of ridicule, from innocent mirth to scornful contempt and odium; but the predominant character tended decidedly to the latter.

Compare Will. Schneider, *Attisches Theater-Wesen*, Notes, p. 22–25; Bernhardt, *Griechische Litteratur*, sect. 67, p. 292.

Flögel (in his History of *Comio Literature*), speaking of the unsparing wit of Rabelais, gives a notice and specimens of the general coarseness of style which marked all the productions of that author's time—mysteries, masks, sermons, &c., “the habit of calling all things by their simplest and most direct names,” &c.

first men of the state, not merely to universal criticism, but also to unmeasured libel.

Out of all the once abundant compositions of Attic comedy, nothing has reached us except eleven plays of Aristophanês. That poet himself singles out Magnês, Kratês, and Kratinus, among predecessors whom he describes as numerous, for honourable mention; as having been frequently, though not uniformly, successful. Kratinus appears to have been not only the most copious, but also the most distinguished, among all those who preceded Aristophanês; a list comprising Hermippus, Telekleidês, and the other bitter assailants of Periklês. It was Kratinus who first extended and systematised the licence of the phallic festival, and the "careless laughter of the festive crowd,"¹ into a drama of regular structure, with actors three in number, according to the analogy of tragedy. Standing forward, against particular persons exhibited or denounced by their names, with a malignity of personal slander not inferior to the Iambist Archilochus, and with an abrupt and dithyrambic style somewhat resembling Æschylus—Kratinus made an epoch in comedy as the latter had made in tragedy; but was surpassed by Aristophanês, as much as Æschylus had been surpassed by Sophoklês. We are told that his compositions were not only more rudely bitter and extensively libellous than those of Aristophanês,² but also destitute of that richness of illustration and felicity of expression which pervades all the wit of the latter, whether good-natured or malignant. In Kratinus, too, comedy first made herself felt as a substantive agent and partisan in the political warfare of Athens. He espoused the cause of Kimon against Periklês;³ eulogising the former, while he

¹ Χαῖρ', ὦ μέγ' ἀγριογέλωτος ἔμιλε
ταῖς ἐπιβδαῖς,
τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτῆς
ἄριστε πάντων, &c.

Kratinus Fragm. Incert. 51; Meineke,
Fr. Com. Græcor. ii. p. 193.

² Respecting Kratinus, see Platonius and the other writers on the Attic comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês in Bekker's edition, pp. vi. ix. xi. xiii. &c.; also Meineke, *Historia Comici Græci*. vol. i. p.

50 seq.

.... Οὐ γάρ, ὡς περ Ἀριστοφάνης,
ἐπιτρέχειν τὴν χάριν τοῖς σκώμμασι
ποιεῖ (Κρατίνος), ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς, καί,
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, γυμνῇ τῇ
κεφαλῇ τίθησι τὰς βλασφη-
μίας κατὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων.

³ See Kratinus—*Ἀρχιλοχοί*—Frag. 1, and Plutarch, *Kimon*, 10. Ἡ κομψία πολιτεύεται ἐν τοῖς δράμασι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ, ἢ τῶν περὶ τὸν Κρατίνον καὶ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ Εὐπολιν,

bitterly derided and vituperated the latter. Hermippus, Telekleidês, and most of the contemporary comic writers followed the same political line in assailing that great man, together with those personally connected with him, Aspasia and Anaxagoras: indeed Hermippus was the person who indicted Aspasia for impiety before the *Dikastery*. But the testimony of Aristophanês ¹ shows that no comic writer, of the time of Periklês, equalled Kratinus either in vehemence of libel or in popularity.

It is remarkable that in 440 B.C. a law was passed forbidding comic authors to ridicule any citizen by name in their compositions; which prohibition, however, was rescinded after two years; an interval marked by the rare phenomenon of a lenient comedy from Kratinus.² Such enactment denotes a struggle in the Athenian mind, even at that time, against the mischief of making the Dionysiac festival an occasion for unmeasured libel against citizens publicly named and probably themselves present. And there was another style of comedy taken up by Kratês—distinct from the Iambic or Archilochian vein worked by Kratinus—in which comic incident was attached to fictitious characters and woven into a story, without recourse to real individual names or direct personality. This species of comedy (analogous to that which Epicharmus had before exhibited at Syracuse) was continued by Pherekratês as the successor of Kratês. Though for a long time less popular and successful than the poignant food served up by Kratinus and others, it became finally predominant after the close of the Peloponnesian war, by the gradual transition of what is called the Old Comedy into the Middle and New Comedy.

But it is in Aristophanês that the genius of the old libellous comedy appears in its culminating perfection. At least we have before us enough of

Exposure
of citizens
by name
in Comedy
—forbidden
for a time
—then
renewed—
Kratês and
the milder
Comedy.

Aristo-
phanês.

&c. (Dionys. Halikarn. *Ars Rhetor.* c. 11).

¹ Aristophan. *Equit.* 525 *seq.*

² A comedy called 'Ὀδυσσεύς' (plur. numb. corresponding to the title of another of his comedies—'Ἀρχιλόγος'). It had a chorus, as one of the *Fragments* shows; but few or no choric songs—nor any Paraba-

sis, or address by the chorus, assuming the person of the poet, to the spectators.

See Bergk, *De Reliquiis Comœd. Antiq.* p. 143 *seq.*: Meineke, *Frag. Cratini*, vol. ii. p. 93. 'Ὀδυσσεύς': compare also the first volume of the same work, p. 43: also Bunkel, *Cratini Fragm.* p. 38 (Leips. 1827).

his works to enable us to appreciate his merits; though perhaps Eupolis, Ameipsias, Phrynichus, Plato (Comicus) and others, who contended against him at the festivals with alternate victory and defeat, would be found to deserve similar praise, if we possessed their compositions. Never probably will the full and unshackled force of comedy be so exhibited again. Without having Aristophanês actually before us, it would have been impossible to imagine the unmeasured and unsparing licence of attack assumed by the old comedy upon the gods, the institutions, the politicians, philosophers, poets, private citizens specially named—and even the women, whose life was entirely domestic—of Athens. With this universal liberty in respect of subject, there is combined a poignancy of derision and satire, a fecundity of imagination and variety of turns, and a richness of poetical expression—such as cannot be surpassed, and such as fully explains the admiration expressed for him by the philosopher Plato, who in other respects must have regarded him with unquestionable disapprobation. His comedies are popular in the largest sense of the word, addressed to the entire body of male citizens on a day consecrated to festivity, and providing for them amusement or derision with a sort of drunken abundance, out of all persons or things standing in any way prominent before the public eye. The earliest comedy of Aristophanês was exhibited in 427 B.C., and his Muse continued for a long time prolific, since two of the dramas now remaining belong to an epoch eleven years after the Thirty and the renovation of the democracy—about 392 B.C. After that renovation, however (as I have before remarked), the unmeasured sweep and libellous personality of the old comedy was gradually discontinued: the comic Chorus was first cut down, and afterwards suppressed, so as to usher in what is commonly termed the Middle Comedy, without any Chorus at all. The *Plutus* of Aristophanês indicates some approach to this new phase; but his earlier and more numerous comedies (from the *Acharneis* in 425 B.C. to the *Frogs* in 405 B.C., only a few months before the fatal battle of *Ægospotami*) exhibit the continuous, unexhausted, untempered, flow of the stream first opened by Kratinus.

Such abundance both of tragic and comic poetry, each of first-rate excellence, formed one of the marked features of Athenian life, and became a powerful instru-

ment in popularising new combinations of thought with variety and elegance of expression. While the tragic Muse presented the still higher advantage of inspiring elevated and benevolent sympathies, more was probably lost than gained by the lessons of the comic Muse—not only bringing out keenly all that was really ludicrous or contemptible in the phenomena of the day, but manufacturing scornful laughter, quite as often, out of that which was innocent or even meritorious, as well as out of boundless private slander. The 'Knights' and the 'Wasps' of Aristophanês, however, not to mention other plays, are a standing evidence of one good point in the Athenian character; that they bore with good-natured indulgence the full outpouring of ridicule and even of calumny interwoven with it, upon those democratical institutions to which they were sincerely attached. The democracy was strong enough to tolerate unfriendly tongues either in earnest or in jest; the reputations of men who stood conspicuously forward in politics, on whatever side, might also be considered as a fair mark for attacks, inasmuch as that measure of aggressive criticism, which is tutelary and indispensable, cannot be permitted, without the accompanying evil, comparatively much smaller, of excess and injustice;¹ though even here we may remark that excess of bitter personality is among the most conspicuous sins of Athenian literature generally. But the warfare of comedy, in the persons of Aristophanês and other composers, against philosophy, literature, and eloquence—in the name of those good old times of ignorance, "when an Athenian seaman knew nothing more than how to call for his barley-cake, and cry Yo-ho;"² and the

Comedy in
its effect on
the
Athenian
mind.

¹ Aristophanês boasts that he was the first comic composer who selected great and powerful men for his objects of attack: his predecessors (he affirms) had meddled only with small vermin and rags (ἐς τὰ ῥάκια σκύπτοντας δού, καὶ τοῖς φθιστοῖσι πολεμοῦντας) (Pac. 724—736; Vesp. 1030).

But this cannot be true in point of fact, since we know that no man was more bitterly assailed by the comic authors of his day than

Periklês. It ought to be added, that though Aristophanês doubtless attacked the powerful men, he did not leave the smaller persons unmolested.

² Aristophan. Ran. 1067 (also Vesp. 1095). Æschylus reproaches Euripidês—

Εἰτ' αὖ λαλίαν ἐπιτηδεύσαι καὶ στω-
μυλίαν, ἰδίδεας,
Ἥ ἔχε νέωσεν τὰς τε καλὰ ἱστίας, καὶ
τὰς κυγὰς ἐνέτριψε

discernment of the true interests of their country—as animated by large and steady views of improving their fellow-citizens, but compelled, in consequence of prejudice or opposition, to disguise a far-sighted political philosophy under the veil of satire—as good judges of the most debateable questions, such as the prudence of making war or peace—and excellent authority to guide us in appreciating the merits or demerits of their contemporaries, inasmuch that the victims of their lampoons are habitually set down as worthless men.¹ There cannot be a greater

¹ The view which I am here combating is very general among the German writers; in proof of which I may point to three of the ablest recent critics on the old comedy—Bergk, Meineke, and Ranke—all most useful writers for the understanding of Aristophanes.

Respecting Kratinus, Bergk observes—"Erat enim Cratinus, pariter atque ceteri principes antiquæ comædiæ, vir egregie moratus, idemque antiqui moris tenax. . . . Cum Cratinus quasi divinitus videret ex hac libertate mox tanquam ex stirpe aliquâ nimiam licentiam existere et nasci, statim his initiis graviter adversatus est, videturque Cimonem tanquam exemplum boni et honesti civis proposuisse," &c.

"Nam Cratinus cum esset magno ingenio et eximîâ morum gravitate, ægerrime tulit rem publicam præceps in perniciem ruere: omnem igitur operam atque omne studium eo contulit, ut imagine ipsius vitæ ante oculos positâ omnes et res divinæ et humanæ emendarentur, hominumque animi ad honestatem colendam incenderentur. Hoc sibi primus et proposuit Cratinus, et propositum strenue persecutus est. Sed si ipsam Veritatem, cujus imago oculis obversabatur, oculis subiecisset, verendum erat ne tadio obrueret eos qui spectarent, nihilque prorsus eorum, quæ summo

studio persequeretur, obtineret. Quare eximîâ quâdam arte pulchram effigiem hilaremque formam finxit, ita tamen ut ad veritatem sublimemque ejus speciem referret omnia: sic cum ludicris misceret seria, ut et vulgus haberet qui delectaretur; et qui plus ingenio valerent, ipsam veritatem, quæ ex omnibus fabularum partibus perluceret, mente et cogitatione comprehenderent." . . . "Jam vero Cratinum in fabulis componendis id unice spectavisse quod esset verum, ne veteres quidem latuit. . . . Aristophanes autem idem et secutus semper est et sæpe professus." (Bergk, de Reliquiis Comæd. Antiq. pp. 1, 10, 20, 233, &c.).

The criticism of Ranke (Commentatio de Vitâ Aristophanis, p. cccxli, cccxiv, cccxlix, cccxxix, cccxxxiii, cccxxxiv, &c.) adopts the same strain of eulogy as to the lofty and virtuous purposes of Aristophanes. Compare also the eulogy bestowed by Meineke on the monitorial value of the comedy (Historia Comic. Græc. p. 39, 50, 165, &c.), and similar praises by Westermann—Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. sect. 36.

In one of the arguments prefixed to the 'Pax' of Aristophanes, the author is so full of the conception of these poets as public instructors or advisers, that he tells us absurdly enough, they were for that

misconception of the old comedy than to regard it in this point of view; yet it is astonishing how many subsequent

reason called διδάσκαλοι—οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβούλων διέφερον θέναι αὐτοὺς καὶ διδάσκαλους ὠνόμαζον· ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρόσφορα διὰ δραμάτων αὐτοὺς ἐδίδασκον (p. 244, ed Bekk.

"Eupolis, atque Cratinus, Aristophanesque poetæ,
Atque alii, quorum Comœdia prisca virorum est,
Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus, aut fur,
Aut mœchus foret, aut sicarius, aut alioqui
Famosus, multâ cum libertate notabant."

This is the early judgement of Horace (Serm. l. 4, 1): his later opinion on the *Fescennina licentia*, which was the same in spirit as the old Grecian comedy, is much more judicious (Epistol. ii. 1, 145): compare Art. Poetic. 224. To assume that the persons derided or vilified by these comic authors must always have deserved what was said of them, is indeed a striking evidence of the value of the maxim—"Fortiter calumniare; semper aliquid restat." Without doubt their indiscriminate libel sometimes wounded a suitable subject; in what proportion of cases, we have no means of determining: but the perusal of Aristophanes tends to justify the epithets which Lucian puts into the mouth of *Dialogus* respecting Aristophanes and Eupolis—not to favour the opinions of the authors whom I have cited above (Lucian, Jov. Accus. vol. ii. p. 332). He calls Eupolis and Aristophanes θεῖοις ἀνδράς ἐκινετροῦσαι τὰ σπινά καὶ γλαυδάαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα.

When we notice what Aristophanes himself says respecting the comic poets, his predecessors

and contemporaries, we shall find it far from countenancing the exalted censorial function which Bergk and others ascribe to them (see the Parabasis in the Nubes, 530 seq., and in the Pax, 735). It seems especially preposterous to conceive Kratinus in that character; of whom what we chiefly know is his habit of drunkenness, and the downright, unadorned, vituperation in which he indulged: see the Fragments and story of his last play—Πυρίνη (in Meineke, vol. ii. p. 116; also Meineke, vol. i. p. 43 seq.).

Meineke copies (p. 46) from Suidas a statement (v. Ἐπίκου δαιμόσιος) to the effect that Kratinus was ταξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνηίδος φυλῆς. He construes this as a real fact: but there can hardly be a doubt that it is only a joke made by his contemporary comedians upon his fondness for wine; and not one of the worst among the many such jests which seem to have been then current. Bunkel also, another editor of the Fragments of Kratinus (Cratini Fragment., Leips. 1827, p. 2—M. M. Bunkel), construes this ταξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνηίδος φυλῆς as if it were a serious function; though he tells us about the general character of Kratinus—"De Vitâ ipsâ et moribus pœne nihil dicere possumus: hoc solum constat, Cratini pœculis et puerorum amori valde deditum fuisse."

Great numbers of Aristophanic jest have been transcribed as serious matter-of-fact, and have found their way into Grecian history. Whoever follows Chapter vii. of K. F. Hermann's Griechische Staats-Alterthümer, containing the *Innere Geschichte* of the

writers (from Diodorus and Plutarch down to the present day) have thought themselves entitled to deduce their facts of Grecian history, and their estimate of Grecian men, events, and institutions—from the comedies of Aristophanês. Standing pre-eminent as the latter does in comic genius, his point of view is only so much the more determined by the ludicrous associations suggested to his fancy, so that he thus departs the more widely from the conditions of a faithful witness or candid critic. He presents himself to provoke the laugh, mirthful or spiteful, of the festival crowd—assembled for the gratification of these emotions, and not with any expectation of serious or reasonable impressions.¹ Nor does he at all conceal how much he is mortified by failure; like the professional jester or “laugh-ter-maker” at the banquets of rich Athenian citizens²—the parallel of Aristophanês as to purpose, however unworthy of comparison in every other respect.

This rise and development of dramatic poetry in in Greece—so abundant, so varied, and so rich in genius—belongs to the fifth century B.C. It had been in the preceding century nothing more than an unpretending graft upon the primitive chorus, and was then even denounced by Solon (or in the dictum ascribed to Solon) as a vicious novelty, tending—by its simulation of a false character and by its effusion of sentiments not genuine or sincere—to corrupt the integrity of human dealings;³ a charge of corruption, not unlike

Aversion
of Solon to
the drama
when
nascent.

Athenian democracy, will see the most sweeping assertions made against the democratical institutions, on the authority of passages of Aristophanês: the same is the case with several of the other most learned German manuals of Grecian affairs.

¹ Horat. de Art. Poetic. 212—224.

“Indoctus quid enim saperet,
liberque laborum,
Rusticus urbano confusus, turpis
honesto?

Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate
morandus

Spectator, functusque sacris, et
potus, et exlex.”

² See the Parabasis of Aristo-

phanês in the Nubes (536 seq.) and in the Vespæ (1015—1045).

Compare also the description of Philippus the γελωροποιος or Jester in the Symposion of Xenophon; most of which is extremely Aristophanic, ii. 10, 14. The comic point of view is assumed throughout that piece; and Sokratês is introduced on one occasion as apologising for the intrusion of a serious reflection (τὸ σπουδαίον, viii. 41). The same is the case throughout much of the Symposion of Plato; though the scheme and purpose of this latter are very difficult to follow.

³ Plutarch, Solon, c. 29. Com-

that which Aristophanês worked up a century afterwards, in his 'Clouds,' against physics, rhetoric and dialectics in the person of Sokratês. But the properties of the graft had overpowered and subordinated those of the original stem; so that dramatic poetry was now a distinct form, subject to laws of its own, and shining with splendour equal, if not superior, to the elegiac, choric, lyric, and epic poetry which constituted the previous stock of the Grecian world.

Such transformations in the poetry—or, to speak more justly, in the literature, for before the year 500 B.C., the two expressions were equivalent—of Greece, were at once products, marks, and auxiliaries, in the expansion of the national mind. Our minds have now become familiar with dramatic combinations, which have ceased to be peculiar to any special form or conditions of political society. But if we compare the fifth century B.C. with that which preceded it, the recently born drama will be seen to have been a most important and impressive novelty: and so assuredly it would have been regarded by Solon, the largest mind of his own age, if he could have risen again a century and a quarter after his death, to witness the *Antigonê* of Sophoklês, the *Medea* of Euripidês, or the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês.

Its novelty does not consist merely in the high order of imagination and judgement required for the construction of a drama at once regular and effective. This indeed is no small addition to Grecian poetical celebrity as it stood in the days of Solon, Alkæus, Sappho, and Stesichorus: but we must remember that the epical structure of the *Odyssey*, so ancient and long acquired to the Hellenic world, implies a reach of architectonic talent quite equal to that exhibited in the most symmetrical drama of Sophoklês. The great innovation of the dramatists consisted in the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the ethical spirit which they breathed into their poetry. Of all this, the undeveloped germ doubtless existed in the previous epic, lyric, and gnomic composition; but the drama stood distinguished from all three by bringing it out into conspicuous amplitude, and

pare the same general view, set forth in Plato, *Legg.* iv. p. 719 C. See the previous volumes of this

History, ch. xxi. vol. ii. p. 145; ch. xxix. vol. iv. p. 12.

making it the substantive means of effect. Instead of recounting exploits achieved or sufferings undergone by the heroes—instead of pouring out his own single-minded impressions in reference to some given event or juncture—the tragic poet produces the mythical persons themselves to talk, discuss, accuse, defend, confute, lament, threaten, advise, persuade, or appease—among one another, but before the audience. In the *drama* (a singular misnomer) nothing is actually done: all is talk, assuming what is done, as passing, or as having passed, elsewhere. The dramatic poet, speaking continually, but each moment through a different character, carries on the purpose of each of his characters by words calculated to influence the other characters and appropriate to each successive juncture. Here are rhetorical exigences from beginning to end;¹ while since the whole interest of the piece turns upon some contention or struggle carried on by speech—since debate, consultation, and retort, never cease—since every character, good or evil, temperate or violent, must be supplied with suitable language to defend his proceedings, to attack or repel opponents, and generally to make good the relative importance assigned to him—here again dialectical skill in no small degree is indispensable.

Lastly the strength and variety of ethical sentiment infused into the Grecian tragedy, is among the most remarkable characteristics which distinguish it from the anterior forms of poetry. "To do or suffer terrible things"—is pronounced by Aristotle to be its proper subject-matter; and the internal mind and motives of the doer or sufferer, on which the ethical interest fastens, are laid open by the Greek tragedians with an impressive minuteness which neither the epic nor the lyric could possibly parallel. Moreover the appropriate subject-matter of tragedy is pregnant not only with ethical sympathy, but also with ethical debate and speculation. Characters of mixed good and evil—distinct rules of duty, one conflicting with the other—wrong done, and justified to the conscience of the doer, if not to that of the spectator, by previous wrong suffered,—all these are the favourite themes of Æschylus

Ethical sentiment, interest and debate, infused into the drama.

¹ Respecting the rhetorical cast of tragedy, see Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 57. p. 502 D. Plato disapproves of tragedy on the same grounds as of rhetoric.

and his two great successors. Klytæmnestra kills her husband Agamemnôn on his return from Troy: her defence is, that he had deserved this treatment at her hands for having sacrificed his own and her daughter, Iphigeneia. Her son Orestês kills her, under a full conviction of the duty of avenging his father, and even under the sanction of Apollo. The retributive Eumenides pursue him for the deed, and Æschylus brings all the parties before the court of Areopagus with Athênê as president; where the case, being fairly argued, with the Eumenides as accusers and Apollo as counsel for the prisoner, ends by an equality of votes in the court: upon which Athênê gives her casting-vote to absolve Orestês. Again—let any man note the conflicting obligations which Sophoklês so forcibly brings in his beautiful drama of the *Antigonê*. Kreon directs that the body of Polyneikês, as a traitor and recent invader of the country, shall remain unburied: *Antigonê*, sister of Polyneikês, denounces such interdict as impious, and violates it, under an overruling persuasion of fraternal duty. Kreon having ordered her to be buried alive, his youthful son Hæmon, her betrothed lover, is plunged into a heart-rending conflict between abhorrence of such cruelty on the one side, and submission to his father on the other. Sophoklês sets forth both these contending rules of duty in an elaborate scene of dialogue between the father and the son. Here are two rules both sacred and respectable, but the one of which cannot be observed without violating the other. Since a choice must be made, which of the two ought a good man to obey? This is a point which the great poet is well-pleased to leave undetermined. But if there be any among the audience in whom the least impulse of intellectual speculation is alive, he will by no means leave it so, without some mental effort to solve the problem, and to discover some grand and comprehensive principle from whence all the moral rules emanate—a principle such as may instruct his conscience in those cases generally, of not unfrequent occurrence, wherein two obligations conflict with each other. The tragedian not only appeals more powerfully to the ethical sentiment than poetry had ever done before, but also, by raising these grave and touching questions, addresses a stimulus and challenge to the intellect, spurring it on to ethical speculation.

Putting all these points together, we see how much wider was the intellectual range of tragedy, and how considerable is the mental progress which it betokens, as compared with the lyric and gnomic poetry, or with the Seven Wise Men and their authoritative aphorisms—which formed the glory, and marked the limit, of the preceding century. In place of unexpanded results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we have even in *Æschylus*, the earliest of the great tragedians, a large latitude of dissent and debate—a shifting point of view—a case better or worse, made out for distinct and contending parties—and a divination of the future advent of sovereign and instructed reason. It was through the intermediate stage of tragedy that Grecian literature passed into the Rhetoric, Dialectics, and Ethical speculation, which marked the fifth century B.C.

The drama formed the stage of transition to rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical philosophy.

Other simultaneous causes, arising directly out of the business of real life, contributed to the generation of these same capacities and studies. The fifth century B.C. is the first century of democracy, at Athens, in Sicily, and elsewhere: moreover, at that period, beginning from the Ionic revolt and the Persian invasions of Greece, the political relations between one Grecian city and another became more complicated, as well as more continuous; requiring a greater measure of talent in the public men who managed them. Without some power of persuading or confuting—of defending himself against accusation, or in case of need, accusing others—no man could possibly hold an ascendent position. He had probably not less need of this talent for private, informal, conversations to satisfy his own political partisans, than for addressing the public assembly formally convoked. Even as commanding an army or a fleet, without any laws of war or habits of professional discipline, his power of keeping up the good humour, confidence, and prompt obedience of his men, depended not a little on his command of speech.¹ Nor was it only to the leaders in political life that such an accomplishment was indispensable. In all the democracies—and probably in several governments which were not democracies but

Practical value and necessity of rhetorical accomplishments.

¹ See the discourse of Sokratēs, of the duties of a commander (*Xen. Mem. iii. 8. 11*), insisting upon this point, as part

oligarchies of an open character—the courts of justice were more or less numerous, and the procedure oral and public: in Athens especially, the Dikasteries (whose constitution has been explained in a former chapter) were both very numerous, and paid for attendance. Every citizen had to go before them in person, without being able to send a paid advocate in his place, if he either required redress for wrong offered to himself, or was accused of wrong by another.¹ There was no man therefore who might not be cast or condemned, or fail in his own suit, even with right on his side—unless he possessed some powers of speech to unfold his case to the Dikasts, as well as to confute the falsehoods, and disentangle the sophistry, of an opponent. Moreover—to any man of known family and station, it would be a humiliation hardly less painful than the loss of the cause, when standing before the Dikastery with friends and enemies around him, to find himself unable to carry on the thread of a discourse without halting or confusion. To meet such liabilities, from which no citizen, rich or poor, was exempt, a certain training in speech became not less essential than a certain training in arms. Without the latter, he could not do his duty as an hoplite in the ranks for the defence of his country; without the former, he could not escape danger to his fortune or honour, and humiliation in the eyes of his friends, if called before a Dikastery; nor could he lend assistance to any of those friends who might be placed under the like necessity.

Here then were ample motives, arising out of practical prudence not less than from the stimulus of ambition, to cultivate the power of both continuous harangue, and of concise argumentation, or interrogation and reply:² motives

¹ This necessity of some rhetorical accomplishments is enforced not less emphatically by Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, i. 1. 3) than by Kallikles in the *Gorgias* of Plato, c. 91, p. 486 B.

² See the description which Cicero gives of his own laborious oratorical training:—

“Ego hoc tempore omni, noctes et dies, in omnium doctrinarum meditatione versabar. Eram cum Stoleo Diodoto, qui cum habita-

visset apud me mecumque vixisset, nuper est domi meæ mortuus. A quo quum in aliis rebus, tum studiosissime in dialecticâ versabar; quæ quasi contracta et astricta eloquentiâ putanda est; sine quâ etiam tu, Brute, judicavisti, te illam justam eloquentiam, quam dialecticam dilatatam esse putant, consequi non posse. Huic ego doctore, et ejus artibus variis et multis, ita eram tamen deditus, ut ab exercitationibus oratoris

for all, to acquire a certain moderate aptitude in the use of these weapons—for the ambitious few, to devote much labour and to shine as accomplished orators.

Such political and social motives, it is to be remembered, though acting very forcibly at Athens, were by no means peculiar to Athens, but prevailed more or less throughout a large portion of the Grecian cities, especially in Sicily, when all the Governments became popularised after the overthrow of the Gelonian dynasty. And it was in Sicily and Italy, that the first individuals arose, who acquired permanent name both in Rhetoric and Dialectics; Empedoklēs of Agrigentum in the former—Zeno of Elea (in Italy) in the latter.¹

But these distinguished men bore a conspicuous part in politics, and both on the popular side; Empedoklēs against an oligarchy, Zeno against a despot. But both also were yet more distinguished as philosophers; and the dialectical impulse in Zeno, if not the rhetorical impulse in Empedoklēs, came more from his philosophy than from his politics. Empedoklēs (about 470—440 B.C.) appears to have held intercourse at least, if not partial communion of doctrine, with the dispersed philosophers of the Pythagorean league; the violent subversion of which, at Kroton and elsewhere, I have related in a previous chapter.² He constructed a system of physics and cosmogony, distinguished for first broaching the doctrine of the Four elements, and set forth in a poem composed by himself: besides which he seems to have had much of the mystical tone and miraculous pretensions of Pythagoras; professing not only to cure pestilence and other distempers, but to teach how old age might be averted and the dead raised from Hades—to prophesy—and to raise and calm the winds at his pleasure. Gorgias his pupil deposed that he had been present at the magical ceremonies of

Empedoklēs of Agrigentum—first name in the rhetorical movement.

nullus dies vacaret." (Cicero, Brutus, 90, 309.)

the poem of Empedoklēs, attesting these large pretensions.

¹ Aristotel. ap. Diog. Laërt. viii. 57.

See Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Röm. Philos. part. i. sect. 47, 48, p. 192; Sturz. ad Empedoclis Frag. p. 36.

² See vol. iv. ch. xxxiv.

³ Diogen. Laërt. viii. 58, 59, who gives a remarkable extract from

Empedoklēs.¹ The impressive character of his poem is sufficiently attested by the admiration of Lucretius,² and the rhetoric ascribed to him may have consisted mainly in oral teaching or exposition of the same doctrines. Tisias and Korax of Syracuse, who are also mentioned as the first teachers of rhetoric—and the first who made known any precepts about the rhetorical practice—were his contemporaries; while the celebrated Gorgias was his pupil.

The dialectical movement emanated at the same time from the Eleatic school of philosophers—Zeno, and his contemporary the Samian Melissus (460—440)—if not from their common teacher Parmenidēs. Melissus also, as well as Zeno and Empedoklēs, was a distinguished citizen as well as a philosopher: having been in command of the Samian fleet at the time of the revolt from Athens, and having in that capacity gained a victory over the Athenians.

All the philosophers of the fifth century B.C., prior to Sokratēs, inheriting from their earliest poetical predecessors the vast and unmeasured problems which had once been solved by the supposition of divine or superhuman agents, contemplated the world, physical and moral, all in a mass, and applied their minds to find some hypothesis which would give explanation of this totality,² or at least appease curiosity by something which looked like an explanation. What were the elements out of which sensible things were made? What was the initial cause or principle of those changes which appeared to our senses? What was change?—was it generation or something integrally new and destruction of something pre-existent—or was it a decomposition and recombination of elements still continuing? The theories

¹ De Rerum Naturā, i. 719.

² Some striking lines of Empedoklēs are preserved by Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathemat. vii. 115; to the effect that every individual man gets through his short life, with no more knowledge than is comprised in his own slender fraction of observation and experience: he struggles in vain to find out and explain the totality—but neither eye, nor ear, nor reason

can assist him:—

Παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἄβιον μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,
Ῥυμόμοροι, κακνοῖο δίκην ἀρβέντες, ἀπέπταν
Αὐτὸ μόνον πισθέντες, ὅτ' προσέκυρσαν ἕκαστος,
Πάντος' ἐλαυνόμενοι. Τὸ δὲ οὐλον ἐπέχεται εὐρεῖν
Αἰδώς· οὐτ' ἐπιδρακτὰ τὰ δ' ἀνδράσιν, οὐτ' ἀκκουστά,
Οὐτε νόψ περιληπτά.

of the various Ionic philosophers and of Empedoklès after them, admitting one, two, or four elementary substances, with Friendship and Enmity to serve as causes of motion or change—the Homœomeries of Anaxagoras, with *Nous* or Intelligence as the stirring and regularizing agent—the atoms and void of Leukippus and Demokritus—all these were different hypotheses answering to a similar vein of thought. All of them, though assuming that the sensible appearances of things were delusive and perplexing, nevertheless were borrowed more or less directly from some of these appearances, which were employed to explain and illustrate the whole theory, and served to render it plausible when stated as well as to defend it against attack. But the philosophers of the Eleatic school—first Xenophanès, and after him Parmenidès—took a distinct path of their own. To find that which was real, and which lay as it were concealed behind or under the delusive phænomena of sense, they had recourse only to mental abstractions. They supposed a Substance or Something not perceivable by sense, but only cogitable or conceivable by reason; a One and All, continuous and finite, which was not only real and self-existent, but was the only reality—eternal, immoveable and unchangeable, and the only matter knowable. The phænomena of sense, which began and ended one after the other (they thought), were essentially delusive, uncertain, contradictory among themselves, and open to endless diversity of opinion.¹ Upon these, nevertheless, they announced an opinion; adopting two elements—heat and cold—or light and darkness.

Parmenidès set forth this doctrine of the One and All in a poem, of which but a few fragments now remain, so that we understand very imperfectly the positive arguments employed to recommend it. The matter of truth and knowledge, such as he alone admitted, was altogether removed from the senses and divested of sensible properties, so as to be conceived only as an *Ens Rationis*, and described and discussed only in the most general words of the language. The exposition given by Parmenidès in

Zeno and
Melissus—
their dialectic
attacks upon the
opponents of
Parmenidès.

¹ See *Parmenidis Fragmenta*, ed. Karsten, v. 30, 55, 60; also the Dissertation annexed by Karsten, sect. 3, 4. p. 148 seq.; sect. 19. p. 221 seq.

Compare also Mullach's edition of the same Fragments, annexed to his edition of the Aristotelian treatise, *De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia*, p. 144.

his poem,¹ though complimented by Plato, was vehemently controverted by others, who deduced from it many contradictions and absurdities. As a part of his reply,—and doubtless the strongest part,—Parmenidēs retorted upon his adversaries; an example followed by his pupil Zeno with still greater acuteness and success. Those who controverted his ontological theory—that the real, ultra-phænomenal, substance, was One,—affirmed it to be not One, but Many; divisible, moveable, changeable, &c. Zeno attacked this latter theory, and proved that it led to contradictions and absurdities still greater than those involved in the proposition of Parmenidēs.² He impugned the testimony of sense, affirming that it furnished premises for conclusions which contradicted each other, and that it was unworthy of trust.³ Parmenidēs⁴ had denied that there was any such thing as real change either of place or colour: Zeno maintained change of place or motion, to be impossible and self-contradictory; propounding many logical difficulties, derived from the infinite divisibility of matter, against some of the most obvious affirmations respecting sensible phænomena. Melissus appears to have argued in a vein similar to that of Zeno, though with much less acuteness; demonstrating indirectly the doctrine of Parmenidēs by deducing impossible inferences from the contrary hypothesis.⁵

Zeno published a treatise to maintain the thesis above described, which he also upheld by personal conversations and discussions, in a manner doubtless far more efficacious than his writing; the oral teaching of these early philosophers being their really impressive manifestation. His subtle dialectic arguments were not only

Zeno at
Athens—
his conver-
sation both
with
Periklēs
and with
Sokratēs.

¹ Plato, *Parmenidēs*, p. 128 B. σὴ μὲν (*Parmenidēs*) γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν ᾧ εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τοῦτω, τεκμήρια παρέχεις καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, &c.

² See the remarkable passage in the *Parmenidēs* of Plato, p. 128 B, C, D.

³ Ἐστὶ δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν πωμψδεῖν, ὡς εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ, πολλὰ καὶ γέλοια συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀνεναντία αὐτῷ. Ἀντιλέγει δὲ οὐν

τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἐκὶ γελoiότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις—ἢ εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν—ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἰ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίτοι.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, c. 44. p. 261 D. See the citations in Brandis, *Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie*, part i. p. 417 seq.

⁵ *Parmenid. Fragm. v. 101*, ed. Mullach.

⁶ See the *Fragments of Melissus*

sufficient to occupy all the philosophers of antiquity, in confuting them more or less successfully, but have even descended to modern times as a fire not yet extinguished.¹ The great effect produced among the speculative minds of Greece by his writing and conversation, is attested both by Plato and Aristotle. He visited Athens, gave instruction to some eminent Athenians, for high pay—and is said to have conversed both with Periklēs and with Sokratēs, at a time when the latter was very young; probably between 450—440 B.C.²

His appearance constitutes a remarkable æra in Grecian philosophy, because he first brought out the extraordinary aggressive or negative force of the dialectic method. In this discussion respecting the One and the Many, positive grounds on either side were alike scanty: each party had to set forth the contradictions deducible from the opposite hypothesis, and Zeno

Early manifestation, and powerful efficacy, of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy.

collected by Mullach, in his publication cited in a previous note p. 81 *seq.*

¹ The reader will see this in Bayle's Dictionary, article, Zeno of Elea.

Simplicius (in his commentary on Aristot. Physic. p. 255) says that Zeno first composed written dialogues—which cannot be believed without more certain evidence. He also particularizes a puzzling question addressed by Zeno to Protagoras. See Brandis, *Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos.* i. p. 409. —Zeno ἵδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξέθετο (sc. περὶ τῶν πάντων), διηπόρητος δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλείον. Plutarch. ap. Eusebium, *Præpar. Evangel.* i. 23 D.

² Compare Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 3; Plato, *Parmenidēs*, p. 126, 127; Plato, *Alkibiad.* i. ch. 14. p. 119 A.

That Sokratēs had in his youth conversed with Parmenidēs, when the latter was an old man, is stated by Plato more than once, over and above his dialogue called *Parmenidēs*, which professes to

give a conversation between the two, as well as with Zeno. I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton, Brandis, and Karsten—in thinking that this is better evidence about the date of Parmenidēs than any of the vague indications which appear to contradict it, in Diogenes Laërtius and elsewhere. But it will be hardly proper to place the conversation between Parmenidēs and Sokratēs (as Mr. Clinton places it—*Fast. H.* vol. ii. App. c. 21. p. 364) at a time when Sokratēs was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety would not permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher, at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or civil. I cannot but think that Sokratēs must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenidēs.

Sokratēs was born in 469 B.C.

professed to show that those of his opponents were the more flagrant. We thus see that along with the methodised question and answer, or dialectic method, employed from henceforward more and more in philosophical inquiries—comes out at the same time the negative tendency, the probing, testing, and scrutinising force—of Grecian speculation. The negative side of Grecian speculation stands quite as prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive side. It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by a certain measure of plausible premise—and then to proclaim it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all objectors—that Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask not only positive falsehood, but even affirmation without evidence, exaggerated confidence in what was only doubtful, and show of knowledge without the reality—to look at a problem on all sides, and set forth all the difficulties attending its solution—to take account of deductions from the affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted as true upon the balance—all this will be found pervading the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of all progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the grounds of negation should be freely exposed, than the grounds of affirmation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and the negative vein indeed the more impressive and characteristic of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history. In one of the earliest memoranda illustrative of Grecian dialectics—the sentences wherein Plato represents Parmenidēs and Zeno as bequeathing their mantle to the youthful Sokratēs, and giving him precepts for successfully prosecuting those researches which his marked inquisitive impulse promised—this large and comprehensive point of view is emphatically inculcated. He is admonished to set before him both sides of every hypothesis, and to follow out both the negative and the affirmative chains of argument with equal perseverance and equal freedom of scrutiny; neither daunted

(perhaps 468 B.C.); he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449; assuming the visit of Parmenidēs to Athens to have been in 448 B.C., since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 B.C. It is objected that, if this

date be admitted, Parmenidēs could not have been a pupil of Xenophanēs: we should thus be compelled to admit (which perhaps is the truth) that he learnt the doctrine of Xenophanēs at second-hand.

by the adverse opinions around him, nor deterred by sneers against wasting time in fruitless talk; since the multitude are ignorant that without thus travelling round all sides of a question, no assured comprehension of the truth is attainable.¹

We thus find ourselves, from the year 450 B.C. downwards, in presence of two important classes of men in Greece, unknown to Solon or even to Kleisthenês—the Rhetoricians, and the Dialecticians; for whom (as has been shown) the ground had been gradually prepared by the politics, the poetry, and the speculation, of the preceding period.

Both these two novelties—like the poetry and other accomplishments of this memorable race—grew up from rude indigenous beginnings, under native stimulus unborrowed and unassisted from without. The rhetorical teaching was an attempt to assist and improve men in the power of continuous speech as addressed to assembled numbers, such as the public assembly or the dikastery; it was therefore a species of training sought for by men of active pursuits and ambition, either that they might succeed in public life, or that they might maintain their rights and dignity if called before the court of justice. On the other hand, the dialectic business had no direct reference to public life, to the judicial pleading, or to any assembled large number. It was a dialogue carried on by two disputants, usually before a few hearers, to

Rhetoric and dialectics—men of active life and men of speculation—two separate lines of intellectual activity.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 135, 136.

Parmenidês speaks to *Sokratês*—*Καλή μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμή, ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσσον δὴ σαυτὸν καὶ γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολασχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεταί ἡ ἀλήθεια. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι (τὸν Σωκράτην), ὦ *Παρμενίδη*, τῆς γυμνασίας; Οὗτος, εἰπεῖν (τὸν *Παρμενίδην*) ἐπεὶ ἤκουσας *Ζήνωνος*. ... *Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τότε ἔτι πρὸς τοῦτω σκοπεῖν, μὴ μόνον, εἰ ἔστιν ἔκαστον, ὑποτιθέμενον, σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως—ἀλλὰ καὶ,**

*εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὑποτίθεσθαι—εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι. . . Ἀγνοοῦσι γάρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. See also Plato's *Kratylus*, p. 428 E, about the necessity of the investigator looking both before and behind—ἔμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.*

See also the *Parmenidês*, p. 130 E.—in which *Sokratês* is warned respecting the ἀνθρώπων δόξας—against enslaving himself to the opinions of men: compare Plato, *Sophistês*, p. 227 B, C.

unravel some obscurity, to reduce the respondent to silence and contradiction, to exercise both parties in mastery of the subject, or to sift the consequences of some problematical assumption. It was spontaneous conversation¹ systematized and turned into some predetermined channel; furnishing a stimulus to thought, and a means of improvement not attainable in any other manner—furnishing to some also a source of profit or display. It opened a line of serious intellectual pursuit to men of a speculative or inquisitive turn, who were deficient in voice, in boldness, in continuous memory, for public speaking; or who desired to keep themselves apart from the political and judicial animosities of the moment.

Although there were numerous Athenians, who combined, in various proportions, speculative with practical study, yet, generally speaking, the two veins of intellectual movement—one towards active public business, the other towards enlarged opinions and greater command of speculative truth, with its evidences—continued simultaneous and separate. There subsisted between them a standing polemical controversy and a spirit of mutual detraction. If Plato despised the sophists and the rhetors, Isokratês thinks himself not less entitled to disparage those who employed their time in debating upon the unity or plurality of virtue.² Even among different teachers, in the same intellectual walk, also, there prevailed but too often an acrimonious feeling of personal rivalry, which laid them all so much the more open to assault from the common enemy of all mental progress—a feeling of jealous ignorance, stationary or wistfully retrospective, of no mean force at Athens, as in every other society, and of course blended at Athens with the indigenous democratical sentiment. This latter senti-

¹ See Aristotel. *De Sophist. Elenchis*, c. 11. p. 172, ed. Bekker; and his *Topica*, ix. 6. p. 154; where the different purposes of dialogue are enumerated and distinguished.

² See Isokratês, *Orat. x.*; *Helene Encomium*, s. 2–7; compare *Orat. xv. De Permutatione*, of the same author, s. 90.

first of these passages is intended as a criticism upon the Platonic dialogues (as in *Or. v. ad Philip.* s. 84), probably the second passage also. Isokratês, evidently a cautious and timid man, avoids mentioning the names of contemporaries, that he may provoke the less animosity.

I hold it for certain that the

ment¹ of antipathy to new ideas, and new mental accomplishments, has been raised into factitious importance by the comic genius of Aristophanês,—whose point of view modern authors have too often accepted; thus allowing some of the worst feelings of Grecian antiquity to influence their manner of conceiving the facts. Moreover, they have rarely made any allowance for that force of literary and philosophical antipathy, which was no less real and constant at Athens than the political; and which made the different literary classes or individuals perpetually unjust one towards another.² It was the blessing and the glory of Athens, that every man could speak out his sentiments and his criticisms with a freedom unparalleled in the ancient world, and hardly paralleled even in the modern, in which a vast body of dissent both is, and always has been, condemned to absolute silence. But this known latitude of censure ought to have imposed on modern authors a peremptory necessity of not accepting implicitly the censure of any one, where the party inculcated has left no defence; at the very least, of construing the censure strictly, and allowing for the point of view from which it proceeds. From inattention to this necessity, almost all the things and persons of Grecian history are presented to

¹ Isokratês alludes much to this sentiment, and to the men who looked upon gymnastic training with greater favour than upon philosophy, in the *Orat. xv. De Permutatione*, s. 267 *et seq.* A large portion of this oration is in fact a reply to accusations, the same as those preferred against mental cultivation by the Δίκατος Λόγος in the *Nubes* of Aristophanês, 947 *seq.*—favourite topics in the mouths of the pugilists “with smashed ears” (Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 71. p. 515 E, τῶν τὰ ὦτα καταγόμενων).

² There is but too much evidence of the abundance of such jealousies and antipathies during the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isokratês: see Stahr’s *Aristotelia*, ch. iii. vol. i. p. 37, 68.

Aristotle was extremely jealous

of the success of Isokratês, and was himself much assailed by pupils of the latter, Kephisodôrus and others—as well as by Dikæarchus, Eubulidês, and a numerous host of writers in the same tone—σπαρτὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθιμένων Ἀριστοτέλει: see the *Fragments* of Dikæarchus, vol. ii. p. 225, ed. Didot.—“De ingenio ejus (observes Cicero in reference to Epicurus, de *Finibus*, ii. 25, 80) in his disputationibus, non de moribus, quaeritur. Sit ista in Græcorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt.” This is a taint noway peculiar to Grecian philosophical controversy: but it has nowhere been more infectious than among the Greeks, and modern historians cannot be too much on their guard against it.

us on their bad side; the libels of Aristophanês, the sneers of Plato and Xenophon, even the interested generalities of a plaintiff or defendant before the Dikastery—are received with little cross-examination as authentic materials for history.

If ever there was need to invoke this rare sentiment of candour, it is when we come to discuss the history of the persons called Sophists, who now for the first time appear as of note; the practical teachers of Athens and of Greece, misconceived as well as misesteemed.

The primitive education at Athens consisted of two branches; gymnastics, for the body—music, for the mind. The word *music* is not to be judged according to the limited signification which it now bears. It comprehended from the beginning everything appertaining to the province of the Nine Muses—not merely learning the use of the lyre, or how to bear part in a chorus, but also the hearing, learning, and repeating of poetical compositions, as well as the practice of exact and elegant pronunciation—which latter accomplishment, in a language like the Greek, with long words, measured syllables, and great diversity of accentuation between one word and another, must have been far more difficult to acquire than it is in any modern European language. As the range of ideas enlarged, so the words *music* and musical teachers acquired an expanded meaning, so as to comprehend matter of instruction at once ampler and more diversified. During the middle of the fifth century B.C. at Athens, there came thus to be found, among the musical teachers, men of the most distinguished abilities and eminence; musters of all the learning and accomplishments of the age, teaching what was known of astronomy, geography, and physics, and capable of holding dialectical discussions with their pupils, upon all the various problems then afloat among intellectual men. Of this character were Lamprus, Agathoklês, Pythokleidês, Damon, &c. The two latter were instructors of Periklês; and Damon was even rendered so unpopular at Athens, partly by his large and free speculations, partly through the political enemies of his great pupil, that he was ostracised, or at least sentenced to banishment.¹ Such men were com-

Gradual
enlarge-
ment of the
field of
education
at Athens
—increased
knowledge
and capa-
city of the
musical
teachers.

¹ See Plato (Protagoras, c. 8. p. 316 D; Laches, c. 8. p. 180 D;

petent companions for Anaxagoras and Zeno, and employed in part on the same studies; the field of acquired knowledge being not then large enough to be divided into separate, exclusive compartments. While Euripidēs frequented the company, and acquainted himself with the opinions of Anaxagoras—Ion of Chios (his rival as a tragic poet, as well as the friend of Kimon) bestowed so much thought upon physical subjects as then conceived, that he set up a theory of his own, propounding the doctrine of three elements in nature¹—air, fire, and earth.

Now such musical teachers as Damon and the others above-mentioned, were Sophists, not merely in the natural and proper Greek sense of that word, but, to a certain extent, even in the special and restricted meaning which Plato afterwards thought proper to confer upon it.² A Sophist, in the genuine sense of the word, was a wise man—a clever man—one who stood prominently before the public as distinguished for intellect or talent of some kind. Thus Solon and Pythagoras are both called Sophists; Thamyras the skilful bard is called a Sophist;³ Sokratēs is so denominated, not merely by

The Sophists—true Greek meaning of that word—invidious sentiment implied in it.

Menexenus, c. 3. p. 236 A; Alkibiad. i. c. 14. p. 118 C; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4.

Periklēs had gone through dialectic practice in his youth (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 46).

¹ Isokratēs, Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 287.

Compare Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i. s. 48. p. 196.

² Isokratēs calls both Anaxagoras and Damon, Sophists (Or. xv. De Perm. s. 251), Plutarch, Periklēs c. 4. 'Ο δὲ Δάμων ἔειπεν, ἄνθρωπος ὢν σοφιστής, καταδύσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα, ἐπιχειρητόμενος πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς τῇ δεινότητι.

So Protagoras too (in the speech put into his mouth by Plato, Protag. c. 8. p. 316) says, very truly, that there had been Sophists from the earliest times of Greece. But he says also (what Plutarch

says in the citation just above) that these earlier men refused, intentionally and deliberately, to call themselves Sophists, for fear of the odium attached to the name; and that he (Protagoras) was the first person to call himself openly a Sophist.

The denomination by which a man is known, however, seldom depends upon himself, but upon the general public, and upon his critics, friendly or hostile. The unfriendly spirit of Plato did much more to attach the title of Sophists specially to these teachers, than any assumption of their own.

³ Herodot. i. 29; ii. 49; iv. 95. Diogenēs of Apollonia, contemporary of Herodotus, called the Ionic philosophers or physiologists by the name Sophists: see Brandis, Geschich. der Griech. Röm. Philosph. c. LVII. note O. About

Aristophanês, but by Æschinês:¹ Aristotle himself calls Aristippus, and Xenophon calls Antisthenês, both of them disciples of Sokratês, by that name:² Xenophon,³ in describing a collection of instructive books, calls them "the writings of the old poets and Sophists," meaning by the latter word prose writers generally: Plato is alluded to as a Sophist, even by Isokratês:⁴ Æschinês (the disciple of Sokratês, not the orator) was so denominated by his contemporary Lysias:⁵ Isokratês himself was harshly criticised as a Sophist, and defends both himself and his profession: lastly, Timon (the friend and admirer of Pyrrho, about 300-280 B.C.), who bitterly satirised all the philosophers, designated them all, including Plato and Aristotle, by the general name of Sophists.⁶ In this large and comprehensive sense the word was originally used, and always continued to be so understood among the general public. But along with this idea, the title Sophist also carried with it or

Thamyras, see Welcker, Griech. Tragöd. Sophoklès, p. 421—

Εἰτ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παρακαλῶν χέλυ, &c.

The comic poet Kratinus called all the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, σοφισταί: see the Fragments of his drama Ἀρχιλόχοι in Meineke, Fragm. Comicor. Græcor. vol. ii. p. 16.

¹ Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34. Æschinês calls Demosthenês also a Sophist, c. 27.

We see plainly from the terms in Plato's Politicus, c. 38. p. 299 B.—μεταπολόγον, ἀδολεσχὴν τινα σοφιστήν—that both Sokratês and Plato himself were designated as Sophists by the Athenian public.

² Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii. 2. p. 996; Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 1.

Aristippus is said to have been the first of the disciples of Sokratês who took money for instruction (Diogen. Laërt. ii. 65).

³ Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 1. γράμματα πολλὰ συναλεγμένων ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκίμωντων. . . .

The word σοφιστῶν is here used

just in the same sense as τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἀπείροι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, &c. (Memor. i. 6, 14). It is used in a different sense in another passage (i. 1, 11) to signify teachers who gave instruction on physical and astronomical subjects, which Sokratês and Xenophon both disapproved.

⁴ Isokratês, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 14: see Heindorf's note on the Euthydemus of Plato, p. 305 O. s. 79. Isokratês is spoken of as a Sophist by Plutarch, Quæst. Sympos. i. 1. 1. p. 613.

⁵ Athenæus, xii. p. 612 F.; Lysias, Fragm. Bekk.

⁶ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 65. Ἐπεὶ νῦν μοι, ὅσοι πολυπράγμονες ἔστε σοφισταί (Diogen. Laërt. viii. 74).

Demetrius of Troezen numbered Empedoklès as a Sophist. Isokratês speaks of Empedoklès, Ion, Alkmaeon, Parmenidès, Melissus, Gorgias, all as οἱ παλαιοὶ σοφισταί—all as having taught different περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ κόσμου elements of the physical world (Isok. de Permut. s. 288).

connoted a certain invidious feeling. The natural temper of a people generally ignorant towards superior intellect—the same temper which led to those charges of magic so frequent in the Middle Ages—appears to be an union of admiration with something of an unfavourable sentiment¹—dislike, or apprehension, as the case may be; unless where the latter element has become neutralised by habitual respect for an established profession or station. At any rate, the unfriendly sentiment is so often intended, that a substantive word in which it is implied without the necessity of any annexed predicate, is soon found convenient. Timon, who hated the philosophers, thus found the word Sophist exactly suitable, in sentiment as well as meaning, to his purpose in addressing them.

Now when (in the period succeeding 450 B.C.) the rhetorical and musical teachers came to stand before the public at Athens in such increased eminence, they of course, as well as other men intellectually celebrated, became designated by the appropriate name of Sophists. But there was one characteristic peculiar to themselves whereby they drew upon themselves a double measure of that invidious sentiment which lay wrapped up in the name. They taught for pay: of course therefore the most eminent among them taught only the rich, and earned large sums: a fact naturally provocative of envy, to some extent, among the many who benefited nothing by them, but still more among the inferior members of their own profession. Even great minds, like Sokratēs and Plato, though much superior to any such envy, cherished in that age a genuine and vehement repugnance against receiving pay for teaching. We read in Xenophon,² that

The name Sophist applied by Plato in a peculiar sense, in his polemic against the eminent paid teachers.

¹ Eurip. Med. 289—

Χρὴ δ' οὐποδ' ὅστις ἀρτίφων πέ-
φυκ' ἀνὴρ,

Παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι σο-
φούς.

Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἥς ἔχουσιν, ἀρ-
γίας,

Φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσ-
μενῇ.

The words ὁ περισσῶς σοφός seem to convey the same unfriendly sentiment as the word σοφιστής.

² Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 6. In

another passage, the Sophist Antiphon (whether this is the celebrated Antiphon of the deme Rhamnus, is uncertain; the commentators lean to the negative) is described as conversing with Sokratēs, and saying that Sokratēs of course must imagine his own conversation to be worth nothing, since he asked no price from his scholars. To which Sokratēs replies—

Ὁ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται,

Sokratês considered such a bargain as nothing less than servitude, robbing the teacher of all free choice as to persons or proceeding; and that he assimilated the relation between teacher and pupil to that between two lovers or two intimate friends, which was thoroughly dishonoured, robbed of its charm and reciprocity, and prevented from bringing about its legitimate reward of attachment and devotion, by the intervention of money payment. However little in harmony with modern ideas,¹ such was the conscientious sentiment of Sokratês and Plato; who therefore considered the name Sophist, denoting intellectual celebrity

τὴν ὥρην καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. Τὴν τε γὰρ ὥρην, εἰ μὲν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν εἰ μὲν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῶ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἐκρυπτῶ ποιῇται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν. Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ὡς περ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ὅστις δὲ, ὃν ἂν γνῶ εὐφραδὲς ὄντα, διδάσκων ᾗ, τι ἂν ἔχη ἀγαθόν, φίλον κεινίται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ πολλὴν προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν (Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 13).

As an evidence of the manners and sentiment of the age, this passage is extremely remarkable. Various parts of the oration of Æschinês against Timarchus, and the Symposium of Plato (p. 217, 218), both receive and give light to it.

Among the numerous passages in which Plato expresses his dislike and contempt of teaching for money, see his Sophistes, c. 9. p. 223. Plato indeed thought that it was unworthy of a virtuous man to accept salary for the discharge of any public duty: see the Republic, i. 19. p. 347. The comic writer Ephippus, however, (see Athenæus xi. 509; Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. iii. p. 332) taunts the

disciples of Plato and pupils of the Academy as receivers of pay teaching; making evidently no distinction between them and Thrasymachus on this point. Athenæus construes the taunt as including Plato himself; which goes beyond the strict meaning of the words.

¹ Ovid, dwelling upon the same general analogy of the relations between lovers (Amores, i. 10, 38), insists on the baseness of accepting money as a reward for pleading in behalf of persons accused before justice. "Turpe reos emptâ miseros defendere linguâ."—That it was dishonourable to receive pay for judicial pleading, was the general idea and dominant sentiment of the Romans, in the time of the Republic, and in the early period of the Empire. The Lex Cincia (passed about 200 B.C.) prohibited such receipt altogether. In practice, as we might expect, the prohibition came to be more and more evaded, though it seems to have been at times formally renewed. But the sentiment, in honourable Romans, continued unaltered certainly down to the days of Tacitus. See Tacit. Ann. xi. 5—7; Livy, xxxiv. 4. A limited maximum of fee was first permitted under Claudius. See Walter, Röm. Recht. s. 751.

combined with an odious association, as preeminently suitable to the leading teachers for pay. The splendid genius, the lasting influence, and the reiterated polemics, of Plato, have stamped it upon the men against whom he wrote as if it were their recognised, legitimate, and peculiar designation: though it is certain, that if, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, any Athenian had been asked,—“Who are the principal Sophists in your city?”—he would have named Sokratēs among the first; for Sokratēs was at once eminent as an intellectual teacher, and personally unpopular—not because he received pay, but on other grounds which will be hereafter noticed: and this was the precise combination of qualities which the general public naturally expressed by a Sophist. Moreover, Plato not only stole the name out of general circulation in order to fasten it specially upon his opponents the paid teachers, but also connected with it express discreditable attributes, which formed no part of its primitive and recognized meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the vague sentiment of dislike associated with it. Aristotle, following the example of his master, gave to the word Sophist a definition substantially the same as that which it bears in the modern languages¹—“an impostrous pretender to knowledge, a man who employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the purpose of deceit and of getting money.” And he did this at a time when he himself, with his estimable contemporary Isokratēs, were considered at Athens to come under the designation of Sophists, and were called so by every one who disliked either their profession or their persons.²

¹Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 1, 4—where he explains the Sophist to be a person who has the same powers as the Dialectician, but abuses them for a bad purpose—ή γάρ σοφιστική, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει. . . . Ἐκεῖ δὲ, σοφιστής μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικός δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. Again in the first chapter of the treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis—ὁ σοφιστής, χρηματιστής ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσης, &c.

² Respecting Isokratēs, see his

Orat. xv. De Permutatione, wherein it is evident that he was not only ranked as a Sophist by others, but also considered himself as such, though the appellation was one which he did not like. He considers himself as such, as well as Gorgias—οἱ καλούμενοι σοφισταί—sect. 166, 169, 213, 231.

Respecting Aristotle, we have only to read (not merely the passage of Timon cited in a previous note, but also) the bitter slander of Timæus (Frag. 70. ed. Didot, Polybius, xii. 8), who called

Great thinkers and writers, like Plato and Aristotle, have full right to define and employ words in a sense of their own, provided they give due notice. But it is essential that the reader should keep in mind the consequences of such change, and not mistake a word used in a new sense for a new fact or phænomenon. The age with which we are now dealing (the last half of the fifth century B.C.) is commonly distinguished in the history of philosophy as the age of Sokratês and the Sophists. The Sophists are spoken of as a new class of men, or sometimes in language which implies a new doctrinal sect or school, as if they then sprang up in Greece for the first time—ostentatious impostors, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain, undermining the morality of Athens public and private, and encouraging their pupils to the unscrupulous prosecution of ambition and cupidity. They are even affirmed to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, as compared with what she was in the time of Miltiadês and Aristeidês. Sokratês, on the contrary, is usually described as a holy man combating and exposing these false prophets—standing up as the champion of morality against their insidious artifices.¹ Now though the appearance of a man so very original as Sokratês was a new fact, of unspeakable importance—the appearance of the Sophists was no new fact: what was new was the peculiar use of an old word; which Plato took out of its usual meaning, and fastened upon the eminent paid teachers of the Sokratic age.

him σοφιστήν ὁφισαθῆ καὶ με-
σητόν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυ-
τήμητον ἱατρῶν ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλι-
κότες, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις, εἰς πᾶσαν
ἀλλήν καὶ σκῆλην ἐμπεπηδηκότες πρὸς
δὲ, γαστρίμαργον, ὀφάρτυτην, ἐπὶ
στόμα φερόμενον ἐν πᾶσι.

¹ In the general point of view here described, the Sophists are presented by Ritter, Geschichte

der Griech. Philosophie, vol. i. book vi. chap. 1—3. p. 577 seq., 629 seq.; by Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. sect. lxxxiv., lxxxvii. vol. i. p. 516 seq.; by Zeller, Geschichte der Philosoph. ii. pp. 65, 69, 165, &c.; and indeed by almost all who treat of the Sophists.

The paid teachers, with whom, under the name of The Sophists, he brings Sokratês into controversy, were Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, Hippias of Elis, Prodikos of Keos, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus of Chios: to whom Xenophôn adds Antiphon of Athens. These men—whom modern writers set down as The Sophists, and denounce as the moral pestilence of their age—were not distinguished in any marked or generic way from their predecessors. Their vocation was to train up youth for the duties, the pursuits, and the successes, of active life, both private and public. Others had done this before; but these teachers brought to the task a larger range of knowledge, with a greater multiplicity of scientific and other topics—not only more impressive powers of composition and speech, serving as a personal example to the pupil, but also a comprehension of the elements of good speaking, so as to be able to give precepts conducive to that accomplishment¹—a considerable treasure of accumulated thought on moral and political subjects, calculated to make their conversation very instructive—and discourse ready prepared, on general heads or *common places*, for their pupils to learn by heart.² But this, though a very important extension, was nothing more than an extension, differing merely in degree—of that which Damon and others had done before them. It arose from the increased demand which had grown up among the Athenian youth, for a larger measure of education and other accomplishments; from an elevation in the standard of what was required from every man who aspired to occupy a place in the eyes of his fellow-citizens. Protagoras, Gorgias, and the rest, supplied this demand with an ability and success unknown before their time: hence they gained a distinction such as none of their predecessors had attained, were prized all over Greece, travelled from city to city with general admiration, and obtained considerable pay. While such success, among men personally strangers to them, attests unequivocally their talent and personal dignity; of course it also laid them open to increased jealousy, as well from inferior teachers, as from the lovers

Paid teachers or Sophists of the Sokratic age—Protagoras, Gorgias, &c.

¹ Compare Isokratês, Orat. xiii. cont. Sophistas, s. 19-21.

² Aristot. Sophist. Elench. c. 83; Cicero, Brut. c. 12.

of ignorance generally; such jealousy manifesting itself (as I have before explained) by a greater readiness to stamp them with the obnoxious title of Sophists.

The hostility of Plato against these teachers (for it is he, and not Sokratês, who was peculiarly hostile to them, as may be seen by the absence of any such marked antithesis in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon) may be explained without at all supposing in them that corruption which modern writers have been so ready not only to admit but to magnify. It arose from the radical difference between his point of view and theirs. He was a great reformer and theorist: they undertook to qualify young men for doing themselves credit, and rendering service to others, in active Athenian life. Not only is there room for the concurrent operation of both these veins of thought and action, in every progressive society, but the intellectual outfit of the society can never be complete without the one as well as the other. It was the glory of Athens that both were there adequately represented, at the period which we have now reached. Whoever peruses Plato's immortal work—'The Republic'—will see that he dissented from society, both democratical and oligarchical, on some of the most fundamental points of public and private morality; and throughout most of his dialogues his quarrel is not less with the statesmen, past as well as present, than with the paid teachers, of Athens. Besides this ardent desire for radical reform of the state, on principles of his own, distinct from every recognized political party or creed—Plato was also unrivalled as a speculative genius and as a dialectician; both which capacities he put forth, to amplify and illustrate the ethical theory and method first struck out by Sokratês, as well as to establish comprehensive generalities of his own.

Now his reforming, as well as his theorising tendencies, brought him into polemical controversy with all the leading agents by whom the business of practical life at Athens was carried on. In so far as Protagoras or Gorgias talked the language of theory, they were doubtless much inferior to Plato, nor would their doctrines be likely to hold against his acute dialectics. But it was neither their duty, nor their engagement, to reform the state, or discover and

vindicate the best theory on ethics. They professed to qualify young Athenians for an active and honourable life, private as well as public, *in Athens* (or in any other given city): they taught them "to think, speak, and act," *in Athens*; they of course accepted, as the basis of their teaching, that type of character which estimable men exhibited and which the public approved, *in Athens*—not undertaking to recast the type, but to arm it with new capacities and adorn it with fresh accomplishments. Their direct business was with ethical precept, not with ethical theory: all that was required of them as to the latter, was, that their theory should be sufficiently sound to lead to such practical precepts as were accounted virtuous by the most estimable society *in Athens*. It ought never to be forgotten, that those who taught for active life were bound by the very conditions of their profession to adapt themselves to the place and the society as it stood. With the Theorist Plato, not only there was no such obligation, but the grandeur and instructiveness of his speculations were realised only by his departing from it, and placing himself on a loftier pinnacle of vision; while he himself¹ not only admits, but even exaggerates, the unfitness and repugnance, of men taught in his school, for practical life and duties.²

¹ See a striking passage in Plato, *Theætet.* c. 24. p. 173, 174.

² Professor Maurice, in his *History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* (vi. 2. 1, 6), remarks as follows: "We at once accept Mr. Grote's definition of the Sophist as the Platonical and the true one. He was the professor of wisdom: he taught men how to think, speak, and act. We wish for no other and no worse account of him. If modern authors have thrown any darker shades into their picture, we believe they have done him a benefit instead of an injury. Their clumsy exaggeration hides the *essential ugliness* which Mr. Grote's flattering sketch brings out in full relief."

The *essential ugliness* here noticed, is described by Professor Maurice

as consisting in the fact, that—"Each held out the acquisition of *political power as a prize to be obtained*. There was their common point of agreement: possibly there was no other. The young Athenians wanted to know how to think, act, and speak on all subjects, *that they might guide the people according to their pleasure*. For this purpose they sought the aid of a sophist or professor." (s. 9. p. 108.) By the necessity of his calling, the Sophist who taught to think, to act, and to speak, would come to regard the last part of his profession as that which included both the others. He would become a rhetorician and a teacher of rhetoric. If his object was to influence the mind of a mob, he was at least in considerable danger

To understand the essential difference between the practical and the theoretical point of view, we need only

of leading his pupils to give the word *sophistry* that force with which we are most familiar" (p. 109).

What Professor Maurice calls the "essential ugliness," resides (according to his own showing), not in the Sophists, but in the young Athenians whom the Sophists taught. These young men wanted political power. To gratify ambition was their end and aim. But this was an end which the Sophists did not implant. They found it pre-existing, learnt from other quarters; and they had to deal with it as a fact. Let us read what Xenophon says about Proxenus and Gorgias. "Proxenus the Boeotian, even in his early youth, desired to become a man competent to achieve great deeds; and through this desire he gave money to Gorgias the Leontine. Having frequented his society, Proxenus conceived himself to have thus become fit for command, for alliance with the first men of his time, and for requiting to them all the good service which they might render to him" (Πρόξενος δὲ ὁ Βοιωτίας εὐθύς μὲν μισράχιον ὦν ἐκισθόμεν γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ τὰ μεγάλα πράττειν ἱκανός· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐκισθμίαν ἔδωκεν ἀργύριον Γοργίᾳ τῷ Λεοντίνῳ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ συνεγένετο ἕκιστος, ἱκανός ἤδη νομισσας εἶναι καὶ ἀρχειν, καὶ φίλος ὦν τοῖς πρώτοις, μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἀνεργεῖν, &c. (Anab. ii. 8, 16). So again in the Protagoras of Plato, Sokratēs introduces Hippokratēs to Protagoras with these words—"This Hippokratēs is a youth of one of our great and wealthy Athenian families, and is not inferior in talents to any of his contemporaries. He desires to become renowned in the city (ἀλλόγματος γινέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει) and he thinks

he shall be most likely to attain this object through your society." (Plato, Protag. c. 19, p. 168 A.)

Here we see that the end and aim was not one inspired by the Sophist to his pupils, but set by the pupils to themselves; just like the ends of Alkibiadēs and Kritias, when they sought the society of Sokratēs. And it is the end which Professor Maurice conceives as the great vice and generating cause of evil.

For the means, however, though not for the end, the Sophist is fairly responsible. What were the means which he communicated? The power of persuasion, with its appropriate stock of knowledge, memorial aptitude, and command of words, subject to the control of free public discussion or counter-persuasion from others. To call this acquisition an evil, can only pass current under that untenable assumption which represents speech as a mere organisation for deceit; against which I need not add anything to the protest of Aristotle and Quintilian.

That speech may be used for good or for evil, is indisputable: speech in all its forms, not less the colloquy of Sokratēs than the oratory of Demosthenēs; speech not less in the mouth of a rude Spartan (who was as great a deceiver as any man in Greece) than in that of an accomplished Athenian; nay, not merely speech, but writing, which is only another mode of reaching the public feeling and conviction. The ambitious man may and will misemploy all these weapons to his own purposes. There is but one way to lessen the proportion of evil belonging to them. It is to ensure free scope

look to Isokratês, the pupil of Gorgias, and himself a Sophist. Though not a man of commanding abilities, Isokratês

to those who would persuade for better purposes; to multiply the number of competent speakers, with the opportunities of discussion; and thus to create a public of competent hearers and judges. Nowhere was so near an approach made to this object as at Athens, nor were there any persons who contributed more directly towards it than the Sophists. For not only they increased the number of speakers capable of enlisting the attention of the public, and thus of making discussion agreeable to the hearers; but even as to the use of oratorical fallacies, their numerous pupils served as checks upon each other. If they taught one ambitious man to deceive, they also taught another how to expose his deceit, and a third how to approach the subject on a different side, so as to divert attention, and prevent the exclusive predominance of any one fallacy.

It will probably be argued by Professor Maurice that the personal contentions of ambitious political rivals are a miserable apparatus for the conduct of society. Granting this to be true, it is still a prodigious improvement (for which we are indebted altogether to Greece, and chiefly to Athens, with the Sophists as auxiliaries) to have brought these ambitious rivals to contend with the tongue only, and not with the sword. But if the remark be true at all, it is not less applicable to English than to Athenian politics; to every country where any free scope is left for human energy. By what else has England been governed for the last century and a half, except by these struggles of rival parties and ambitious politicians?

If Plato disparaged the debates in the Athenian assembly and dikastery, would he have felt any greater esteem for those in the Houses of Lords and Commons? If he thought himself entitled to despise the whole class of Athenian statesmen, Themistoklês and Periklês among them, as "mere servants of the city" (δουλοῦς τῆς πόλεως—Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 154. p. 152 A, 155 A), supplying Athens with docks, harbours, walls, and such like follies, but making no provision for the moral improvement of the citizens"—would his judgement have been more favourable on Walpole and Pulteney—Pitt and Fox—Peel and Russell—the 'Times' and the 'Chronicle'?

When we try Athens by the ideal standard of Sokratês and Plato, we ought in fairness to apply the same criticism to other societies also, which will be found just as little competent to stand the scrutiny. And those who, like Professor Maurice, assume that intellectual and persuasive power in the hands of an ambitious man is an instrument of evil—which is implied in the assertion that the Sophist, to whom he owes the improvement of such power, is a teacher of evil—will find that they are passing sentence upon the leading men in the English Houses of Lords and Commons, not less than upon the prominent politicians of Athens. In both the "essential ugliness" is found—if that be the name which it deserves—of qualifying themselves to think, speak, and act, in order that they may gain or keep "political power as the prize," and may "guide the people according to their pleasure."

It will probably be said that this

was one the most estimable men of Grecian antiquity. He taught for money, and taught young men to "think, speak, and act," all with a view to an honourable life of active citizenship; not concealing his marked disparagement¹ of speculative study and debate, such as the dialogues of Plato and the dialectic exercises generally. He defends his profession much in the same way as his master Gorgias, or Protagoras,

The Sophists were professional teachers for active life, like Isokratés and Quintilian.

is not absolutely true of all English politicians, but only of some; that others among them, more or fewer, have devoted their knowledge and eloquence to persuading for public-minded purposes, and with beneficial results. Such reserves, if made for England, ought to be made for Athens also; which is quite enough as a reply to the censure pronounced by Professor Maurice against the Sophist. The Sophist imparted intellectual and persuasive force to the high-minded politicians, as well as to the ambitious. To those pupils who combined in different proportions the one and the other class of motives (as must have happened very frequently), his teaching tended to foster the better rather than the worse. The very topics upon which he talked ensured such a tendency: the materials, out of which persuasion is to be manufactured, must be, for the most part, of a public-minded, lofty, and beneficent bearing—though an ambitious talker may choose to misemploy them for his own personal power-seeking.

As to the influence of ambitious motives in politicians, when subject to the necessity of persuasion and to the control of free discussion—though I do not concur in the sweeping censure of Professor Maurice, I admit that it is partly evil as well as good, and that it leads to great or material improvement, beyond the actual

state of society which the ambitious man finds. But the Sophist does not represent ambition. He represents intellectual and persuasive force, reflecting and methodised so as to operate upon the minds of free hearers, yet under perfect liberty of opposition: persuasion against the ambitious man, as well as by him or for him. It is this which I am here upholding against Professor Maurice, as not only no evil, but (in my judgement) one of the grand sources of good in Athens, and essential to human improvement everywhere else. There are only two modes of governing society, either by persuasion or by coercion. Discredit the arguments of the Sophist as much as you can by others of an opposite tendency: but when you discredit his weapon of intellectual and persuasive force, as if it were nothing better than cheat and imposture, manufactured and sold for the use of ambitious men—you leave open no other ascendancy over men's minds, except the crushing engine of extraneous coercion with assumed infallibility.

¹ Isokratés, Orat. v. (ad Philip.) s. 14; Orat. x. (Enc. Hel.) s. 2; Orat. xiii. adv. Sophist. s. 9 (compare Heindorf's note ad Platon. Euthydem. s. 79); Orat. xii. (Panath.) s. 126; Orat. xv. (Perm.) s. 90.

Isokratés, in the beginning of his Orat. x. Encom. Helenæ, censures all the speculative teachers—first

would have defended it, if we had before us vindications from their pens. Isokratês at Athens, and Quintilian, a

Antisthenês and Plato (without naming them, but identifying them sufficiently by their doctrines), next Protagoras, Gorgias, Melissus, Zeno, &c., by name, as having wasted their time and teaching on fruitless paradox and controversy. He insists upon the necessity of teaching with a view to political life and to the course of actual public events—abandoning these useless studies (s. 6).

It is remarkable that what Isokratês recommends is just what Protagoras and Gorgias are represented as actually doing (each doubtless in his own way) in the dialogues of Plato; who censures them for being too practical, while Isokratês, commenting on them from various publications which they left, treats them only as teachers of useless speculations.

In the Oration De Permutatione, composed when he was eighty-two years of age (s. 10—the orations above cited are earlier compositions, especially Orat. xiii. against the Sophists, see s. 208), Isokratês stands upon the defensive, and vindicates his profession against manifold aspersions. It is a most interesting oration, as a defence of the educators of Athens generally, and would serve perfectly well as a vindication of the teaching of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, &c., against the reproaches of Plato.

This oration should be read, if only to get at the genuine Athenian sense of the word Sophists, as distinguished from the technical sense which Plato and Aristotle fasten upon it. The word is here used in its largest sense, as distinguished from *ιδιώτης* (s. 159): it meant literary men or philosophers generally, but especially the

professional teachers: it carried however an obnoxious sense, and was therefore used as little as possible by themselves—as much as possible by those who disliked them.

Isokratês, though he does not willingly call himself by this unpleasant name, yet is obliged to acknowledge himself unreservedly as one of the profession, in the same category as Gorgias (s. 166, 179, 211, 213, 231, 256), and defends the general body as well as himself; distinguishing himself of course from the bad members of the profession—those who pretended to be Sophists, but devoted themselves to something different in reality (s. 230).

This professional teaching, and the teachers, are signified indiscriminately by these words—*οι σοφισταί—οι περί τήν φιλοσοφίαν διατριβόντες—τήν φιλοσοφίαν αἰδέως διαβεβλημένην* (s. 44, 157, 159, 179, 211, 217, 219)—*ή τῶν λόγων παιδεία—ή τῶν λόγων μελέτη—ή φιλοσοφία—ή τῆς φρονήσεως ἀσκήσις—τῆς ἐμῆς, εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμειος, εἴτε φιλοσοφίας, εἴτε διατριβῆς* (s. 58, 187, 189, 193, 196). All these expressions mean the same process of training—that is, general mental training as opposed to bodily (s. 194, 199), and intended to cultivate the powers of thought, speech, and action—*πρὸς τὸ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν—τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν—τὸ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν* (s. 221, 261, 285, 296, 330). So again in the *Busiris*, Isokratês represents Polykratês as a *σοφιστής*, making an income by *φιλοσοφία* or by *ή περί τοὺς λόγους παιδευσίς*, sect. 1, 2, 44, 45, 50, 51.

Isokratês does not admit any such distinction between the philosopher and dialectician on the one

man equally estimable at Rome, are in their general type of character and professional duty, the fair counterpart of those whom Plato arraigns as The Sophists.

We know these latter chiefly from the evidence of Plato, their pronounced enemy: yet even his evidence, when construed candidly and taken as a whole, will not be found to justify the charges of corrupt and immoral teaching, impious pretence of knowledge, &c. which the modern historians pour forth in loud chorus against them. I know few characters in history who have been so hardly dealt with as these so-called Sophists. They bear the penalty of their name, in its modern sense; a misleading association, from which few modern writers take pains to emancipate either themselves or their readers—though the English or French word Sophist is absolutely inapplicable to Protagoras or Gorgias, who ought to be called rather “Professor or Public Teachers.” It is really surprising to examine the expositions prefixed, by learned men like Stallbaum and others, to the Platonic dialogues entitled Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydēmus, Theætētus, &c., where Plato introduces Sokratēs either in personal controversy with one or other of these Sophists, or as canvassing their opinions. We continually read from the pen of the expositor such remarks as these—“Mark how Plato puts down the shallow and worthless Sophist”—the obvious reflection, that it is Plato himself who plays both games on the chess-board, being altogether overlooked. And again—“This or that argument, placed in the mouth of Sokratēs, is not to be regarded as the real opinion of Plato: he only takes it up and enforces it at this moment, in order to puzzle and humiliate an ostentatious pretender¹”—a remark which converts Plato

side—and the Sophist on the other—as Plato and Aristotle contend for. He does not like dialectical exercises, yet he admits them to be useful for youth, as a part of intellectual training, on condition that all such speculations shall be dropped, when the youth come into active life (s. 280, 287).

This is the same language as that of Kalliklēs in the Gorgias of Plato, c. 40. p. 484.

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon. Protagor. p. 23. “Hoc vero ejus judicio ita utitur Socrates, ut eum dehinc dialecticā subtilitate in summam consilii inopiam conjiciat. Colligit enim inde satis captiose rebus ita comparatis justitiam, quippe quæ a sanctitate diversa sit, plane nihil sanctitatis habituram, ac vicissim sanctitati nihil fore commune cum justitiâ. Respondet quidem ad hæc Protagoras;

into an insincere disputant and a Sophist in the modern sense, at the very moment when the commentator is extolling his pure and lofty morality as an antidote against the alleged corruption of Gorgias and Protagoras.

Plato has devoted a long and interesting dialogue to the inquiry, What is a Sophist?¹ and it is curious to observe that the definition which he at last brings out suits Sokratês himself, intellectually speaking, better than any one else whom we know. Cicero defines the Sophist to be one who pursues philosophy for the sake of ostentation or of gain;² which, if it is to be held as a reproach, will certainly bear hard upon the great body of modern teachers, who are determined

The Sophists as paid teachers—no proof that they were greedy or exorbitant—proceeding of Protagoras.

justitiam ac sanctitatem non per omnia sibi similes esse, nec tamen etiam prorsus dissimiles videri. Sed etsi *verissima est hæc ejus sententia*, tamen comparatione illâ a partibus faciei repetitâ, in *fraudem inductus*, et quid sit, in quo omnis virtutis natura contineatur, ignarus, sese ex his difficultatibus adeo non potest expedire," &c.

Again, p. 24. "Itaque Socrates, missâ hujus rei disputatione, repente ad alia progreditur, scilicet similibus laqueis hominem deinceps denuo irretiturus." . . . "Nemini facile obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco, Protagoram *argutis conclusionibus deludi atque callide eo permoveri*," &c. . . . p. 25. "Quamquam nemo erit, quin videat *callide deludi Protagoram*," &c. . . . p. 34. "Quod si autem ea, quæ in Protagorâ *Sophistâ ridendi causâ* e vulgi atque sophistarum ratione disputantur, in Gorgiâ ex ipsius philosophi mente et sententiâ vel brevius proponuntur vel copiosius disputantur," &c.

Compare similar observations of Stallbaum, in his Prolegom. ad Theætet. p. 12, 22; ad Menon. p. 16; ad Euthydemum, p. 28, 30; ad Lachetem, p. 11; ad Lysidem, p. 79, 80, 87; ad Hippiam Major, p. 154—156.

"Facile apparet Socratem *argutâ*, quæ verbo *privatâ* inest, *diologiâ interlocutorem* (Hippiam Sophistam) in *fraudem inducere*." . . . "Illud quidem pro certo et explorato habemus, non serio sed *ridendi vexandique Sophistâ gratiâ* *graculissimam illam sententiam in dubitationem vocari*, ideoque iis conclusionibus labefactari, quas quilibet paulo attentior facile intelligat non ad fidem faciendam, sed ad lusus jocumque, esse comparatas."

¹ Plato, Sophistes, c. 52. p. 268.

² Cicero, Academ. iv. 23. Xenophon, at the close of his treatise De Venatione (c. 13), introduces a sharp censure upon the Sophists, with very little that is specific or distinct. He accuses them of teaching command and artifice of words, instead of communicating useful maxims—of speaking for purposes of deceit, or for their own profit, and addressing themselves to rich pupils for pay—while the *philosopher* gives his lessons to every one gratuitously, without distinction of persons. This is the same distinction as that taken by Sokratês and Plato, between the Sophist and the Philosopher: compare Xenoph. de Vectigal. v. 4.

to embrace their profession and to discharge its important duties, like other professional men, by the prospect either of deriving an income or of making a figure in it, or both—whether they have any peculiar relish for the occupation or not. But modern writers, in describing Protagoras or Gorgias, while they adopt the sneering language of Plato against teaching for pay, low purposes, tricks to get money from the rich, &c.—use terms which lead the reader to believe that there was something in these Sophists peculiariy greedy, exorbitant, and truckling; something beyond the mere fact of asking and receiving remuneration. Now not only there is no proof that any of them (speaking of those conspicuous in the profession) were thus dishonest or exorbitant, but in the case of Protagoras, even his enemy Plato furnishes a proof that he was not so. In the Platonic dialogue termed *Protagoras*, that Sophist is introduced as describing the manner in which he proceeded respecting remuneration from his pupils. “I make no stipulation beforehand: when a pupil parts from me, I ask from him such a sum as I think the time and the circumstances warrant; and I add, that if he deems the demand too great, he has only to make up his own mind what is the amount of improvement which my company has procured to him, and what sum he considers an equivalent for it. I am content to accept the sum so named by himself, only requiring him to go into a temple and make oath that it is his sincere belief.”¹ It is not easy to imagine a more dignified way of dealing than this, nor one which more thoroughly attests an honourable reliance on the internal consciousness of the scholar; on the grateful sense of improvement realised, which to every teacher constitutes a reward hardly inferior to the payment

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 16. p. 328 B. Diogenes Laërtius (ix. 58) says that Protagoras demanded 100 minæ as pay: little stress is to be laid upon such a statement, nor is it possible that he could have had one fixed rate of pay. The story told by Aulus Gellius (v. 10) about the suit at law between Protagoras and his disciple Euathlus, is at least amusing and ingenious. Compare the story of

the rhetor Skopellianus, in *Philostrophus*, *Vit. Sophist.* i. 21, 4.

Isokratēs (*Or. xv. de Perm.* s. 186) affirms that the gains made by Gorgias or by any of the eminent Sophists had never been very high; that they had been greatly and maliciously exaggerated; that they were very inferior to those of the great dramatic actors (s. 168).

that proceeds from it, and which (in the opinion of Sokratēs) formed the only legitimate reward. Such is not the way in which the corruptors of mankind go to work.

That which stood most prominent in the teaching of Gorgias and the other Sophists, was, that they cultivated and improved the powers of public speaking in their pupils; one of the most essential accomplishments to every Athenian of consideration. For this, too, they have been denounced by Ritter, Brandis, and other learned writers on the history of philosophy, as corrupt and immoral. "Teaching their pupils rhetoric (it has been said), they only enable them to second unjust designs, to make the worse appear the better reason, and to delude their hearers, by trick and artifice, into false persuasion and show of knowledge without reality. Rhetoric (argues Plato in the dialogue called Gorgias) is no art whatever, but a mere unscientific knack, enslaved to the dominant prejudices, and nothing better than an impostrous parody on the true political art." Now though Aristotle, following the Platonic vein, calls this power of making the worse appear the better reason, "the promise of Protagoras"¹—the accusation ought never to be urged as it bore specially against the teachers of the Sokratic age. It is an argument against rhetorical teaching generally; against all the most distinguished teachers of pupils for active life, throughout the ancient world, from Protagoras, Gorgias, Isokratēs, &c, down to Quintilian. Not only does the argument bear equally against all, but it was actually urged against all. Isokrates² and Quintilian

The Sophists as rhetorical teachers—groundless accusations against them in that capacity, made also against Sokratēs, Isokratēs, and others.

¹ Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 26. Bitter (p. 582) and Brandis (p. 521) quote very unfairly the evidence of the 'Clouds' of Aristophanēs, as establishing this charge, and that of corrupt teaching generally, against the Sophists as a body. If Aristophanes is a witness against any one, he is a witness against Sokratēs, who is the person singled out for attack in the 'Clouds.' But these authors, not admitting Aristophanēs as an evidence against Sokratēs whom he *does* attack, nevertheless quote him as

an evidence against men like Protagoras and Gorgias whom he *does not* attack.

² Isokratēs, Or. xv. (De Permut.) s. 16. νῦν δὲ λέγει μὲν (the accuser) ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἡττοὺς λόγους κρείττους δύναιμι ποιεῖν, &c.

Ibid. s. 32. περιῆται με διαβάλλειν, ὡς διεφθεῖρω τοὺς νεωτέρους, λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι κλεινεύειν, &c.

Again, s. 59, 65, 95, 98, 187 (where he represents himself, like Sokratēs in his defence, as vindicating philosophy generally against

both defend themselves against it: Aristotle¹ was assailed by it, and provides a defence in the beginning of his treatise on Rhetoric: nor was there ever any man, indeed, against whom it was pressed with greater bitterness of calumny than Sokratês—by Aristophanês in his comedy of the 'Clouds,' as well as by other comic composers. Sokratês complains of it in his defence before his judges;² characterising such accusations in their true point of view, as being "the stock reproaches against all who pursue philosophy." They are indeed only one of the manifestations, ever varying in form though the same in spirit, of the antipathy of ignorance against dissenting innovation or superior mental accomplishments; which antipathy, intellectual men themselves, when it happens to make on their side in a controversy, are but too ready to invoke. Considering that we have here the materials of defence, as well as of attack, supplied by Sokratês and Plato, it might have been expected that modern writers would have refrained from employing such an argument to discredit Gorgias or Protagoras; the rather, as they have before their eyes, in all the countries of modern Europe, the profession of lawyers and advocates, who lend their powerful eloquence without distinction to the cause of justice or injustice, and who, far from being regarded as the corruptors of society, are usually looked upon, for that very reason among others, as indispensable auxiliaries to a just administration of law.

Though writing was less the business of these Sophists than personal teaching, several of them published treatises. Thrasy-machus and Theodôrus both set forth written precepts on the art of Rhetoric;³ precepts which have not descended to us, but which appear to have been narrow and special, bearing directly upon practice, and relating chiefly to the proper component parts of an oration. To Aristotle, who had attained

Thrasy-machus—
his rhetorical precepts
—Prodikus
—his discrimination of words analogous in meaning.

the accusation of corrupting youth), 238, 256.

¹ Plutarch, Alexander, c. 74.

² Plato, Sok. Apolog. c. 10. p. 23 D. τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζουσιν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον ἀνίστασθαι νομίσιν (διδέρκω). Compare

a similar expression in Xen. Mem. i. 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον, &c.

The same unfairness, in making this point tell against the Sophists exclusively, is to be found in Westermann, Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit, sect. 30, 64.

³ See the last chapter of Aristotle

that large and comprehensive view of the theory of Rhetoric which still remains to instruct us in his splendid treatise, the views of Thrasy-machus appeared unimportant, serving to him only as hints and materials. But their effect must have been very different when they first appeared, and when young men were first enabled to analyse the parts of an harangue, to understand the dependence of one upon the other, and call them by their appropriate names; all illustrated, let us recollect, by oral exposition on the part of the master, which was the most impressive portion of the whole.

Prodikus, again, published one or more treatises intended to elucidate the ambiguities of words and to point out the different significations of terms apparently, but not really, equivalent. For this Plato often ridicules him, and the modern historians of philosophy generally think it right to adopt the same tone. Whether the execution of the work was at all adequate to its purpose, we have no means of judging; but assuredly the purpose was one pre-eminently calculated to aid Grecian thinkers and dialecticians; for no man can study their philosophy without seeing how lamentably they were hampered by enslavement to the popular phraseology, and by inferences founded on mere verbal analogy. At a time when neither dictionary nor grammar existed, a teacher who took care, even punctilious care, in fixing the meaning of important words of his discourse—must be considered as guiding the minds of his hearers in a salutary direction; salutary, we may add, even to Plato himself, whose speculations would most certainly have been improved by occasional hints from such a monitor.

Protagoras, too, is said to have been the first who discriminated, and gave names to the various modes and forms of address—an analysis well-calculated to assist his lessons on right speaking:¹ he appears also to have been the first who distinguished the three genders of nouns. We hear further of a treatise which he wrote on wrestling—or most probably on

Protagoras—his treatise on Truth—his opinions about the Pagan gods.

De Sophisticis Elenchis. He notices these early rhetorical teachers, also, in various parts of the treatise on Rhetoric.

Quintilian however still thought

the precepts of Theodorus and Thrasy-machus worthy of his attention (Inst. Orat. iii. 3).

¹ Quintilian, Inst. Orat. iii. 4, 10; Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 5. See the

gymnastics generally; as well as a collection of controversial dialogues.¹ But his most celebrated treatise was one entitled 'Truth,' seemingly on philosophy generally. Of this treatise we do not even know the general scope or purport. In one of his treatises, he confessed his inability to satisfy himself about the existence of the gods, in these words²—"Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist, nor what are their attributes; the uncertainty of the subject, the shortness of human life, and many other causes, debar me from this knowledge." That the believing public of Athens were seriously indignant at this passage, and that it caused the author to be threatened with prosecution and forced to quit Athens—we can perfectly understand; though there seems no sufficient proof of the tale that he was drowned in his outward voyage. But that modern historians of philosophy, who consider the Pagan gods to be fictions, and the religion to be repugnant to any reasonable mind, should concur in denouncing Protagoras on this ground as a corrupt man, is to me less intelligible. Xenophanês,³ and probably many other philosophers, had said the same thing before him. Nor is it easy to see what a superior man was to do, who could not adjust his standard of belief to such fictions—or what he could say, if he said any thing, less than the words cited above from Protagoras; which appear, as far as we can appreciate them standing without the context, to be a brief mention, in modest and circumspect phrase, of the reason why he said nothing about the gods, in a treatise where the reader would expect to find much upon the subject.⁴ Certain it is that in the Platonic dialogue, called

passages cited in Preller, *Histor. Philos.* ch. iv. p. 132, note *d*, who affirms respecting Protagoras—"alia inani grammaticorum principiorum ostentatione novare conabatur"—which the passages cited do not prove.

¹ Isokratês, *Or. x. Encom. Helen.* s. 3; Diogen. Laërt. ix. 54.

² Diogen. Laërt. ix. 51; Sext. *Empir. adv. Math.* ix. 56. *Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω σίκαίν, οὐτὰ εἰ εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἔποισι τινές εἰσι· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἣ τὰ ἀδηλόγητος, καὶ βραχύς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.*

I give the words partly from Diogenes, partly from Sextus, as I think they would be most likely to stand.

³ Xenophanês ap. Sext. *Emp. adv. Mathem.* vii. 49.

⁴ The satirical writer Timon (ap. Sext. *Emp.* ix. 57), speaking in very respectful terms about Protagoras, notices particularly the guarded language which he used in this sentence about the gods; though this precaution did not enable him to avoid the

'Protagoras,' that Sophist is introduced speaking about the gods exactly in the manner that any orthodox Pagan might naturally adopt.

The other fragment preserved of Protagoras relates to his view of the cognitive process, and of truth generally. He taught that "Man is the measure of all things, both of that which exists, and of that which does not exist:" a doctrine canvassed and controverted by Plato, who represents that Protagoras affirmed knowledge to consist in sensation, and considered the sensations of each individual man to be, to him, the canon and measure of truth. We know scarce anything of the elucidations or limitations with which Protagoras may have accompanied his general position: and if even Plato, who had good means of knowing them, felt it ungenerous to insult an orphan doctrine whose father was recently dead, and could no longer defend it!—much more ought modern authors, who speak with mere scraps of evidence before them, to be cautious how they heap upon the same doctrine insults much beyond those which Plato recognises. In so far as we can pretend to understand the theory, it was certainly not more incorrect than several others then afloat, from the Eleatic school and other philosophers; while it had the merit of bringing into forcible relief the essentially relative nature of cognition?—relative, not indeed to the sensitive

His view of the cognitive process and its relative nature.

necessity of flight. Protagoras spoke—

Πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπισει-
κλιῆς· τὰ μὲν οὐ οἱ
Χραίσμησ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμίστο,
ὅφρα μὴ οὕτως
Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον
'Αἶδα δῶη.

¹ Plato, *Theætet.* 18. p. 164 E. Οὐτι ἂν, οἶμαι, ὧ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἐτέρου λόγου ἐζη—ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὅρσανον αὐτὸν ὄντα ἡμῖς προσηλακίζομεν. . . . ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικάτου ἔνεα' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

This theory of Protagoras is discussed in the dialogue called *Theætetus*, p. 152 *seq.*, in a long, but desultory way.

See Sextus Empiric. *Pyrrhonic*.

Hypol. I. 216—219, et contra *Mathematicos*, vii. 60—64. The explanation which Sextus gives of the Protagorean doctrine, in the former passage, cannot be derived from the treatise of Protagoras himself; since he makes use of the word ὅλη in the philosophical sense, which was not adopted until the days of Plato and Aristotle.

It is difficult to make out what Diogenes Laërtius states about other tenets of Protagoras, and to reconcile them with the doctrine of "man being the measure of all things," as explained by Plato (*Diog. Laërt.* ix. 51, 57).

² Aristotle (in one of the passages of his *Metaphysica*—wherein

faculty alone, but to that reinforced and guided by the other faculties of man, memorial and ratiocinative. And had it been even more incorrect than it really is, there would be no warrant for those imputations which modern authors build upon it, against the morality of Protagoras. No such imputations are countenanced in the discussion which Plato devotes to the doctrine: indeed, if the vindication which he sets forth against himself on behalf of Protagoras be really ascribable to that Sophist, it would give an exaggerated importance to the distinction between Good and Evil, into which the distinction between Truth and Falsehood is considered by the Platonic Protagoras as resolvable. The subsequent theories of Plato and Aristotle respecting cognition, were much more systematic and elaborate, the work of men greatly superior in speculative genius to Protagoras: but they would not have been what they were, had not Protagoras as well as others gone before them, with suggestions more partial and imperfect.

From Gorgias there remains one short essay, preserved in one of the Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatises,¹ on a metaphysical thesis. He professes to demon-

he discusses the Protagorean doctrine—x. i. p. 1063 B.) says that this doctrine comes to nothing more than saying, that man, so far as cognizant, or so far as perceptive, is the measure of all things; in other words, that knowledge, or perception, is the measure of all things. This Aristotle says—is trivial, and of no value, though it sounds like something of importance—Πρωταγόρας δ' ἀνθρώπων φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· τούτους δ' ἔτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἰσθῆσθαι ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην. ἃ φημεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐδὲν δὲ λόγων περιττὸν φαίνεται τι λέγειν.

It appears to me that to insist upon the essentially relative nature of cognizable truth, was by no means a trivial or unimportant doctrine, as Aristotle pronounces it to be; especially when we compare it with the unmeasured con-

ceptions of the objects and methods of scientific research, which were so common in the days of Protagoras.

Compare *Metaphysic.* iii. 5. p. 1008, 1009, where it will be seen how many other thinkers of that day carried the same doctrine seemingly further than Protagoras.

Protagoras remarked that the observed movements of the heavenly bodies did not coincide with that which the astronomers represented them to be, and to which they applied their mathematical reasonings. This remark was a criticism on the mathematical astronomers of his day—ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμήτρους (*Aristot. Metaph.* iii. 2. p. 998 A). We know too little how far his criticism may have been deserved, to assent to the general strictures of Ritter, *Gesch. der Phil.* vol. i. p. 633.

¹ See the treatise entitled *De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia* in

strate that nothing exists: that if anything exist, it is unknowable; and granting it even to exist and to be knowable by any one man, he could never communicate it to others. The modern historians of philosophy here prefer the easier task of denouncing the scepticism of the Sophist, instead of performing the duty incumbent on them of explaining his thesis in immediate sequence with the speculations which preceded it. In our sense of the words, it is a monstrous paradox: but construing them in their legitimate filiation from the Eleatic philosophers immediately before him, it is a plausible, not to say conclusive, deduction from principles which they would have acknowledged.¹ The word Existence, as they understood it, did not mean phænomenal, but ultra-phænomenal existence. They looked upon the phænomena of sense as always coming and going—as something essentially transitory, fluctuating, incapable of being surely known, and furnishing at best grounds only for conjecture. They searched by cogitation for what they presumed to be the really existent Something or Substance—the Noumenon, to use a Kantian phrase—lying behind or under the phænomena, which Noumenon they recognised as the only appropriate object of knowledge. They discussed much (as I have before remarked) whether it was One or Many—Noumenon in the singular, or Noumena in the plural. Now the thesis of Gorgias related to his ultra-phænomenal existence, and bore closely upon the arguments of Zeno and Melissus, the Eleatic reasoners of his elder contemporaries. He denied that any such ultra-phænomenal Something, or Noumenon, existed, or could be known, or could be described. Of this tripartite thesis, the first negation was neither more untenable, nor less untenable, than that of those philosophers who before him had argued for the affirmative: on the two last points, his conclusions were neither paradoxical nor improperly sceptical, but perfectly just,—and have been ratified by the gradual abandonment, either avowed or

Gorgias—
his treatise
on physical
subjects—
misrepresentations
of the
scope of it.

Bekker's edition of Aristotle's Works, vol. i. p. 979 *seq.*; also the same treatise with a good preface and comments by Mullach, p. 62 *seq.*: compare Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. 65, 87.

¹ See the note of Mullach, on the treatise mentioned in the preceding note, p. 72. He shows that Gorgias followed in the steps of Zeno and Melissus.

implied, of such ultra-phænomenal researches among the major part of philosophers. It may fairly be presumed that these doctrines were urged by Gorgias for the purpose of diverting his disciples from studies which he considered as unpromising and fruitless; just as we shall find his pupil Isokratês afterwards enforcing the same view, discouraging speculations of this nature, and recommending rhetorical exercise as preparation for the duties of an active citizen.¹ Nor must we forget that Sokratês himself discouraged physical speculations even more decidedly than either of them.

If the censures cast upon the alleged scepticism of Gorgias and Protagoras are partly without sufficient warrant, partly without any warrant at all—much more may the same remark be made respecting the graver reproaches heaped upon their teaching on the score of immorality or corruption. It has been common with recent German historians of philosophy to translate from Plato and dress up a fiend called “Die Sophistik” (Sophistic)—whom they assert to have poisoned and demoralised, by corrupt teaching, the Athenian moral character, so that it became degenerate at the end of the Peloponnesian war, compared with what it had been in the time of Militiadês and Aristeidês.

Now, in the first place, if the abstraction “Die Sophistik” is to have any definite meaning, we ought to have proof that the persons styled Sophists had some doctrines, principles, or method, both common to them all and distinguishing them from others. But such a supposition is untrue: there were no such common doctrines, or principles, or method, belonging to them. Even the name by which they are known did not belong to them, any more than to Sokratês and others; they had nothing in common except their profession, as paid teachers, qualifying young men “to think, speak, and act” (these are the words of Isokratês, and better words it would not be easy to find) with credit to themselves as citizens. Moreover, such community of profession did not at that time imply so much analogy of character as it does now, when the path of teaching has been beaten into a broad and visible high road, with

Unfounded
accusations
against the
Sophists.

They were
not a sect
or school,
with
common
doctrines or
method:
they were a
profession,
with
strong in-
dividual
peculiarities.

¹ Isokratês *De Permutatione*, Or. xv. s. 287; Xenophon *Memor.* i. 1, 14.

measured distances, and stated intervals: Protagoras and Gorgias found predecessors indeed, but no binding precedents to copy; so that each struck out more or less a road of his own. And accordingly, we find Plato, in his dialogue called 'Protagoras,' wherein Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias are all introduced—imparting a distinct type of character and distinct method to each, not without a strong admixture of reciprocal jealousy between them; while Thrasymachus, in the Republic, and Euthydêmus, in the dialogue so called, are again painted each with colours of his own, different from all the three above-named. We do not know how far Gorgias agreed in the opinion of Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things;" and we may infer even from Plato himself, that Protagoras would have opposed the views expressed by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. It is impossible therefore to predicate anything concerning doctrines, methods, or tendencies, common and peculiar to all the Sophists. There were none such; nor has the abstract word—"Die Sophistik"—any real meaning, except such qualities (whatever they may be) as are inseparable from the profession or occupation of public teaching. And if, at present, every candid critic would be ashamed to cast wholesale aspersions on the entire body of professional teachers—much more is such censure unbecoming in reference to the ancient Sophists, who were distinguished from each other by stronger individual peculiarities.

If, then, it were true that in the interval between 480 B.C. and the end of the Peloponnesian war, a great moral deterioration had taken place in Athens and in Greece generally, we should have to search for some other cause than the imaginary abstraction called Sophistic. But—
The Athenian character was not really corrupted, between 480 B.C. and 405 B.C.
 and this is the second point—the matter of fact here alleged is as untrue, as the cause alleged is unreal. Athens, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, was not more corrupt than Athens in the days of Miltiadês and Aristeidês. If we revert to that earlier period, we shall find that scarcely any acts of the Athenian people have drawn upon them sharper censure (in my judgement, unmerited) than their treatment of these very two statesmen; the condemnation of Miltiadês, and the ostracism of Aristeidês. In writing my history of that time, far from finding

previous historians disposed to give the Athenians credit for public virtue, I have been compelled to contend against a body of adverse criticism, imputing to them gross ingratitude and injustice. Thus the contemporaries of Miltiadês and Aristeidês, when described as matter of present history, are presented in anything but flattering colours; except their valour at Marathon and Salamis, which finds one unanimous voice of encomium. But when these same men have become numbered among the mingled recollections and fancies belonging to the past—when a future generation comes to be present, with its appropriate stock of complaint and denunciation—then it is that men find pleasure in dressing up the virtues of the past, as a count in the indictment against their own contemporaries. Aristophanês,¹ writing during the Peloponnesian war, denounced the Demos of his day as degenerated from the virtue of that Demos which had surrounded Miltiadês and Aristeidês; while Isokratês,² writing as an old man between 350—340 B.C., complains in like manner of his own time, boasting how much better the state of Athens had been in his youth: which period of his youth fell exactly during the life of Aristophanês, in the last half of the Peloponnesian war.

Such illusions ought to impose on no one without a careful comparison of facts; and most assuredly that comparison will not bear out the allegation of increased corruption and degeneracy, between the age of Miltiadês and the end of the Peloponnesian war. Throughout the whole of Athenian history, there are no acts which attest so large a measure of virtue and judgement pervading the whole people, as the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nor do I believe that the contemporaries of Miltiadês would have been capable of such heroism; for that appellation is by no means too large for the case. I doubt whether they would have been competent to the steady self-denial of retaining a large sum in reserve during the time of peace, both prior to the Peloponnesian war and after the peace of Nikias—or of keeping back the reserve fund of 1000 talents, while they were forced year after year to pay taxes for the support of the war³—or of

¹ Aristophan. *Equit.* 1316-1321.

² *Isokr.*, Or. xv. *De Perm.* s. 170.

³ Two years before the invasion

by Xerxes, the Athenians did indeed forego a dividend about to be distributed to each of the

acting upon the prudent, yet painfully trying policy recommended by Periklês, so as to sustain an annual invasion without either going out to fight or purchasing peace by ignominious concessions. If bad acts such as Athens committed during the later years of the war, for example, the massacre of the Melian population, were not done equally by the contemporaries of Miltiadês, this did not arise from any superior humanity or principle on their part, but from the fact that they were not exposed to the like temptation, brought upon them by the possession of imperial power. The condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, if we suppose the same conduct on their part to have occurred in 490 B.C., would have been decreed more rapidly and more unceremoniously than it was actually decreed in 406 B.C. For at that earlier date there existed no psephism of Kannônus, surrounded by prescriptive respect—no *Graphê Paranomôn*—no such habits of established deference to a *Dikastery* solemnly sworn, with full notice to defendants and full time of defence measured by the water-glass—none of those securities which a long course of democracy had gradually worked into the public morality of every Athenian, and which (as we saw in a former chapter) interposed a serious barrier to the impulse of the moment, though ultimately overthrown by its fierceness. A far less violent impulse would have sufficed for the same mischief in 490 B.C., when no such barriers existed. Lastly, if we want a measure of the appreciating sentiment of the Athenian public, towards a strict and decorous morality in the narrow sense, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, we have only to consider the manner in which they dealt with Nikias. I have shown, in describing the Sicilian expedition, that the gravest error which the Athenians ever committed, that which shipwrecked both their armament at Syracuse and their power at home, arose from their unmeasured esteem for the respectable and pious Nikias, which blinded them to the grossest defects of generalship and public conduct.

citizens out of the silver mines of Laureium, in order that the money might be applied to building of triremes. This was honourable to them in every way: but it is by no means to be compared, for

self-denial and estimate of future chances, to the effort of paying money more than once out of their pockets, in order that they might leave untouched the public fund of 1000 talents.

Disastrous as such misjudgement was, it counts at least as a proof that the moral corruption, alleged to have been operated in their characters, is a mere fiction. Nor let it be supposed that the nerve and resolution which once animated the combatants of Marathon and Salamis, had disappeared in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war. On the contrary, the energetic and protracted struggle of Athens, after the irreparable calamity at Syracuse, forms a worthy parallel to her resistance in the time of Xerxes, and maintained unabated that distinctive attribute which Periklês had set forth as the main foundation of her glory—that of never giving way before misfortune.¹ Without any disparagement to the armament at Salamis, we may remark that the patriotism of the fleet at Samos, which rescued Athens from the Four Hundred, was equally devoted and more intelligent; and that the burst of effort, which sent a subsequent fleet to victory at Arginusæ, was to the full as strenuous.

If then we survey the eighty-seven years of Athenian history, between the battle of Marathon and the renovation of the democracy after the Thirty, we shall see no ground for the assertion, so often made, of increased and increasing moral and political corruption. It is my belief that the people had become both morally and politically better, and that their democracy had worked to their improvement. The remark made by Thucydides, on the occasion of the Korkyræan bloodshed—on the violent and reckless political antipathies, arising out of the confluence of external warfare with internal party-feud²—wherever else it may find its application, has no bearing upon Athens: the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 64—γνώτε δ' ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτῇν (τὴν πόλιν) ἔχουσιν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, διὰ τὸ ταῖς συμφοραῖς μὴ εἶναι.

² Thucydides (iii. 82) specifies very distinctly the cause to which he ascribes the bad consequences which he depicts. He makes no allusion to Sophists or sophistical teaching; though Brandis (*Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos.* i. p. 518. not. f.) drags in "the sophistical spirit of the statesmen of that time," as if

it were the cause of the mischief, and as if it were to be found in the speeches of Thucydides, i. 76. v. 105.

There cannot be a more unwarranted assertion; nor can a learned man like Brandis be ignorant, that such words as "the sophistical spirit" (*Der sophistische Geist*) are understood by a modern reader in a sense totally different from its true Athenian sense.

Thirty, prove the contrary. And while Athens may thus be vindicated on the moral side, it is indisputable that her population had acquired a far larger range of ideas and capacities than they possessed at the time of the battle of Marathon. This indeed is the very matter of fact deplored by Aristophanês, and admitted by those writers, who, while denouncing the Sophists, connect such enlarged range of ideas with the dissemination of the pretended sophistical poison. In my judgement, not only the charge against the Sophists as poisoners, but even the existence of such poison in the Athenian system, deserves nothing less than an emphatic denial.

Let us examine again the names of these professional teachers, beginning with Prodikus, one of the most renowned. Who is there that has not read the well-known fable called "The Choice of Hercules," which is to be found in every book professing to collect impressive illustrations of elementary morality? Who does not know that its express purpose is, to kindle the imaginations of youth in favour of a life of labour for noble objects, and against a life of indulgence? It was the favourite theme on which Prodikus lectured, and on which he obtained the largest audience.¹ If it be of striking simplicity and effect even to a modern reader, how much more powerfully must it have worked upon the audience for whose belief it was specially adapted, when set off by the oral expansions of its author! Xenophon wondered that the Athenian Dikasts dealt with Sokratês as a corruptor of youth: Isokratês wondered that a portion of the public made the like mistake about himself: and I confess my wonder to be not less, that not only Aristophanês,² but even the modern writers on Grecian philosophy, should rank Prodikus in the same unenviable catalogue.³

¹ Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1. 21-34.—
Καὶ Προδίκος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγ-
γράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, δεικνύ-
σκει καὶ πλείστοις ἀποδείκνυται,
ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνε-
ται, &c.

Xenophon here introduces Sokratês himself as bestowing much praise on the moral teaching of Prodikus.

² See Fragment iii. of the *Tayn-*

visual of Aristophanês—Meineke, Fragment. Aristoph. p. 1140.

³ Upon Prodikus and his fable called the "Choice of Hercules," Pro essor Maurice remarks as follows (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, iv. 2. 1. 11. p. 10').—
"The effect of the lesson which it inculcates is good or evil, according to the object which the reader proposes to himself. If he wishes

This is the only composition¹ remaining from him—indeed the only composition remaining from any one of the

to acquire the power of draining marshes and killing noisome beasts, all must bless him for not yielding to the voice of the Goddess of Pleasure. If he merely seeks to be the strongest of men, by resisting the enchantress, it might have been better for the world and for himself, that he should have yielded to her blandishments. Mr. Grote is not likely to have forgotten the celebrated paradox of Gibbon respecting the clergy—'That their virtues are more dangerous to society than their vices.' On the hypothesis which Gibbon no doubt adopted, that this order is divided into those who deny themselves for the sake of obtaining dominion over their fellow-countrymen, and those who yield to animal indulgence—his dictum may be easily admitted. The monk who restrains his appetites that he may be more followed and idolized as a confessor, does more harm to others, is probably more evil in himself, than the sleek abbot who is given up to his hawks and hounds. The principle is of universal application. We must know whether Prodikus departed from the general rule of the professorial class, by not holding out political power as his prize—before we can pronounce him a useful teacher, because he taught his pupils how they might obtain the bone and nerve of Hercules."

With the single reserve of what Professor Maurice calls "the general rule of the professorial class," against which assertion I have already shown cause in a previous note—I fully admit not merely the justice, but the importance, of his general remark. I have transcribed. I recognise no

merit in self-denial, unless in so far as the self-denying person becomes thereby the instrument of increased security and happiness to others or to himself—or unless it be conducive to the formation of a character of which such is the general result. And respecting Prodikus himself, I willingly accept the challenge. He marks out, in the most distinct and emphatic manner, the achievement of good to others, and the acquisition of esteem from others, as going together, and constituting in combination the prize for which the youthful Heraklēs is exhorted to struggle—εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον· εἴτε ὑπὸ τινος κόλπου ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελήτεον· εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιώεις ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὐ ποιῆν, &c. (Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 28). I select these few words, but the whole tenor and spirit of the fable is similar.

Indeed the very selection of Heraklēs as an ideal to be followed, is of itself a proof that the Sophist did not intend to point out the acquisition of personal dominion and pre-eminence, except in so far as they naturally sprang from services rendered, as the grand prize to be contended for by his pupils. For Heraklēs is, in Greek conception, the type of those who work for others—one condemned by his destiny to achieve great, difficult, and unrewarded exploits at the bidding of another (Suidas and Diogenianus, vi. 7, under the words τετραδί γίγνας—ἐκ τῶν ἄλλοις ποιοῦντων, &c.)

¹ Xenophon gives only the substance of Prodikus's lecture, not his exact words. But he gives what

Sophists, excepting the thesis of Gorgias above noticed. It serves, not merely as a vindication of Prodikus against such reproach, but also as a warning against implicit confidence in the sarcastic remarks of Plato—which include Prodikus as well as the other Sophists—and in the doctrines which he puts into the mouth of the Sophists generally, in order that Sokratēs may confute them. The commonest candour would teach us, that if a polemical writer of dialogue chooses to put indefensible doctrine into the mouth of the opponent, we ought to be cautious of condemning the latter upon such very dubious proof.

Welcker and other modern authors treat Prodikus as "the most innocent" of the Sophists, and except him from the sentence which they pass upon the class generally. Let us see therefore what Plato himself says about the rest of them, and first about Protagoras. If it were not the established practice with readers of Plato to condemn Protagoras beforehand, and to put, upon every passage relating to him, not only a sense as bad as it will bear, but much worse than it will fairly bear—they would probably carry away very different inferences from the Platonic dialogue called by that Sophist's name, and in which he is made to bear a chief part. That dialogue is itself enough to prove that Plato did not conceive Protagoras either as a corrupt, or unworthy, or incompetent teacher. The course of the dialogue exhibits him as not master of the theory of ethics, and unable to solve various difficulties with which that theory is expected to grapple; moreover, as no match for Sokratēs in dialectics, which Plato considered as the only efficient method of philosophical investigation. In so far therefore as imperfect acquaintance with the science or theory upon which rules of art, or the precepts bearing on practice, repose, disqualifies a teacher from giving instruction in such art or practice—to that extent Protagoras is exposed as wanting. And if an expert dialectician,

Protagoras
—real
estimate
exhibited
of him by
Plato.

may be called the whole substance, so that we can appreciate the scope as well as the handling of the author. We cannot say the same of an extract given (in the Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Axiochus, c. 7, 8) from a lecture said to have been delivered by Prodikus—respecting

the miseries of human life pervading all the various professions and occupations. It is impossible to make out distinctly either how much really belongs to Prodikus, or what was his scope and purpose, if any such lecture was really delivered.

like Plato, had passed Isokratēs or Quintilian, or the large majority of teachers past or present, through a similar cross-examination as to the theory of their teaching—an ignorance not less manifest than that of Protagoras would be brought out. The antithesis which Plato sets forth, in so many of his dialogues, between precept or practice, accompanied by full knowledge of the scientific principles from which it must be deduced, if its rectitude be disputed—and unscientific practice, without any such power of deduction or defence—is one of the most valuable portions of his speculations: he exhausts his genius to render it conspicuous in a thousand indirect ways, and to shame his readers, if possible, into the loftier and more rational walk of thought. But it is one thing to say of a man, that he does not know the theory of what he teaches, or of the way in which he teaches; it is another thing to say, that he actually teaches that which scientific theory would not prescribe as the best; it is a third thing, graver than both, to say that his teaching is not only below the exigences of science, but even corrupt and demoralising. Now of these three points, it is the first only which Plato in his dialogue makes out against Protagoras: even the second, he neither affirms nor insinuates; and as to the third, not only he never glances at it, even indirectly, but the whole tendency of the discourse suggests a directly contrary conclusion. As if sensible that when an eminent opponent was to be depicted as puzzled and irritated by superior dialectics, it was but common fairness to set forth his distinctive merits also—Plato gives a fable, and expository harangue, from the mouth of Protagoras,¹ upon the question whether virtue is teachable. This harangue is, in my judgement, very striking and instructive; and so it would have been probably accounted, if commentators had not read it with a pre-established persuasion that whatever came from the lips of a Sophist must be either ridiculous or immoral.² It is the only part

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 320 D. o. 11 *et seq.*, especially p. 323 D, where Protagoras lays it down that no man is fit to be a member of a social community who has not in his bosom both δίκη and εὐδωκία—that is, a sense of reciprocal obligation and right between himself

and others—and a sensibility to esteem or reproach from others. He lays these fundamental attributes down as what a good ethical theory must assume or exact in every man.

² Of the unjust asperity and contempt with which the Platonic

of Plato's works wherein any account is rendered of the growth of that floating, uncertified, self-propagating, body of opinion, upon which the cross-examining analysis of Sokratēs is brought to bear—as will be seen in the following chapter.

Protagoras professes to teach his pupils "good counsel" in their domestic and family relations, as well as how to speak and act in the most effective manner for the weal of the city. Since this comes from Protagoras, the commentators of Plato pronounce it to be miserable morality: but it coincides, almost to the letter, with that which Isokratēs describes himself as teaching, a generation afterwards, and substantially even with that which Xenophon represents Sokratēs as teaching: nor is it easy to set forth, in a few words, a larger scheme of practical duty.¹ And if the measure of

commentators treat the Sophists, see a specimen in Ast, Ueber Platons Leben und Schriften, p. 70, 71—where he comments on Protagoras and this fable.

¹ Protagoras says—Τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν, εὐβουλία περὶ τὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἔπος ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῶν, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ἔπος τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατος εἶη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. (Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318 E.)

A similar description of the moral teaching of Protagoras and the other Sophists, yet comprising a still larger range of duties, towards parents, friends, and fellow-citizens in their private capacities—is given in Plato, Meno. p. 81 B. E.

Isokratēs describes the education which he wished to convey almost in the same words—Τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθηάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσιν, ὧν περ ἔνεκα καὶ ποιητῶν καὶ φιλοσοφητῶν καὶ πάντα πρακτικῶν ἐστὶ (Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 304: compare 289).

Xenophon also describes, almost in the same words, the teaching of Sokratēs. Kriton and others

sought the society of Sokratēs, οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γίνοντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι γινόμεναι, καὶ οἶκῳ καὶ οἰκείαις καὶ οἰκείαις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι (Memor. i. 2, 48). Again, i. 2, 64—Φανερός ἦν Σωκράτης τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηράς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας, τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστερης ἀρετῆς, ἣ πόλεις τε καὶ οἶκοι εὖ εἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμῶν. Compare also i. 6, 15; ii. 1, 19; iv. 1, 2; iv. 5, 10.

When we perceive how much analogy Xenophon establishes—so far as regards practical precept, apart from theory or method—between Sokratēs, Protagoras, Prodikus, &c., it is difficult to justify the representations of the commentators respecting the Sophists: see Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon. Menon. p. 8. "Etenim virtutis nomen, cum propter ambitus magnitudinem valde esset ambiguum et obscurum, Sophistæ interpretabantur sic, ut, missâ verâ honestatis et probitatis vi, unice de prudentiâ civili ac domesticâ cogitari vellent, eoque modo totam virtutem ad callidum quoddam utilitatis vel privatim vel publice conse-

practical duty, which Protagoras devoted himself to teach, was thus serious and extensive, even the fraction of theory assigned to him in his harangue, includes some points better than that of Plato himself. For Plato seems to have conceived the Ethical End, to each individual, as comprising nothing more than his own permanent happiness and moral health; and in this very dialogue, he introduces Sokratês as maintaining virtue to consist only in a right calculation of a man's own personal happiness and misery. But here we find Protagoras speaking in a way which implies a larger, and in my opinion, a juster appreciation of the Ethical End, as including not only reference to a man's own happiness, but also obligations towards the happiness of others. Without at all agreeing in the harsh terms of censure which various critics pronounce upon that theory which Sokratês is made to set forth in the Platonic Protagoras, I consider his conception of the Ethical End essentially narrow and imperfect, not capable of being made to serve as basis for deduction of the best ethical precepts. Yet such is the prejudice with which the history of the Sophists has been written, that the commentators on Plato accuse the Sophists of having originated what they ignorantly term "the base theory of utility," here propounded by Sokratês himself; complimenting the latter on having set forth those larger views which in this dialogue belong only to Protagoras.¹

quenda artificium revocarent"....
"Pervidit hanc opinionis istius per-
verositatem, ejusque turpitudinem
intimo sensit pectore, vir sanctis-
simi animi, Socrates," &c. Stall-
 baum speaks to the same purpose
 in his Prolegomena to the Prota-
 goras, p. 10, 11; and to the Euthy-
 demus, p. 21, 22.

Those who, like these censors
 on the Sophists, think it base to
 recommend virtuous conduct by
 the mutual security and comfort
 which it procures to all parties
 must be prepared to condemn on
 the same ground a large portion
 of what is said by Sokratês through-
 out the Memorabilia of Xenophon,
 καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἐλευθεριῶν ἀ-

δρῶν, &c. (iii. 4, 12): see also his
 Economic. xi. 10.

¹ Stallbaum, Prolegomena ad
 Platonis Menonem, p. 9. "Etenim
 Sophistæ, quum virtutis exercita-
 tionem et ad utilitates externas
 referrent, et facultate quâdam at-
 que consuetudine ejus, quod utile
 videretur, reperiendi, absolvi statu-
 erent—Socrates ipse, rejectâ uti-
 litatis turpitudine, vim naturamque
 virtutis unice ad id quod bonum
 honestumque est, revocavit; voluit-
 que esse in eo, ut quis recti bonique
 sensu ac scientiâ polleret, ad quam
 tanquam ad certissimam normam
 atque regulam actiones suas omnes
 dirigeret atque poneret."

Whoever will compare this criti-

So far as concerns Protagoras, therefore, the evidence of Plato himself may be produced to show that he was not a corrupt teacher, but a worthy companion of Prodikus; worthy also of that which we know him to have enjoyed—the society and conversation of Periklēs. Let us now examine what Plato says about a third Sophist—Hippias of Elis; who figures both in the dialogues called ‘Protagoras,’ and in two distinct

Hippias of
Elis—how
he is repre-
sented by
Plato.

cism with the Protagoras of Plato, c. 36, 37—especially p. 367 B.—wherein Sokratēs identifies good with pleasure and evil with pain, and wherein he considers right conduct to consist in justly calculating the items of pleasure and pain one against the other—ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη—will be astonished how a critic on Plato could write what is above cited. I am aware that there are other parts of Plato's dialogues in which he maintains a doctrine different from that just alluded to. Accordingly Stallbaum (in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, p. 30) contends that Plato is here setting forth a doctrine not his own, but is reasoning on the principles of Protagoras, for the purpose of entrapping and confounding him—“Quæ hic de fortitudine disseruntur, ea item cavendum est ne protenus pro decretis mere Platoniciis habeantur. Disputat enim Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ, ita quidem ut eum per suam ipsius rationem in fraudem et errorem inducat.”

I am happy to be able to vindicate Plato against the disgrace of so dishonest a spirit of argumentation as that which Stallbaum ascribes to him. Plato most certainly does not reason here upon the doctrines or principles of Protagoras: for the latter begins by positively denying the doctrine, and is only brought to admit it in a very qualified manner—c. 35. p.

351 D. He says in reply to the question of Sokratēs—Οὐκ οἶδα ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὥς σὺ ῥωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκρίτεον ἐστίν, ὥς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιστὰ κακά· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλτέστατον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἐστίν ἀγαθὰ. ἐστὶ δὲ αὐ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιστῶν οὐκ ἐστὶ κακά, ἐστὶ δὲ ἃ ἐστὶ, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθὰ.

There is something peculiarly striking in this appeal of Protagoras to his whole past life, as rendering it impossible for him to admit what he evidently looked upon as a *base theory*, as Stallbaum pronounces it to be. Yet the latter actually ventures to take it away from Sokratēs, who not only propounds it confidently, but reasons it out in a clear and forcible manner—and of fastening it on Protagoras, who first disclaims it and then only admits it under reserve! I deny the theory to be *base* though I think it an imperfect theory of ethics. But Stallbaum, who calls it so, was bound to be doubly careful in looking into his proof before he ascribed it to any one. What makes the case worse, is that he fastens it not only on Protagoras, but on the Sophists collectively, by that monstrous fiction which treats them as a doctrinal sect.

dialogues known by the titles of 'Hippias Major and Minor'. Hippias is represented as distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments, of which in these dialogues he ostentatiously boasts. He could teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic—which subjects Protagoras censured him for enforcing too much upon his pupils; so little did these Sophists agree in any one scheme of doctrine or education. Besides this, he was a poet, a musician, an expositor of the poets, and a lecturer with a large stock of composed matter—on subjects moral, political, and even legendary—treasured up in a very retentive memory. He was a citizen much employed as envoy by his fellow-citizens: to crown all, his manual dexterity was such that he professed to have made with his own hands all the attire and ornaments which he wore on his person. If, as is sufficiently probable, he was a vain and ostentatious man—defects not excluding an useful and honourable career—we must at the same time give him credit for a variety of acquisitions such as to explain a certain measure of vanity.¹ The style in which Plato handles Hippias is very different from that in which he treats Protagoras. It is full of sneer and contemptuous banter, insomuch that even Stallbaum,² after having repeated a great many times that this was a vile Sophist who deserved no better treatment, is forced to admit that the petulance is carried rather too far, and to suggest that the dialogue must have been a juvenile work of Plato. Be this as it may amidst so much unfriendly handling, not only we find no imputation against Hippias of having preached a low or corrupt morality, but Plato inserts that which furnishes good, though indirect, proof of the contrary. For Hippias is made to say that he had already delivered, and was about to deliver again, a lecture composed by himself with great care, wherein he enlarged upon the aims and pursuits which a young man ought to follow. The scheme of his discourse was, that after the capture of Troy, the youthful Neoptolemus was introduced as asking the advice of Nestor about his own future conduct; in reply to which, Nestor sets forth to him what was the plan of life incumbent on a young man of honourable aspirations, and unfolds to him the full details of regulated

¹ See about Hippias, Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 9. p. 318 E; Stallbaum, 368 B. *Prolegom. ad Platon. Hipp. Maj.* ² Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Plat. Hipp. Maj.* p. 150.

and virtuous conduct by which it ought to be filled up. The selection of two such names, among the most venerated in all Grecian legend, as monitor and pupil, is a stamp clearly attesting the vein of sentiment which animated the composition. Morality preached by Nestor for the edification of Neoptolemus, might possibly be too high for Athenian practice; but most certainly it would not err on the side of corruption, selfishness, or over-indulgence. We may fairly presume that this discourse composed by Hippias would not be unworthy, in spirit and purpose, to be placed by the side of 'The Choice of Hercules,' nor its author by that of Prodikus as a moral teacher.

The dialogue entitled 'Gorgias' in Plato, is carried on by Sokratês with three different persons one Gorgias, after the other—Gorgias, Pôlus and Kalliklês. Pôlus, and Kalliklês. Gorgias (of Leontini in Sicily), as a rhetorical teacher, acquired greater celebrity than any man of his time, during the Peloponnesian war: his abundant powers of illustration, his florid ornaments, his artificial structure of sentences distributed into exact antithetical fractions—all spread a new fashion in the art of speaking, which for the time was very popular, but afterwards became discredited. If the line could be clearly drawn between rhetors and sophists, Gorgias ought rather to be ranked with the former.¹ In the conversation with Gorgias, Sokratês exposes the fallacy and imposture of rhetoric and rhetorical teaching, as cheating an ignorant audience into persuasion without knowledge, and as framed to satisfy the passing caprice, without any regard to the permanent welfare and improvement of the people. Whatever real inculcation may be conveyed in these arguments against a rhetorical teacher, Gorgias must bear in common with Isokratês and Quintilian, and under the shield of Aristotle. But save and except rhetorical teaching, no dissemination of corrupt morality is ascribed to him by Plato; who indeed treats him with a degree of respect which surprises the commentators.²

The tone of the dialogue changes materially when it passes to Pôlus and Kalliklês, the former of whom is described as a writer on rhetoric, and Doctrine advanced by Pôlus. probably a teacher also.³ There is much

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 95 A; Foss van Prinsterer and Stallbaum—De Gorgia Leontino, p. 27 seq. Stallbaum ad Platon. Gorg. c. 1.

² See the observations of Groen ³ Plato, Gorgias, c. 17. p. 462 B.

insolence in Pôlus, and no small asperity in Sokratês. Yet the former maintains no arguments which justify the charge of immorality against himself or his fellow-teachers. He defends the tastes and sentiments common to every man in Greece, and shared even by the most estimable Athenians—Periklês, Nikias, and Aristokratês,¹ while Sokratês prides himself on standing absolutely alone, and having no support except from his irresistible dialectics, whereby he is sure of extorting reluctant admission from his adversary. How far Sokratês may be right, I do not now inquire: it is sufficient that Pôlus, standing as he does amidst company at once so numerous and so irreproachable, cannot be fairly denounced as a poisoner of the youthful mind.

Pôlus presently hands over the dialogue to Kalliklês, who is here represented, doubtless, as laying down doctrines openly and avowedly anti-social. He distinguishes between the law of nature and the law (both written and unwritten, for the Greek word substantially includes both) of society. According to the law of nature (Kalliklês says) the strong man—the better or more capable man—puts forth his strength to the full for his own advantage, without limit or restraint; overcomes the resistance which weaker men are able to offer; and seizes for himself as much as he pleases of the matter of enjoyment. He has no occasion to restrain any of his appetites or desires; the more numerous and pressing they are, so much the better for him—since his power affords him the means of satiating them all. The many, who have the misfortune to be weak, must be content with that which he leaves them, and submit to it as best they can. This (Kalliklês says) is what actually happens in a state of nature; this is what is accounted just, as is evident by the practice of independent communities, not included in one common political society, towards each other; this is *justice*, by nature, or

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 27. p. 472 A. Καὶ νῦν (says Sokratês) περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφέσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι—μαρτυρήσουσι σοι, εἴαν μὲν βούλη, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ—εἴαν δὲ βούλη, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Ξελλίου—εἴαν δὲ βούλη, ἡ Περικλέ-

ους δὴ οἰκίτις, ἡ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥτινα ἂν βούλη τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ.... Ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σέ αὐτὸν εἶνα δυνάμει μαρτυρα παράγωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπερῆσθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ.

according to the law of nature. But when men come into society, all this is reversed. The majority of individuals know very well that they are weak, and that their only chance of security or comfort consists in establishing laws to restrain the strong man, reinforced by a moral sanction of praise and blame devoted to the same general end. They catch him like a young lion whilst his mind is yet tender, and fascinate him by talk and training into a disposition conformable to that measure and equally which the law enjoys. Here, then, is justice according to the law of society; a factitious system built up by the many for their own protection and happiness, to the subversion of the law of nature, which arms the strong man with a right to encroachment and license. Let a fair opportunity occur, and the favourite of nature will be seen to kick off his harness, tread down the laws, break through the magic circle of opinion around him, and stand forth again as lord and master of the many; regaining that glorious position which nature has assigned to him as his right. Justice by nature—and justice by law and society—are thus, according to Kalliklēs, not only distinct, but mutually contradictory. He accuses Sokratēs of having jumbled the two together in his argument.¹

It has been contended by many authors, that this anti-social reasoning (true enough, in so far as it states simple² matter of fact and probability—immoral, in so far as it erects the power of the strong man into a right; and inviting many comments, if I could find a convenient place for them) represents the morality commonly and publicly taught by the persons called Sophists at Athens.³ I deny this assertion

¹ This doctrine asserted by Kalliklēs will be found in Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484.

² See the same matter-of-fact strongly stated by Sokratēs in the *Memorab. of Xenophon*, ii. 1, 13.

³ Schleiermacher (in the *Prolegomena* to his translation of the *Theætetus*, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kalliklēs; which supposition he sustains by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that

there was no such thing as justice by nature, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kalliklēs is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklēs not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner—explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others—and puts it above the justice of law

emphatically. Even if I had no other evidence to sustain my denial, except what has been already extracted from the unfriendly writings of Plato himself, respecting Protagoras and Hippias—with what we know from Xenophon about Prodikus—I should consider my case made out as vindicating the Sophists generally from such an accusation. If refutation to the doctrine of Kalliklès were needed, it would be obtained quite as efficaciously from Prodikus and Protagoras as from Sokratès and Plato.

But this is not the strongest part of the vindication.

First, Kalliklès himself is not a Sophist, nor represented by Plato as such. He is a young Athenian citizen, of rank and station, belonging to the deme Acharnæ; he is intimate with other young men of condition in the city, has recently entered into active political life, and bends his whole soul towards it; he disparages philosophy, and speaks with utter contempt about the Sophists.¹ If then it were even just (which I do not admit) to infer from opinions put into the mouth of one Sophist, that the same were held by another or by all of them—it would not be the less unjust to draw the like inference from opinions

and society, in respect to authority.

Ritter and Brandis are yet more incorrect in their accusations of the Sophists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 581)—“It is affirmed as a common tenet of the Sophists—there is no right by nature, but only by convention:” compare Brandis, p. 521. The very passages to which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the contrary of what they assert: and Preller actually imputes the contrary tenets to the Sophists (*Histor. Philosoph.* c. 4. p. 130, Hamburg 1838) with just as little authority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the Sophists with wickedness for this alleged tenet—for denying that there was any right by nature, and allowing no right except by convention; a doctrine which had been maintained before them by Archelaus (*Diogen. Laërt.* ii. 16). Now Plato (*Legg.* x. p. 802), whom these writers

refer to, charges certain wise men—σοφοὺς ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ποιητάς (he does not mention Sophists)—with wickedness, but on the ground directly opposite; because *they did acknowledge a right by nature, of greater authority than the right laid down by the legislator*; and because they encouraged pupils to follow this supposed right of nature, disobeying the law; interpreting the right of nature as Kalliklès does in the *Gorgias*!

Teachers are thus branded as wicked men by Ritter and Brandis, for the negative, and by Plato (if he here means the Sophists), for the affirmative doctrine.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 37. p. 481 D; c. 41. p. 435 B, D; c. 42. p. 487 C; c. 50. p. 495 B; c. 70. p. 515 A. εὐ μὲν αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἀρετὴν πρᾶττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα: compare c. 55. p. 500 C. His contempt for the Sophists, c. 75. p. 519 E, with the note of Heindorf.

professed by one who is not a Sophist, and who despises the whole profession.

Secondly, if any man will read attentively the course of the dialogue, he will see that the doctrine of Kalliklēs is such as no one dared publicly to propound. So it is conceived both by Kalliklēs himself, and by Sokratēs. The former first takes up the conversation by saying that his predecessor Pōlus had become entangled in a contradiction, because he had not courage enough openly to announce an unpopular and odious doctrine; but he (Kalliklēs) was less shamefaced, and would speak out boldly that doctrine which others kept to themselves for fear of shocking the hearers. "Certainly (says Sokratēs to him) your audacity is abundantly shown by the doctrine which you have just laid down—you set forth plainly that which other people think, but do not choose to utter." Now, opinions of which Pōlus, an insolent young man, was afraid to proclaim himself the champion, must have been revolting indeed to the sentiments of hearers. How then can any reasonable man believe, that such opinions were not only openly propounded, but seriously inculcated as truth upon audiences of youthful hearers, by the Sophists? We know that the teaching of the latter was public in the highest degree; publicity was pleasing as well as profitable to them; among the many disparaging epithets heaped upon them, ostentation and vanity are two of the most conspicuous. Whatever they taught, they taught publicly; and I contend, with full conviction, that had they even agreed with Kallikles in this opinion, they could neither have been sufficiently audacious,

The doctrine put into his mouth could never have been laid down in any public lecture among the Athenians.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 38. p. 482 E. ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὐτῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτός ἐκ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη (Pōlus), αἰσχυνθεὶς δ' ἐνόησε εἰπεῖν· σὺ γάρ τῳ δῶτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἀγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικὰ, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν. . . . ἐάν οὖν τις αἰσχυνῆται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.

Καὶ μὴν (says Sokratēs to Kalliklēs, c. 42. p. 487 D) ὅτι γε οἷος

εἰ παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνέσθαι, αὐτός τε φῆς, καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. Again, c. 47. p. 492 D. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλικλέεις, ἐπεξέρχαι τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γάρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

Again from Kalliklēs—ὅ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω—c. 46. p. 491 E.

nor sufficiently their own enemies, to make it a part of their public teaching; but would have acted like Pôlus, and kept the doctrine to themselves.

Thirdly, this latter conclusion will be rendered doubly certain, when we consider of what city we are now speaking. Of all places in the world, the democratical Athens is the last in which the doctrine advanced by Kalliklês could possibly have been professed by a public teacher; or even by Kalliklês himself, in any public meeting. It is unnecessary to remind the reader how profoundly democratical was the sentiment and morality of the Athenians—how much they loved their laws, their constitution, and their political equality—how jealous their apprehension was of any nascent or threatening despotism. All this is not simply admitted, but even exaggerated, by Mr. Mitford, Wachsmuth, and other anti-democratical writers, who often draw from it materials for their abundant censures. Now the very point which Sokratês (in this dialogue called 'Gorgias') seeks to establish against Kalliklês, against the Rhetors, and against the Sophists,—is, that they courted, flattered, and truckled to the sentiment of the Athenian people, with degrading subservience; that they looked to the immediate gratification simply, and not to permanent moral improvement of the people—that they had not courage to address to them any unpalatable truths, however salutary, but would shift and modify opinions in every way so as to escape giving offence¹—that no man who put himself prominently forward at Athens had any chance of success, unless he became moulded and assimilated, from the core, to the people and their type of sentiment.² Granting such charges to be true, how is it

¹ This quality is imputed by Sokratês to Kalliklês in a remarkable passage of the *Gorgias*, c. 37. p. 481 D, E, the substance of which is thus stated by Stallbaum in his note—"Carpit Socrates Calliclis levitatem, mobili populi turbæ nunquam non blandientis et adulantis."

It is one of the main points of Sokratês in the dialogue, to make out that the practice (for he will not call it an art) of Sophists, as

well as Rhetors, aims at nothing but the immediate gratification of the people, without any regard to their ultimate or durable benefit—that they are branches of the widely-extended knack of flattery (*Gorgias*, c. 19. p. 464 D; c. 20. p. 465 C; c. 56. p. 501 C; c. 76. p. 520 B).

² Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 68. p. 513. Οὐ γὰρ μνηστὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοφῶς ὅμοιον τοῦτοιοις, εἰ μάλιστα τὴ γνῶσιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φίλον τῷ

conceivable that any Sophist, or any Rhetor, could venture to enforce upon an Athenian public audience the doctrine laid down by Kalliklès? To tell such audience—"Your laws and institutions are all violations of the law of nature, contrived to disappoint the Alkibiadès or Napoleon among you of his natural right to become your master, and to deal with you petty men as his slaves. All your unnatural precautions, and conventional talk, in favour of legality and equal dealing, will turn out to be nothing better than pitiful impotence,¹ as soon as *he* finds a good opportunity of standing forward in his full might and energy—so as to put you into your proper places, and show you what privileges Nature intends for her favourite!" Conceive such a doctrine propounded by a lecturer to assembled Athenians! A doctrine just as revolting to Nikias as to Kleon, and which even Alkibiadès would be forced to affect to disapprove; since it is not simply anti-popular—not simply despotic—but the drunken extravagance of despotism. The Great man as depicted by Kalliklès stands in the same relation to ordinary mortals, as Jonathan Wild the Great in the admirable parody of Fielding.

That Sophists, whom Plato accuses of slavish flattery to the democratical ear, should gratuitously insult it by the proposition of such tenets—is an assertion not merely untrue, but utterly absurd. Even as to Sokratès, we know from Xenophon how much the Athenians were offended with him, and how much it was urged by the accusers on his trial, that in his conversations he was wont to cite with peculiar relish the description (in the second book of the *Iliad*) of Odysseus following the Grecian crowd when running away from the agora to get on ship-board, and prevailing upon them to come back—by gentle words addressed to the chiefs, but by blows of his stick, accompanied with contemptuous reprimand, to the common people. The indirect evidence thus afforded that Sokratès countenanced unequal dealing and ill-usage towards the Many, told much

Ἀθηναίων δῆμῳ. . . Ὅστις οὖν σε
τούτοις ὁμοϊότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός
σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμῆις πολιτικὸς
εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ
αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθει λεγόμενων τῶν λόγων
ἐκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ

ἄχθονται.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 46. p. 492 C
(the words of Kalliklès). Τα δὲ
ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα,
τὰ παρὰ φύσιν εὐνοήματα, ἀνθρώπων
φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔστι.

against him in the minds of the Dikasts. What would they have felt then towards a Sophist who publicly professed the political morality of Kalliklês? The truth is—not only was it impossible that any such morality, or anything of the same type even much diluted, could find its way into the educational lectures of professors at Athens,—but the fear would be in the opposite direction. If the Sophist erred in either way, it would be in that which Sokratês imputes—by making his lectures over-democratical. Nay, if we suppose any opportunity to have arisen of discussing the doctrine of Kalliklês, he would hardly omit to flatter the ears of the surrounding democrats by enhancing the beneficent results of legality and equal dealing, and by denouncing this “natural despot” or undisclosed Napoleon, as one who must either take his place under such restraints, or find a place in some other city.

I have thus shown, even from Plato himself, that the doctrine ascribed to Kalliklês neither did enter, nor could have entered, into the lectures of a Sophist or professed teacher. The same conclusion may be maintained respecting the doctrine of Thrasymachus in the first book of the ‘Republic.’ Thrasymachus was a rhetorical teacher, who had devised precepts respecting the construction of an oration and the training of young men for public speaking. It is most probable that he confined himself, like Gorgias, to this department, and that he did not profess to give moral lectures, like Protagoras and Prodikus. But granting him to have given such, he would not talk about justice in the way in which Plato makes him talk, if he desired to give any satisfaction to an Athenian audience. The mere brutality and ferocious impudence of demeanour, even to exaggeration, with which Plato invests him—is in itself a strong proof that the doctrine, ushered in with such a preface, was not that of a popular and acceptable teacher, winning favour in public audiences. He defines justice to be “the interest of the superior power; that rule, which, in every society, the dominant power prescribes, as being for its own advantage.” A man is just (he says) for the advantage of another, not for his own: he is weak, cannot help himself, and must submit to that which the stronger authority, whether despot, oligarchy, or commonwealth commands.

The theory is essentially different from the doctrine of Kalliklès, as set forth a few pages back; for Thrasymachus does not travel out of society to insist upon anterior rights dating from a supposed state of nature—he takes societies as he finds them, recognizing the actual governing authority of each as the canon and constituent of justice or injustice. Stallbaum and other writers have incautiously treated the two theories as if they were the same; and with something even worse than want of caution, while they pronounce the theory of Thrasymachus to be detestably immoral, announce it as having been propounded not by him only, but by *The Sophists*—thus, in their usual style, dealing with the Sophists as if they were a school, sect, or partnership with mutual responsibility. Whoever has followed the evidence which I have produced respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, will know how differently these latter handled the question of justice.

Such doctrine not common to all the Sophists—what is offensive in it is, the manner in which it is put forward.

But the truth is, that the theory of Thrasymachus, though incorrect and defective, is not so detestable as these writers represent. What makes it seem detestable, is, the style and manner in which he is made to put it forward, which causes the just man to appear petty and contemptible, while it surrounds the unjust man with enviable attributes. Now this is precisely the circumstance which revolts the common sentiments of mankind, as it revolts also the critics who read what is said by Thrasymachus. The moral sentiments exist in men's minds in complex and powerful groups, associated with some large words and emphatic forms of speech. Whether an ethical theory satisfies the exigences of reason, or commands and answers to all the phenomena—a common audience will seldom give themselves the trouble to consider with attention: but what they imperiously exact—and what is indispensable to give the theory any chance of success, is, that it shall exhibit to their feelings the just man as respectable and dignified, and the unjust man as odious and repulsive. Now that which offends in the language ascribed to Thrasymachus, is, not merely the absence, but the reversal, of this condition—the presentation of the just man as weak and silly, and of injustice in all the *prestige* of triumph and dignity. And for this very reason I venture to infer that such a theory was never

propounded by Thrasymachus to any public audience in the form in which it appears in Plato. For Thrasymachus was a rhetor, who had studied the principles of his art: now we know that these common sentiments of an audience, were precisely what the rhetors best understood, and always strove to conciliate. Even from the time of Gorgias, they began the practice of composing beforehand declamations upon the general heads of morality, which were ready to be introduced into actual speeches as occasion presented itself, and in which appeal was made to the moral sentiments foreknown as common, with more or less of modification, to all the Grecian assemblies. The real Thrasymachus, addressing any audience at Athens, would never have wounded these sentiments, as the Platonic Thrasymachus is made to do in the 'Republic.' Least of all would he have done this, if it be true of him, as Plato asserts of the Rhetors and Sophists generally, that they thought about nothing but courting popularity, without any sincerity of conviction.

Though Plato thinks fit to bring out the opinion of Thrasymachus with accessories unnecessarily offensive, and thus to enhance the dialectical triumph of Sokratês by the brutal manners of the adversary—he was well-aware that he had not done justice to the opinion itself, much less confuted it. The proof of this is, that in the second book of the 'Republic', after Thrasymachus has disappeared, the very same opinion is taken up by Glaukon and Adeimantus, and set forth by both of them (though they disclaim entertaining it as their own), as suggesting grave doubts and difficulties which they desire to hear solved by Sokratês. Those who read attentively the discourses of Glaukon and Adeimantus, will see that the substantive opinion ascribed to Thrasymachus, apart from the brutality with which he is made to state it, does not even countenance the charge of immoral teaching against *him*—much less against the Sophists generally. Hardly anything in Plato's compositions is more powerful than those discourses. They present in a perspicuous and forcible manner, some of the most serious difficulties with which ethical theory is required to grapple. And Plato can answer them only in one way—by taking society to pieces, and reconstructing it in the form of his

Opinion of
Thrasymachus
afterwards
brought out
by Glaukon
—with less
brutality,
and much
greater
force of
reason.

imaginary republic. The speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus form the immediate preface to the striking and elaborate description which he goes through, of his new state of society, nor do they receive any other answer than what is implied in that description. Plato indirectly confesses that he cannot answer them, assuming social institutions to continue unreformed: and his reform is sufficiently fundamental.¹

¹ I omitted to notice the Dialogue of Plato entitled *Euthydemus*, wherein Sokratēs is introduced in conversation with the two persons called Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are represented as propounding a number of verbal quibbles, assertions of double sense, arising from equivocal grammar or syntax—fallacies of mere diction, without the least plausibility as to the sense—specimens of jest and hoax (p. 278 B). They are described as extravagantly conceited, while Sokratēs is painted with his usual affectation of deference and modesty. He himself, during a part of the dialogue, carries on conversation in his own dialectical manner with the youthful Kleinias; who is then handed over to be taught by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; so that the contrast between their style of questioning, and that of Sokratēs, is forcibly brought out.

To bring out this contrast, appears to me the main purpose of the dialogue—as has already been remarked by Socher and others (see Stallbaum, *Prolegom. ad Euthydem.* pp. 15-65); but its construction, its manner, and its result (previous to the concluding conversation between Sokratēs and Kriton separately), is so thoroughly comic, that Ast, on this and other grounds, rejects it as spurious and unworthy of Plato (see Ast, *über Platons Leben und Schriften*, p. 414-418).

Without agreeing in Ast's inference, I recognise the violence of the caricature which Plato has here presented under the characters of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. And it is for this reason, among many others, that I protest the more emphatically against the injustice of Stallbaum and the commentators generally, who consider these two persons as disciples of Protagoras, and samples of what is called "Sophistica"—the Sophistical Practice—the Sophists generally. There is not the smallest ground for considering these two men as disciples of Protagoras, who is presented to us, even by Plato himself, under an aspect as totally different from them as it is possible to imagine. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described, by Plato himself in this very dialogue, as old men who had been fencing-masters, and who had only within the last two years applied themselves to the eristic or controversial dialogue (*Euthyd.* c. 1. p. 272 C; c. 3. p. 273 E). Schleiermacher himself accounts their personal importance so mean, that he thinks Plato could not have intended to attack them, but meant to attack Antisthenēs and the Megaric school of philosophers (*Prolegom. ad Euthydem.* vol. iii. p. 403, 404, of his translation of Plato). So contemptible does Plato esteem them, that Krito blames Sokratēs for having so far degraded himself as to be seen talking with them

I call particular attention to this circumstance, without which we cannot fairly estimate the Sophists, or practical teachers of Athens, face to face with their accuser-general—Plato. He was a great and systematic theorist, whose opinions on ethics, politics, cognition, religion, &c., were all wrought into harmony by his own mind, and stamped with that peculiarity which is the mark of an original intellect. So splendid an effort of speculative genius is among the marvels of the Grecian world. His dissent from all the societies which he saw around him, not merely democratical, but oligarchical and despotic also, was of the deepest and most radical character. Nor did he delude himself by the belief, that any partial amendment of that which he saw around could bring about the end which he desired: he looked to nothing short of a new genesis of the man and the citizen, with institutions calculated from the beginning to work out the full measure of perfectibility. His fertile scientific imagination realized this idea

Plato
against the
Sophists
generally.
His cate-
gory of
accusation
com-
prehends
all society,
with all the
poets and
statesmen.

before many persons (p. 305 B, c. 30).

The name of Protagoras occurs only once in the dialogue, in reference to the doctrine, started by Euthydemus, that false propositions or contradictory propositions were impossible, because no one could either think about, or talk about, that which was not or the non-existent (p. 284 A; 286 C). This doctrine is said by Sokratēs to have been much talked of "by Protagoras and by men yet earlier than he." It is idle to infer from such a passage any connection or analogy between these men and Protagoras—as Stallbaum labours to do throughout his Prolegomena; affirming (in his note on p. 286 C) most incorrectly, that Protagoras maintained this doctrine about τὸ μὴ ὂν or the non-existent, because he had too great faith in the evidence of the senses—whereas we learn from Plato that it had its

rise with Parmenidēs, who rejected the evidence of the senses entirely (see Plato, Sophist. 24. p. 237 A, with Heindorf and Stallbaum's notes). Diogenes Laërtius (ix. 8, 53) falsely asserts that Protagoras was the first to broach the doctrine and even cites as his witness Plato in the Euthydemus, where the exact contrary is stated. Whoever broached it first—it was a doctrine following plausibly from the then received Realism, and Plato was long perplexed before he could solve the difficulty to his own satisfaction (Theætet. p. 187 D).

I do not doubt that there were in Athens persons who abused the dialectical exercise for frivolous puzzles, and it was well for Plato to compose a dialogue exhibiting the contrast between these men and Sokratēs. But to treat Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as samples of "The Sophists," is altogether unwarranted.

in the 'Republic.' But that very systematic and original character, which lends so much value and charm to the substantive speculations of Plato, counts as a deduction from his trustworthiness as critic or witness, in reference to the living agents whom he saw at work in Athens and other cities, as statesmen, generals, or teachers. His criticisms are dictated by his own point of view, according to which the entire society was corrupt, and all the instruments who carried on its functions were of essentially base metal. Whoever will read either the 'Gorgias' or the 'Republic,' will see in how sweeping and indiscriminate a manner he passes his sentence of condemnation. Not only all the Sophists and all the Rhetors¹—but all the musicians and dithyrambic or tragic poets—all the statesmen, past as well as present, not excepting even the great Periklēs—receive from his hands one common stamp of dishonour. Every one of these men are numbered by Plato among the numerous category of flatterers, who minister to the immediate gratification and to the desires of the people, without looking to their permanent improvement, or making them morally better. "Periklēs and Kimon (says Sokratēs in the 'Gorgias') are nothing but servants or ministers who supply the immediate appetites and tastes of the people; just as the baker and the confectioner do in their respective departments, without knowing or caring whether the food will do any real good—a point which the physician alone can determine. As ministers, they are clever enough: they have provided the city amply with tribute, walls, docks, ships, and *such other follies*: but I (Sokratēs) am the only man in Athens who aim, so far as my strength permits, at the true purpose of politics—the mental improvement of the people."² So wholesale a

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, 58. p. 502, 503.

² Plato, Gorgias, c. 72, 73. p. 517 (Sokratēs speaks). 'Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

Ὡ δαιμόνια, οὐδ' ἐγὼ φέγω τούτους (Periklēs and Kimon) ὥς γε διαχόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὢν ἐπεθύμει.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἑμαλλον ἀμείνους εἶσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἔπος εἰπαῖν, οὐδέν τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου.

Ἄνευ γὰρ σωπροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, λιμένων καὶ ταυχῶν καὶ νεωρίων καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν (c. 74, p. 519 A).

Οἶμαι (says Sokratēs, c. 77. p.

condemnation betrays himself as the offspring, and the consistent offspring, of systematic peculiarity of vision—the prejudice of a great and able mind.

It would be not less unjust to appreciate the Sophists or the statesmen of Athens from the point of view of Plato, than the present teachers and politicians of England or France from that of Mr. Owen or Fourier. Both the one and the other class laboured for society as it stood at Athens: the statesmen carried on the business of practical politics, the Sophist trained up youth for practical life in all its departments, as family men, citizens, and leaders—to obey as well as to command. Both accepted the system as it stood without contemplating the possibility of a new birth of society: both ministered to certain exigences, held their anchorage upon certain sentiments, and bowed to a certain morality, actually felt among the living men around them. That which Plato says of the statesmen of Athens is perfectly true—that they were only servants or ministers of the people. He, who tried the people and the entire society by comparison with an imaginary standard of his own, might deem all these ministers worthless in the lump, as carrying on a system too bad to be mended; but nevertheless the difference between a competent and an incompetent minister—between Periklês and Nikias—was of unspeakable moment to the security and happiness of the Athenians. What the Sophists on their part undertook, was, to educate young men so as to make them better qualified for statesmen or ministers; and Protagoras would have thought it sufficient honour to himself—as well as sufficient benefit to Athens, which assuredly it would have been—if he could have inspired any young Athenian with the soul and the capacities of his friend and companion Periklês.

So far is Plato from considering the Sophists as the corruptors of Athenian morality, that he distinctly protests against that supposition, in a remarkable passage of the 'Republic.' It is (he says) the whole people, or the society, with its established morality, intelligence, and

521 D) μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα
μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὥς
ἀληθὲς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν
πολιτικά μόνος τῶν νῦν, ἅτε οὗ

οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους
οὐδὲ λέγω ἐκείστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ
βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, &c.

tone of sentiment, which is intrinsically vicious; the teachers of such a society must be vicious also, otherwise their teaching would not be received; and even if their private teaching were ever so good, its effect would be washed away except in some few privileged natures, by the overwhelming deluge of pernicious social influences.¹ Nor let any one imagine (as modern readers are but too ready to understand it) that this poignant censure is intended for Athens so far forth as a democracy. Plato was not the man to preach king-worship, or wealth-worship, as social or political remedies: he declares emphatically that not one of the societies then existing was such that a truly philosophical nature could be engaged in active functions under it.² These passages would be alone sufficient to repel the assertions of those who denounce the Sophists as poisoners of Athenian morality, on the alleged authority of Plato.

Nor is it at all more true that they were men of mere words, and made their pupils no better—a charge just as vehemently pressed against Sokratês as against the Sophists—and by the same class of enemies, such as Anytus,³ Aristophanês, Eupolis &c. It was mainly from Sophists like Hippias that the Athenian youth learnt what they knew of geometry, astronomy, and arithmetic: but the range of what is called special science, possessed even by the teacher, was at that time very limited; and the

Plato distinctly denies that Athenian corruption was to be imputed to the Sophists.

The Sophists were not teachers of mere words, apart from action.

¹ This passage is in *Republ. vi.* 6. p. 492 *seq.* I put the first words of the passage (which is too long to be cited, but which richly deserves to be read, entire) in the translation given by Stallbaum in his note.

Sokratês says to Adeimantus—*"An tu quoque putas esse quidem sophistas, homines privatos, qui corrumpunt juventutem in quâcunque re mentione dignâ; nec illud tamen animadvertisti et tibi persuasisti, quod multo magis debebas, ipsos Athenienses turpissimos esse aliorum corruptores?"*

Yet the commentator who trans-

lates this passage, does not scruple (in his *Prolegomena* to the *Republic*, p. xlii., xli., as well as to the *Dialogues*) to heap upon the Sophists aggravated charges, as the actual corruptors of Athenian morality.

² Plato, *Repub. vi.* 11. p. 497 B. *μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατὰ στας τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως, &c.*

Compare Plato, *Epistol. vii.* p. 325 A.

³ Anytus was the accuser of Sokratês: his enmity to the Sophists may be seen in Plato, *Meno*, p. 91 C.

matter of instruction communicated was expressed under the general title of "Words or Discourses," which were always taught by the Sophists, in connection with thought and in reference to a practical use. The capacities of thought, speech and action—are conceived in conjunction by Greeks generally, and by teachers like Isokratês and Quintilian especially; and when young men in Greece, like the Boeotian Proxenus, put themselves under training by Gorgias or any other Sophist—it was with a view of qualifying themselves, not merely to speak, but to act.¹

Most of the pupils of the Sophists (as of Sokratês² himself) were young men of wealth; a fact, at which Plato sneers, and others copy him, as if it proved that they cared only about high pay. But I do not hesitate to range myself on the side of Isokratês,³ and to contend that the Sophist himself had much to lose by corrupting his pupils (an argument used by Sokratês in defending himself before the Dikastery, and just as valid in defence of Protagoras or Prodikus⁴) and strong personal interest in sending them forth accomplished and virtuous—that the best taught youth were decidedly the most free from crime and the most active towards good—that among the valuable ideas and feelings which a young Athenian had in his mind as well as among the good pursuits which he followed, those which he learnt from the Sophists counted nearly as the best—that, if the contrary had been the fact, fathers would not have continued so to send their sons, and pay their money. It was not merely that these teachers countervailed in part the temptations to dissipated enjoyment, but also that they were personally unconcerned in the acrimonious

¹ Xenoph. Anab. ii. 6. Πρόξενος—εὐθὺς μαιράκιον ὦν ἐπεθύμει γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ τὰ μεγάλα πράττειν ἱκανός· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔδωκε Γοργία ἀργύριον τῷ Λεοντίῳ. . . . Τούτων δ' ἐπιθυμῶν, σφόδρα ἐνδελον αὐ καὶ τοῦτο εἶχεν, ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν θέλοι κτᾶσθαι μετὰ ἀδικίας, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ὥστε δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν, ἅνευ δὲ τούτων μὴ.

Proxenus, as described by his friend Xenophon, was certainly a man who did no dishonour to the

moral teaching of Gorgias.

The connection between thought, speech, and action, is seen even in the jests of Aristophanes upon the purposes of Sokratês and the Sophists:—

Νικᾶν πράττων καὶ βουλευῶν καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων (Nubes, 418).

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 10. p. 23 C, Protagoras, p. 328 C.

³ See Isokr. Or. xv. De Perm. s. 218, 233, 235, 245, 254, 257.

⁴ Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 13. p. 25 D.

slander and warfare of party in his native city—that the topics with which they familiarized him were, the general interests and duties of men and citizens—that they developed the germs of morality in the ancient legends (as in Prodikus's fable), and amplified in his mind all the undefined cluster of associations connected with the great words of morality—that they vivified in him the sentiment of Pan-hellenic brotherhood—and that in teaching him the art of persuasion,¹ they could not but make him feel the dependence in which he stood towards those who were to be persuaded, together with the necessity under which he lay of so conducting himself as to conciliate their good will.

The intimations given in Plato, of the enthusiastic reception which Protagoras, Prodikus, and other Sophists² met with in the various cities—the description which we read (in the dialogue called Protagoras) of the impatience of the youthful Hippokratēs, on hearing of the arrival of that Sophist, insomuch that he awakens Sokratēs before daylight, in order to obtain an introduction to the newcomer and profit by his teaching—the readiness of such rich young men to pay money, and to devote time and trouble, for the purpose of acquiring a personal superiority apart from their wealth and station—the ardour with which Kallias is represented as employing his house for the hospitable entertainment, and his fortune for the aid, of the Sophists—all this makes upon my mind an expression directly the reverse of that ironical and contemptuous phraseology with which it is set forth by Plato. Such Sophists had nothing to recommend them except superior knowledge and intellectual force, combined with an imposing personality, making itself felt in their lectures and conversation. It is to this that the admiration was shown; and the fact that it was so shown, brings to view the best attributes of the Greek, especially the Athenian mind. It exhibits those qualities of which Periklēs made emphatic boast in his celebrated funeral oration³—conception of public speech as a practical thing,

Great reputation of the Sophists—evidence of respect for intellect and of a good state of public sentiment.

¹ See these points strikingly put by Isokratēs—in the Orat. xv. De Permutatione, throughout, especially in sect. 294, 297, 305, 307—and again by Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2,

10, in reference to the teaching of Sokratēs.

² See a striking passage in Plato's Republic. x. c. 4. p. 600 C.

³ Thucyd. ii. 40. φιλοσοφοῦμεν

not meant as an excuse for inaction, but combined with energetic action, and turning it to good account by full and open discussion beforehand—profound sensibility to the charm of manifested intellect, without enervating the powers of execution or endurance. Assuredly a man like Protagoras, arriving in a city with all his train of admiration laid before him, must have known very little of his own interest or position, if he began to preach a low or corrupt morality. If it be true generally, as Voltaire has remarked, that “any man who should come to preach a relaxed morality would be pelted,” much more would it be true of a Sophist like Protagoras, arriving in a foreign city with all the prestige of a great intellectual name, and with the imagination of youths on fire to hear and converse with him,—that any similar doctrine would destroy his reputation at once. Numbers of teachers have made their reputation by inculcating overstrained asceticism; it will be hard to find an example of success in the opposite vein.¹

δνευ μαλαχίας—οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλαβὴν ἡγοῦμενοι—διαφερόντως δὲ καὶ τὸς ἔχομεν, ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀπαιτῶμεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

¹ In an able and interesting criticism on these volumes (in the ‘Quarterly Review,’ No. clxxv. Art. ii. p. 53) the general drift of my remarks on the Sophists is stated in the following terse and perspicuous manner:—

“It is enough here to state, as briefly as possible, the contrast between Mr. Grote’s view and the popular representation of the Sophists. According to the common notion, they were a sect; according to him, they were a class or profession. According to the common view, they were the propagators of demoralising doctrines, and of what from them are termed ‘sophistical’ argumentations. According to Mr. Grote, they were the regular

teachers of Greek morality, neither above nor below the standard of the age. According to the common view, Socrátēs was the great opponent of the Sophists, and Plato his natural successor in the same combat. According to Mr. Grote, Socrátēs was the great representative of the Sophists, distinguished from them only by his higher eminence, and by the peculiarity of his life and teaching. According to the common view, Plato and his followers were the authorized teachers, the established clergy of the Greek nation,—and the Sophists the dissenters. According to Mr. Grote, the Sophists were the established clergy, and Plato was the dissenter—the Socialist, who attacked the sophists (as he attacked the poets and the statesmen) not as a particular sect, but as one of the existing orders of society.”

CHAPTER LXVIII.

SOKRATES.

THAT the professional teachers called Sophists in Greece were intellectual and moral corruptors—and that much corruption grew up under their teaching in the Athenian mind—are common statements which I have endeavoured to show to be erroneous. Corresponding to these statements is another, which represents Sokratès as one whose special merit it was to have rescued the Athenian mind from such demoralising influences;—a reputation, which he neither deserves nor requires. In general, the favourable interpretation of evidence, as exhibited towards Sokratès, has been scarcely less marked than the harshness of presumption against the Sophists. Of late, however, some authors have treated his history in an altered spirit, and have manifested a disposition to lower him down to that which they regard as the Sophistical level. M. Forchhammer's treatise—"The Athenians and Sokratès, or Lawful Dealing against Revolution"—goes even further, and maintains confidently that Sokratès was most justly condemned as a heretic, a traitor, and a corruptor of youth. His book, the conclusions of which I altogether reject, is a sort of retribution to the Sophists, as extending to their alleged opponent the same bitter and unfair spirit of construction with that under which they have so long unjustly suffered. But when we impartially consider the evidence, it will appear that Sokratès deserves our admiration and esteem, not indeed as an anti-Sophist, but as combining with the qualities of a good man, a force of character and an originality of speculation as well as of method, and a power of intellectually working on others—generally different from that of any professional teacher—without parallel either among contemporaries or successors.

Different
spirit
shown
towards
Sokratès
and towards
the
Sophists.

The life of Sokratês comprises seventy years, from 469 to 399 B.C. His father Sophroniskus being a sculptor, the son began by following the same profession, in which he attained sufficient proficiency to have executed various works; especially a draped group of the Charites or Graces, preserved in the Acropolis, and shown as his work down to the time of Pausanias.¹ His mother Phænaretê was a midwife, and he had a brother by the mother's side named Patroklês.² Respecting his wife Xanthippê, and his three sons, all that has passed into history is the violent temper of the former, and the patience of her husband in enduring it. The position and family of Sokratês, without being absolutely poor, were humble and unimportant: but he was of genuine Attic breed, belonging to the ancient gens Dædalidæ, which took its name from Dædalus the mythical artist as progenitor.

The personal qualities of Sokratês, on the other hand, were marked and distinguishing, not less in body than in mind. His physical constitution was healthy, robust and enduring, to an extraordinary degree. He was not merely strong and active as an hoplite on military service, but capable of bearing fatigue or hardship, and indifferent to heat or cold, in a measure which astonished all his companions. He went barefoot in all seasons of the year, even during the winter campaign at Potidæa, under the severe frosts of Thrace; and the same homely clothing sufficed to him for winter as well as for summer. Though his diet was habitually simple as well as abstemious, yet there were occasions, of religious festival or friendly congratulation, on which every Greek considered joviality and indulgence to be becoming. On such occasions, Sokratês could drink more wine than any guest present, yet without being overcome or intoxicated.³ He abstained, on principle, from

¹ Pausanias, i. 22, 8; ix. 35, 2.

² Plato, Euthydem. c. 24. p. 297 D.

³ See the Symposium of Plato as well as that of Xenophon, both of which profess to depict Sokratês at one of these jovial moments. Plato, Symposium, c. 31. p. 214 A; c. 35, &c., 39 *ad finem*; Xenoph. Symp. ii. 26—where Sokratês requests that the wine may be handed

round in small cups, but that they may succeed each other quickly, like drops of rain in a shower. Compare Athenæus, xi. p. 504 F.

The view which Plato takes of indulgence in wine, as affording a sort of test of the comparative self-command of individuals, and measuring the facility with which any man may be betrayed into

all extreme gymnastic training, which required, as necessary condition, extraordinary abundance of food.¹ It was his professed purpose to limit, as much as possible, the number of his wants, as a distant approach to the perfection of the gods, who wanted nothing; to control such as were natural, and prevent the multiplication of any that were artificial.² His admirable bodily temperament contributed materially to facilitate such a purpose, and assist him in the maintenance of that self-mastery, contented self-sufficiency, and independence of the favour³ as well as of the enmity of others—which were essential to his plan of intellectual life. His friends, who communicate to us his great bodily strength and endurance, are at the same time full of jests upon his ugly physiognomy—his flat nose, thick lips, and prominent eyes, like a satyr or Silenus.⁴ We cannot implicitly trust the evidence of such very admiring witnesses, as to the philosopher's exemption from infirmities of temper; for there seems good proof that he was by natural temperament violently irascible—a defect, which he generally kept under severe control, but which occasionally betrayed him into great improprieties of language and demeanour.⁵

folly and extravagance—and the regulation to which he proposes to submit the practice—may be seen in his treatise *De Legibus*, i. p. 649; ii. p. 671-674. Compare *Xenoph. Memorab.* i. 2, 1; i. 6, 10.

¹ *Xenoph. Memorab.* i. 2, 4. τὸ μὲν ὑπερσθίωντα ὑπερπορεῖν ἀνδραγματοῦ, &c.

² *Xenoph. Mem.* i. 6, 10. Even Antisthenes (disciple of Sokrates, and the originator of what was called the Cynic philosophy), while he pronounced virtue to be self-sufficient for conferring happiness, was obliged to add that the strength and vigour of Sokrates were required as a farther condition—αὐτάρετη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην διὰ μὴ τῆς Σωκρατικῆς τοχρῶς—Winkelman, *Antisthen.* Fragment. p. 47; *Diog. Laërt.* vi. 11.

³ See his reply to the invitation

of Archelaus king of Macedonia, indicating the repugnance to accept favours which he could not return (*Arist. Rhetor.* ii. 24).

⁴ *Plato, Sympos.* c. 32, p. 215 A; *Xenoph. Sympos.* c. 5; *Plato, Theætet.* p. 143 D.

⁵ This is one of the traditions which Aristoxenus, the disciple of Aristotle, heard from his father Spintharus, who had been in personal communication with Sokrates. See the *Fragments of Aristoxenus*, *Fragm.* 27, 28; *ap. Frag. Hist. Græc.* p. 280, ed. Didot.

It appears to me that *Frag.* 28 contains the statement of what Aristoxenus really said about the irascibility of Sokrates; while the expressions of *Fragm.* 27, ascribed to that author by Plutarch, are unmeasured.

Fragm. 28 also substantially contradicts *Fragm.* 26, in which Dio-

Of those friends, the best known to us are Xenophon and Plato, though there existed in antiquity various dialogues composed, and memoranda put together, by other hearers of Sokratês, respecting his conversations and teaching, which are all now lost.¹ The 'Memorabilia' of Xenophon profess to record actual conversations held by Sokratês, and are prepared with the announced purpose of vindicating him against the accusations of Melêtus and his other accusers on the trial, as well as against unfavourable opinions, seemingly much circulated, respecting his character and purposes. We thus have in it a sort of partial biography, subject to such deductions from its evidentiary value as may be requisite for imperfection of memory, intentional decoration, and partiality. On the other hand, the purpose of Plato in the numerous dialogues wherein he introduces Sokratês, is not so clear—and is explained very differently by different commentators. Plato was a great speculative genius, who came to form opinions of his own distinct from those of Sokratês, and employed the name of the latter as spokesman for these opinions in various dialogues. How much, in the Platonic Sokratês, can be safely accepted either as a picture of the man or as a record of his opinions—how much, on the other hand, is to be treated as Platonism—or in what proportions the two are intermingled—is a point not to be decided with certainty or rigour. The 'Apology of Sokratês,' the 'Kriton,' and the 'Phædon' (in so far as it is a moral picture, and apart from

genes asserts, on the authority of Aristoxenus—what is not to be believed, even if Aristoxenus had asserted it—that Sokratês made a regular trade of his teaching, and collected perpetual contributions: see Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 6; i. 5, 6

I see no reason for the mistrust with which Preller (Hist. Philosophiæ, c. 5. p. 139) and Ritter (Geschichte d. Philos. vol. ii. ch. ii. p. 19) regard the general testimony of Aristoxenus about Sokratês.

¹ Xenophon (Mem. i. 4, 1) alludes to several such biographers, or collectors of anecdotes about Sokratês. Yet it would seem that

most of these *Socratici viri* (Cicer. ad Attic. xiv. 9, 1) did not collect anecdotes or conversations of the master, after the manner of Xenophon; but composed dialogues, manifesting more or less of his method and ἥθος, after the type of Plato. Simon the leather-cutter however took memoranda of conversations held by Sokratês in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such (Diog. Laërt. ii. 123). The *Socratici viri* are generally praised by Cicero (Tusc. D. ii. 3, 8) for the elegance of their style.

the doctrines advocated in it) appear to belong to the first category; while the political and social views of the 'Republic,' the cosmic theories in the 'Timæus,' and the hypothesis of Ideas, as substantive existences apart from the phænomenal world, in the various dialogues wherever it is stated—certainly belong to the second. Of the ethical dialogues, much may be probably taken to represent Sokratēs more or less platonized.

But though the opinions put by Plato into the mouth of Sokratēs are liable to thus much of uncertainty, we find, to our great satisfaction, that the pictures given by Plato and Xenophon of their common master are in the main accordant; differing only as drawn from the same original by two authors radically different in spirit and character. Xenophon, the man of action, brings out at length those conversations of Sokratēs which had a bearing on practical conduct and were calculated to correct vice or infirmity in particular individuals; such being the matter which served his purpose as an apologist, at the same time that it suited his intellectual taste. But he intimates nevertheless very plainly, that the conversation of Sokratēs was often, indeed usually, of a more negative, analytical, and generalising tendency;¹ not destined for the reproof of positive or special defect, but to awaken the inquisitive faculties and lead to the rational comprehension of vice and virtue as referable to determinate general principles. Now this latter side of the master's physiognomy, which Xenophon records distinctly, though without emphasis or development, acquires almost exclusive prominence in the Platonic picture. Plato leaves out the practical, and consecrates himself to the theoretical, Sokratēs; whom he divests in part of his identity, in order to enrol him as chief speaker in certain larger theoretical views of his own. The two pictures therefore do not contradict each other, but mutually supply each other's defects, and admit of being blended into one consistent whole. And respecting the

Their pictures of Sokratēs are in the main accordant.

¹ Xenophon, Memor. i. 1, 6. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὖσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρὸν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδίκον, τί ἀνδρία, τί δειλία, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μαγία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχή

ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχιτὸς ἀνθρώπων, &c. Compare i. 2, 50; iii. 8, 3, 4; iii. 9; iv. 4, 5; iv. 6, 1. σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέ ποτε ἔληγε.

method of Sokratês—a point more characteristic than either his precepts or his theory—as well as respecting the effect of that method on the minds of hearers—both Xenophon and Plato are witnesses substantially in unison: though, here again, the latter has made the method his own, worked it out on a scale of enlargement and perfection, and given to it a permanence which it could never have derived from its original author, who only talked and never wrote. It is fortunate that our two main witnesses about him, both speaking from personal knowledge, agree to so great an extent.

Both describe in the same manner his private life and habits; his contented poverty, justice, temperance Sokratês. in the largest sense of the word, and self-sufficing independence of character. On most of these points too, Aristophanês and the other comic writers, so far as their testimony counts for anything, appear as confirmatory witnesses; for they abound in jests on the coarse fare, shabby and scanty clothing, bare feet, pale face, poor and joyless life, of Sokratês.¹ Of the circumstances of his life we are almost wholly ignorant. He served as an hoplite at Potidæa, at Delium, and at Amphipolis; with credit apparently in all, though exaggerated encomiums on the part of his friends provoked an equally exaggerated scepticism on the part of Athenæus and others. He seems never to have filled any political office until the year (B.C. 406) of the battle of Arginusæ, in which year he was member of the Senate of Five Hundred, and one of the Prytanes on that memorable day when the proposition of Kallixenus against the six generals was submitted to the public assembly. His determined refusal, in spite of all personal hazard, to put an unconstitutional question to the vote, has been already recounted. That during his long life he strictly obeyed the laws,² is proved by the fact that none of his numerous enemies ever arraigned him before a court of justice: that he discharged all the duties of an upright man and a brave as well as pious citizen, may also be confidently asserted.

¹ Aristoph. *Nubes*, 106, 121, 362, 414; *Aves*, 1282; *Eupolis*, Fragment. *Incert.* ix., x., xi., ap. Meineke, p. 552; *Ameipsias*, *Fragmenta*, Konnus, p. 793, Meineke—*Diogen. Laërt.* ii. 28.

The later comic writers ridiculed

the Pythagoreans, as well as Zeno the Stoic, on grounds very similar: see *Diogenes Laërt.* vii. 1, 24.

² Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* c. 1. Νῦν ἰὼν πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐπὶ τῇ γεγενησῇ πλείω ἐβδόμηκοντα.

His friends lay especial stress upon his piety, that is upon his exact discharge of all the religious duties considered as incumbent upon an Athenian.¹

Though these points are requisite to be established, in order that we may rightly interpret the character of Sokratês—it is not from them that he has derived his eminent place in history. Three peculiarities distinguish the man. 1. His long life passed in contented poverty, and in public, apostolic, dialectics. 2. His strong religious persuasion—or belief of acting under a mission and signs from the gods; especially his Dæmon or Genius—the special religious warning of which he believed himself to be frequently the subject. 3. His great intellectual originality, both of subject and of method, and his power of stirring and forcing the germ of inquiry and ratiocination in others. Though these three characteristics were so blended in Sokratês that it is not easy to consider them separately—yet in each respect, he stood distinguished from all Greek philosophers before or after him.

At what time Sokratês relinquished his profession as a statuary, we do not know; but it is certain that all the middle and later part of his life, at least, was devoted exclusively to the self-imposed task of teaching; excluding all other business, public or private, and to the neglect of all means of fortune. We can hardly avoid speaking of him as a teacher, though he himself disclaimed the appellation:² his practice was to talk or converse—to *prattle or prose*,³ if we translate the derisory word by which the enemies of philosophy described dialectic conversation. Early in the morning he frequented the public walks, the gymnasia for bodily training, and the schools where youths were receiving instruction. He was to be seen in the market-place at the hour when it was most crowded, among the booths and tables where goods were exposed for sale: his whole day

His constant publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation.

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 2-20; i. 3, 1-3.

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 21, p. 33 A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὴν οὐδένος πώποτε ἐγενόμην: compare c. 4, p. 19 E.

Xenoph. Memor. iii. 11, 16. Sokratês — ἐπισχῶπων τὴν αὐτοῦ

ἀπραγμοσύνην—Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 31 B.

³ Ἀδολεσχῆν—see Ruhnken's Animadversiones in Xen. Memor. p. 293, of Schneider's edition of that treatise. Compare Plato, Sophistês, c. 23, p. 225 E.

was usually spent in this public manner.¹ He talked with any one, young or old, rich or poor, who sought to address him, and in the hearing of all who chose to stand by. Not only he never either asked or received any reward, but he made no distinction of persons, never withheld his conversation from any one, and talked upon the same general topics to all. He conversed with politicians, Sophists, military men, artisans, ambitious or studious youths, &c. He visited all persons of interest in the city, male or female: his friendship with Aspasia is well known, and one of the most interesting chapters² of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* recounts his visit to, and dialogue with, Theodotê—a beautiful Hetæra or Female Companion. Nothing could be more public, perpetual, and indiscriminate as to persons, than his conversation. But as it was engaging, curious, and instructive to hear, certain persons made it their habit to attend him in public as companions and listeners. These men, a fluctuating body, were commonly known as his disciples or scholars; though neither he nor his personal friends ever employed the terms *teacher* and *disciple* to describe the relation between them.³ Many of them came, attracted by his reputation, during the later years of his life, from other Grecian cities; Megara, Thebes, Elis, Kyrene, &c.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 10; Plato, Apol. Sok. i. p. 17 D; 18. p. 31 A. οἶον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πειθων, καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον, οὐδὲν παύομαι, τὴν ἡμέραν δὴ πᾶντα τοῦ προσκαθίζων.

² Xen. Mem. iii. 11.

³ Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* speaks always of the companions of Sokratês, not of his disciples—οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ—οἱ συνουσιασται (i. 6, 1)—οἱ συνδιατρίβοντες—οἱ συγγινόμενοι—οἱ ἑταῖροι—οἱ ὁμιλοῦντες αὐτῷ—οἱ συνηθείς (iv. 8, 2)—οἱ μεθ' αὐτοῦ (iv. 3, 1)—οἱ ἐπιθυμηταὶ (i. 2, 60). Aristippus also, in speaking to Plato, talked of Sokratês as ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν—Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 24. His enemies spoke of his disciples, in an invidious sense—Plato, Ap.

Sok. c. 21, p. 93 A.

It is not to be believed that any companions can have made frequent visits, either from Megara and Thebes, to Sokratês at Athens, during the last years of the war, before the capture of Athens in 404 B.C. And in point of fact, the passage of the Platonic Theætetus represents Eukleidês of Megara as alluding to his conversations with Sokratês only a short time before the death of the latter (Plato, Theætetus, c. 2. p. 142 E.). The story given by Aulus Gellius—that Eukleidês came to visit Sokratês by night in woman's clothes, from Megara to Athens—seems to me an absurdity, though Deycks (*De Megaricorum Doctrinâ*, p. 5) is inclined to believe it.

Now no other person in Athens, or in any other Grecian city, appears ever to have manifested himself in this perpetual and indiscriminate manner as a public talker for instruction. All teachers either took money for their lessons, or at least gave them apart from the multitude in a private house or garden, to special pupils, with admissions and rejections at their own pleasure. By the peculiar mode of life which Sokratès pursued, not only his conversation reached the minds of a much wider circle, but he became more abundantly known as a person. While acquiring a few attached friends and admirers, and raising a certain intellectual interest in others, he at the same time provoked a large number of personal enemies. This was probably the reason why he was selected by Aristophanès and the other comic writers, to be attacked as a general representative of philosophical and rhetorical teaching; the more so, as his marked and repulsive physiognomy admitted so well of being imitated in the mask which the actor wore. The audience at the theatre would more readily recognise the peculiar figure which they were accustomed to see every day in the market-place, than if Prodikus or Protagoras, whom most of them did not know by sight, had been brought on the stage. It was of little importance either to them or to Aristophanès, whether Sokratès was represented as teaching what he did really teach, or something utterly different.

Reason
why So-
kratès was
shown up
by Aristophanès
on the stage.

This extreme publicity of life and conversation was one among the characteristics of Sokratès, His per-
distinguishing him from all teachers either suasion of
before or after him. Next was, his persuasion a special
of a special religious mission, restraints, impulses, mission.
and communications, sent to him by the gods. Taking the belief in such supernatural intervention generally, it was indeed noway peculiar to Sokratès: it was the ordinary faith of the ancient world, insomuch that the attempts to resolve phenomena into general laws were looked upon with a certain disapprobation, as indirectly setting it aside. And Xenophon¹ accordingly avails himself of such general fact, in replying to the indictment for religious innovation of which his master was found guilty, to affirm that the latter pretended to nothing beyond what was included in

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 2, 3.

the creed of every pious man. But this is not an exact statement of the matter in debate; for it slurs over at least, if it does not deny, that speciality of inspiration from the gods, which those who talked with Sokratês (as we learn even from Xenophon) believed, and which Sokratês himself believed also.¹ Very different is his own representation, as put forth in the defence before the Dikastery. He had been accustomed constantly to hear, even from his childhood, a divine voice; interfering, at moments when he was about to act, in the way of restraint, but never in the way of instigation. Such prohibitory warning was wont to come upon him very frequently, not merely on great, but even on small occasions, intercepting what he was about to do or to say.² Though later writers speak of this as the

¹ See the conversation of Sokratês (reported by Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 15) with Aristodemus, respecting the gods—"What will be sufficient to persuade you (asks Sokratês) that the gods care about you?" "When they send me special monitors, as you say that they do to you (replies Aristodemus), to tell me what to do, and what not to do." To which Sokratês replied, that they answer the questions of the Athenians, by replies of the oracle—and that they send prodigies (τέρατα) by way of information to the Greeks generally. He further advises Aristodemus to pay assiduous court (θεραπεύειν) to the gods, in order to see whether they will not send him monitory information about doubtful events (i. 4, 18).

So again in his conversation with Euthydemus, the latter says to him—Σοὶ δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὐχαισιν εἰσι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, οἷός μιν ἀπαρωτῶμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσιν, ἅτε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ δὲ μὴ (iv. 8, 12).

Compare i. 1, 19; and iv. 8, 11—where the fact of perpetual communication and advice from the gods is employed as an evidence to prove the superior piety of So-

kratês.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 19. p. 81 D. Τοῦτου δὲ αἰτιὸν ἐστὶν (that is, the reason why Sokratês had never entered on public life) δὲ ὁμοίως ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηχόατε πολυλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράφετο. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γινωσκμένη, ἣ δταν γέννηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου δὲ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐκ οὔτε. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶν δὲ μοι ἐναντιοῦνται τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν.

Again, c. 31. p. 40 A, he tells the Dikasts, after his condemnation—"Ἡ γὰρ εὐνοϊά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιοῦμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμεν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. Νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταῦτι, δὲ γε δὴ οἰηθεὶς ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξίοντι ἔωθεν οἰκοθεν ἡναντιώθην τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μέλλοντι τι εἶναι καί τοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολυλαχοῦ δὲ με ἐπεσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ.

He goes on to infer that his line

dæmon or genius of Sokratês, he himself does not personify it, but treats it merely as a "divine sign, a prophetic or supernatural voice."¹ He was accustomed not only to obey it implicitly, but to speak of it publicly and familiarly to others, so that the fact was well known both to his friends and to his enemies. It had always forbidden him to enter on public life: it forbade him, when the indictment was hanging over him, to take any thought for a prepared defence;² and so completely did he march with a consciousness of this bridle in his mouth, that when he felt no check, he assumed that the turning which he was about to take was the right one. Though his persuasion on the subject was unquestionably sincere, and his obedience constant—yet he never dwelt upon it himself as anything grand or awful, or entitling him to peculiar deference; but spoke of it often in his usual strain of familiar playfulness. To his friends generally, it seems to have constituted one of his titles to reverence, though neither Plato nor Xenophon scruples to talk of it in that jesting way which doubtless they caught from himself.³ But to his enemies and to the Athenian public, it appeared in the light of an offensive heresy; an impious innovation on the orthodox creed, and a desertion of the recognized gods of Athens.

Such was the Dæmon or Genius of Sokratês as described by himself and as conceived in the genuine Platonic dialogues; a voice always prohibitory, and bearing exclusively upon his

*His Dæmon
or Genius—
other inspi-
rations.*

of defence has been right, and that his condemnation is no misfortune to him, but a benefit—seeing that the sign has not manifested itself.

I agree in the opinion of Schleiermacher (in his Preface to his translation of the Apology of Sokratês, part i. vol. ii. p. 185, of his general translation of Plato's works), that this defence may be reasonably taken as a reproduction by Plato of what Sokratês actually said to the Dikasts on his trial. In addition to the reasons given by Schleiermacher, there is one which may be noticed. Sokratês predicts to the Dikasts, that if they put him to death, a great number of young men will forthwith put themselves

forward to take up the vocation of cross-questioning, who will give them more trouble than he has ever done (Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 30. p. 39 D). Now there is no reason to believe that such prediction was realized. If therefore Plato puts an erroneous prophecy into the mouth of Sokratês, this is probably because Sokratês really made one.

¹ The words of Sokratês plainly indicate this meaning: see also a good note of Schleiermacher—appended to his translation of the Platonic Apology—Platons Werke, part i. vol. ii. p. 432.

² Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8, 5.

³ Xenoph. Sympos. viii. 5; Plato, Euthydem. c. 5. p. 272 E.

own personal conduct.¹ That which Plutarch and other admirers of Sokratēs conceived as a Dæmon or intermediate Being between gods and men, was looked upon by the fathers of the Christian church as a devil—by Le Clerc as one of the fallen angels—by some other modern commentators, as mere ironical phraseology on the part of Sokratēs himself.² Without presuming to determine the question raised in the former hypotheses, I believe that the last is untrue, and that the conviction of Sokratēs on the point was quite sincere. A circumstance little attended to, but deserving peculiar notice, and stated by himself—is, that the restraining voice began when he was a child, and continued even down to the end of his life: it had thus become an established persuasion, long before his philosophical habits began. But though this peculiar form of inspiration belonged exclusively to him, there were also other ways in which he believed himself to have received the special mandates of the gods, not simply checking him when he was about to take a wrong turn, but spurring him on, directing, and peremptorily exacting from him, a positive course of proceeding. Such distinct mission had been imposed upon him by dreams, by oracular intimations, and by every other means which the gods employed for signifying their special will.³

¹ See Plato (*Theætet.* c. 7. p. 151 A; *Phædrus*, c. 20. p. 242 C; *Republic*, vi. 10. p. 496 C)—in addition to the above citations from the *Apology*.

The passage in the *Euthyphron* (c. 2. p. 3 B) is somewhat less specific. The Pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Theagēs* retains the strictly prohibitory attribute of the voice, as never in any case impelling; but extends the range of the warning, as if it was heard in cases not simply personal to Sokratēs himself, but referring to the conduct of his friends also (*Theagēs*, c. 11, 12, p. 128, 129).

Xenophon also neglects the specific attributes, and conceives the voice generally as a divine communication with instruction and exhortation to Sokratēs, so that he often

prophesied to his friends and was always right (*Memor.* i. 1, 2-4; iv. 8, 1).

² See Dr. Forster's note on the *Euthyphron* of Plato, c. 2. p. 3.

The treatise of Plutarch (*De Genio Socratis*) is full of speculation on the subject, but contains nothing about it which can be relied upon as matter of fact. There are various stories about prophecies made by Sokratēs, and verified by the event, c. 11. p. 582.

See also this matter discussed, with abundant references, in Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, v. ii. p. 25-28.

³ Plato, *Ap. Sok.* c. 22. p. 33 C. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστάττει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἀμάρτυρων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς

Of these intimations from the oracle, he specifies particularly one, in reply to a question put at Delphi, by his intimate friend, and enthusiastic admirer, Chærephon. The question put was, whether any other man was wiser than Sokratês; to which the Pythian priestess replied, that no other man was wiser.¹ Sokratês affirms that he was greatly perplexed on hearing this declaration from so infallible an authority, —being conscious to himself that he possessed no wisdom on any subject, great or small. At length, after much meditation and a distressing mental struggle, he resolved to test the accuracy of the infallible priestess, by taking measure of the wisdom of others as compared with his own. Selecting a leading politician, accounted wise both by others and by himself, he proceeded to converse with him and put scrutinising questions; the answers to which satisfied him, that this man's supposed wisdom was really no wisdom at all. Having made such a discovery, Sokratês next tried to demonstrate to the politician himself how much he wanted of being wise; but this was impossible: the latter still remained as fully persuaded of his own wisdom as before. "The result which I acquired (says Sokratês) was, that I was a wiser man than he, for neither he nor I knew anything of what was truly good and honourable; but the difference between us was, that he fancied he knew them, while I was fully conscious of my own ignorance: I was thus wiser than he, inasmuch as I was exempt from that capital error." So far therefore the oracle was proved to be right. Sokratês repeated the same experiment successively upon a great number of different persons, especially those in reputation for distinguished abilities; first, upon political men and rhetors, next upon poets of every variety, and upon artists as well as artisans. The result of his trial was substantially the same in all cases. The poets indeed composed splendid verses, but when questioned even about the words, the topics, and the purpose, of their own compositions, they could give no consistent or satisfactory explanations: so that it became

Oracle from Delphi declaring that no man was wiser than he.

καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπων
καὶ ὅτι οὐν προσέταξε πρῶτον
ταῖς.

testimony of the brother of Chærephon (the latter himself being dead) to attest the reality of this question and answer.

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 5. p. 21 A. Sokratês offers to produce the

evident that they spoke or wrote, like prophets, as unconscious subjects under the promptings of inspiration. Moreover their success as poets filled them with a lofty opinion of their own wisdom on other points also. The case was similar with artists and artisans; who, while highly instructed, and giving satisfactory answers, each in his own particular employment, were for that reason only the more convinced that they also knew well other great and noble subjects. This great general mistake more than counter-vailed their special capacities, and left them, on the whole, less wise than Sokratēs.¹

„In this research and scrutiny (said Sokratēs on his defence) I have been long engaged, and am still engaged. I interrogate every man of reputation: I prove him to be defective in wisdom; but I cannot prove it so as to make him sensible of the defect. Fulfilling the mission imposed upon me, I have thus established the veracity of the god, who meant to pronounce that human wisdom was of little reach or worth, and that he who, like Sokratēs, felt most convinced of his own worthlessness as to wisdom, was really the wisest of men.² My service to the god has not only constrained me to live in constant poverty³ and neglect of political estimation, but has brought upon me a host of bitter enemies in those whom I have examined and exposed; while the bystanders talk of me as a wise man, because they give me credit for wisdom respecting all the points on which my exposure of others turns.” — „Whatever be the danger and obloquy which I may incur, it would be monstrous indeed, if having maintained my place in the ranks as an hoplite under your generals at Delium and Potidæa, I were now, from fear of death or anything else, to disobey the oracle and desert the post which the god has assigned to me—the duty of living for philosophy and cross-questioning both myself and others.⁴ And should

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 7, §. 8. p. 22.
² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9. p. 23. I give here the sense rather than the exact words—Οὗτος ὁμῶν σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὡσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἐστι τῆ ἀληθείας πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦθ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἱερυνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ

τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφός.

³ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9. p. 23 A-C.ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμι, διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

⁴ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17. p. 29. Τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήσῃην

you even now offer to acquit me, on condition of my renouncing this duty,—I should tell you, with all respect and affection, that I will obey the god rather than you, and that I will persist until my dying day, in cross-questioning you, exposing your want of wisdom and virtue, and reproaching you until the defect be remedied.¹ My mission as your monitor is a mark of the special favour of the god to you; and if you condemn me, it will be your loss; for you will find none other such.² Perhaps you will ask me, Why cannot you go away, Sokratês, and live among us in peace and silence? This is the hardest of all questions for me to answer to your satisfaction. If I tell you that silence on my part would be disobedience to the god, you will think me in jest and not believe me. You will believe me still less, if I tell you that the greatest blessing which can happen to man is, to carry on discussions every day about virtue and those other matters which you hear me canvassing when I cross-examine myself as well as others—and that life without such examination is no life at all. Nevertheless so stands the fact, incredible as it may seem to you.”³

I have given rather ample extracts from the Platonic Apology, because no one can conceive fairly the character of Sokratês who does not enter into the spirit of that impressive discourse. We see in it plain evidence of a marked supernatural mission which he believed himself to be executing, and which would not allow him to rest or employ himself in other ways. The oracular answer brought by Chærephon from Delphi, was a fact of far more importance in his history than the so-called Dæmon, about which so much

Confluence of the religious motive with the inquisitive and intellectual impulse in his mind—numerous enemies whom he made.

καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἡ θάνατον, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον πρᾶγμα λίκοιμι τήν τάξιν.

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17. p. 29 C.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 18. p. 30 D.

³ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 28. p. 38 A. 'Εάν τε γάρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθαι μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· εἰάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι

καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε, διαλεγομένου καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος—ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστός βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (these last striking words are selected by Dr. Hutcheson as the motto for his Synopsis Philosophiæ Moralæ)—ταῦτα δὲ ἔτι ἥτιον πείσεσθαι μοι λέγοντι.

more has been said. That answer, together with the dreams and other divine mandates concurrent to the same end, came upon him in the middle of his life, when the intellectual man was formed and when he had already acquired a reputation for wisdom among those who knew him. It supplied a stimulus which brought into the most pronounced action a pre-existing train of generalising dialectics and Zenonian negation—an intellectual vein with which the religious impulse rarely comes into confluence. Without such a motive, to which his mind was peculiarly susceptible, his conversation would probably have taken the same general turn, but would assuredly have been restricted within much narrower and more cautious limits. For nothing could well be more unpopular and obnoxious than the task which he undertook of cross-examining, and convicting of ignorance, every distinguished man whom he could approach. So violent indeed was the enmity which he occasionally provoked, that there were instances (we are told) in which he was struck or maltreated,¹ and very frequently laughed to scorn. Though he acquired much admiration from auditors, especially youthful auditors,—and from a few devoted adherents—yet the philosophical motive alone would not have sufficed to prompt him to that systematic, and even obtrusive, cross-examination which he adopted as the business of his life.

This then is the second peculiarity which distinguishes Sokratês,—in addition to his extreme publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation. He was not simply a philosopher, but a religious missionary doing the work of philosophy—"an elenchthic or cross-examining god (to use an expression which Plato puts into his mouth respecting an Eleatic philosopher) going about to examine and convict the infirm in reason."² Nothing of this character belonged either to Parmenidês and Anaxagoras before him, or to Plato and Aristotle after him. Both Pythagoras and Empedoklês did indeed lay claim to supernatural communications, mingled with their philosophical teaching. But

Sokratês a religious missionary, doing the work of philosophy.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 21.

² Plato, *Sophistês*, c. i. p. 216—the expression is applied to the Eleatic Stranger who sustains the chief part in that dialogue—Τάχ'

ἄν οὖν καὶ σοὶ τις οὗτος τῶν χρηστῶν συνέποιτο, παύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποφύμενος καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὧν τις ἐλεγκτικὸς.

though there be thus far a general analogy between them and Sokratēs, the modes of manifestation were so utterly different, that no fair comparison can be instituted.

The third and most important characteristic of Sokratēs—that through which the first and second became operative—was his intellectual peculiarity. His influence on the speculative mind of his age was marked and important, as to subject, as to method, and as to doctrine.

Intellectual peculiarities of Sokratēs.

He was the first who turned his thoughts and discussions distinctly to the subject of ethics. With the philosophers who preceded him, the subject of examination had been Nature or the Kosmos¹ as one undistinguishable whole, blending together cosmogony, astronomy, geometry, physics, metaphysics, &c. The Ionic as well as the Eleatic philosophers, Pythagoras as well as Empedoklēs, all set before themselves this vast and undefined problem; each framing some system suited to his own vein of imagination, religious, poetical, scientific, or sceptical. According to that honourable ambition for enlarged knowledge, however, which marked the century following 480 B.C., and of which the professional men called Sophists were at once the products and the instruments—arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, as much as was then known, were becoming so far detached sciences, as to be taught separately to youth. Such appears to have been the state of science when Sokratēs received his education. He received at least the ordinary amount of instruction in all:² he devoted himself as a young man to the society and lessons of the physical philosopher Archelaus³ (the disciple of Anaxagoras), whom he accompanied

He opened ethics as a new subject of scientific discussion.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 11. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἤπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγεται, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν Κόσμος ἔχει, &c.

Plato, Phædon, c. 45. p. 96 B. ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν.

² Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7, 3-3.

³ Ion Chius, Fragm. 9. ap. Didot. Fragm. Historic. Græcor. Diogen. Laërt. ii. 16-19.

Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii. ch. 2. p. 19) calls in question

the assertion that Sokratēs received instruction from Archelaus; in my judgement, without the least reason, since Ion of Chios is a good contemporary witness. He even denies that Sokratēs received any instruction in philosophy at all, on the authority of a passage in the Symposium of Xenophon, where Sokratēs is made to speak of himself as ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁρᾶς αὐτοῦργούς τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὄντας (1, 6). But it appears to me that that expression implies nothing more than

from Athens to Samos; and there is even reason to believe that during the earlier part of his life he was much devoted to what was then understood as the general study of Nature.¹ A man of his earnest and active intellect was likely first to manifest his curiosity as a learner—"to run after and track the various discourses of others, like a Laconian hound," if I may borrow an expression applied to him by Plato²—before he struck out any novelties of his own. And in Plato's dialogue called 'Parmenidês,' Sokratês appears as a young man full of ardour for the discussion of the Parmenidean theory, looking up with reverence to Parmenidês and Zeno, and receiving from them instructions in the process of dialectical investigation. I have already in the preceding chapter³ noted the tenor of that dialogue as illustrating the way in which Grecian philosophy presents itself, even at the first dawn of dialectics, as at once negative and positive, recognizing the former branch of method no less than the latter as essential to the attainment of truth. I construe it as an indication respecting the early mind of Sokratês, imbibing this conviction from the ancient Parmenidês and the mature and practised Zeno—and imposing upon himself as a condition

a sneering antithesis (so frequent both in Plato and Xenophon) to the costly lessons given by Protagoras, Gorgias and Prodikus. It cannot be understood to deny instruction given to Sokratês in the earlier portion of his life.

¹ I think that the expression in Plato's *Phædo*, c. 102. p. 96 A. applies to Sokratês himself, and not to Plato—τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη—means the mental tendencies of Sokratês when a young man.

Respecting the physical studies probably sought and cultivated by Sokratês in the earlier years of his life, see the instructive Dissertation of Tychsen—*Ueber den Prozess des Sokratês*—in the *Bibliothek der Alten Literatur und Kunst*—Erstes Stück, p. 43.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 128 C. καίτοι ὡς περ γε αἱ Λακωνικαὶ σκύλακες, αὐ μεταβαίεις καὶ ἰχθυοῦσι τὰ λεχθέντα,

&c.

Whether Sokratês can be properly said to have been the pupil of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, is a question of little moment, which hardly merited the scepticism of Bayle (*Anaxagoras*, note R; *Archelaus*, note A; compare Schaubach, *Anaxagoræ Fragmenta*, p. 23, 27). That he would seek to acquaint himself with their doctrines, and improve himself by communicating personally with them, is a matter so probable, that the slenderest testimony suffices to make us believe it. Moreover, as I have before remarked, we have here a good contemporary witness, Ion of Chios, to the fact of his intimacy with Archelaus. In no other sense than this could a man like Sokratês be said to be the pupil of any one.

³ See the chapter immediately preceding, p. 147.

of assent to any hypothesis or doctrine, the obligation of setting forth conscientiously both the positive conclusions, and the negative conclusions, which could be deduced from it; however laborious such a process might be, and however little appreciated by the multitude.¹ Little as we know the circumstances which went to form the remarkable mind of Sokratês, we may infer from this dialogue that he owes in part his powerful negative vein of dialectics to "the double-tongued and all-objecting Zeno."²

To a mind at all exigent on the score of proof, physical science as handled in that day was indeed likely to appear not only unsatisfactory, but hopeless; and Sokratês, in the maturity of his life, deserted it altogether. The contradictory hypotheses which he heard, with the impenetrable confusion which overhung the subject, brought him even to the conviction, that the gods intended the machinery by which they brought about astronomical and physical results to remain unknown, and that it was impious, as well as useless, to pry into their secrets.³ His master Archelaus, though mainly occupied with physics, also speculated more or less concerning moral subjects—concerning justice and injustice, the laws, &c.; and is said to have maintained the tenet, that justice and injustice were determined by law or convention, not by nature. From him, perhaps, Sokratês may have been partly led to turn his mind in this direction. But to a man disappointed with physics, and having in his bosom a dialectical impulse powerful, unemployed, and restless—the mere realities of Athenian life, even without Archelaus, would suggest human relations, duties, action and suffering, as the most interesting materials for contemplation and

Circumstances which turned the mind of Sokratês towards ethical speculations.

¹ See the remarkable passage in Plato's *Parmenidês*, p. 135 C to 136 E, of which a portion has already been cited in my note to the preceding chapter, referred to in the note above.

² Timon the Sillographer ap. Diogen. Laërt. ix. 25.

Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου δὲ μέγα σθένος ἀλαπαδὸν

Ζήνωνος, πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, &c.

³ Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 7, 6. Ὅλως δὲ

τῶν οὐρανίων, ἣ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἀνῆγειτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβούληθησαν. Κινδυνεύουσι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ τὰ μέγιστα φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανᾶς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

discourse. Sokratês could not go into the public assembly, the Dikastery, or even the theatre—without hearing discussions about what was just or unjust, honourable or base, expedient or hurtful, &c., nor without having his mind conducted to the inquiry, what was the meaning of these large words which opposing disputants often invoked with equal reverential confidence. Along with the dialectic and generalising power of Sokratês, which formed his bond of connexion with such minds as Plato—there was at the same time a vigorous practicality, a large stock of positive Athenian experience, with which Xenophon chiefly sympathised, and which he has brought out in his ‘*Memorabilia*.’ Of these two intellectual tendencies, combined with a strong religious sentiment, the character of Sokratês is composed; and all of them were gratified at once, when he devoted himself to admonitory interrogation on the rules and purposes of human life; from which there was the less to divert him, as he had neither talents nor taste for public speaking.

That “the proper study of mankind is man” —Sokratês was the first to proclaim. He recognised the security and happiness of man both as the single end of study, and as the limiting principle whereby it ought to be circumscribed. In the present state to which science has attained, nothing is more curious than to look back at the rules which this eminent man laid down. Astronomy — now exhibiting the maximum of perfection, with the largest and most exact power of predicting future phænomena, which human science has ever attained—was pronounced by him to be among the divine mysteries which it was impossible to understand, and madness to investigate—as Anaxagoras had foolishly pretended to do. He admitted indeed that there was advantage in knowing enough of the movements of the heavenly bodies to serve as an index to the change of seasons, and as guides for voyages, journeys by land, or night-watches. But thus much (he said) might easily be obtained from pilots and watchmen; while all beyond was nothing but waste of valuable time, exhausting that mental effort which ought to be employed in profitable acquisitions. He reduced geometry to its literal meaning of land-measuring, necessary so far as to enable any one to proceed

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16. Αὐτὸς διέλεγετο, &c. Compare the whole δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ of this chapter.

correctly in the purchase, sale, or division of land, which any man of common attention might do almost without a teacher—but silly and worthless, if carried beyond, to the study of complicated diagrams.¹ Respecting arithmetic, he gave the same qualified permission of study; but as to general physics, or the study of Nature, he discarded it altogether: “Do these inquirers (he asked) think that they already know *human affairs* well enough, that they thus begin to meddle with *divine*? Do they think that they shall be able to excite or calm the winds and the rain at pleasure, or have they no other view than to gratify an idle curiosity? Surely they must see that such matters are beyond human investigation. Let them only recollect how much the greatest men, who have attempted the investigation, differ in their pretended results, holding opinions extreme and opposite to each other, like those of madmen!” Such was the view which Sokratês took of physical science and its prospects.² It is the very same scepticism in substance, and carried farther in degree, though here invested with a religious colouring—for which Ritter and others so severely denounce Gorgias. But looking at matters as they stood in 440—430 B.C., it ought not to be accounted even surprising, much less blameable. To an acute man of that day, physical science as then studied may well be conceived to have promised no result; and even to have seemed worse than barren, if (like Sokratês) he had an acute perception how much of human happiness was forfeited by immorality, and by corrigible ignorance—how much might be gained by devoting the same amount of earnest study to this latter object. Nor ought we to omit remarking, that the objection of Sokratês—“You may judge how unprofitable are these studies, by observing how widely the students differ among themselves”—remains in high favour down to the present day, and may constantly be seen employed against theoretical arguments, in every department.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7, 5.

Phædrus, c. 120. p. 270 A; and Republic, vii. c. 6-11. p. 522 seq.

² Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 12-15. Plato entertained much larger views on the subject of physical and astronomical studies than either Sokratês or Xenophon: see Plato,

His treatise De Legibus, however, written in his old age, falls below this tone.

Sokratēs desired to confine the studies of his hearers to *human* matters as distinguished from *divine*; the latter comprehending astronomy and physics. He looked at all knowledge from the point of view of human practice, which had been assigned by the gods to man as his proper subject for study and learning, and with reference to which, therefore, they managed all the current phenomena upon principles of constant and intelligible sequence: so that everyone who chose to learn, might learn—while those who took no such pains suffered for their neglect. Even in these, however, the most careful study was not by itself completely sufficient; for the gods did not condescend to submit *all* the phenomena to constant antecedence and consequence, but reserved to themselves the capital turns and junctures for special sentence.¹ Yet here again, if a man had been diligent in learning all that the gods permitted to be learnt—and if, besides, he was assiduous in pious court to them and in soliciting special information by way of prophecy—they would be gracious to him, so far as to signify beforehand how they intended to act in putting the final hand and in settling the undecipherable portions, of the problem.² The kindness of the gods in replying through their oracles, or sending information by sacrificial signs or prodigies, in cases of grave difficulty—was, in the view of Sokratēs, one of the most signal evidences of their care for the human race.³ To seek access to these prophecies, or indications of special divine intervention to come, was the proper supplementary business of any one who had done as much for himself as

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 7. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκῆσιν, μαντικῆς ἰσθμὸς προσεῖσθαι. Τεκτονικὸν μὲν γάρ, ἢ χαλκευτικόν, ἢ γεωργικόν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικόν, ἢ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικόν, ἢ λογιστικόν, ἢ οἰκονομικόν, ἢ στρατηγικόν γενέσθαι—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετὰ ἀνόμιζεν εἶναι. Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τοῖς τοῖς ἐφη τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, &c.

² Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 9-10. Ἐφη

δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκεν οἱ θεοί, μαθάνειν δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθάνεσθαι. τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς, οἷς ἂν ἴλεω ᾖσι, σημαίνειν.

³ Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 15; iv. 3, 12. When Xenophon was deliberating whether he should take military service under Cyrus the younger, he consulted Sokratēs, who advised him to go to Delphi and submit the case to the oracle (Xenoph. Anab. iii. 1, 5).

could be done by patient study.¹ But as it was madness in a man to solicit special information from the gods on matters which they allowed him to learn by his own diligence—so it was not less madness in him to investigate as a learner that which they chose to keep back for their own specialty of will.²

Such was the capital innovation made by Sokratês in regard to the subject of Athenian study, bringing down philosophy (to use the expression of Cicero)³ from the heavens to the earth; and such his attempt to draw the line between that which was, and was not, scientifically discoverable: an attempt, remarkable, inasmuch as it shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began the former ended. It was an innovation, inestimable, in respect to the new matter which it let in; of little import, as regards that which it professed to exclude. For in point of fact, physical science, though partially discouraged, was never absolutely excluded, through any prevalence of that systematic disapproval which he, in common with the multitude of his day, entertained. If it became comparatively neglected, this arose rather from the greater popularity, and the more abundant and accessible matter, of that which he introduced. Physical or astronomical science was narrow in amount, known only to few; and even with those few it did not admit of being expanded, enlivened, or turned to much profitable account in discussion. But the moral and political phenomena, on which Sokratês turned the light of speculation, were abundant, varied, familiar, and interesting to every one; comprising (to translate a Greek line which he was fond of quoting) „all the good and evil which has befallen you in your home;“⁴ connected too, not merely with the realities of the present, but also with the literature of the past, through the gnomic and other poets.

The motives which determined this important innovation, as to subject of study, exhibit Sokratês chiefly as a religious man and a practical, philanthropic preceptor—

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7, 10.

² Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 9; iv. 7, 6.

³ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 4, 10.

⁴ Ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι καχόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τίτχεται.

the Xenophontic hero. His innovations, not less important, as to method and doctrine, place before us the philosopher and dialectician—the other side of his character, or the Platonic hero; faintly traced indeed, yet still recognised and identified, by Xenophon.

"Sokratês (says the latter!) continued incessantly discussing *human* affairs (the sense of this word will be understood by what has been said above, p. 226), investigating—What is piety? What is impiety? What is the honourable and the base? What is the just and the unjust? What is temperance, or unsound mind? What is courage or cowardice? What is a city? What is the character fit for a citizen? What is authority over men? What is the character befitting the exercise of such authority? and other similar questions. Men who knew these matters he accounted good and honourable; men who were ignorant of them he assimilated to slaves."

Sokratês (says Xenophon again, in another passage) considered that the *dialectic process* consisted in coming together and taking common counsel to distinguish and distribute things into Genera or Families, so as to learn what each separate thing really was. To go through this process carefully was indispensable, as the only way of enabling a man to regulate his own conduct, aiming at good objects and avoiding bad. To be so practised as to be able to do it readily, was essential to make a man a good leader or adviser of others. Every man who had gone through the process, and come to know what each thing was, could also of course define it and explain it to others; but if he did not know, it was no wonder that he went wrong himself, and put others wrong besides.² Moreover,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16.

² Xenoph. Mem. iv. 5, 11, 12. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκράτεσι μόνους ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κρᾶτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαίμονεσσι τοὺς ἀνδρας γίνεσθαι, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους. Ἐφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι, ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βου-

λεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα· δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἔτοιμον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελίσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἀνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

Surely the etymology here given by Xenophon or Sokratês of the word διαλέγεσθαι, cannot be considered as satisfactory.

Aristotle says—"To Sokratês we may unquestionably assign two novelties—Inductive Discourses—and the Definitions of general terms.¹"

I borrow here intentionally from Xenophon in preference to Plato; since the former, tamely describing a process which he imperfectly appreciated, identifies it so much the more completely with the real Sokratês—and is thus a better witness than Plato, whose genius not only conceived but greatly enlarged it for didactic purposes of his own. In our present state of knowledge, some mental effort is required to see anything important in the words of Xenophon; so familiar has every student been rendered with ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification,—such as Genus—Definition—Individual things as comprehended in a Genus—what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, &c. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process, of which, in 440-430 B.C., few men besides Sokratês had any conscious perception. Of course men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in

Commencement of analytical consciousness of the mental operations—genera and species.

Again, iv. 6. 1. Σωκράτης δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες τί ἔχαστον εἰη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀν' ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότες, οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν. Ὡς ἕνεκα σοκῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἔχαστον εἰη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτε ἔληγε. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ἧ διωρίζετο, πολὺ ἀνέργον εἰη διεξελεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἴμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

¹ Aristot. Metaphys. i. 6, 3. p. 987 b. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδὲν—ἐν μέντοι τοῦτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, &c. Again, xiii. 4, 6-8. p. 1078 b. Δύο γὰρ ἔστιν αἱ τις ἀν' ἀποδοῖη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτιχοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίξεσθαι καθόλου: compare xiii. 9, 35. p. 1086 b; Cicero, Topic. x. 42.

These two attributes, of the dis-

cussions carried on by Sokratês, explain the epithet attached to him by Timon the Sillographer, that he was the leader and originator of the accurate talkers or precisians—

Ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινε λιθοξόος,

ἐννομολέσχης,

Ἑλλήνων ἐπαοιδὸς ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφῆνας,

Μυκτῆρ, ῥητορομυκτος, ὑπακτιχός, εἰρωνεύτης.

(ap. Diog. Laërt. ii. 19.)

To a large proportion of hearers of that time (as of other times), accurate thinking and talking appeared petty and in bad taste—ἡ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπής (Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. iv. 4. p. 1122 b; also Aristot. Metaphys. ii. 3. p. 995 a). Even Plato thinks himself obliged to make a sort of apology for it (Theætet. c. 102. p. 184 C). No doubt Timon used the word ἀκριβολόγους in a sneering sense.

the very form and language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. They explained their meaning clearly and forcibly in particular cases: they laid down maxims, argued questions, stated premises, and drew conclusions, on trials in the *Dikastery*, or debates in the assembly: they had an abundant poetical literature, which appealed to every variety of emotion: they were beginning to compile historical narrative, intermixed with reflection and criticism. But though all this was done, and often admirably well done, it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men—speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude—were associated together in groups favourable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical, narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalisation, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, compare, and rectify, their own mental process, was only just beginning. It was a recent novelty on the part of the rhetorical teachers, to analyse the component parts of a public harangue, and to propound some precepts for making men tolerable speakers. Protagoras was just setting forth various grammatical distinctions, while Prodikus discriminated the significations of words nearly equivalent and liable to be confounded. All these proceedings appeared then so new¹ as to incur the ridicule even of Plato: yet they were branches of that same analytical tendency which Sokratês now carried into scientific inquiry. It may be doubted whether any one before him ever used the words *Genus* and *Species* (originally meaning *Family* and *Form*) in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names (called by logicians *names of the second intention*), which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to con-

¹ How slowly grammatical analysis proceeded among the Greeks, and how long it was before they got at what are now elementary ideas in every instructed man's mind—may be seen in Gräfenbahr,

Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum, s. 89-92, &c. On this point, these Sophists seem to have been decidedly in advance of their age.

sider and criticise it in detail—then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Sokratês.

To comprehend the full value of the improvements struck out by Sokratês, we have only to examine the intellectual paths pursued by his predecessors or contemporaries. He set to himself distinct and specific problems—"What is justice? What is piety, courage, political government? What is it which is really denoted by such great and important names, bearing upon the conduct or happiness of man?" Now it has been already remarked that Anaxagoras, Empedoklês, Demokritus, the Pythagoreans, all had still present to their minds those vast and undivided problems which had been transmitted down from the old poets; bending their minds to the invention of some system which would explain them all at once, or assist the imagination in conceiving both how the Kosmos first began, and how it continued to move on.¹ Ethics and physics, man

Sokratês compared with previous philosophers.

¹ This same tendency, to break off from the vague aggregate then conceived as Physics, is discernible in the Hippocratic treatises, and even in the treatise de Antiquâ Medicinâ, which M. Littré places first in his edition, and considers to be the production of Hippokratês himself, in which case it would be contemporary with Sokratês. On this subject of authorship, however, other critics do not agree with him: see the question examined in his vol. i. ch. xii. p. 295 seq.

Hippokratês (if he be the author) begins by deprecating the attempt to connect the study of medicine with physical or astronomical hypothesis (c. 2), and farther protests against the procedure of various medical writers and Sophists, or philosophers, such as Empedoklês, who set themselves to make out "what man was from the beginning, how he began first to exist, and in what manner he was constructed"

(c. 20). This does not belong (he says) to medicine, which ought indeed to be studied as a comprehensive whole, but as a whole determined by and bearing reference to its own end: "You ought to study the nature of man, what he is with reference to that which he eats and drinks, and to all his other occupations or habits, and to the consequences resulting from each"—*ὅ,τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὅ,τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ὅ,τι ἀπ' ἐκάστου ἐκάστω συμβήσεται.*

The spirit, in which Hippokratês here approaches the study of medicine, is exceedingly analogous to that which dictated the innovation of Sokratês in respect to the study of Ethics. The same character pervades the treatise, *De Aëre, Locis et Aquis*—a definite and predetermined field of inquiry—and Hippocratic treatises generally.

and nature, were all blended together; and the Pythagoreans, who explained all Nature by numbers and numerical relations, applied the same explanation to moral attributes—considering justice to be symbolised by a perfect equation, or by four, the first of all square numbers.¹ These early philosophers endeavoured to find out the beginnings, the component elements, the moving cause or causes, of things in the mass;² but the logical distribution into Genus, Species, and individuals, does not seem to have suggested itself to them, or to have been made a subject of distinct attention by any one before Sokratēs. To study Ethics, or human dispositions and ends, apart from the physical world, and according to a theory of their own, referring to human good and happiness as the sovereign and comprehensive end;³ to treat each of the great and familiar words designating moral attributes, as logical aggregates comprehending many judgements in particular cases, and

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* i. 5. p. 985. 986. τὸ μὲν τοιόνδε τῶν ἀριθμῶν πᾶθος δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ψυχῇ καὶ νοῦς, ἔκτερον δὲ καὶ πός, &c. *Ethica Magna*, i. 1. ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσότητος: see Brandis, *Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos.* lxxii. lxxiii. p. 492.

² Aristotel. *Metaphys.* iii. 3. p. 998 A. Οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων, στοιχεῖα φησὶν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶν τὰ ὄντα ἀνυπαρχόντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὥς γέννη λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων. That generic division and subdivision was unknown or unpractised by these early men, is noticed by Plato (*Sophist.* c. 114. p. 267 D).

Aristotle thinks that the Pythagoreans had some faint and obscure notion of the logical genus—περὶ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἤρξαντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὀρίσασθαι, λίαν δὲ ἀπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν (*Metaphys.* i. 5, 29. p. 986 B.). But we see by comparing two other passages in that treatise (xiii. 4. 6. p. 1078 b. with i. 5, 2. p. 985 b) that the Pythagorean definitions of καὶ πός, τὸ δίκαιον, &c. were nothing more than certain numer-

ical fancies; so that these words cannot fairly be said to have designated, in their view, logical genera. Nor can the ten Pythagorean στοιχεῖα, or parallel series of contraries, be called by that name; arranged in order to gratify a fancy about the perfection of the number ten, which fancy afterwards seems to have passed to Aristotle himself when drawing up his ten predicaments.

See a valuable Excursus upon the Aristotelian expressions τί ἐστιν—τί ἦν εἶναι, &c., appended to Schwegler's edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysica*, vol. ii. p. 369. p. 378.

About the few and imperfect definitions which Aristotle seems also to ascribe to Demokritus, see Trendelenburg, *Comment. ad Aristot. De Animā*, p. 212.

³ Aristotle remarks about the Pythagoreans, that they referred the virtues to number and numerical relations—not giving to them a theory of their own—τάς γὰρ ἀρετάς τις τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο (*Ethic. Magn.* i. 1).

connoting a certain harmony or consistency of purpose among the separate judgements; to bring many of these latter into comparison, by a scrutinising dialectical process, so as to test the consistency and completeness of the logical aggregate or general notion, as it stood in every man's mind:—all these were parts of the same forward movement which Sokratês originated.

It was at that time a great progress to break down the unwieldy mass conceived by former philosophers as science; and to study Ethics apart, with a reference, more or less distinct, to their own appropriate end. Nay, we see (if we may trust the 'Phædon' of Plato¹) that Sokratês, before he resolved on such pronounced severance, had tried to construct, or had at least yearned after, an undivided and reformed system including Physics also under the Ethical end; a scheme of optimistic Physics, applying the general idea "*What was best*" as the commanding principle from whence physical explanations were to be deduced; which he hoped to find, but did not find, in Anaxagoras. But it was a still greater advance to seize, and push out in conscious application, the essential features of that logical process, upon the correct performance of which our security for general truth greatly depends. The notions of Genus, subordinate Genera, and individuals as comprehended under them (we need not here notice the points on which Plato and Aristotle differed from each other and from the modern conceptions on that subject), were at that time newly brought into clear consciousness in the human mind. The profusion of logical distribution employed in some of the dialogues of Plato, such as the *Sophistês* and the *Politicus*, seems partly traceable to his wish to familiarise hearers with that which was then a novelty, as well as to enlarge its development, and diversify its mode of application. He takes numerous indirect opportunities of bringing it out into broad light, by putting into the mouths of his dialogists answers implying complete inattention to it, exposed afterwards in the course of the dialogue by Sokratês.² What was now begun by Sokratês, and

Great step made by Sokratês in laying the foundation of formal logic, afterwards expanded by Plato, and systematised by Aristotle.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, c. 102 *seq.* p. 96, see Plato, *Theætet.* c. 11. p. 146 D.
97 It is maintained by Brandis, and

² As one specimen among many, in part by C. Heyder (see Heyder,

improved by Plato, was embodied as part in a comprehensive system of formal logic by the genius of Aristotle; a system which was not only of extraordinary value in reference to the processes and controversies of its time, but which also, having become insensibly worked into the minds of instructed men, has contributed much to form what is correct in the habits of the modern thinking. Though it has been now enlarged and recast, by some modern authors (especially by Mr. John Stuart Mill in his admirable *System of Logic*) into a structure commensurate with the vast increase of knowledge and extension of positive method belonging to the present day—we must recollect that the distance, between the best modern logic and that of Aristotle, is hardly so great as that between Aristotle and those who preceded him by a century—Empedoklēs, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans; and that the movement in advance of these latter commences with Sokratēs.

By Xenophon, by Plato, and by Aristotle, the growth as well as the habitual use of logical classification is represented as concurrent with and dependent upon dialectics. In this methodised discussion, so much in harmony with the marked sociability of the Greek character, the quick recurrence of short question and answer was needful as a stimulus to the attention, at a time when the habit of close and accurate reflection on abstract subjects had been so little cultivated. But the dialectics of Sokratēs had far greater and more important peculiarities than this. We must always consider his method in con-

Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, part i. p. 85, 129), that the logical process, called Division, is not to be considered as having been employed by Sokratēs along with definition, but begins with Plato: in proof of which they remark that in the two Platonic dialogues called *Sophistēs* and *Politicus*, wherein this process is most abundantly employed, Sokratēs is not the conductor of the conversation.

Little stress is to be laid on this circumstance, I think; and the

terms in which Xenophon describes the method of Sokratēs (δικιλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα, *Mem. iv. 5, 12*) seems to imply the one process as well as the other: indeed it was scarcely possible to keep them apart, with so abundant a talker as Sokratēs. Plato doubtless both enlarged and systematised the method in every way, and especially made greater use of the process of Division, because he pushed the Dialogue further into positive scientific research than Sokratēs.

junction with the subjects to which he applied it. As those subjects were not recondite or special, but bore on the practical life of the house, the market-place, the city, the *Dikastery*, the gymnasium, or the temple, with which every one was familiar—so Sokratēs never presented himself as a teacher, nor as a man having new knowledge to communicate. On the contrary, he disclaimed such pretensions, uniformly and even ostentatiously. The subjects on which he talked were just those which every one professed to know perfectly and thoroughly, and on which every one believed himself in a condition to instruct others, rather than to require instruction for himself. On such questions as these—What is justice?—What is piety?—What is a democracy?—What is a law?—every man fancied that he could give a confident opinion, and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokratēs, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given offhand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term—familiar indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import—given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratēs put fresh questions applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow, or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer, but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or if he did not himself admit this, the hearers at least felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the question proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satisfactory even to himself. Sokratēs, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who would be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself

disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised.

We see by this description of the cross-examining path of this remarkable man, how intimate was the bond of connexion between the dialectic method and the logical distribution of particulars into species and genera. The discussion first raised by Sokratês turns upon the meaning of some large generic term: the queries whereby he follows it up, bring the answer given into collision with various particulars which it ought not to comprehend, yet does—or with others which it ought to comprehend, but does not. It is in this manner that the latent and undefined cluster of association, which has grown up round a familiar term, is as it were penetrated by a fermenting leaven, forcing it to expand into discernible portions, and bringing the appropriate function which the term ought to fulfil, to become a subject of distinct consciousness. The inconsistencies into which the hearer is betrayed in his various answers proclaim to him the fact that he has not yet acquired anything like a clear and full conception of the common attribute which binds together the various particulars embraced under some term which is ever upon his lips—or perhaps enable him to detect a different fact, not less important, that there is no such common attribute, and that the generalisation is merely nominal and fallacious. In either case, he is put upon the train of thought which leads to a correction of the generalisation, and lights him on to that which Plato¹ calls seeing the One in the Many, and the Many in the One. Without any predecessor to copy, Sokratês fell as it were instinctively into that which Aristotle² describes as the double track of the dialectic process—breaking up the One into Many and recombining the Many into One. The former duty, at once the first and the most essential, Sokratês performed directly by his analytical string of questions—

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, c. 109. p. 265 D; *Sophistês*, c. 83. p. 253 E.

² Aristot. *Topic.* viii. 14. p. 164, b. 2. Ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἐνοτατικὸς. Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνεισθαι, ἐν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν δλωρῃ ληθῆναι πρὸς δὲ λόγος) τὸ δ'

ἐνίστασθαι, τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ἢ γὰρ διαιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδούς, τὸ δ' οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

It was from Sokratês that dialectic skill derived its great extension and development (Aristot. *Metaphys.* xiii. 4. p. 1078 b).

the latter, or synthetical process, was one which he did not often directly undertake, but strove so to arm and stimulate the hearer's mind, as to enable him to do it for himself. This One and Many denote the logical distribution of a multifarious subject-matter under generic terms, with clear understanding of the attributes implied or connoted by each term, so as to discriminate those particulars to which it really applies. At a moment when such logical distribution was as yet novel as a subject of consciousness, it could hardly have been probed and laid out in the mind by any less stringent process than the cross-examining dialectics of Sokratēs—applied to the analysis of some attempts at definition hastily given by respondents; that “inductive discourse and search for (clear general notions or) definitions of general terms,” which Aristotle so justly points out as his peculiar innovation.

I have already adverted to the persuasion of religious mission under which Sokratēs acted in pursuing this system of conversation and interrogation. He probably began it in a tentative way,¹ upon a modest scale, and under the pressure of logical embarrassment weighing on his own mind. But as he proceeded, and found himself successful as well as acquiring reputation among a certain circle of friends, his earnest soul became more and more penetrated with devotion to that which he regarded as a duty. It was at this time probably, that his friend Chærephon came back with the oracular answer from Delphi (noticed a few pages above) to which Sokratēs himself alluded as having prompted him to extend the range of his conversation, and to question a class of persons whom he had not before ventured to approach—the noted politicians, poets, and artisans. He found them more confident than humbler individuals in their own wisdom, but quite as unable to reply to his queries without being driven to contradictory answers.

Such scrutiny of the noted men in Athens is made to stand prominent in the ‘Platonic Apology,’ because it was the principal cause of that unpopularity which

¹ What Plato makes Sokratēs say in the *Euthyphron*, c. 12. p. 11 D—*Ἄνω ἐπὶ σοφῶς, &c.*, may be accounted as true at least in the be-

ginning of the active career of Sokratēs: compare the *Hippias Minor*, c. 18. p. 376 B; *Laches*, c. 33. p. 200 E.

Sokratês at once laments and accounts for before the Dikasts.

His cross-examining purpose was not confined to noted men, but of universal application.

It was the most impressive portion of his proceedings, in the eyes both of enemies and admirers, as well as the most flattering to his own natural temper. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to present this part of the general purpose of Sokratês—or of his divine mission, if we adopt his own language,—as if it were the whole; and to describe him as one standing forward merely to unmask select leading men, politicians, sophists, poets, or others, who had acquired unmerited reputation, and were puffed up with foolish conceit of their own abilities, being in reality shallow and incompetent. Such an idea of Sokratês is at once inadequate and erroneous. His conversation (as I have before remarked) was absolutely universal and indiscriminate; while the mental defect which he strove to rectify was one not at all peculiar to leading men, but common to them with the mass of mankind—though seeming to be exaggerated in them, partly because more is expected from them, partly because the general feeling of self-estimation stands at a higher level, naturally and reasonably, in their bosoms, than in those of ordinary persons. That defect was, the “seeming and conceit of knowledge without the reality,” on human life with its duties, purposes, and conditions—the knowledge of which Sokratês called emphatically “human wisdom,” and regarded as essential to the dignity of a freeman; while he treated other branches of science as above the level of man,¹ and as a stretch of curiosity, not merely superfluous, but reprehensible. His warfare against such false persuasion of knowledge, in one man as well as another, upon those subjects (for with him, I repeat, we must never disconnect the method from the subjects)—clearly marked even in Xenophon, is abundantly and strikingly illustrated

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-16. Πότερὸν ποτε νομίσαντες ἰκανῶς ᾗδῃ τῶν θρώπων αἰσιδέναι ἔρχονται (the physical philosophers) ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν· ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. . . . Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὖσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς

μὲν εἰδότες ἡγήτο καλοὺς καγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδῶδεις ἀνδικαίως πεκλῆσθαι.

Plato, Apolog. Sok. c. 6. p. 20 D. ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπινῇ σοφίᾳ· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἐν, οὗς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπινον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, &c. Compare c. 9. p. 23 A.

by the fertile genius of Plato, and constituted the true missionary scheme which pervaded the last half of his long life: a scheme far more comprehensive, as well as more generous, than those anti-Sophistic polemics which are assigned to him by so many authors as his prominent object.¹

In pursuing the thread of his examination, there was no topic upon which Sokratēs more frequently insisted, than the contrast between the state of men's knowledge on the general topics of man and society—and that which artists or professional men possessed in their respective special crafts. So perpetually did he reproduce this comparison, that his enemies accused him of wearing it threadbare.² Take a man of special vocation—a carpenter, a brazier, a pilot, a musician, a surgeon—and examine him on the state of his professional knowledge—you will find him able to indicate the persons from whom, and the steps by which he first acquired it: he can describe to you his general aim, with the particular means which he employs to realise the aim, as well as the reason why such means must be employed and why precautions must be taken to combat such and such particular obstructions: he can teach his profession to

Leading ideas which directed the scrutiny of Sokratēs—contrast between the special professions and the general duties of social life.

¹ It is this narrow purpose that Plutarch ascribes to Sokratēs, *Questiones Platonice*, p. 299 E: compare also Tennemann, *Gesch. der Philos.* part ii. art. i. vol. ii. p. 81.

Amidst the customary outpouring of groundless censure against the Sophists, which Tennemann here gives, one assertion is remarkable. He tells us that it was the more easy for Sokratēs to put down the Sophists, since their shallowness and worthlessness, after a short period of vogue, had already been detected by intelligent men, and was becoming discredited.

It is strange to find such an assertion made, for a period between 420-399 B.C., the era when Protagoras, Prodikos, Hippas, &c., reached the maximum of celebrity.

And what are we to say about the statement, that Sokratēs put down the Sophists, when we recollect that the Megaric school and Antisthenēs—both emanating from Sokratēs—are more frequently attacked than any one else in the dialogues of Plato, as having all those sceptical and disputatious propensities with which the Sophists are reproached?

² Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 101. p. 491 A. Kalliklēs. 'Ὡς ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Sokratēs. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλικλείης, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Kalliklēs. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας καὶ πναφείας καὶ μαγαίρους λέγων καὶ λατρούς, οὐδὲν παύῃ. Compare Plato, *Symposium*, p. 221 E; also Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 2, 37; iv. 5, 5.

others: in matters relating to his profession, he counts as an authority, so that no extra-professional person thinks of contesting the decision of a surgeon in case of disease, or of a pilot at sea. But while such is the fact in regard to every special art, how great is the contrast in reference to the art of righteous, social, and useful living, which forms, or ought to form, the common business alike important to each and to all! On this subject Sokratès¹ remarked that every one felt perfectly well-informed, and confident in his own knowledge—yet no one knew from whom, or by what steps, he had learnt: no one had ever devoted any special reflection either to ends, or means, or obstructions: no one could explain or give a consistent account of the notions in his own mind, when pertinent questions were put to him: no one could teach another, as might be inferred (he thought) from the fact that there were no professed teachers, and that the sons of the best men were often destitute of merit: every one knew for himself, and laid down general propositions confidently, without looking up to any other man as knowing better—yet there was no end of dissension and dispute on particular cases.²

Such was the general contrast which Sokratès sought to impress upon his hearers by a variety of questions bearing on it, directly or indirectly. One way of presenting it, which Plato devoted much of his genius to expand in dialogue, was, to discuss, Whether virtue be really teachable?

Platonic dialogues—discussion whether virtue is teachable.

¹ It is not easy to refer to specific passages in manifestation of the contrast set forth in the text, which however runs through large portions of many Platonic dialogues, under one form or another: see the *Menon*, c. 27-33. p. 90-94; *Protagoras*, c. 28, 29, p. 319, 320; *Politicus*, c. 38. p. 299 D; *Lachès*, c. 11, 12. p. 185, 186; *Gorgias*, c. 121. p. 501 A; *Alkibiadès*, i. c. 12-14. p. 108, 109, 110, c. 20. p. 113 C. D.

Xenoph. Mem. iii. 5, 21, 22; iv. 2, 20-23; iv. 4, 5; iv. 6, 1. Of these passages, iv. 2, 20, 23 is among the most remarkable.

It is remarkable that Sokratès

(in the Platonic *Apology*, c. 7. p. 22), when he is describing his wanderings (*πλάνην*) to test supposed knowledge, first in the statesmen, next in the poets, lastly in the artisans and craftsmen, finds satisfaction only in the answers which these latter made to him on matters concerning their respective trades or professions. They would have been wise men, had it not been for the circumstance, that because they knew these particular things, they fancied that they knew other things also.

² Plato, *Euthyphrôn*, c. 8. p. 7 D; *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4, 8.

How was it that superior men like Aristeidês and Periklês¹ acquired the eminent qualities essential for guiding and governing Athens—since they neither learnt them under any known master, as they had studied music and gymnastics—nor could ensure the same excellences to their sons, either through their own agency or through that of any master? Was it not rather the fact, that virtue, as it was never expressly taught, so it was not really teachable; but was vouchsafed or withheld according to the special volition and grace of the gods? If a man has a young horse to be broken or trained, he finds without difficulty a professed trainer, thoroughly conversant with the habits of the race,² to communicate to the animal the excellence required; but whom can he find to teach virtue to his sons, with the like preliminary knowledge and assured result? Nay, how can any one either teach virtue, or affirm virtue to be teachable, unless he be prepared to explain what virtue is, and what are the points of analogy and difference between its various branches—justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, &c.? In several of the Platonic dialogues, the discussion turns on the analysis of these last-mentioned words—the ‘Lachês’ and ‘Protagoras’ on courage, the ‘Charmidês’ on temperance, the ‘Euthyphrôn’ on holiness.

By these and similar discussions did Sokratês, and Plato amplifying upon his master, raise indirectly all the important questions respecting society, human aspirations and duties, and the principal moral qualities which were accounted virtuous in individual men. As the general terms, on which his conversation turned, were among the most current and familiar in the language, so also the abundant instances of detail, whereby he tested the hearer’s rational comprehension and consistent application of such large terms, were selected from the best-known phænomena of daily life;³ bringing home the inconsistency, if inconsistency there was, in a manner obvious to every one. The answers made to him—not merely by

Conceit of
knowledge
without
real know-
ledge—uni-
versal
prevalence
of it.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 2; Plato, Meno, c. 33, p. 94.

² Compare Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 4. p. 20 A; Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 25.

³ Xenoph. Memor. iv. 6, 15. Ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν

μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου· τοιγαροῦν πολλὸ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρείχε.

ordinary citizens, but by men of talent and genius, such as the poets or the rhetors, when called upon for an explanation of the moral terms and ideas set forth in their own compositions¹—revealed alike that state of mind against which his crusade, enjoined and consecrated by the Delphian oracle, was directed—the semblance and conceit of knowledge without real knowledge. They proclaimed confident, unhesitating persuasion, on the greatest and gravest questions concerning man and society, in the bosoms of persons who had never bestowed upon them sufficient reflection to be aware that they involved any difficulty. Such persuasion had grown up gradually and unconsciously, partly by authoritative communication, partly by insensible transfusion, from others; the process beginning antecedent to reason as a capacity—continuing itself with little aid and no control from reason—and never being finally revised. With the great terms and current propositions concerning human life and society, a complex body of association had become accumulated from countless particulars, each separately trivial and lost to the memory—knit together by a powerful sentiment, and imbibed as it were by each man from the atmosphere of authority and example around him. Upon this basis the fancied knowledge really rested; and reason, when invoked at all, was called in simply as a handmaid, expositor, or apologist of the pre-existing sentiment; as an accessory after the fact, not as a test of verification. Every man found these persuasions in his own mind, without knowing how they became established there; and witnessed them in others, as portions of a general fund of unexamined common-place and credence. Because the words were at once of large meaning, embodied in old and familiar mental processes, and surrounded by a strong body of sentiment,—the general assertions in which they were embodied appeared self-evident and imposing to every one: so that in spite of continual dispute in particular cases, no one thought himself obliged to analyse the general propositions themselves, or to reflect whether he had verified their import, and could apply them rationally and consistently.²

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 7. p. 22 C: compare Plato, *Ion.* p. 533, 534.

² Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν (says Sokratēs to Euthydēmus) ἴσως, διὰ τὸ σφοδρῶς

πιστεύειν εἰδέναι, οὐδ' ἐπαίψω (*Xen. Mem.* iv. 2, 36): compare Plato, *Alkibiad.* i. c. 14. p. 110 A.

The phenomenon here adverted to is too obvious, even at the present day, to need further elucidation as matter of fact. In morals, in politics, in political economy, on all subjects relating to man and society—the like confident persuasion of knowledge without the reality is sufficiently prevalent: the like generation and propagation, by authority and example, of unverified convictions, resting upon strong sentiment, without consciousness of the steps or conditions of their growth; the like enlistment of reason as the one-sided advocate of a pre-established sentiment; the like illusion, because every man is familiar with the language, that therefore every man is master of the complex facts, judgements, and tendencies, involved in its signification—and competent both to apply comprehensive words and to assume the truth or falsehood of large propositions, without any special analysis or study.¹

Such confident persuasion, without science, belonged at that time to astronomy and physics, as well as to the subjects of man and society—it is now confined to the latter.

There is one important difference, however, to note, between our time and that of Sokratês. In his day, the impressions not only respecting man and society, but also respecting the physical world, were of this same self-propagating, and unscientific character. The popular astronomy of the Sokratic age was an aggregate of primitive superficial observations and imaginative inferences, passing unexamined from elder men to younger, accepted with unsuspecting faith, and consecrated by intense sentiment. Not only men like Nikias, or Anytus and Melêtus, but even Sokratês himself protested against the impudence of Anaxagoras, when he degraded the divine Helios and Selênê into a sun and moon of calculable motions and magnitudes. But now, the development of the scientific point of view, with the vast increase of methodised physical and mathematical knowledge, has taught everyone that such primitive astronomical and physical convictions were

¹ "Moins une science est avancée, moins elle a été bien traitée, et plus elle a besoin d'être enseignée. C'est ce qui me fait beaucoup désirer qu'on ne renonce pas en France à l'enseignement des sciences idéologiques, morales, et politiques; qui, après tout, sont des

sciences comme les autres — à la différence près, que ceux qui ne les ont pas étudiées sont persuadés de si bonne foi de les savoir, qu'ils se croient en état d'en décider." (Destutt de Tracy, *Elémens d'Idéologie*, Préface, p. xxxiv. ed. Paris, 1827.)

nothing better than "a fancy of knowledge without the reality."¹ Everyone renounces them without hesitation, seeks his conclusions from the scientific teacher, and looks to the proofs alone for his guarantee. A man who has never bestowed special study on astronomy knows that he is ignorant of it: to fancy that he knows it, without such preparation, would be held an absurdity. While the scientific point of view has thus acquired complete predominance in reference to the physical world, it has made little way comparatively on topics regarding man and society—wherein "fancy of knowledge without the reality" continues to reign, not without criticism and opposition, yet still as a paramount force. And if a new Sokratês were now to put the same questions in the market-place to men of all ranks and professions, he would find the like confident persuasion and unsuspecting dogmatism as to generalities—the like faltering blindness, and contradiction, when tested by cross-examining details.

In the time of Sokratês, this last comparison was not open, since there did not exist, in any department, a body of doctrine scientifically constituted: but the comparison which he actually took, borrowed from the special trades and professions, brought him to an important result. He was the first to see (and the idea pervades all his speculations), that as in each art or profession, there is an end to be attained,—a theory, laying down the means and conditions whereby it is attainable—and precepts, deduced from that theory—such precepts, collectively taken, directing

Sokratês first lays down the idea of ethical science, comprising the appropriate ethical end with theory and precepts.

¹ "There is no science which, more than astronomy, stands in need of such a preparation, or draws more largely on that intellectual liberality which is ready to adopt whatever is demonstrated, or concede whatever is rendered highly probable, however new and uncommon the points of view may be, in which objects the most familiar may thereby become placed. Almost all its conclusions stand in open and striking contradiction with those of superficial and vulgar observation, and with what

appears to every one, until he has understood and weighed the proofs to the contrary, the *most positive evidence of his senses*. Thus the earth on which he stands, and which has served for ages as the unshaken foundation of the firmest structures either of art or nature, is divested by the astronomer of its attribute of fixity, and conceived by him as turning swiftly on its centre, and at the same time moving onward through space with great rapidity," &c. (Sir John Herschel, *Astronomy*, Introduction, sect. 2.)

and covering nearly the entire field of practice, but each precept, separately taken, liable to conflict with others, and therefore liable to cases of exception; so all this is not less true, or admits not less of being realized, respecting the general art of human living and society. There is a grand and all-comprehensive End—the security and happiness, as far as practicable, of each and all persons in the society:¹ there may be a theory, laying down those

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv. 1, 2. Ἐτεκμαίρετο (Sokratēs) δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις, ἐκ τοῦ ταχὺ τε μαθάνειν οἷς προσέχουσιν, καὶ μνημονεύειν δ' ἂν μάθοισιν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων, δι' ὧν ἔστιν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν, καὶ τὸ δῖον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι. Τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτοὺς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Ib. iii. 2, 4. Καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν, τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιγέρει, κατέλειπε δὲ, τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν, ὧν ἂν ἡγήται.

Ib. iii. 8, 3, 4, 5; iv. 6, 8. He explains τὸ ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ὠφέλιμον—μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεζέχει τοῖς συνοῦσι (iv. 7, 8). Compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 66, 67. p. 474 D. 475 A.

Things are called ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ on the one hand, and κακὰ καὶ αἰσχρά on the other, in reference each to its distinct end, of averting or mitigating, in the one case—of bringing on or increasing in the other—different modes of human suffering. So again, iii. 9, 4, we find the phrases—δὲ εἰ πράττειν—ὁρθῶς πράττειν—τὰ συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς πράττειν—all used as equivalents.

Plato, Symposion, p. 205 A. Κτῆσαι γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εὐδαίμονας ἔσονται—καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρεῖσθαι, ἵνα ἴτ

δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις; compare Euthydēm. c. 20. p. 279 A; c. 25. p. 281 D.

Plato, Alkibiadēs, ii. c. 13. p. 145 C. Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, εἰάν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὐτῇ δ' ἦν ἡ αὐτῇ δῆπου ἡ περ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου—φρόνιμόν γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχωρῶντα ξυμβουλον, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα, τάναντία τούτων: compare Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504 E. The fact that this dialogue, called Alkibiadēs II., was considered by some as belonging not to Plato, but to Xenophon or Æschinēs Socraticus, does not detract from its value as evidence about the speculations of Sokratēs (see Diogen. Laërt. ii. 61, 62; Athenæus, v. p. 220).

Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 30 A. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων περιέρχομαι, ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, μῆτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μῆτε χρημάτων πρότερον μῆτε οὕτω σφόδρα, ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται· λέγων δὲ οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία.

Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. p. 61-64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic Ethics to human security and happiness as their end; while Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosoph. ii. p. 40 seq.) resorts to inadmissible

means and condition under which the nearest approach can be made to that end: there may also be precepts, prescribing to every man the conduct and character which best enables him to become an auxiliary towards its attainment, and imperatively restraining him from acts which tend to hinder it—precepts deduced from the theory, each one of them separately taken being subject to exceptions, but all of them taken collectively governing practice, as in each particular art.¹ Sokratēs and Plato talk of “the art of dealing with human beings”—“the art of behaving in society”—“that science which has for its object to make men happy,” &c. They draw a marked distinction between art, or rules of practice deduced from a theoretical survey of the subject-matter, and taught with precognition of the end—and mere artless, irrational, knack or dexterity, acquired by simple copying or assimilation, through a process of which no one could render account.²

suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it and to explain away the direct testimony of Xenophon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokratēs. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that “the eudæmonistic basis of the Sokratic Ethics differs from *Sophistical moral philosophy*, not in principle, but only in result” (p. 61).

I protest against this allusion to a *Sophistical moral philosophy*, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as *Sophistical moral philosophy*. Not only the Sophists were no sect or school, but farther—not one of them ever aimed (so far as we know) at establishing any ethical theory: this was the great innovation of Sokratēs. But it is perfectly true, that between the preceptorial exhortation of Sokratēs, and that of Protagoras or Prodikos, there was no great or material difference; and this Zeller seems to admit.

¹ The existence of cases forming exceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Sokratēs in Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i. 6. p. 331. C, D, E; ii. p. 382. C.

² Plato, Phædon, c. 88. p. 89 E. ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπων οὐ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· εἰ γὰρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, &c. ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, Protagor. c. 27. p. 319 A. Gorgias, c. 168. p. 521 D.

Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4. p. 20 A, B; Euthydēmus, c. 50. p. 292 E.—τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἣ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσειεν; . . .

The marked distinction between τέχνη, as distinguished from ἀτεχνος τριβή—ἄλογος τριβή or ἐμπειρία, is noted in the Phædrus, c. 96. p. 260 E. and in Gorgias, c. 42. p. 463 B; c. 45. p. 465 A; c. 121. p. 501 A—a remarkable passage. That there is in every art, some assignable end to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is again laid down in the Sophistēs, c. 37. p. 232 A.

Plato, with that variety of indirect allusion which is his characteristic, continually constrains the reader to look upon human and social life as having its own ends and purposes no less than each separate profession or craft; and impels him to transfer to the former that conscious analysis as a science, and intelligent practice as an art, which are known as conditions of success in the latter.¹ It was in furtherance of these rational conceptions—"Science and Art"—that Sokratês carried on his crusade against "that conceit of knowledge without reality," which reigned undisturbed in the moral world around him, and was only beginning to be slightly disturbed even as to the physical world. To him the precept, inscribed in the Delphian temple—"Know Thyself"—was the holiest of all texts, which he constantly cited, and strenuously enforced upon his hearers; interpreting it to mean, Know what sort of a man thou art, and what are thy capacities, in reference to human use.² His manner of enforcing it was alike original and effective, and though he was dexterous in varying his topics³ and queries according to the individual person with whom he had to deal, it was his first object to bring the hearer to take just measure of his own real knowledge or real ignorance. To preach, to exhort, even to confute particular errors, appeared to Sokratês useless, so long as the mind lay wrapped up in its habitual mist, or illusion of wisdom:

Earnest-
ness with
which
Sokratês
inculcated
self-ex-
amination—
effect of his
conver-
sation upon
others.

¹ This fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Sokratês, between the special professions, and social living generally—transferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived End, a Theory, and a regulated Practice or Art, which are observed in the former—is strikingly stated in one of the Aphorisms of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, vi. 35—Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς οἱ βάνηται τεχνίται ἀρμόζονται μὲν ἄχρι τινός πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας, οὐδὲν ἥσσον μέντοι ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τούτου ἀποστήναι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν; Οὐ δεῖνόν, εἰ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καὶ ὁ ἱατρός, μᾶλλον αἰδέσονται τὸν τέχ-

ιδίας τέχνης λόγον, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὃς αὐτῷ κοινός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς;

² Plato (Phædr. c. 8. p. 229 E; Charmidês, c. 26. p. 164 E; Alkibiad. i. p. 124 A; 129 A; 131 A).

Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 24-26. οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρῆσιν, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Cicero (de Legib. i. 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well-known text, far more vague and tumid than the conception of Sokratês.

³ See the striking conversations of Sokratês with Glaukon and Charmidês, especially that with the former, in Xen. Mem. iii. c. 6, 7.

such mist must be dissipated before any new light could enter. Accordingly, the hearer being usually forward in announcing positive declarations on those general doctrines, and explanations of those terms, to which he was most attached and in which he had the most implicit confidence, Sokratês took them to pieces, and showed that they involved contradiction and inconsistency; professing himself to be without any positive opinion, nor ever advancing any until the hearer's mind had undergone the proper purifying cross-examination.¹

It was this indirect and negative proceeding, which, though only a part of the whole, stood out as his most original and most conspicuous characteristic, and determined his reputation with a large number of persons who took no trouble to know anything else about him. It was an exposure no less painful than surprising to the person questioned; producing upon several of them an effect of permanent alienation, so that they never came near him again,² but reverted to their former state of mind without any permanent change. But on the other hand, the ingenuity and novelty of the process was highly interesting to hearers, especially youthful hearers, sons of rich men and enjoying leisure; who not only carried away with them a lofty admiration of Sokratês, but were fond of trying to

¹ There is no part of Plato, in which this doxosophy, or false conceit of wisdom, is more earnestly reprobated than in the *Sophistês*—with notice of the *Elenchus*, or cross-examining exposure, as the only effectual cure for such fundamental vice of the mind; as the true purifying process (*Sophistês*, c. 33-35. p. 230, 231).

See the same process illustrated by Sokratês, after his questions put to the slave of Menon (*Plato*, *Menon*, c. 18. p. 84 B; *Charmidês*, c. 80, p. 166 D).

As the Platonic Sokratês, even in the Defence where his own personality stands most manifest, denounces as the worst and deepest of all mental defects, this conceit of knowledge without reality—*ἡ ἀπατία αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκονιδίετος, ἢ τοῦ*

οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι & *οὐκ οἶδεν*, c. 17. p. 29 B—so the Xenophontic Sokratês, in the same manner, treats this same mental infirmity as being near to madness, and distinguishes it carefully from simple want of knowledge or *conscious ignorance*—*Μανίαν γὰρ μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γὰρ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζεν. Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν, καὶ δὲ μὴ τις οἶδε δοξάζειν, καὶ οἰεσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγχεύεται μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι* (*Mem.* iii. 9, 6). Such conviction thus stands foremost in the mental character of Sokratês, and on the best evidence, Plato and Xenophon united.

² Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσήεσαν, οὐδὲ καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

copy his negative polemics.¹ Probably men like Alkibiadēs and Kritias frequented his society chiefly for this purpose of acquiring a quality which they might turn to some account in their political career. His constant habit of never suffering a general term to remain undetermined, but applying it at once to particulars—the homely and effective instances of which he made choice—the string of interrogatories each advancing towards a result, yet a result not foreseen by any one—the indirect and circuitous manner whereby the subject was turned round, and at last approached and laid open by a totally different face—all this constituted a sort of prerogative in Sokratēs, which no one else seems to have approached. Its effect was enhanced by a voice and manner highly plausible and captivating—and to a certain extent, by the very excentricity of his Silenic physiognomy.² What is termed “his irony”—or assumption of the character of an ignorant learner asking information from one who knew better than himself—while it was essential³ as an excuse for his practice as a questioner, contributed also to add zest and novelty to his conversation; and totally banished from it both didactic pedantry and seeming bias as an advocate; which, to one who talked so much, was of no small advantage. After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as mere affectation, and

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 9. p. 23 A. Οἶονταί γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

Ibid. c. 10. p. 23. C. Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς, οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλὰκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἰτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν, &c.

Compare also *ibid.* c. 22. p. 33 C; c. 27. p. 37 D.

² This is an interesting testimony preserved by Aristoxenus, on the testimony of his father Spintharus, who heard Sokratēs (*Aristox. Frag.* 28. ed. Didot). Spintharus said, respecting Sokratēs—ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτὸς γε καθαωτέροις ἐντετυχηκώς

εἶη τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι τε τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἶδους ἰδιότητα.

It seems evident also, from the remarkable passage in Plato's *Symposium* c. 39. p. 215 A, that he too must have been much affected by the singular physiognomy of Sokratēs: compare *Xenoph. Sympos.* iv. 19.

³ *Aristot. de Sophist. Elench.* c. 32. p. 183. b. 6. Compare also *Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic.* p. 999 E. Τὸν οὖν ἐλεγχτικὸν λόγον ὥσπερ καθαρτικὸν ἔχων φάρμακον, ὁ Σωκράτης ἀξιόπιστος ἦν ἐτέρους ἐλέγχων, τῷ μηδὲν ἀποφαινεσθαι· καὶ μᾶλλον ἤπτετο, δοκῶν ζητεῖν κοινῇ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ βοηθεῖν.

those who merely heard him occasionally, without penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox.¹ Timon the Satirist, and Zeno the Epicurean, accordingly described him as a buffoon who turned every one into ridicule, especially men of eminence.²

It is by Plato that the negative and indirect vein of Sokratēs has been worked out and immortalized; while Xenophon, who sympathised little in it, complains that others looked at his master too exclusively on this side, and that they could not conceive him as a guide to virtue, but only as a stirring and propulsive force.³ One of the principal objects of his 'Memorabilia' is, to show, that Sokratēs, after having worked upon novices sufficiently with the negative line of questions, altered his tone, desisted from embarrassing them, and addressed to them precepts not less plain and simple than directly useful in practice.⁴ I do not at all doubt that this was often the fact, and that the various dialogues in which Xenophon presents to us

Precept-
torial and
positive
exhortation
of Sokratēs
chiefly
brought out
by Xeno-
phon.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 9.

Plato, Gorgias, c. 81. p. 481 B. σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παιζει; Republic, i. c. 11. p. 337 A. αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εὐθυσία εὐφροσύνη Σωκράτους, &c. (Apol. Sok. c. 28. p. 38 A).

² Diog. Laërt. ii. 16; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 34, 93. Cicero (Brutus, 85, 292) also treats the irony of Sokratēs as intended to mock and humiliate his fellow-dialogists, and it sometimes appears so in the dialogues of Plato. Yet I doubt whether the real Sokratēs could have had any pronounced purpose of this kind.

³ The beginning of Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1, is particularly striking on this head—Εἰ δὲ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν (ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσι τε καὶ λέγουσι) περὶ αὐτοῦ τεχμαυρόμενοι) προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐν ἡμέρῃν χράτιστον γιγνόμεναι, προαγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκ' αὐτῆν οὐχ ἱκανόν—σπεύδοντες μὴ μόνον ἀ' ἐκείνους καὶ ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄλλους πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐνεκα τοῦ πᾶντος

ολομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἢ λέγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀ' λέγων συνδιημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσιν, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.

⁴ Xenophon, after describing the dialogue wherein Sokratēs cross-examines and humiliates Euthydēmus, says at the end—Ὁ δὲ (Sokratēs) ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἤκιστα μὲν αὐτὸν διαστράττειν, ἀπλοῦστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἀ' τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν, καὶ ἀ' ἐπιτηδεύειν χράτιστα εἶναι.

Again, iv. 7, 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὴν ἐκαστοῦ γνώμην ἀνσφαινίζοντο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημίων εἶναι, &c.

His readers were evidently likely to doubt, and required proof, that Sokratēs could speak *plainly, directly*, and *positively*: so much better known was the other side of his character.

the philosopher inculcating self-control, temperance, piety, duty to parents, brotherly love, fidelity in friendship, diligence, benevolence, &c., on positive grounds—are a faithful picture of one valuable side of his character, and an essential part of the whole. Such direct admonitory influence was common to Sokratēs with Prodikus and the best of the Sophists.

It is however neither from the virtue of his life, nor from the goodness of his precepts (though both were essential features in his character), that he derives his peculiar title to fame, but from his originality and prolific efficacy in the line of speculative philosophy. Of that originality, the first portion (as has been just stated) consisted in his having been the first to conceive the idea of an Ethical Science with its appropriate End, and with precepts capable of being tested and improved; but the second point, and not the least important, was, his peculiar method—and extraordinary power of exciting scientific impulse and capacity in the minds of others. It was not by positive teaching that this effect was produced. Both Sokratēs and Plato thought that little mental improvement could be produced by expositions directly communicated, or by new written matter lodged in the memory.¹ It was necessary that mind should work upon mind, by short question and answer, or an expert employment of the dialectic process,² in order to generate new thoughts and powers: a process, which Plato, with his exuberant fancy, compares to copulation and pregnancy, representing it as the true way, and the only effectual way, of propagating the philosophic spirit.

We should greatly misunderstand the negative and indirect vein of Sokratēs, if we suppose that it ended in nothing more than simple negation. On busy or ungifted minds, among the indiscriminate public who heard him, it probably left little permanent effect of any kind, and

This was not the peculiarity of Sokratēs—his powerful method of stirring up the analytical faculties.

¹ Plato, *Sophistēs*, c. 17. p. 230 A. μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νοητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύταιν, &c. Compare a fragment of Demokritus, in Mullach's edition of the *Fragm. Demokrit.* p. 175. Fr. Moral. 59. Τὸν ἀόριστον νόον ἔχειν ὁ νοητικὸς μα-

τατικόν.

Compare Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 343, 344.

² Compare two passages in Plato's *Protagoras*, c. 49. p. 329 A, and c. 94. p. 348 D; and the *Phædrus*, c. 138-140. p. 276 A, E.

ended in a mere feeling of admiration for ingenuity, or perhaps dislike of paradox: on practical minds like Xenophon, its effect was merged in that of the preceptorial exhortation. But where the seed fell upon an intellect having the least predisposition or capacity for systematic thought, the negation had only the effect of driving the hearer back at first, giving him a new impetus for afterwards springing forward. The Sokratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance, produced an immediate effect like the touch of the torpedo.¹ The newly-created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected, painful, and humiliating—a season of doubt and discomfort, yet combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could never commence until the mind had been disabused of its original illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Sokratēs not merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable condition, of future progress. It was the middle point in the ascending mental scale; the lowest point being ignorance unconscious, self-satisfied, and mistaking itself for knowledge; the next above, ignorance conscious, unmasked, ashamed of itself, and thirsting after knowledge as yet unpossessed; while actual knowledge, the third and highest stage, was only attainable after passing through the second as a preliminary.² This second stage was a sort of pregnancy, and every mind either by nature incapable of it, or in which, from want of the necessary conjunction, it had never arisen—was barren for all purposes of original or self-appropriated thought. Sokratēs regarded it as his peculiar vocation and skill (employing another Platonic metaphor), while he had himself no power

¹ Plato, *Men.* c. 13, p. 80 A. ὁμοιω-
τατος τῇ κλασει νάρκη τῇ θαλασει.

² This tripartite graduation of
the intellectual scale is brought
out by Plato in the *Symposium*, c.
29, p. 204 A, and in the *Lysis*, c. 33,
p. 218 A.

The intermediate point of the
scale is what Plato here (though
not always) expresses by the word

φιλόσοφος in its strict etymological
sense—"a lover of knowledge;" one
who is not yet wise, but who,
having learnt to know and feel his
own ignorance, is anxious to be-
come wise—and has thus made what
Plato thought the greatest and most
difficult step towards really be-
coming so.

of reproduction, to deal with such pregnant and troubled minds in the capacity of a midwife; to assist them in that mental parturition whereby they were to be relieved, but at the same time to scrutinise narrowly the offspring which they brought forth, and if it should prove distorted or unpromising, to cast it away with the rigour of a Lykurgian nurse, whatever might be the reluctance of the mother-mind to part with its new-born.¹ Plato is fertile in illustrating this relation between the teacher and the scholar, operating not by what it put into the latter, but by what it evolved out of him; by creating an uneasy longing after truth—aiding in the elaboration necessary for obtaining relief—and testing whether the doctrine elaborated possessed the real lineaments, or merely the delusive semblance, of truth.

There are few things more remarkable than the description given of the colloquial magic of Sokratês and its vehement effects, by those who had themselves heard it and felt its force. Its suggestive and stimulating power was a gift so extraordinary, as well to justify any abundance of imagery on the part of Plato to illustrate it.²

Inductive
process of
scrutiny,
and
Baconian
spirit, of
Sokratês.

¹ The effect of the interrogatory procedure of Sokratês in forcing on the minds of youth a humiliating consciousness of ignorance and an eager anxiety to be relieved from it, is not less powerfully attested in the simpler language of Xenophon, than in the metaphorical variety of Plato. See the conversation with Euthydêmus in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, iv. 2; a long dialogue, which ends by the confession of the latter (c. 39) —'Αναγκάζει με ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δηλονότι ἢ ἐμὴ φυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ἢ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. Καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε· καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι: compare i. 1, 16.

This same expression—"thinking himself no better than a slave"—is also put by Plato into the mouth of Alkibiadês, when he is describing the powerful effect wrought on his mind by the conversation of So-

kratês (*Symposion*, c. 39. p. 215, 216) —Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εὖ μὲν ἠγούμην, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδὲ τεθορόβητο μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ' ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἀνδράποδω δῶς διασκειμένου. Ἄλλ' ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ Μαρσίου πολὺ λάξις δὴ οὕτω διετίθη, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω.

Compare also the *Meno*, c. 13. p. 79 E., and *Theætet.* c. 17, 22. p. 148 E, 151 C, where the metaphor of pregnancy, and of the obstetric art of Sokratês, is expanded—πάσχεις δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ευγυγιγόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταίς τιχτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γάρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπιμπλάνται νυκτὰς τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκαίηναι. Ταύτην τε τὴν ὥδινα ἐγείρουν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται—Ἐνίοτε δὲ, οἱ ἂν μὴ μοι δόξωσιν ἐγχομόνες εἶναι, γνοῦς δτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δεόνται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι, &c.

² There is a striking expression of Xenophon, in the *Memorabilia*

On the subjects to which he applied himself—man and society—his hearers had done little but feel and affirm: Sokratēs undertook to make them think, weigh, and examine themselves and their own judgements—until the latter were brought into consistency with each other as well as with a known and venerable end. The generalisations embodied in their judgements had grown together and coalesced in a manner at once so intimate, so familiar, yet so unverified, that the particulars implied in them had passed out of notice: so that Sokratēs, when he recalled these particulars out of a forgotten experience, presented to the hearer his own opinions under a totally new point of view. His conversations (even as they appear in the reproduction of Xenophon, which presents but a mere skeleton of the reality) exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself without conscious march or scientific guidance—of the *intellectus sibi permissus*—upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells. Amidst abundance of *instantiæ negativæ*, the scientific value of which is dwelt upon in the 'Novum Organon,'¹—and negative instances too so dexterously

about Sokratēs and his conversation (1. 2, 14):—

"He dealt with every one just as he pleased in his discussions," says Xenophon—τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως ἐβούλετο.

¹ I know nothing so clearly illustrating both the subjects and the method chosen by Sokratēs, as various passages of the immortal criticisms in the Novum Organon. —When Sokratēs (as Xenophon tells us) devoted his time to questioning others "What is piety? What is justice? What is temperance, courage, political government?" &c., we best understand the spirit of his procedure by comparing the sentence which Bacon pronounces upon the first notions of the intellect—as radically vicious, confused, badly abstracted from reality, and needing complete re-

examination and revision—without which (he says) not one of them could be trusted:—

"Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectûs, nihil est earum, quas intellectus sibi permissus concessit, quin nobis pro suspecto sit, nec ullo modo ratum nisi novo judicio se steterit, et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit." (Distributio Operis, prefixed to the N. O. p. 168 of Mr. Montagu's edition.) —"Serum sane rebus perditis adhibetur remedium, postquam mens ex quotidianâ vitæ consuetudine, et auditionibus, et doctrinis inquinatis occupata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit. . . . Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut opus mentis universum de integro resumatur; ac mens, jam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur, sed perpetuo regatur." (Ib. Præfatio, p. 186.)—"Syllogismus ex proposi-

chosen as generally to show the way to new truth, in place of that error which they set aside—there is a close pressure on the hearer's mind, to keep it in the distinct track of

tionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesserae sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsae (id quod basis rei est) confusae sint et temere a rebus abstractae, nihil in iis quae superstruuntur est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione vera. In notionibus nihil sani est, nec in logicis, nec in physicis. Non Substantia, non Qualitas, Agere, Pati, ipsum Esse, bonae notiones sunt; multo minus Grave, Leve, Densum, Tenuis, Humidum, Siccum, Generatio, Corruptio, Attrahere, Fugere, Elementum, Materia, Forma, et id genus; sed omnes phantasiae et male terminatae. Notiones infirmarum specierum, Hominis, Canis, et prehensionum immediatarum sensus, Albi, Nigri, non fallunt magnopere: reliquae omnes (quibus homines hactenus uti sunt) aberrationes sunt, nec debitis modis a rebus abstractae et excitatae." (Aphor. 14, 15, 16.)—"Nemo adhuc tantam mentis constantiam et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries." (Aphor. 97.)—"Nil magis philosophiæ officisse deprehendimus, quam quod res quæ familiares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non morentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causæ queri soleant; ut non sæpius requiratur informatio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis." (Aphor. 119.)

These passages, and many others to the same effect which might be

extracted from the *Novum Organon*, afford a clear illustration and an interesting parallel to the spirit and purpose of Sokratēs. He sought to test the fundamental notions and generalisations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics: he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars—and from particulars too, the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Sokratēs described in his language as "conceit of knowledge without the reality," is identical with what Bacon designates as the *primary notions*—the *puerile notions*—the *aberrations*—of the intellect left to itself, which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them.

The stringent process (or electric shock, to use the simile in Plato's *Menon*) of the Sokratic Elenchus, afforded the best means of resuscitating this lost power. And the manner in which Plato speaks of the cross-examining Elenchus, as "the great and sovereign purification, whithout which every man, be he the great King himself, is unschooled, dirty, and full of uncleanness in respect to the main conditions of happiness"—(καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχὸν λεκτικόν ὡς ἅρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐ νομιστέον, ὃν καὶ τυγχάνη μέγας βασιλεὺς ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα· ἀπαιδευτόν τε καὶ ἀλογὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τοῦ

particulars, as conditions of every just and consistent generalisation; and to divert it from becoming enslaved to unexamined formulæ, or from delivering mere intensity of persuasion under the authoritative phrase of reason. Instead of anxiety to plant in the hearer a conclusion ready-made and accepted on trust, the questioner keeps up a prolonged suspense, with special emphasis laid upon the particulars tending both affirmatively and negatively; nor is his purpose answered, until that state of knowledge and apprehended evidence is created, out of which the conclusion starts as a living product, with its own root and self-sustaining power, consciously linked with its premises. If this conclusion so generated be not the same as that which the

ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι— Plato Sophist. c. 34. p. 230 E.) precisely corresponds to that "*cross-examination of human reason in its native or spontaneous process,*" which Bacon specifies as one of the three things essential to the expurgation of the intellect, so as to qualify it for the attainment of truth—"Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectus, ut ipse ad veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargutionibus absolvitur; redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redargutione rationis humanæ nativæ." (Nov. Organ. Distributio Operis, p. 170 ed. Montagu.)

To show further how essential it is (in the opinion of the best judges) that the native intellect should be purged or purified, before it can properly apprehend the truths of physical philosophy—I transcribe the introductory passage of Sir John Herschel's 'Astronomy':—

"In entering upon any scientific pursuit, one of the student's first endeavours ought to be to prepare his mind for the reception of truth, by dismissing, or at least loosening his hold on, all such crude and hastily adopted notions respecting the objects and relations he is about to examine, as may tend to em-

barrass or mislead him; and to strengthen himself, by *something of an effort and a resolve*, for the unprejudiced admission of any conclusion which shall appear to be supported by careful observation and logical argument; even should it prove adverse to notions he may have previously formed for himself, or taken up, without examination, on the credit of others. *Such an effort is, in fact, a commencement of that intellectual discipline which forms one of the most important ends of all science.* It is the first movement of approach towards that state of mental purity which alone can fit us for a full and steady preception of moral beauty as well as physical adaptation. It is the 'euphrasy and rue,' with which we must purge our sight, before we can receive, and contemplate as they are, the lineaments of truth and nature." (Sir John Herschel, 'Astronomy'—Introduction.)

I could easily multiply citations from other eminent writers on physical philosophy, to the same purpose. All of them prescribe this intellectual purification: Sokratēs not only prescribed it, but actually administered it, by means of his Elenchus, in reference to the subjects on which he talked.

questioner himself adopts, it will at least be some other, worthy of a competent and examining mind taking its own independent view of the appropriate evidence. And amidst all the variety and divergence of particulars which we find enforced in the language of Sokratês, the end, towards which all of them point, is one and the same, emphatically signified—the good and happiness of social man.

It is not then to multiply proselytes or to procure authoritative assent—but to create earnest seekers, analytical intellects, foreknowing and consistent agents, capable of forming conclusions for themselves and of teaching others—as well as to force them into that path of inductive generalisation whereby alone trustworthy conclusions can be formed—that the Sokratic method aspires. In many of the Platonic dialogues, wherein Sokratês is brought forward as the principal disputant, we read a series of discussions and arguments, distinct, though having reference to the same subject—but terminating either in a result purely negative, or without any definite result at all. The commentators often attempt, but in my judgement with little success, either by arranging the dialogues in a supposed sequence or by various other hypotheses—to assign some positive doctrinal conclusion as having been indirectly contemplated by the author. But if Plato had aimed at any substantive demonstration of this sort, we cannot well imagine that he would have left his purpose thus in the dark, visible only by the microscope of a critic. The didactic value of these dialogues—that, wherein the genuine Sokratic spirit stands most manifest—consists, not in the positive conclusion proved, but in the argumentative process itself, coupled with general importance of the subject upon which evidence negative and affirmative is brought to bear.

This connects itself with that which I remarked in the preceding chapter, when mentioning Zeno and the first manifestations of dialectics, respecting the large sweep, the many-sided argumentation, and the strength as well as forwardness of the negative arm—in Grecian speculative philosophy. Through Sokratês, this amplitude of dialectic range was transmitted from Zeno

Sokratic method tends to create minds capable of forming conclusions for themselves—not to plant conclusions ready-made.

Grecian dialectics—their many-sided handling of subjects—force of the negative arm.

first to Plato and next to Aristotle. It was a proceeding natural to men who were not merely interested in establishing, or refuting, some given particular conclusion—but who also (like expert mathematicians in their own science) loved, esteemed, and sought to improve, the dialectic process itself, with the means of verification which it afforded; a feeling, of which abundant evidence is to be found in the Platonic writings.¹ Such pleasure in the scientific operation—though not merely innocent, but valuable both as a stimulant and as a guarantee against error, and though the corresponding taste among mathematicians is always treated with the sympathy which it deserves—incur much unmerited reprobation from modern historians of philosophy, under the name of love of disputation, cavilling, or sceptical subtlety.

But over and above any love of the process, the subjects to which dialectics were applied, from Sokratès downwards,—man and society, ethics, politics, metaphysics, &c., were such as particularly called for this many-sided handling. On topics like these, relating to sequences of fact which depend upon a multitude of cooperating or conflicting causes, it is impossible to arrive, by any one thread of positive reasoning or induction, at absolute doctrine which a man may reckon upon finding always true, whether he remembers the proof or not; as is the case with mathematical, astronomical, or physical truth. The utmost which science can ascertain, on subjects thus complicated, is an aggregate, not of peremptory theorems and predictions, but of tendencies;² by studying the action of each separate cause, and combining them together as well as our means admit. The knowledge of tendencies thus obtained, though falling much short of certainty, is highly important for guidance: but it is plain that conclusions of this nature—resulting from multifarious threads of evidence—true only on a balance, and always liable to limitation—can never be safely detached from the proofs on which they rest, or taught as absolute and consecrated formulæ.³ They require

¹ See particularly the remarkable passage in the *Philæbus*, c. 18. p. 18, seq.

² See this point instructively set forth in Mr. John Stuart Mill's

System of Logic, vol. ii. book vi. p. 565. 1st edition.

³ Lord Bacon remarks in the *Novum Organon* (Aph. 71):—
"Erat autem sapientia Græcorum

to be kept in perpetual and conscious association with the evidences, affirmative and negative, by the joint consideration of which their truth is established; nor can this object be attained by any other means than by ever-renovated discussion, instituted from new and distinct points of view, and with free play to that negative arm which is indispensable as stimulus not less than as control. To ask for nothing but results—to decline the labour of verification—to be satisfied with a ready-made stock of established positive arguments as proof—and to decry the doubter or negative reasoner, who starts new difficulties, as a common enemy—this is a proceeding sufficiently common, in ancient as well as in modern times. But it is nevertheless an abnegation of the dignity and even of the functions of speculative philosophy. It is the direct reverse of the method both of Sokratēs and Plato, who, as inquirers, felt that, for the great subjects which they treated, multiplied threads of reasoning, coupled with the constant presence of the cross-examining Elenchus, were indispensable. Nor is it less at variance with the views of Aristotle (though a man very different from either of them), who goes round his subject on all sides, states and considers all its difficulties, and insists emphatically on the necessity of having all these difficulties brought out in full force, as the

professoria, et in disputationes effusa, quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adversissimum est. Itaque nomen illud Sophistarum—quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi voluerunt, in antiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgiam, Protagoram, Hippiam, Polum—etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicuro, Theophrasto, et eorum successoribus, Chrysippo, Carneadi, reliquis.

Bacon is quite right in effacing the distinction between the two lists of persons whom he compares, and in saying that the latter were just as much Sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word as well as in every other legitimate sense. But he is

not justified in imputing to either of them this many-sided argumentation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has application to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great pertinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical subjects, they come justly under Bacon's censure. But here again, the fault consisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccurate axioms without dispute.

incitement and guide to positive philosophy, as well as the test of its sufficiency.¹

Understanding thus the method of Sokratēs, we shall be at no loss to account for a certain variance on his part (and a still greater variance on the part of Plato, who expanded the method in writing so much more) with the Sophists, without supposing the latter to be corrupt teachers. As they aimed at qualifying young men for active life, they accepted the current ethical and

Real
distinction
and
variance
between
Sokratēs
and the
Sophists.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphysic.* iii. 1, 2-5. p. 995 a.

The indispensable necessity, to a philosopher, of having before him all the difficulties and doubts of the problem which he tries to solve, and of looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants—is strikingly set forth in this passage: I transcribe a portion of it—'Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὑστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. . . . Διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερεῖας τε θεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τους ζητοῦντας ἀνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον, ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἰ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὑρηκεν, ἢ μὴ, γινώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος· τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. Ἐτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀχχοῦσα πάντων.

A little further on, in the same chapter (iii. 1, 19. p. 996 a), he makes a remarkable observation. Not merely is it difficult, on these philosophical subjects, to get at the truth—but it is not easy to perform well even the preliminary task of discerning and setting forth the ratiocinative difficulties which

are to be dealt with—Περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ ῥάδιον καλῶς. Διαπορῆσαι means the same as διεξελεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας (Bonitz. not. *ad loc.*) "to go through the various points of difficulty."

This last passage illustrates well the characteristic gift of Sokratēs, which was exactly what Aristotle calls τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ καλῶς—to force on the hearer's mind those ratiocinative difficulties which served both as spur and as guide towards solution and positive truth—towards comprehensive and correct generalisation, with clear consciousness of the common attribute binding together the various particulars included.

The same care to admit and even invite the development of the negative side of a question—to accept the obligation of grappling with all the difficulties—to assimilate the process of inquiry to a judicial pleading—is to be seen in other passages of Aristotle; see *Ethic. Nikomach.* vii. 1, 5; *De Animâ*, i. 2. p. 403 b; *De Cœlo*, i. 10. p. 279 b; *Topica*, i. 2. p. 101 a—(Χρήσιμος δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ) πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνατόι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω διαπορῆσαι, ἔχον ἐν ἐκάστοις κατοφόμεθα τὰ ληθῆς τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Compare also Cicero, *Tusc. Disput.* ii. 3, 9.

political sentiment, with its unexamined common-places and inconsistencies, merely seeking to shape it into what was accounted a meritorious character at Athens. They were thus exposed, along with others—and more than others, in consequence of their reputation—to the analytical cross-examination of Sokratès, and were quite as little able to defend themselves against it.

Whatever may have been the success of Protagoras or any other among these Sophists, the mighty originality of Sokratès achieved results not only equal at the time, but incomparably grander and more lasting in reference to the future. Out of his intellectual school sprang not merely Plato, himself a host—but all the other leaders of Grecian speculation for the next half-century, and all those who continued the great line of speculative philosophy down to later times. Eukleidès and the Megaric school of philosophers—Aristippus and the Kyrenaic—Antisthenès and Diogenès, the first of those called the Cynics—all emanated more or less directly from the stimulus imparted by Sokratès, though each followed a different vein of thought.¹ Ethics continue to be what Sokratès had first made them, a distinct branch of philosophy, alongside of which politics, rhetoric, logic, and other speculations relating to man and society, gradually arranged themselves; all of them more popular, as well as more keenly controverted, than physics, which at that time presented comparatively little charm, and still less of attainable certainty. There can be no doubt that the individual influence of Sokratès permanently enlarged the horizon, improved the method, and multiplied the ascendent minds, of the Grecian speculative world, in a manner never since paralleled. Subsequent philosophers may have had a more elaborate doctrine, and a large number of disciples who imbibed their ideas; but none of them applied the same stimulating method with the same efficacy—none of them struck out of other minds that fire which sets light to original thought

Prodigious efficacy of Sokratès in forming new philosophical minds.

¹ Cicero (de Orator. iii. 16, 61; Tuscul. Disput. v. 4, 11)—“Cujus (Socratis) multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas, et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis ingenio et literis consecrata, plura genera

effecit dissentientium philosophorum.” Ten distinct varieties of Sokratic philosophers are enumerated; but I lay little stress on the exact number.

—none of them either produced in others the pains of intellectual pregnancy, or extracted from others the fresh and unborrowed offspring of a really parturient mind.

Having thus touched upon Sokratês, both as first
 General theory of Sokratês on ethics—he resolved virtue into knowledge or wisdom. opener of the field of Ethics to scientific study —and as author of a method, little copied and never paralleled since his time, for stimulating in other men's minds earnest analytical inquiry —I speak last about his theoretical doctrine. Considering the fanciful, far-fetched ideas, upon which alone the Pythagoreans and other predecessors had shaped their theories respecting virtues and vices, the wonder is that Sokratês, who had no better guides to follow, should have laid down an ethical doctrine which has the double merit of being true, as far as it goes, legitimate, and of comprehensive generality; though it errs, mainly by stating a part of the essential conditions of virtue¹ (sometimes also a part of the Ethical End), as if it were the whole. Sokratês resolved all virtue into knowledge or wisdom; all vice, into ignorance or folly. To do right was the only way to impart happiness, or the least degree of unhappiness compatible with any given situation: now this was precisely what every one wished for and aimed at—only that many persons, from ignorance, took the wrong road; and no man was wise enough always to take the right. But as no man was willingly his own enemy, so no man ever did wrong willingly; it was because he was not fully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions; so that the proper remedy to apply was enlarged teaching of consequences and improved judgement.² To make him willing to be taught, the only con-

¹ In setting forth the Ethical End, the language of Sokratês (as far as we can judge from Xenophon and Plato) seems to have been not always consistent with itself. He sometimes stated it as if it included a reference to the happiness, not merely of the agent himself, but of others besides—both, as co-ordinate elements; at other times, he seems to speak as if the end was nothing more than the happiness of the agent himself, though the

happiness of others was among the greatest and most essential means. The former view is rather countenanced by Xenophon, the best witness about his master, so that I have given it as belonging to Sokratês, though it is not always adhered to. The latter view appears most in Plato, who assimilates the health of the soul to the health of the body—an End essentially self-regarding.

² Cicero, de Orator. i. 47, 204.

dition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance; the want of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and of vice.

That this doctrine sets forth one portion of the essential conditions of virtue, is certain; and that too the most commanding portion, since there can be no assured moral conduct except under the supremacy of reason. But that it omits to notice, what is not less essential to virtue, the proper condition of the emotions, desires, &c., taking account only of the intellect—is also certain; and has been remarked by Aristotle¹ as well as by many others. It is fruitless, in my judgement, to attempt by any refined explanation, to make out that Sokratês meant by “knowledge,” something more than what is directly implied in the word. He had present to his mind, as the grand depravation of the human being, not so much vice as madness; that state in which a man does not know what he is doing. Against the vicious man, securities, both public and private, may be taken with considerable effect; against the madman there is no security except perpetual restraint. He is incapable of any of the duties incumbent on social man, nor can he, even if he wishes, do good either to himself or to others. The sentiment which we feel towards such an unhappy being is indeed something totally different from moral reprobation, such as we feel for the vicious man who does wrong knowingly. But Sokratês took measure of both with reference to the purposes of human life and society, and pronounced that the latter was less completely spoiled for those purposes than the former. Madness was ignorance at its extreme pitch, accompanied too by the circumstance that the madman himself was unconscious of his own ignorance, acting under a sincere persuasion that he knew what he was doing. But short of this extremity, there were many varieties and gradations in the scale of ignorance, which, if accompanied by false conceit of knowledge, differed from madness only in degree; and each of which disqualified a man from doing right, in proportion to the ground which it covered. The worst of all ignorance—that which stood nearest to madness—was when a man was ignorant of himself, fancying that he knew what he

This doctrine defective as stating a part for the whole.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4; Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 13, 3-5; Ethic. Eudem. i. 5; Ethic. Magn. i. 1-35

did not really know, and that he could do, or avoid, or endure, what was quite beyond his capacity; when, for example, intending to speak the same truth, he sometimes said one thing, sometimes another—or, casting up the same arithmetical figures, made sometimes a greater sum, sometimes a less. A person who knows his letters, or an arithmetician, may doubtless write bad orthography or cast-up incorrectly, by design—but can also perform the operations correctly, if he chooses; while one ignorant of writing or of arithmetic, *cannot* do it correctly, even though he should be anxious to do so. The former therefore comes nearer to the good orthographer or arithmetician than the latter. So, if a man knows what is just, honourable, and good, but commits acts of a contrary character—he is juster, or comes nearer to being a just man, than one who does not know what just acts are, and does not distinguish them from unjust; for this latter *cannot* conduct himself justly, even if he desires it ever so much.¹

The opinion here maintained illustrates forcibly the general doctrine of Sokratēs. I have already observed that the fundamental idea which governed his train of reasoning, was, the analogy of each man's social life and duty to a special profession or trade. Now what is principally inquired after in regard to these special men, is their professional capacity; without this, no person would ever think of employing them, let their dispositions be ever so good; with it, good dispositions and diligence are presumed, unless there be positive grounds for suspecting the contrary. But why do we indulge such presumption? Because their pecuniary interest, their professional credit, and their place among competitors, are staked upon success, so that we reckon upon their best efforts. But in regard to that manifold and indefinite

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 6; iv. 2, 19-22. δίκαιοτερον δὲ τὸν ἐκιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐκιστάμενου—To call him the *juster* man of the two, when neither are just, can hardly be meant: I translate it according to what seems to me the meaning intended. So γραμματικώτερον (in the sentence before) means, comes nearer to a good orthographer. The

Greek derivative adjectives in-ίκος are very difficult to render precisely.

Compare Plato, Hippias Minor, c. 15. p. 372 D—where the same opinion is maintained. Hippiastell's Sokratēs in that dialogue (c. 11. p. 369 B) that he fixes his mind on a part of the truth, and omits to notice the rest.

series of acts which constitute the sum total of social duty, a man has no such special interest to guide and impel him, nor can we presume in him those dispositions which will ensure his doing right, wherever he knows what right is. Mankind are obliged to give premiums for these dispositions, and to attach penalties to the contrary, by means of praise and censure: moreover the natural sympathies and antipathies of ordinary minds, which determine so powerfully the application of moral terms, run spontaneously in this direction, and even overshoot the limit which reason would prescribe. The analogy between the paid special duty, and the general social duty, fails in this particular. Even if Sokratês were correct as to the former (and this would be noway true), in making the intellectual conditions of good conduct stand for the whole—no such inference could safely be extended to the latter.

Sokratês affirmed that "well-doing" was the noblest pursuit of man. "Well-doing" consisted in doing a thing well after having learnt it and practised it, by the rational and proper means: it was altogether disparate from good fortune, or success without rational scheme and preparation. "The best man (he said) and the most beloved by the gods, is, he who as a husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry—as a surgeon, those of medical art—in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. But the man who does nothing well, is neither useful—nor agreeable to the gods."¹ This is the Sokratic view of human life: to look at it as an assemblage of realities and practical details—to translate the large words of the moral vocabulary into those homely particulars to which at bottom they refer—to take account of acts, not of dispositions apart from act (in contradiction to the ordinary flow of the moral sympathies)—to enforce upon all men, that what they chiefly required was, teaching and practice as preparations for act; and that therefore ignorance, especially ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, was their capital deficiency. The religion of Sokratês, as well as his ethics, had reference to practical human ends. His mind had little of that transcendentalism which his scholar Plato exhibits in such abundance.

Constant
reference of
Sokratês to
duties of
practice
and detail.

It is indisputable, then, that Sokratês laid down a general ethical theory which is too narrow, and which states a part of the truth as if it were the whole. But as it frequently happens with philosophers who make the like mistake—we find that he did not confine his deductive reasonings within the limits of the theory, but escaped the erroneous consequences by a partial inconsistency. For example—no man ever insisted more emphatically than he, on the necessity of control over the passions and appetites—of enforcing good habits—and on the value of that state of the sentiments and emotions which such a course tended to form.¹ In truth, this is one particular characteristic of his admonitions. He exhorted men to limit their external wants, to be sparing in indulgence, and to cultivate, even in preference to honours and advancement, those pleasures which would surely arise from a performance of duty, as well as from self-examination

The derivative reasonings of Sokratês were of larger range than his general doctrine.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. ii. 6, 39. *δοτι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀπαρὰ λέγονται τούτους πάσας εὐκροῦμενος εὐρησας μὴ ῥῆσαι τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανομένους.* Again, the necessity of practice or discipline is inculcated, iii. 9, 1. When Sokratês enumerates the qualities requisite in a good friend, it is not merely superior knowledge which he talks of. He includes also moral excellence, continence, a self-sufficing temper, mildness, a grateful disposition (c. ii. 6, 1-5).

Moreover Sokratês laid it down that continence or self-control was the very basis of virtue—τὴν ἐνχράταιαν ἀρετῆς κρηίδα (i. 5, 4). Also that continence was indispensable in order to enable a man to acquire knowledge (iv. 5, 10, 11).

Sokratês here plainly treats ἐνχράταιαν (continence or self-control) as not being a state of the intellectual man, and yet as being the very basis of virtue. He therefore does not seem to have applied consistently his general doctrine, that virtue consisted in knowledge, or the excellence of the intellectual

man, alone. Perhaps he might have said—Knowledge alone will be sufficient to make you virtuous; but before you can acquire knowledge, you must previously have disciplined your emotions and appetites. This merely eludes the objection, without saving the sufficiency of the general doctrine.

I cannot concur with Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii. ch. 2. p. 78) in thinking that Sokratês meant by knowledge or wisdom, a transcendental attribute, above humanity, and such as is possessed only by a god. This is by no means consistent with that practical conception of human life and its ends, which stands so plainly marked in his character.

Why should we think it wonderful that Sokratês should propose a defective theory, which embraces only one side of a large and complicated question? Considering that his was the first theory derived from data really belonging to the subject, the wonder is, that it was so near an approach to the truth.

and the consciousness of internal improvement. This earnest attention, in measuring the elements and conditions of happiness, to the state of the internal associations as contrasted with the effect of external causes—as well as the pains taken to make it appear how much the latter depend upon the former for their power of conferring happiness, and how sufficient is moderate good fortune in respect to externals, provided the internal man be properly disciplined—is a vein of thought which pervades both Sokratês and Plato, and which passed from them, under various modifications, to most of the subsequent schools of ethical philosophy. It is probable that Protagoras or Prodikus, training rich youth for active life—without altogether leaving out such internal element of happiness, would yet dwell upon it less; a point of decided superiority in Sokratês.

The political opinions of Sokratês were much akin to his ethical, and deserve especial notice as having in part contributed to his condemnation by the Dikastery. He thought that the functions of government belonged legitimately to those who knew best how to exercise them for the advantage of the governed. Political opinions of Sokratês. “The legitimate King or Governor was not the man who held the sceptre—nor the man elected by some vulgar persons—nor he who had got the post by lot—nor he who had thrust himself in by force, or by fraud—but he alone who knew how to govern well.”¹ Just as the pilot governed on ship-board, the surgeon in a sick man’s house the trainer in a palæstra—every one else being eager to obey these professional superiors, and even thanking and recompensing them for their directions, simply because their greater knowledge was an admitted fact. It was absurd (Sokratês used to contend) to choose public officers by lot, when no one would trust himself on shipboard under the care of a pilot selected by hazard,² nor would any one pick out a carpenter or a musician in like manner.

We do not know what provisions Sokratês suggested for applying his principle to practice—for discovering who was the fittest man in point of knowledge—or for superseding him in case of his becoming unfit, or in case another fitter than he should arise. The analogies of the pilot, the surgeon, and professional men generally, would

¹ Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10, 11.

² Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9.

naturally conduct him to election by the people, renewable after temporary periods; since no one of these professional persons, whatever may be his positive knowledge, is ever trusted or obeyed except by the free choice of those who confide in him, and who may at any time make choice of another. But it does not appear that Sokratês followed out this part of the analogy. His companions remarked to him that his first-rate intellectual ruler would be a despot, who might, if he pleased, either refuse to listen to good advice, or even put to death those who gave it. "He will not act thus—(replied Sokratês) for if he does, he will himself be the greatest loser."¹

We may notice in this doctrine of Sokratês the same imperfection as that which is involved in the ethical doctrine; a disposition to make the intellectual conditions of political fitness stand for the whole. His negative political doctrine is not to be mistaken: he approved neither of democracy nor of oligarchy. As he was not attached, either by sentiment or by conviction, to the constitution of Athens—so neither had he the least sympathy with oligarchical usurpers such as the Four Hundred and the Thirty. His positive ideal state, as far as we can divine it, would have been something like that which is worked out in the 'Cyropædia' of Xenophon.

In describing the persevering activity of Sokratês, as a religious and intellectual missionary, we have really described his life; for he had no other occupation than this continual intercourse with the Athenian public—his indiscriminate conversation, and invincible dialectics. Discharging faithfully and bravely his duties as an hoplite on military service—but keeping aloof from official duty in the Dikastery, the public assembly, or the Senate-house, except in that one memorable year of the battle of Arginusæ—he incurred none of those party animosities which an active public life at Athens often provoked. His life was legally blameless, nor had he ever been brought up before the Dikastery until his one final trial, when he was seventy years of age. That he stood conspicuous before the public eye in 423 B.C., at the time when the 'Clouds' of Aristophanês were brought on the stage—is certain. He may have been and probably

Long
period
during
which
Sokratês
exercised
his
vocation as
a public
converser.

¹ Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 12: compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 56. p. 469, 470.

was, conspicuous even earlier: so that we can hardly allow him less than thirty years of public, notorious, and efficacious discoursing, down to his trial in 399 B.C.

It was in that year that Melêtus, seconded by two auxiliaries, Anytus and Lykon, presented against him, and hung up in the appointed place (the portico before the office of the second or King-Archon), an indictment against him in the following terms:—"Sokratês is guilty of crime, first, for not worshipping the gods whom the city worships, but introducing new divinities of his own—next, for corrupting the youth. The penalty due is, death."

Accusation against him by Melêtus, Anytus and Lykon.

It is certain that neither the conduct nor the conversation of Sokratês had undergone any alteration for many years past; since the *samenes* of his manner of talking is both derided by his enemies and confessed by himself. Our first sentiment therefore (apart from the question of guilt or innocence) is one of astonishment, that he should have been prosecuted, at seventy years of age, for persevering in an occupation which he had publicly followed during twenty-five or thirty years preceding. Xenophon, full of reverence for his master, takes up the matter on much higher ground, and expresses himself in a feeling of indignant amazement that the Athenians could find anything to condemn in a man every way so admirable. But whoever attentively considers the picture which I have presented of the purpose, the working, and the extreme publicity of Sokratês, will rather be inclined to wonder, not that the indictment was presented at last, but that some such indictment had not been presented long before. Such certainly is the impression suggested by the language of Sokratês himself, in the 'Platonic Apology.' He there proclaims emphatically, that though his present accusers were men of consideration, it was neither *their* enmity, nor *their* eloquence, which he had now principally to fear; but the accumulated force of antipathy—the numerous and important personal enemies, each with sympathising partisans—the long-standing and uncontradicted calumnies¹—raised against him throughout his cross-examining career.

The real ground for surprise is, that that accusation had not been preferred before.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2. p. 18 B; ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι c. 16. p. 28 A. Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπέναντα γέγονα καὶ πρὸς πολλοῦς,

In truth, the mission of Sokratês, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious. To convince a man that, of matters which he felt confident of knowing, and had never thought of questioning or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions—is an operation highly salutary, often necessary, to his future improvement; but an operation of painful mental surgery, in which indeed the temporary pain experienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admiration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of the operation developed themselves. But we know (from the express statement of Xenophon) that many, who underwent this first pungent thrust of his dialectics, never came near him again: he disregarded them as laggards,¹ but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable, was, the high quality and position of its leaders. For Sokratês himself tells us, that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine, were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans; those at once most sensitive to such humiliation, and most capable of making their enmity effective.

When we reflect upon this great body of antipathy, so terrible both from number and constituent items, we shall wonder only that Sokratês could have gone on so long standing in the marketplace to aggravate it, and that the indictment of Melêtus could have been so long postponed; since it was just as applicable earlier as later, and since the sensitive temper of the people, as to charges of irreligion, was a well-known fact.² The truth is, that as history presents to us only

εὐ ἵστα δτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρή—οὐ Μέλητος, οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ καὶ φθόνος.

The expression τῶν πολλῶν in this line is not used in its common signification, but is

equivalent to τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑποβλήτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσέειπεν, οὐς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

² Plato, Euthyphron, c. 2. p. 3 C.

one man who ever devoted his life to prosecute this duty of an elenchthic or cross-examining missionary—so there was but one city, in the ancient world at least, wherein he would have been allowed to prosecute it for twenty-five years with safety and impunity; and that city was Athens. I have in a previous volume noted the respect for individual dissent of opinion, taste, and behaviour, among one another, which characterised the Athenian population, and which Periklês puts in emphatic relief as a part of his funeral discourse. It was this established liberality of the democratical sentiment at Athens which so long protected the noble excentricity of Sokratês from being disturbed by the numerous enemies which he provoked. At Sparta, at Thebes, at Argos, Milêtus, or Syracuse, his blameless life would have been insufficient as a shield, and his irresistible dialectic power would have caused him to be only the more speedily silenced. Intolerance is the natural weed of the human bosom, though its growth or development may be counteracted by liberalizing causes; of these, at Athens, the most powerful was, the democratical constitution as there worked, in combination with diffused intellectual and æsthetical sensibility, and keen relish for discourse. Liberty of speech was consecrated, in every man's estimation, among the first of privileges; every man was accustomed to hear opinions, opposite to his own, constantly expressed,—and to believe that others had a right to their opinions as well as himself. And though men would not, as a general principle, have extended such toleration to religious subjects—yet the established habit in reference to other matters greatly influenced their practice, and rendered them more averse to any positive severity against avowed dissenters from the received religious belief. It is certain that there was at Athens both a keener intellectual stimulus, and greater freedom as well of thought as of speech than in any other city of Greece. The long toleration of Sokratês is one example of this general fact, while his trial proves little, and his execution nothing, against it—as will presently appear.

There must doubtless have been particular circumstances, of which we are scarcely at all informed, which induced his accusers to prefer their indictment at the actual moment, in spite of the advanced age of Sokratês.

Particular
circum-
stances
which
brought on
the trial of
Sokratês.

In the first place, Anytus, one of the accusers

εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιόβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοίς.

of Sokratês, appears to have become incensed against him on private grounds. The son of Anytus had manifested interest in his conversation: and Sokratês, observing in the young man intellectual impulse and promise, endeavoured to dissuade his father from bringing him up to his own trade of a leather-seller.¹ It was in this general way that a great proportion of the antipathy against Sokratês was excited, as he himself tells us in the 'Platonic Apology.' The young men were those to whom he chiefly addressed himself, and who, keenly relishing his conversation, often carried home new ideas, which displeased their fathers;² hence the general charge

¹ See Xenoph. Apol. Sok. s. 29, 30. This little piece bears a very erroneous title, and may possibly not be the composition of Xenophon, as the commentators generally affirm; but it has every appearance of being a work of the time.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 10. p. 23 C; c. 27. p. 37 E.

In the Cyropædia of Xenophon, an interesting anecdote appears, illustrating what was often meant by a father, when he accused Sokratês, or one of the Sophists, of "corrupting his son;" also the extreme vengeance which he thought himself entitled to take. (Cyropæd. iii. l. 14. 38. 40.)

The Armenian prince, with his newly-married youthful son Tigranes, are represented as conversing with Cyrus, who asks the latter—"What is become of that man, the Sophist, who used to be always in your company, and to whom you were so much attached?"—"My father put him to death."—"For what offence?"—"Affirming that he corrupted me: though the man was of such an admirable character, that even when he was dying, he called me, and said, 'Be not angry with your father for killing me, for he does it from no bad intention, but from ignorance; and sins committed

from ignorance ought to be reckoned as involuntary.'"—"Alas! poor man!" exclaimed Cyrus.—The father himself then spoke as follows; "Cyrus, you know that a husband puts to death any other man whom he finds conversing with (and corrupting) his wife. It is not that he corrupts her understanding, but that he robs the husband of her affection, and therefore the latter deals with him as an enemy. *Just so did I hate this Sophist, because he made my son admire him more than me.*" "By the Gods," replied Cyrus, "I think you have yielded only to human frailty (ἀνθρωπινὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἀμαρτάν). Forgive your father, Tigranes." Compare a similar train of thought, Cyropæd. v. 5, 28.

As marital jealousy was held, both by Attic law and opinion, to be entitled to the gratification of its extreme vindictive impulse, so the same right is here claimed by analogy for paternal jealousy, even to the destruction of a man of exemplary character. The very strong sympathy expressed with offended jealousy is a circumstance deserving notice, and suggesting much reflection. And if we apply the principle of the case to real life at Athens, we shall comprehend how it was that Anytus and other

against Sokratês of corrupting the youth. Now this circumstance had recently happened in the peculiar case of Anytus, a rich tradesman, a leading man in politics, and just now of peculiar influence in the city, because he had been one of the leading fellow-labourers with Thrasybulus in the expulsion of the Thirty, manifestating an energetic and meritorious patriotism. He (like Thrasybulus and many others) had sustained great loss of property¹ during the oligarchical dominion; which perhaps made him the more strenuous in requiring that his son should pursue trade with assiduity, in order to restore the family fortunes. He seems moreover to have been an enemy of all teaching which went beyond the narrowest practicality; hating alike Sokratês and the Sophists.²

While we can thus point out a recent occurrence, which had brought one of the most ascendent politicians in the city into special exasperation against Sokratês—another circumstance which weighed him down was, his past connexion with the deceased Kritias and Alkibiadês. Of these two men, the latter, though he had some great admirers, was on the whole odious; still more from his private insolence and enormities than from his public treason as an exile. But the name of Kritias was detested, and deservedly detested, beyond that of any other man in Athenian history, as the chief director of the unmeasured spoliation and atrocities committed by the Thirty. That Sokratês had educated both Kritias and Alkibiadês, was affirmed by the accusers, and seemingly believed by the general public, both at the time and afterwards.³ That both of them had been among those who conversed with him, when young men, is an unquestionable fact; to what extent, or down to what period, the conversation was carried, we cannot distinctly ascertain. Xenophon affirms that both of them frequented his society when young, to

Unpopularity arising from his connexion with Kritias and Alkibiadês.

fathers became so incensed against Sokratês and the Sophists of influence and ascendancy. The mere fact, that the youth became intensely attached to their conversation and society, would be often sufficient to raise bitter resentment, and was called by the name *corruption*.

¹ Isokrat. Or. xviii. cont. Kallimach. s. 30.

² See Plato, Menon, c. 27, 28. p. 90, 91.

³ Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34. p. 74. ὅτις Σωκράτην τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπαρτίζατο, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐπ' αὐτὴν πεποιθὲς, &c. Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, 21.

catch from him an argumentative facility which might be serviceable to their political ambition; that he curbed their violent and licentious propensities so long as they continued to come to him; that both of them manifested a respectful obedience to him, which seemed in little consonance with their natural tempers; but that they soon quitted him, weary of such restraint, after having acquired as much as they thought convenient of his peculiar accomplishment. The writings of Plato, on the contrary, impress us with the idea that the association of both of them with Sokratês must have been more continued and intimate; for both of them are made to take great part in the Platonic dialogues—while the attachment of Sokratês to Alkibiadês is represented as stronger than that which he ever felt towards any other man; a fact not difficult to explain, since the latter, notwithstanding his ungovernable dispositions, was distinguished in his youth not less for capacity and forward impulse, than for beauty—and since youthful male beauty fired the imagination of Greeks, especially that of Sokratês, more than the charms of women.¹ From the year 420 B.C., in which the activity of Alkibiadês as a political leader commenced, it seems unlikely that he could have seen much of Sokratês—and after the year 415 B.C., the fact is impossible; since in that year he became a permanent exile, with the exception of three or four months in the year 407 B.C. At the moment of the trial of Sokratês, therefore, his connexion with Alkibiadês must at least have been a fact long past and gone. Respecting Kritias, we make out less. As he was a kinsman of Plato (one of the well-known companions of Sokratês, and present at his trial), and himself an accomplished and literary man, his association with Sokratês may have continued longer; at least a colour was given for so asserting. Though the supposition that any of the vices either of Kritias or Alkibiadês were encouraged, or even tolerated, by Sokratês, can have arisen in none but prejudiced or ill-informed minds—yet it is certain that such a supposition was entertained; and that it placed him before the public in an altered position after the enormities of the Thirty. Anytus, incensed with him already on the subject of his son, would be doubly incensed against him as the reputed tutor of Kritias.

¹ See Plato (*Charmidês*, c. 3. p. 154 C; *Lysis*, c. 2. p. 204 B; *Protagoras*, a. 1. p. 309 A), &c.

Of Melêtus, the primary, though not the most important, accuser, we know only that he was a poet; of Lykon, that he was a rhetor. Both these classes had been alienated by the cross-examining dialectics to which many of their number had been exposed by Sokratês. They were the last men to bear such an exposure with patience; while their enmity, taken as a class rarely unanimous, was truly formidable when it bore upon any single individual.

Enmity of the poets and rhetors to Sokratês.

We know nothing of the speeches of either of the accusers before the Dikastery, except what can be picked out from the remarks in Xenophon and the defence of Plato.¹ Of the three counts of the indictment, the second was the easiest for them to support, on plausible grounds. That Sokratês was a religious innovator, would be considered as proved by the peculiar divine sign of which he was wont to speak freely and publicly, and which visited no one except himself. Accordingly in the 'Platonic Defence,' he never really replies to the second charge. He questions Melêtus before the Dikastery, and the latter is represented as answering, that he meant to accuse Sokratês of not believing in the gods at all;² to which imputed disbelief Sokratês answers with an emphatic negative. In support of the first count, however—the charge of general disbelief in the gods recognised by the city—nothing in his conduct could be cited; for he was exact in his legal worship like other citizens—and even more than others, if Xenophon is correct.³ But it would appear that the old calumnies of the Aristophanic 'Clouds' were revived, and that the effect of that witty drama, together with similar efforts of Eupolis and others, perhaps hardly less witty—was still enduring; a striking proof that these comedians were no impotent libellers. Sokratês manifests greater apprehension of the

Indictment—grounds of the accusers—effect of the 'Clouds' of Aristophanês, in creating prejudice against Sokratês.

¹ The Sophist Polykratês, a few years after the death of Sokratês, chose the accusation against him as a theme for composing an harangue, which Quintilian appears to have perused, accepting it as the real discourse pronounced in court by one of the accusers. It is plain from Isokratês, however,

that the harangue was only a rhetorical exercise, and, in his judgement, not a good one. See Quintilian, I. O. II. 17, 4; iii. 1, 11; and Isokratês, *Busiris*, s. 4. The Argument prefixed to this last oration is full of errors.

² Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 14. p. 26 C.

³ Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 64; i. 3. 1.

effect of the ancient impressions, than of the speeches which had been just delivered against him. But these latter speeches would of course tell, by refreshing the sentiments of the past, and reviving the Aristophanic picture of Sokratês as a speculator on physics as well as a rhetorical teacher for pleading, making the worse appear the better reason.¹ Sokratês in the 'Platonic Defence' appeals to the number of persons who had listened to his conversation, whether any of them had ever heard him say one word on the subject of physical studies;² while Xenophon goes further, and represents him as having positively discountenanced them, on the ground of impiety.³

As there were three distinct accusers to speak against Sokratês, so we may reasonably suppose that they would concert beforehand on what topics each should insist; Melêtus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lykon would dwell on the political grounds of attack. In the 'Platonic Apology,' Sokratês comments emphatically on the allegations of Melêtus, questions him publicly before the Dikasts, and criticises his replies. He makes little allusion to Anytus, or to anything except what is formally embodied in the indictment; and treats the last count, the charge of corrupting youth, in connection with the first, as if the corruption alleged consisted in irreligious teaching. But Xenophon intimates that the accusers, in enforcing this allegation of pernicious teaching, went into other matters quite distinct from the religious tenets of Sokratês, and denounced him as having taught them lawlessness and disrespect, as well towards their parents as towards their country. We find mention made in Xenophon of accusatory grounds similar to those in the 'Clouds'—similar also to those which modern authors usually advance against the Sophists.

Sokratês (said Anytus and the other accusers) taught young men to despise the existing political constitution, by remarking that the Athenian practice of naming Archons by lot was silly, and that no man of sense would ever choose in this way a pilot or a carpenter—though the mischief there arising from bad qualification was far less than in the case of the Archons.⁴ Such teaching (it was urged)

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 8. p. 19 B.

² Xen. *Mem.* i. 1, 13.

³ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 8. p. 19 C.

⁴ Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 9.

destroyed in the minds of the hearers respect for the laws and constitution, and rendered them violent and licentious. As examples of the way in which it had worked, his two pupils Kritias and Alkibiadês might be cited, both formed in his school; one, the most violent and rapacious of the Thirty recent oligarchs; the other, a disgrace to the democracy by his outrageous insolence and licentiousness;¹ both of them authors of ruinous mischief to the city.

Moreover the youth learnt from him conceit of their own superior wisdom, and the habit of insulting their fathers as well as of slighting their other kinsmen. Sokratês told them (it was urged) that even their fathers, in case of madness, might be lawfully put under restraint, and that when a man needed service, those whom he had to look to were not his kinsmen as such, but the persons best qualified to render it: thus, if he was sick, he must consult a surgeon—if involved in a lawsuit, those who were most conversant with such a situation. Between friends also, mere good feeling and affection was of little use: the important circumstance was, that they should acquire the capacity of rendering mutual service to each other. No one was worthy of esteem except the man who knew what was proper to be done, and could explain it to others: which meant (urged the accuser) that Sokratês was not only the wisest of men, but the only person capable of making his pupils wise; other advisers being worthless compared with him.²

He was in the habit too (the accusation proceeded) of citing the worst passages out of distinguished poets, and of perverting them to the mischievous purpose of spoiling the dispositions of youth; planting in them criminal and despotic tendencies. Thus he quoted a line of Hesiod—"No work is disgraceful; but indolence is disgraceful:" explaining it to mean, that a man might without scruple do any sort of work, base or unjust as it might be, for the sake of profit. Next, Sokratês was particularly fond of quoting those lines of Homer (in the second book of the *Iliad*) wherein Odysseus is described as bringing back the Greeks, who had just dispersed from the public agora, in compliance with the exhortation of Agamemnôn, and were hastening to their ships. Odysseus caresses and flatters the chiefs,

Perversion
of the poets
alleged
against
him.

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 2, 12.

² Xen. Mem. i. 2, 49-53.

while he chides and even strikes the common men; though both were doing the same thing, and guilty of the same fault—if fault it was, to obey what the commander-in-chief had himself just suggested. Sokratês interpreted this passage (the accuser affirmed) as if Homer praised the application of stripes to poor men and the common people.¹

Nothing could be easier than for an accuser to find matter for inculpation of Sokratês, by partial citations from his continual discourses, given without the context or explanations which had accompanied them—by bold invention, where even this partial basis was wanting—sometimes also by taking up real error, since no man who is continually talking, especially extempore, can always talk correctly. Few teachers would escape, if penal sentences were permitted to tell against them, founded upon evidence such as this. Xenophon, in noticing the imputations, comments upon them all, denies some, and explains others. As to the passages out of Hesiod and Homer, he affirms that Sokratês drew from them inferences quite contrary to those alleged;² which latter seem indeed altogether unreasonable, invented to call forth the deep-seated democratical sentiment of the Athenians, after the accuser had laid his preliminary ground by connecting Sokratês with Kritias and Alkibiadês. That Sokratês improperly depreciated either filial duty, or the domestic affections, is in like manner highly improbable. We may much more reasonably believe the assertion of Xenophon, who represents him to have exhorted the hearer “to make himself as wise, and as capable of rendering service, as possible; so that, when he wished to acquire esteem from father or brother or friend, he might not sit still in reliance on the simple fact of relationship, but might earn such feeling by doing them positive good.”³ To tell a young man that mere good feeling would be totally insufficient, unless he were prepared and competent to carry it into action—is a lesson which few parents would wish to discourage. Nor would

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56-59.

² Xen. Mem. i. 2, 59.

³ Xen. Mem. i. 2, 55. Καὶ παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὡφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ πατρός εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ ἀδελ-

φοῦ εἰς τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμέλῃ, ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται, ὑφ' ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τοῦτοισι ὡφελίμος εἶναι.

any generous parent make it a crime against the teaching of Sokratês, that it rendered his son wiser than himself—which probably it would do. To restrict the range of teaching for a young man, because it may make him think himself wiser than his father—is only one of the thousand shapes in which the pleading of ignorance against knowledge was then, and still continues occasionally to be, presented.

Nevertheless it is not to be denied that these attacks of Anytus, bear upon the vulnerable side of the Sokratic general theory of Ethics, according to which, virtue was asserted to depend upon knowledge. I have already remarked that this is true, but not the whole truth; a certain state of the affections and dispositions being not less indispensable, as conditions of virtue, than a certain state of the intelligence. An enemy therefore had some pretence for making it appear that Sokratês, stating a part of the truth as the whole, denied or degraded all that remained. But though this would be a criticism not entirely unfounded against his general theory, it would not hold against his precepts or practical teaching, as we find them in Xenophon; for these (as I have remarked) reach much wider than his general theory, and inculcate the cultivation of habits and dispositions not less strenuously than the acquisition of knowledge.

The charges touch upon the defective point of the Sokratic Ethical theory.

The censures affirmed to have been cast by Sokratês against the choice of Archons by lot at Athens, are not denied by Xenophon. The accuser urged that "by such censures Sokratês excited the young men to despise the established constitution, and to become lawless and violent in their conduct."¹ This is just the same pretence, of tendency to bring the government into hatred and contempt, on which in former days prosecutions for public libel were instituted against writers in England, and on which they still continued to be abundantly instituted in France, under the first President of the Republic (1850). There can hardly be a more serious political mischief than such confusion of the disapproving critic with a conspirator, and such imposition of silence upon dissentient minorities. Nor has there ever been any

His political strictures.

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦ- καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστῶσης πολι-
τους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἐφ' ἃ τοὺς νέους τείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βίαιους.

case in which such an imputation was more destitute of colour than that of Sokratês, who appealed always to men's reason and very little to their feelings: so little indeed, that modern authors make his coldness a matter of charge against him; who never omitted to inculcate rigid observance of the law, and set the example of such observance himself. Whatever may have been his sentiments about democracy, he always obeyed the democratical government; nor is there any pretence for charging him with participation in oligarchical schemes. It was the Thirty, who for the first time in his long life, interdicted his teaching altogether, and were on the point almost of taking his life; while his intimate friend Chærephon was actually in exile with the democrats.¹

Xenophon lays great emphasis on two points, when defending Sokratês against his accusers. First, Sokratês was in his own conduct virtuous, self-denying, and strict in obedience to the law. Next, he accustomed his hearers to hear nothing except appeals to their reason, and impressed on them obedience only to their rational convictions. That such a man, with so great a weight of presumption in his favour, should be tried and found guilty as a corruptor of youth—the most undefined of all imaginable charges—is a grave and melancholy fact in the history of mankind. Yet when we see upon what light evidence modern authors are willing to admit the same charge against the Sophists, we have no right to wonder that the Athenians—when addressed, not through that calm reason to which Sokratês appealed, but through all their antipathies, religious as well as political, public as well as private—were exasperated into dealing with him as the type and precursor of Kritias and Alkibiadês.

After all, the exasperation, and the consequent verdict of guilty, were not wholly the fault of the Diakasts, nor wholly brought about by his accusers and his numerous private enemies. No such verdict would have been given unless by what we must call the consent and concurrence of Sokratês himself. This is one of the most important facts of the case, in reference both to himself and to the Athenians.

The verdict
against
Sokratês
was
brought
upon him
partly by
his own
concur-
rence.

¹ *Plato, Apol. Sok.* c. 5. p. 21 A; c. 20, p. 32 E; *Xen. Mem.* i. 2, 31.

We learn from his own statement in the 'Platonic Defence,' that the verdict of Guilty was only pronounced by a majority of five or six, amidst a body so numerous as an Athenian Dikastery;—probably 557 in total number,¹ if a confused statement in Diogenes Laërtius can be trusted. Now any one who reads that defence, and considers it in conjunction with the circumstances of the case and the feelings of the Dikasts, will see that its tenor is such as must have turned a much greater number of votes than six against him. And we are informed by the distinct testimony of Xenophon,² that Sokratēs approached his trial with the feelings of one who hardly wished to be acquitted. He took no thought whatever for the preparation of his defence: and when his friend Hermogenēs remonstrated with him on the serious consequences of such an omission, he replied, first, that the just and blameless life, which he was conscious of having passed, was the best of all preparations for defence—next, that having once begun to meditate on what it would proper for him to say, the divine sign had interposed to forbid him from proceeding. He went on to say, that it was no wonder that the gods should deem it better for him to die now, than to live longer. He had hitherto lived in perfect satisfaction, with a consciousness of progressive moral improvement, and with esteem, marked and unabated, from his friends. If his life were prolonged, old age would soon overpower him; he would lose in part his sight, his hearing, or his intelligence; and life with such abated efficacy and dignity would be intolerable to him. Whereas, if he were condemned now, he should be condemned

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 25. p. 86 A; *Diog. Laërt.* ii. 44. Diogenes says that he was condemned by 281 ψήφοις πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολυούσων. If Diogenes meant to assert that the verdict was found by a majority of 281 above the acquitting votes, this would be contradicted by the 'Platonic Apology,' which assures us beyond any doubt that the majority was not greater than five or six, so that the turning of three votes would have altered the verdict. But as the number 281

seems precise, and is not in itself untrustworthy, some commentators construe it, though the words as they now stand are perplexing, as the aggregate of the majority. Since the 'Platonic Apology' proves that it was a majority of five or six, the minority would consequently be 276, and the total 557.

² *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8, 4 seq. He learnt the fact from Hermogenēs, who heard it from Sokratēs himself.

unjustly, which would be a great disgrace to his judges, but none to him: nay, it would even procure for him increase of sympathy and admiration, and a more willing acknowledgment from every one that he had been both a just man and an improving preceptor.¹

These words, spoken before his trial, intimate a state of belief which explains the tenor of the defence and formed one essential condition of the final result. They proved that Sokratês not only cared little for being acquitted, but even thought that the approaching trial was marked out by the gods as the term of his life, and that there were good reasons why he should prefer such a consummation as best for himself. Nor is it wonderful that he should entertain that opinion, when we recollect the entire ascendancy within him of strong internal conscience and intelligent reflection, built upon an originally fearless temperament, and silencing what Plato² calls "the child within us, who trembles before death"—his great love of colloquial influence, and incapacity of living without it—his old age, now seventy years, rendering it impossible that such influence could much longer continue—and the opportunity afforded to him, by now towering above ordinary men under the like circumstances, to read an impressive lesson, as well as to leave behind him a reputation yet more exalted than that which he had hitherto acquired. It was in this frame of mind that Sokratês came to his trial, and undertook his unpremeditated defence, the substance of which we now read in the 'Platonic Apology.' His calculations, alike high-minded and well-balanced, were completely realised. Had he been acquitted after such a defence, it would have been not only a triumph over his personal enemies, but would have been a sanction on the part of the people and the popular Dikastery to his teaching—which indeed had been enforced by Anytus³ in his accusing argument, in reference to acquittal generally, even before he heard the defence: whereas his condemnation, and the feelings with which he met it, have shed double and triple lustre over his whole life and character.

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 9, 10.

² Plato, Phædon, c. 60. p. 77 E.
ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς,
ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβείται. Τοῦτον

οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιάναι τὸν
θάνατον, ὥσπερ τὰ μωρολύκεια.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 29 C.

Prefaced by this exposition of the feelings of Sokratēs, the 'Platonic Defence' becomes not merely sublime and impressive, but also the manifestation of a rational and consistent purpose. It does indeed include a vindication of himself against two out of the three counts of the indictment—against the charge of not believing in the recognised gods of Athens, and that of corrupting the youth: respecting the second of the three, whereby he was charged with religious innovation, he says little or nothing. But it bears no resemblance to the speech of one standing on his trial, with the written indictment concluding 'Penalty, Death'—hanging up in open court before him. On the contrary, it is an emphatic lesson to the hearers, embodied in the frank outpouring of a fearless and self-confiding conscience. It is undertaken, from the beginning, because the law commands; with a faint wish, and even not an unqualified wish,—but no hope,—that it may succeed.¹ Sokratēs first replies to the standing antipathies against him without, arising from the number of enemies whom his cross-examining Elenchus had aroused against him, and from those false reports which the Aristophanic 'Clouds' had contributed so much to circulate. In accounting for the rise of these antipathies, he impresses upon the Dikasts the divine mission under which he was acting, not without considerable doubts whether they will believe him to be in earnest;² and gives that interesting exposition of his intellectual campaign, against "the conceit of knowledge without the reality," of which I have already spoken. He then goes into the indictment, questions Melētus in open court, and dissects his answers. Having rebutted the charge of irreligion, he reverts again to the imperative mandate of the gods under which he is acting, "to spend his life in the search for wisdom and in examining himself as well as others;" a mandate, which if he were to disobey, he would be then justly amenable to the charge

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2. p. 19 A. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴτι ἀμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστι. "Ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω δηρὰ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5. p. 20 D. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν καίρειν—εὐ μὲντοι ἴσατε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Again, c. 28. p. 37 E. 'Εάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ καίσεσθέ μοι ὥς εἰρωνευομένην.

of irreligion;¹ and he announces to the Dikasts distinctly, that even if they were now to acquit him, he neither could nor would relax in the course which he had been pursuing.² He considers that the mission imposed upon him is among the greatest blessings ever conferred by the gods upon Athens.³ He deprecates those murmurs of surprise or displeasure, which his discourse evidently called forth more than once⁴—though not so much on his own account, as on that of the Dikasts, who will be benefitted by hearing him, and who will hurt themselves and their city much more than him, if they should now pronounce condemnation.⁵ It was not on his own account that he sought to defend himself, but on account of the Athenians, lest they by condemning him should sin against the gracious blessing of the god: they would not easily find such another, if they should put him to death.⁶ Though his mission had spurred him on to indefatigable activity in individual colloquy, yet the divine sign had always forbidden him from taking active part in public proceedings. On the two exceptional occasions when he had stood publicly forward,—once under the democracy, once under the oligarchy,—he had shown the same resolution as at present;—not to be deterred by any terrors from that course which he believed to be just.⁷ Young men were delighted, as well as improved, by listening to his cross-examinations. In proof of the charge that he had corrupted them, no witnesses had been produced—neither any of themselves, who having been once young when they enjoyed his conversation, had since grown elderly—nor any of their relatives; while he on his part could produce abundant testimony to the improving effect of his society, from the relatives of those who had profited by it.⁸

“No man (says he) knows what death is, yet men fear it as if they knew well that it was the greatest of all evils;

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 29 A.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 30 B.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 30 A, B.
ολομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν
γενέσθαι ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρε-
σίαν.

⁴ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18. p. 30 B.

⁵ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18. p. 30 B.
καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούον-
τες—ἐάν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνετε τοιοῦτον
δυνατόν ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐπὶ μαίῳ

βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτοῦς.

⁶ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30 E.
πολλοὺ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπολο-
γεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ
ὑμῶν μὴ τι ἑξαμάρτυτε περὶ τὴν τοῦ
θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι·
ἐάν γάρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνετε, οὐ ῥαδίως
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, &c.

⁷ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 20, 21.
p. 33.

⁸ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 22.

which is just a case of that worst of all ignorance—the conceit of knowing what you do not really know. For my part, this is the exact point on which I differ from most other men, if there be any one thing in which I am wiser than they: as I know nothing about Hades, so I do not pretend to any knowledge; but I do know well, that disobedience to a person better than myself, either God or man, is both an evil and a shame; nor will I ever embrace evil certain, in order to escape evil which may for aught I know be a good.¹ Perhaps you may feel indignant at the resolute tone of my defence: you may have expected that I should do as most others do in less dangerous trials than mine—that I should weep, beg and entreat for my life, and bring forward my children and relatives to do the same. I have relatives like other men—and three children; but not one of them shall appear before you for any such purpose. Not from any insolent dispositions on my part, nor any wish to put a slight upon you—but because I hold such conduct to be degrading to the reputation which I enjoy: for I *have* a reputation for superiority among you, deserved or undeserved as it may be. It is a disgrace to Athens when her esteemed men lower themselves, as they do but too often, by such mean and cowardly supplications; and you Dikasts, instead of being prompted thereby to spare them, ought rather to condemn them the more for so dishonouring the city.² Apart from any reputation of mine, too, I should be a guilty man if I sought to bias you by supplications. My duty is to instruct and persuade you, if I can: but you have sworn to follow your convictions in judging according to the laws, not to make the laws bend to your partiality—and it is your duty so to do. Far be it from me to habituate you to perjury; far be it from you to contract any such habit. Do not therefore require of me proceedings dishonourable in reference to myself, as well as criminal and impious in regard to you; especially at a moment when I am myself rebutting an accusation of impiety advanced by Melétus.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 29 B. Contrast this striking and truly Sokratic sentiment about the fear of death, with the commonplace way in which Sokratés is re-

presented as handling the same subject in Xenoph. Memor. i. 4, 7.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 23. p. 34, 35. I translate the substance and not the words.

I leave to you and to the god, to decide as may turn out best both for me and for you."¹

No one who reads the 'Platonic Apology' of Sokratês will ever wish that he had made any other defence. But it is the speech of one who deliberately forgoes the immediate purpose of a defence—persuasion of his judges; who speaks for posterity, without regard to his own life—"solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."² The effect produced upon the Dikasts was such as Sokratês anticipated beforehand, and heard afterwards without surprise as without discomposure, in the verdict of guilty. His only surprise was, at the extreme smallness of the majority whereby that verdict was passed.³ And this is the true matter for astonishment. Never before had the Athenian Dikasts heard such a speech addressed to them. While all of them doubtless knew Sokratês as a very able and very excentric man, respecting his purposes and character they would differ; some regarding him with unqualified hostility, a few others with respectful admiration, and a still larger number with simple admiration for ability, without any decisive sentiment either of antipathy or esteem. But by all these three categories, hardly excepting even his admirers, the speech would be felt to carry one sting which never misses its way to the angry feelings of the judicial bosom, whether the judges in session be one or a few or many—the sting of "affront to the court." The Athenian Dikasts were always accustomed to be addressed with deference, often with subservience: they now heard themselves lectured by a philosopher who stood before them like a fearless and invulnerable superior, beyond their power, though awaiting their verdict; one who laid claim to a divine mission, which probably many of them believed to be an imposture—and who declared himself the inspired

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 24. p. 35.

² These are the striking words of Tacitus (Hist. ii. 54) respecting the last hours of the Emperor Otho, after his suicide had been fully resolved upon, but before it had been consummated; an interval spent in the most careful and provident arrangements for the security and welfare of those around him

—*ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis.*"

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25. p. 36 A. Οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν φήγων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. Οὐ γάρ ψιμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγων ἕσσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολλῶ, &c.

uprooter of "conceit of knowledge without the reality," which purpose many would not understand, and some would not like. To many, his demeanour would appear to betray an insolence not without analogy to Alkibiadès or Kritias, with whom his accuser had compared him. I have already remarked, in reference to his trial, that considering the number of personal enemies whom he made, the wonder is, not that he was tried at all, but that he was not tried until so late in his life: I now remark, in reference to the verdict, that, considering his speech before the Dikastery, we cannot be surprised that he was found guilty, but only that such verdict passed by so small a majority as five or six.¹

That the condemnation of Sokratès was brought on distinctly by the tone and tenor of his defence —is the express testimony of Xenophon. "Other persons on trial (he says) defended themselves in such manner as to conciliate the favour of the Dikasts, or flatter, or entreat them, contrary to the laws, and thus obtained acquittal. But Sokratès would resort to nothing of this customary

Assertion of Xenophon that Sokratès might have been acquitted if he had chosen it.

¹ Respecting the death of Sokratès, M. Cousin observes as follows (in his translation of Plato, tom. i. p. 58. Preface to the Apology of Sokrates):—

"Il y a plus: on voit qu'il a reconnu la nécessité de sa mort. Il dit expressément qu'il ne servirait à rien de l'absoudre, parce qu'il est décidé à mériter de nouveau l'accusation maintenant portée contre lui: que l'exil même ne peut le sauver, ses principes qu'il n'abandonnera jamais, et sa mission, qu'il poursuivra partout, devant le mettre toujours et partout dans la situation où il est: qu'enfin, il est inutile de reculer devant la nécessité, qu'il faut que sa destinée s'accomplisse, et que sa mort est venue. Socrate avait raison: sa mort était forcée, et le résultat inévitable de la lutte qu'il avait engagée contre le dogmatisme religieux et la fausse sagesse de son temps. C'est l'esprit de ce

temps, et non pas Anytus, ni l'Aréopage, qui a mis en cause et condamné Socrate. Anytus, il faut le dire, étoit un citoyen recommandable: l'Aréopage, un tribunal équitable et modéré: et, s'il falloit s'étonner de quelque chose, ce seroit que Socrate ait été accusé si tard, et qu'il n'ait pas été condamné à une plus forte majorité."

[It is proper to remark, that Sokratès was tried before the Dikastery, not before the Areopagus.]

I am happy also to add, to the same effect, the judgement of another estimable authority—Professor Maurice, in his recent work—*Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*—(Part. i. Ancient Philosophy, chap. vi. div. ii. sect. 2. 15):—

"How can such a man as Sokrates, it has been often asked, have been compelled to drink hemlock? Must not the restored democracy of Athens have been worse, and

practice of the Dikastery contrary to the laws. Though *he might easily have been let off by the Dikasts, if he would have done anything of the kind even moderately*, he preferred rather to adhere to the laws and die, than to save his life by violating them.¹ Now no one in Athens except Sokratēs, probably, would have construed the laws as requiring the tone of oration which he adopted; nor would he himself have so construed them, if he had been twenty years younger, with less of acquired dignity, and more years of possible usefulness open before him. Without debasing himself by unbecoming flattery or supplication, he would have avoided lecturing them as a master and superior²—or ostentatiously asserting a divine mission for purposes which they would hardly understand—or an independence of their verdict which they might construe as defiance. The rhetor Lysias is said to have sent to him a composed speech for his defence, which he declined to use, not thinking it suitable to his dignity. But such a man as Lysias would hardly compose what would lower the dignity even of the loftiest client—though he would look to the result also; nor is there any doubt that if Sokratēs had pronounced it—or even a much less able speech, if inoffensive—he would have been acquitted. Quintilian³ indeed expresses his satisfaction that Sokratēs maintained that towering dignity which brought out the rarest and most exalted of his attributes, but which at the same time renounced all chance of acquittal. Few persons will dissent from this criticism: but when we look at the sentence, as we ought in fairness to do, from the point of view of the Dikasts,

more intolerant, than any power which ever existed on earth? Mr. Grote answers, we think, most reasonably, that the wonder is, how such a man should have been suffered to go on teaching for so long. No state, he adds, ever showed so much tolerance for differences of opinion as Athens."

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 4. 'Ἐκείνος οὐδὲν ἡθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι· ἀλλὰ ῥαδίως ἐν ἀρεταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προσέλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

² Cicero (de Orat. i. 54, 281)—"Socrates ita in iudicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicium." So Epiktētus also remarked, in reference to the defence of Sokratēs—"By all means, abstain from supplication for mercy; but do not put it specially forward, that you *will* abstain, unless you intend, like Sokratēs, purposely to provoke the judges" (Arrian, Epiktēt. Diss. ii. 2, 18).

³ Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii. 15, 30; xi. 1, 10; Diog. Laërt. ii. 40.

justice will compel us to admit that Sokratês deliberately brought it upon himself.

If the verdict of guilty was thus brought upon Sokratês by his own consent and cooperation, much more may the same remark be made respecting the capital sentence which followed it. In Athenian procedure, the penalty inflicted was determined by a separate vote of the Dikasts, taken after the verdict of guilty. The accuser having named the penalty which he thought suitable, the accused party on his side named some lighter penalty upon himself; and between these two the Dikasts were called on to make their option—no third proposition being admissible. The prudence of an accused party always induced him to propose, even against himself, some measure of punishment which the Dikasts might be satisfied to accept, in preference to the heavier sentence invoked by his antagonist.

The sentence—how passed in Athenian procedure.

Now Melêtus, in his indictment and speech against Sokratês, had called for the infliction of capital punishment. It was for Sokratês to make his own counter-proposition: and the very small majority, by which the verdict had been pronounced, afforded sufficient proof that the Dikasts were noway inclined to sanction the extreme penalty against him. They doubtless anticipated, according to the uniform practice before the Athenian courts of justice, that he would suggest some lesser penalty—fine, imprisonment, exile, disfranchisement, &c. And had he done this purely and simply, there can be little doubt that the proposition would have passed. But the language of Sokratês, after the verdict, was in a strain yet higher than before it; and his resolution to adhere to his own point of view, disdaining the smallest abatement or concession, only the more emphatically pronounced. "What counter-proposition shall I make to you (he said) as a substitute for the penalty of Melêtus? Shall I name to you the treatment which I think I deserve at your hands? In that case, my proposition would be that I should be rewarded with a subsistence at the public expense in the Prytaneum; for that is what I really deserve as a public benefactor—one who has neglected all thought of his own affairs, and embraced

Sokratês is called upon to propose some counter-penalty against himself—his behaviour.

voluntary poverty, in order to devote himself to your best interests, and to admonish you individually on the serious necessity of mental and moral improvement. Assuredly I cannot admit that I have deserved from you any evil whatever; nor would it be reasonable in me to propose exile or imprisonment, which I know to be certain and considerable evils—in place of death, which may perhaps be not an evil, but a good. I might indeed propose to you a pecuniary fine; for the payment of *that* would be no evil. But I am poor and have no money: all that I could muster might perhaps amount to a mina; and I therefore propose to you a fine of one mina, as punishment on myself. Plato, and my other friends near me, desire me to increase this sum to thirty minæ, and they engage to pay it for me. A fine of thirty minæ, therefore, is the counter-penalty which I submit for your judgement.”¹

Subsistence in the Prytaneum at the Public expense, was one of the greatest honorary distinctions which the citizens of Athens ever conferred; an emphatic token of public gratitude. That Sokratês therefore should proclaim himself worthy of such an honour, and talk of assessing it upon himself in lieu of a punishment, before the very Dikasts who had just passed against him a verdict of guilty—would be received by them as nothing less than a deliberate insult; a defiance of judicial authority, which it was their duty to prove, to an opinionated and haughty citizen, that he could not commit with impunity. The persons who heard his language with the greatest distress, were doubtless Plato, Krito, and his other friends around him; who, though sympathising with him fully, knew well that he was assuring the success of the proposition of Melêtus,² and would regret that he should thus throw away his life by what they would think an ill-placed and unnecessary self-exaltation. Had he proposed, with little or no preface, the substitute-fine of thirty minæ with which this part of his speech concluded, there is every reason for believing that the majority of Dikasts would have voted for it.

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 26, 27, 28. from the emphatic language of the p. 37, 38. I give, as well as I can, original.
the substantive propositions, apart ² See Plato, *Krito*, c. 5. p. 45 B.

The sentence of death passed against him, by what majority we do not know. But Sokratēs neither altered his tone, nor manifested any regret for the language by which he had himself seconded the purpose of his accusers. On the contrary, he told the Dikasts, in a short address prior to his departure for the prison, that he was satisfied both with his own conduct and with the result. The divine sign (he said) which was wont to restrain him, often on very small occasions, both in deeds and in words—had never manifested itself once to him, throughout the whole day, neither when he came thither at first, nor at any one point throughout his whole discourse. The tacit acquiescence of this infallible monitor satisfied him not only that he had spoken rightly, but that the sentence passed was in reality no evil to him; that to die now was the best thing which could befall him.¹ Either death was tantamount to a sound, perpetual, and dreamless sleep—which in his judgement would be no loss, but rather a gain, compared with the present life; or else, if the common mythes were true, death would transfer him to a second life in Hades, where he would find all the heroes of the Trojan War, and of the past generally—so as to pursue in conjunction with them the business of mutual cross-examination, and debate on ethical progress and perfection.²

There can be no doubt that the sentence really appeared to Sokratēs in this point of view, and to his friends also, after the event had happened—though doubtless not at the time when they were about to lose him. He took his line of defence advisedly, and with full knowledge of the result. It supplied him with the fittest of all opportunities for manifesting, in an impressive manner, both his personal ascendancy over human fears and weakness, and the dignity of what he believed to be his divine mission. It took him away in his full grandeur and glory, like the setting of the tropical sun, at a moment when senile decay might be looked upon as close at hand. He calculated that his defence and bearing on the trial would be the most emphatic lesson which he could possibly read to the youth of Athens; more emphatic, probably, than

Sentence of death—
resolute
adherence
of Sokratēs
to his own
convictions.

Satisfaction
of Sokratēs
with the
sentence,
on deliber-
ate conviction.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 31. p. 40 B; c. 33. p. 41 D.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 32, p. 40 C; p. 41 B.

the sum total of those lessons which his remaining life might suffice to give, if he shaped his defence otherwise. This anticipation of the effect of the concluding scene of his life, setting the seal on all his prior discourses, manifests itself in portions of his concluding words to the Dikasts, wherein he tells them that they will not, by putting him to death, rid themselves of the importunity of the cross-examining Elenchus; that numbers of young men, more restless and obtrusive than he, already carried within them that impluse, which they would now proceed to apply; his superiority having hitherto kept them back.¹ It was thus the persuasion of Sokratês, that his removal would be the signal for numerous apostles, putting forth with increased energy that process of interrogatory test and spur to which he had devoted his life, and which doubtless was to him far dearer and more sacred than his life. Nothing could be more effective than his lofty bearing on his trial, for inflaming the enthusiasm of young men thus predisposed; and the loss of life was to him compensated by the missionary successors whom he calculated on leaving behind.

Under ordinary circumstances, Sokratês would have drunk the cup of hemlock in the prison, on the day after his trial. But it so happened that the day of his sentence was immediately after that on which the sacred ship started on its yearly ceremonial pilgrimage from Athens to Delos, for the festival of Apollo. Until the return of this vessel to Athens, it was accounted unholy to

Sokratês in prison for thirty days—he refuses to accept the means of escape—his serene death.

put any person to death by public authority. Accordingly, Sokratês remained in prison—and we are pained to read, actually with chains on his legs—during the interval that this ship was absent, thirty days altogether. His friends and companions had free access to him, passing nearly all their time with him in the prison; and Kritô had even arranged a scheme for procuring his escape, by a bribe to the gaoler. This scheme was only prevented from taking effect by the decided refusal of Sokratês to become a party in any breach of the law;² a resolution, which we should expect as a matter of course, after the line which he had taken in his defence. His days were spent in the prison in discourse respecting ethical and human subjects, which had formed the charm and occupation of his previous life: it is

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 30. p. 39 C.

² Plato, *Krito*, c. 2, § seq.

to the last of these days that his conversation with Simmias, Kebês, and Phædon, on the immortality of the soul, is referred in the Platonic Dialogue called 'Phædon.' Of that conversation the main topics and doctrines are Platonic rather than Sokratic. But the picture which the dialogue presents of the temper and state of mind of Sokratês, during the last hours of his life, is one of immortal beauty and interest, exhibiting his serene and even playful equanimity, amidst the uncontrollable emotions of his surrounding friends—the genuine unforced persuasion, governing both his words and his acts, of what he had pronounced before the Dikasts, that the sentence of death was no calamity to him¹—and the unabated maintenance of that earnest interest in the improvement of man and society, which had for so many years formed both his paramount motive and his active occupation. The details of the last scene are given with minute fidelity, even down to the moment of his dissolution; and it is consoling to remark that the cup of hemlock (the means employed for executions by public order at Athens) produced its effect by steps far more exempt from suffering than any natural death which was likely to befall him. Those who have read what has been observed above respecting the strong religious persuasions of Sokratês, will not be surprised to hear that his last words, addressed to Krito immediately before he passed into a state of insensibility, were—"Krito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius: discharge the debt, and by no means omit it."²

Thus perished the "parens philosophiæ"—the first of Ethical philosophers; a man who opened to Originality Science both new matter, alike copious and of Sokratês. valuable—and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators, speculative philosophers, historians, &c., yet other countries, having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and surpassed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Sokratês, either in or out of the Grecian world? The cross-examining Elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such matchless effect and to such noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, c. 77. p. 84 E. ² Plato, *Phædon*, c. 155. p. 118 A.

conversation in the prison; for even his great successor Plato was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow; much less, sure enough to use it as he did. His life remains as the only evidence, but a very satisfactory evidence, how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation; how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire—how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power.

It has been often customary to exhibit Sokratês as a moral preacher, in which character probably he has acquired to himself the general reverence attached to his name. This is indeed a true attribute, but not the characteristic or salient attribute, nor that by which he permanently worked on mankind. On the other hand, Arkesilaus, and the New Academy,¹ a century and more afterwards, thought that they were following

Views taken of Sokratês as a moral preacher and as a sceptic—the first inadequate—the second incorrect.

¹ Cicero, *Academ. Post.* i. 12, 44. "Cum Zenone Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinaciâ aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur), sed earum rerum obscuritate, quæ ad confessionem ignorantis adduxerant Socratem, et jam ante Socratem, Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt. . . . Itaque Arcesilas negabat, esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere in occulto." Compare *Academ. Prior.* ii. 23, 74; de *Nat. Deor.* i. 5, 11.

In another passage (*Academ. Post.* i. 4, 17) Cicero speaks (or rather introduces Varro as speaking) rather confusedly. He talks of "illam Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nullâ affirmatione adhibitâ, consuetudinem disserendi;" but a few lines before, he had said what implies that men might (in the opinion of Sokratês)

come to learn and know what belonged to human conduct and human duties.

Again (in *Tusc. Disp.* i. 4, 8) he admits that Sokratês had a positive ulterior purpose in his negative questioning—"vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi: nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur."

Tennemann (*Gesch. der Philos.* ii. 5. vol. ii. p. 169-175) seeks to make out considerable analogy between Sokratês and Pyrrho. But it seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far—that both agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical (see the verses of Timon upon Pyrrho, *Diog. Laërt.* ix. 65). But in regard to Ethics, the two differed materially. Sokratês maintained that Ethics were a matter of science, and the proper subject of study. Pyrrho on the other hand seems to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and science just as unattainable,

the example of Sokratês (and Cicero seems to have thought so too) when they reasoned against everything—and when they laid it down as a system, that against every affirmative position, an equal force of negative argument might be brought up as counterpoise. Now this view of Sokratês is, in my judgement, not merely partial, but incorrect. He entertained no such systematic distrust of the powers of the mind to attain certainty. He laid down a clear (though erroneous) line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. About physics, he was more than a sceptic—he thought that man could know nothing: the gods did not intend that man should acquire any such information, and therefore managed matters in such a way as to be beyond his ken, for all except the simplest phænomena of daily wants: moreover, not only man could not acquire such information, but ought not to labour after it. But respecting the topics which concern man and society, the views of Sokratês were completely the reverse. This was the field which the gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, but to human study and acquisition of knowledge; a field, wherein, with that view, they managed phænomena on principles of constant and observable sequence, so that every man who took the requisite pains might know them. Nay, Sokratês went a step further—and this forward step is the fundamental conviction upon which all his missionary impulse hinges. He thought that every man not only might know these things, but ought to know them; that he could not possibly act well, unless he did know them; and that it was his imperious duty to learn them as he would learn a profession: otherwise he was nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable being. Sokratês felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent,—unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety, and patriotism, &c., really were. He was possessed with the truly Baconian idea, that the power of steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the rational comprehension of moral ends and means. But when he looked at the minds around him, he perceived that few or none either had any such comprehension, or had ever studied to acquire it—

upon Ethics as upon Physics; that except feelings, and nothing cultivated except good dispositions.

yet at the same time every man felt persuaded that he did possess it, and acted confidently upon such persuasion. Here then Sokratês found that the first outwork for him to surmount, was, that universal "conceit of knowledge without the reality," against which he declares such emphatic war; and against which, also, though under another form of words and in reference to other subjects, Bacon declares war not less emphatically, two thousand years afterwards—"Opinio copiæ inter causas inopiæ est." Sokratês found that those notions respecting human and social affairs, on which each man relied and acted, were nothing but spontaneous products of the "intellectus sibi permissus,"—of the intellect left to itself, either without any guidance, or with only the blind guidance of sympathies, antipathies, authority, or silent assimilation. They were products got together (to use Bacon's language) "from much faith and much chance, and from the primitive suggestions of boyhood," not merely without care or study, but without even consciousness of the process, and without any subsequent revision. Upon this basis the Sophists, or professed teachers for active life, sought to erect a superstructure of virtue and ability; but to Sokratês such an attempt appeared hopeless and contradictory—not less impracticable than Bacon in his time pronounced it to be, to carry up the tree of science into majesty and fruit-bearing, without first clearing away those fundamental vices which lay unmolested and in poisonous influence round its root. Sokratês went to work in the Baconian manner and spirit; bringing his cross-examining process to bear, as the first condition to all further improvement, upon these rude, self-begotten, incoherent generalisations, which passed in men's minds for competent and directing knowledge. But he, not less than Bacon, performs this analysis, not with a view to finality in the negative, but as the first stage towards an ulterior profit—as the preliminary purification, indispensable to future positive result. In the physical sciences, to which Bacon's attention was chiefly turned, no such result could be obtained without improved experimental research, bringing to light facts new and yet unknown; but on those topics which Sokratês discussed, the elementary data of the inquiry were all within the hearer's experience, requiring only to be pressed upon his notice, affirmatively, as well as negatively, together with the

appropriate ethical and political End; in such manner as to stimulate within him the rational effort requisite for combining them anew upon consistent principles.

If then the philosophers of the New Academy considered Sokratês either as a sceptic, or as a partisan of systematic negation, they misinterpreted his character, and mistook the first stage of his process—that which Plato, Bacon, and Herschel call the purification of the intellect—for the ultimate goal. The Elenchus, as Sokratês used it, was animated by the truest spirit of positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment.¹

Sokratês, positive and practical in his end—negative only in his means.

There are two points, and two points only, in topics concerning man and society, with regard to which Sokratês is a sceptic—or rather, which he denies; and on the negation of which, his whole method and purpose turn. He denies, first, that men can know that on which they have bestowed no conscious effort, no deliberate pains, no systematic study, in learning. He denies, next, that men can practice what they do not know;² that they can be just, or temperate, or virtuous generally, without knowing what justice, or temperance, or virtue is. To imprint upon the minds of his hearers his own negative conviction, on these two points—is indeed his first object, and the primary purpose of his multiform dialectical manœuvring. But though negative in his means, Sokratês is strictly positive in his ends: his attack is undertaken only with distinct view to a positive result; in order to shame them out of the illusion of knowledge, and to spur them on and arm them for the acquisition of real, assured, comprehensive, self-explanatory, knowledge—as the condition and guarantee of virtuous practice. Sokratês was indeed the reverse of a sceptic: no man ever looked upon life with a more positive and practical eye: no man ever pursued his mark with a clearer preception of the road which he was travelling: no man ever combined, in like manner, the absorbing enthusiasm of a missionary,³

Two points on which Sokratês is systematically negative.

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 7. p. 11 A. τίς . . .

ἑαί δὲ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐκιδείξει, ὥσπερ τινὰς πόνοὺς πονοῦντος, &c.

² So Demokritus, *Fragm.* ed. Mul-lach, p. 185. Fr. 131. οὐτε τίχνη, οὐτε σοφίη, ἐφικτόν, ἢν μὴ μάθῃ

³ Aristotle (*Problem.* c. 30. p. 953 Bek.) numbers both Sokratês and Plato (compare Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 2) among those to whom he ascribes φύσιν μελαγχολικὴν—the

with the acuteness, the originality, the inventive resource, and the generalising comprehension, of a philosopher.

His method yet survives, as far as such method can survive, in some of the dialogues of Plato. It is a process of eternal value and of universal application. That purification of the intellect, which Bacon signalized as indispensable for rational or scientific progress, the Sokratic Elenchus affords the only known instrument for at least partially accomplishing. However little that instrument may have been applied since the death of its inventor, the necessity and use of it neither have disappeared, nor ever can disappear. There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that state of sham knowledge against which Sokratès made war: there is no man whose notions have not been first got together by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association—resting upon forgotten particulars, blending together disparates or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases, and oracular propositions, of which he has never rendered to himself account: there is no man, who, if he be destined for vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of self-education, to break up, disentangle, analyse, and reconstruct, these ancient mental compounds—and who has not been driven to do it by his own lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial Elenchus no longer stands in the market-place to lend him help and stimulus.

To hear of any man,¹ especially of so illustrious a man, being condemned to death on such accusations as that of heresy and alleged corruption of youth—inspires at the present day a sentiment of indignant reprobation, the force of which I have no desire to enfeeble. The fact

Condemnation of Sokratès—one of the misdeeds of intolerance.

black bile and ecstatic temperament. I do not know how to reconcile this with a passage in his Rhetoric (ii. 17), in which he ranks Sokratès among the *sedate* persons (*εὐδαίμονες*). The first of the two assertions seems countenanced by the anecdotes respecting Sokratès (in Plato, *Symposion*, p. 175 B, p. 220 C), that he stood in the same

posture, quite unmoved, even for several hours continuously, absorbed in meditation upon some idea which had seized his mind.

¹ Dr. Thirlwall has given, in an Appendix to his fourth volume (Append. VII. p. 526 *seq.*), an interesting and instructive review of the recent sentiments expressed by Hegel, and by some other emi-

stands eternally recorded as one among the thousand misdeeds of intolerance, religious and political. But since amidst this catalogue each item has its own peculiar character, grave or light—we are bound to consider at what point of the scale the condemnation of Sokratês is to be placed, and what inferences it justifies in regard to the character of the Athenians. Now if we examine the circumstances of the case, we shall find them all extenuating; and so powerful indeed, as to reduce such inferences to their minimum, consistent with the general class to which the incident belongs.

First, the sentiment now prevalent is founded upon a conviction that such matters as heresy and heretical teaching of youth are not proper for judicial cognizance. Even in the modern world, such a conviction is of recent date; and in the fifth century B.C. it was unknown. Sokratês himself would not have agreed in it; and all Grecian governments, oligarchical and democratical alike, recognised the opposite. The testimony furnished by Plato is on this point decisive. When we examine the two positive communities which he constructs, in the treatises 'De Republica' and 'De Legibus,' we find that there is nothing about which he is more anxious, than to establish an unresisted orthodoxy of doctrine, opinion, and education. A dissenting and free-spoken teacher, such as Sokratês was at Athens, would not have been allowed to pursue his vocation for a week, in the Platonic Republic. Plato would not indeed condemn him to death; but he would put him to silence, and in case of need, send him away. This in fact is the consistent deduction, if you assume that the state is to determine what is orthodoxy, and orthodox teaching—and to repress what contradicts its own views. Now all the Grecian states, including Athens, held this principle,¹ of interference against the

Extenuating circumstances—principle of orthodox enforcements recognised generally in ancient times.

nent German authors, on Sokratês and his condemnation. It affords me such satisfaction to see that he has bestowed such just animadversions on the unmeasured bitterness, as well as upon the untenable views, of M. Forchhammer's treatise respecting Sokratês.

I dissent however altogether

from the manner in which Dr. Thirlwall speaks about the Sophists both in this Appendix and elsewhere. My opinion, respecting the persons so called, has been given at length in the preceding chapter.

¹ See Plato, Euthyphron, c. 3. p. 3 D.

dissenting teacher. But at Athens, though the principle was recognised, yet the application of it was counteracted by resisting forces which it did not find elsewhere; by the democratical constitution with its liberty of speech and love of speech—by the more active spring of individual intellect—and by the toleration, greater there than anywhere else, shown to each man's peculiarities of every sort. In any other government of Greece, as well as in the Platonic Republic, Sokratês would have been quickly arrested in his career, even if not severely punished; in Athens, he was allowed to talk and teach publicly for twenty-five or thirty years, and then condemned when an old man. Of these two applications of the same mischievous principle, assuredly the latter is at once the more moderate and the less noxious.

Secondly, the force of this last consideration, as an extenuating circumstance in regard to the Athenians, is much increased, when we reflect upon the number of individual enemies whom Sokratês made to himself in the prosecution of his cross-examining process. Here were a multitude of individuals, including men personally the most eminent and effective in the city, prompted by special antipathies, over and above general convictions, to call into action the dormant state-principle of intolerance against an obnoxious teacher. If, under such provocation, he was allowed to reach the age of seventy, and to talk publicly for so many years, before any real Melêtus stood forward—this attests conspicuously the efficacy of the restraining dispositions among the people, which made their practical habits more liberal than their professed principles.

Thirdly, whoever has read the account of the trial and defence of Sokratês, will see that he himself contributed quite as much to the result as all the three accusers united. Not only he omitted to do all that might have been done without dishonour, to ensure acquittal—but he held positive language very nearly such as Melêtus himself would have sought to put in his mouth. He did this deliberately; having an exalted opinion both of himself and his own mission, and accounting the cup of hemlock, at his age, to be no calamity. It was only by such marked and offensive self-exaltation that he brought on the first vote of the Dikastery, even then the

Number of
personal
enemies
made by
Sokratês.

His con-
demnation
brought on
by himself.

narrowest majority, by which he was found guilty: it was only by a still more aggravated manifestation of the same kind, even to the pitch of something like insult, that he brought on the second vote, which pronounced the capital sentence. Now it would be uncandid not to allow for the effect of such a proceeding on the minds of the Dikastery. They were not at all disposed, of their own accord, to put in force the recognised principle of intolerance against him. But when they found that the man who stood before them charged with this offence, addressed them in a tone such as Dikasts had never heard before and could hardly hear with calmness—they could not but feel disposed to credit all the worst inferences which his accusers had suggested, and to regard Sokratês as a dangerous man both religiously and politically, against whom it was requisite to uphold the majesty of the court and constitution.

In appreciating this memorable incident, therefore, though the mischievous principle of intolerance cannot be denied, yet all the circumstances show that that principle was neither irritable nor predominant in the Athenian bosom; that even a large body of collateral antipathies did not readily call it forth against any individual; that the more liberal and generous dispositions, which deadened its malignity, were of steady efficacy, not easily overborne; and that the condemnation ought to count as one of the least gloomy items in an essentially gloomy catalogue.

Let us add, that as Sokratês himself did not account his own condemnation and death, at his age, to be any misfortune, but rather a favourable dispensation of the gods, who removed him just in time to escape that painful consciousness of intellectual decline, which induced Demokritus to prepare the poison for himself—so his friend Xenophon goes a step further, and while protesting against the verdict of guilty, extols the manner of death as a subject of triumph; as the happiest, most honourable, and most gracious way, in which the gods could set the seal upon an useful and exalted life.¹

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 3—

“Denique Democritum postquam
matura vetustas
Admonuit memores motus lan-
guescere mentis,

Sponte sua letho sese obvi-
uit ipse.”

(Lucretius, iii. 1052.)

It is asserted by Diodorus, and repeated with exaggerations by other later authors, that after the death of Sokratês the Athenians bitterly repented of the manner in which they had treated him, and that they even went so far as to put his accusers to death without trial.¹ I know not upon what authority this statement is made, and I disbelieve it altogether. From the tone of Xenophon's 'Memorabilia,' there is every reason to presume that the memory of Sokratês still continued to be unpopular at Athens when that collection was composed. Plato, too, left Athens immediately after the death of his master, and remained absent for some time: indirectly, I think, this affords a presumption that no such reaction took place in Athenian sentiment as that which Diodorus alleges; and the same presumption is countenanced by the manner in which the orator Æschinês speaks of the condemnation, half a century afterwards. I see no reason to believe that the Athenian Dikasts, who doubtless felt themselves justified, and more than justified, in condemning Sokratês after his own speech—retracted that sentiment after his decease.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 37, with Wesseling's note; Diog. Laërt. ii. 43; Argument. ad Isokrat. Or. xi. Busiris.

CHAPTER LXIX.

CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

IN my sixty-sixth chapter, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to the close of the Peloponnesian War, including a description of the permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression, the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of defeated Athens. The defeat of that once-powerful city, accomplished by the Spartan confederacy—with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard—left Sparta mistress for the time of the Grecian world. Lysander, her victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed however to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual consequences—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of the Persian Empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an illustration of Hellenic character and competence, measured against that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands pre-eminent and full of instruction.

This march from Sardis up to the neighbourhood of Babylon, conducted by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes Mnemon—was commenced

B.C. 401.
March of
the Ten
Thousand
Greeks.

about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October of the same year, that the battle of Cunaxa was fought, in which, though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.

The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of 19 years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which lasted nearly 40 years, fill up almost all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the place named Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus; who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother Darius Nothus mentioned above.¹

The wars between the Persian Empire and Athens as the head of the confederacy of Delos (477—449 B.C.), have been already related in one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian Empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus obscurely noticed in the

¹ See Diodor. xi. 69; xii. 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45; Aristotel. Polit. v. 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not very clear. Compare Justin, x. 1.

For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, App. 18. vol. ii. p. 313-316.

Fragments of Ktesias.¹ About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence—though probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country.² He was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C., was put down by Darius, and subsequently, a like revolt of the Kadusians.³

The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and the Persian Empire, continued without open violation, until the ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413 B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from Sparta to the Persian court, endeavouring to procure aid from the Great King during the early years of the war: communications so confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernês who was captured by the Athenians) complained of being unable to understand what they meant—no two Spartans telling the same story.⁴ It appears that Pisuthnês, satrap of Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernês was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap's mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.⁵ We find Tissaphernês satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations, jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnês, who occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.⁶

¹ Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.

² See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton (mentioned in the preceding note), p. 317.

There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at the battle of Kunaxa: on the other hand, there were other Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, i. 8, 9; ii. 5, 13; Diodor. xiii. 46; and the Dissertation of F. Ley, *Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum*, p.

20-56 (Cologne, 1830).

³ Xen. Hellen. i. 2, 19; ii. 1, 13.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταῦτά λεγαι.

This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiadês duped them at Athens (Thuc. v. 45). See above, in this History, ch. lv.

⁵ Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.

⁶ Thucyd. viii. 28. See ch. lxi. of this History.

Cyrus the younger in Ionia—his vigorous operations against Athens. The increased vigour of Persian operations against Athens, after Cyrus the younger son of Darius Nothus came down to the Ionic coast in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my sixty-fourth chapter; together with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active cooperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince soon became penetrated with their superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in furtherance of the war;¹ which during his absence was brought to a victorious close.

Youth and education of Cyrus. Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis (in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at the plain of Kastólus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernês.² We cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace—under the strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them, and upon him with peculiar success.³ It is contradicted by all the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the romance of the *Cyropædia* than to the *Anabasis*. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being intoxicated—Cyrus stood pre-eminent: and especially so when compared with

¹ Xen. Hellen. ii. 1, 14. Compare Hellen. i. 4, 3.

Xen. Econom. iv. 20.

² Xen. Anab. i. 9, 3-5. Compare

³ Xen. Anab. i. 1, 2; i. 9, 7; Xen. Cyropædia, i. 2, 4-6; viii. 1, 16, &c.

his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.¹ And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen—competence for alternate command and obedience—formed no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind: insomuch that on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled and repressed. How zealously he cooperated with Lysander and the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my preceding chapters.²

An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to himself. To cooperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate the good-will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he became to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear feasible to a young man of much less ardour than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favourite son of Queen Parysatis,³ who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to that event. And as this latter consideration had been employed seventy years earlier by Queen Atossa⁴ in determining her husband Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her son Xerxes as his intended

¹ Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. Anab. *ut sup.*

² See vol. vii. ch. lxiv. p. 377.

³ Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all except

Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, Persica, c. 49).

⁴ Herodot. vii. 4.

successor, to the exclusion of an elder son by a different wife and born before Darius's accession—so Cyrus perhaps anticipated the like effective preference to himself from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of the monarchy; whose memory every Persian revered. How completely he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use: but such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of Cyrus—sons of Hieramenês (seemingly one of the satraps or high Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor) by a sister of Darius—appeared in his presence without thus concealing their hands:¹ upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.

If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up from Sardis to Media, along with his bodyguard of 300 Greeks under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.² He also took with him Tissaphernês as an ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare in favour of Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the customary solemnities.

¹ Xen. Hellen. ii. 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii. 58.

Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii. 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota, c. 30. vol. iii. p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul's note.

It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either

Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes (instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors, without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from *Ξέρξου* to *Ἀρταξέρξου*.

² Xen. Anab. i. 4, 12.

Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused by Tissaphernês of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.¹ He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of de-throning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernês may well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.²

The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favourable to his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of employment: many others were driven into exile, by the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernês, with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernês, but had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution; for Tissaphernês, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately got together both an

Secret pre-
parations
of Cyrus for
attacking
his brother.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 1, 4.

² So it is presented by Justin, v. 11.

army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,¹ to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that they should be transferred from Tissaphernês to himself. Hence the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernês; an event not uncommon between two neighbouring satraps. Nor was it displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus occupied at a distance.²

Besides the army thus collected round Miletus, Cyrus found means to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at Sardis. He appears to have been banished (as far as we can judge amidst contradictory statements) for gross abuse of authority, and extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian harmost at Byzantium, and even for having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike appetite of Klearchus,³ procured for him the confidence of Cyrus, who gave him the large sum of 10,000 Darics (about 7600*l.*), which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian tribes in their neighbourhood: thus maintaining the troops until they were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family ever since the time

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 1, 6; i. 4, 2.

² Xen. Anab. i. 1, 7, 8. ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχρηστο (the king) αὐτῶν πολέμοις.

³ Xen. Anab. i. 1, 9; ii. 6, 3. The statements here contained do not agree with Diodor. xiv. 12; while both of them differ from Isokratês (Orat. viii. De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii. Panath. s. 111) and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.

I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to suppose

that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was taken, by Lysander after the battle of Ægos-potami (Xen. Hellen. ii. 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther, from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C. Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C.

of Xerxes, and were now in connection with Cyrus¹—received from him funds to maintain a force of 2000 mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with Cyrus by service during the late war—Proxenus, a Boeotian; Agias and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokratês, an Achæan, &c.,—were empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition against the Pisidians,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.

Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens, —and received a favourable answer. He farther got together a considerable native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well as to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like a candidate for command”—to use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Deïokês;² maintaining order and security throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil-doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity of rigour; of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.³ But he was also exact in requiting faithful

Strict administration, and prudent behaviour, of Cyrus.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 1, 10; Herodot. vii. 6; ix. 1; Plato, Menon, c. 1. p. 70; c. 11. p. 78 O.

² Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Deïokês) εἰς ἀνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, τοῦς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 1; Diodor. xiv. 19.

³ Xen. Anab. i. 9, 8. Πολλὰκις δ' ἴδεν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς σταθρομένας ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στρομεμένους ἀνθρώπους.

For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was

approaching near to Persepolis, “quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque, amputatis, inustusque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui ludibrium reservaverant,” &c. Compare Diodorus, xvii. 69; and the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix. 112; Ktesias, Persic. c. 54; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.

It is not unworthy of remark,

service, both civil and military. He not only made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached men to his person both by a winning demeanour and by seasonable gifts. As it was the uniform custom (and is still the custom in the East) for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand,¹ so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn assurance of fidelity for the future.² In all agreements, even with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was trusted by every one.

Of such virtues (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or modern)—and of such secret preparations—Cyrus sought to reap the fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for defence of the

B.C. 401.
Cyrus collected his army at Sardis.

that while there was nothing in which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the execution took place within the prison by administering a cup of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who reads the account of the death of Sokratēs, given by Plato at the end of the *Phædon*.

It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in England is more humane now than it was

in that day at Athens. Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures inflicted on Damians at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the Persian *σάφευσις*; described in *Plutarch*, *Artaxerx.* c. 16), in the presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window commanding a view of the *Place de Grève* was let at a high price, and filled by the best company in Paris.

¹ Xen. *Anab.* i. 9, 13.

² Xen. *Anab.* i. 6, 6.

towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a body of 7700 Grecian hoplites, with 500 light-armed.¹ Others afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native army of about 100,000 men. With such means Cyrus set forth (March or April 401 B.C.) from Sardis. His real purpose was kept secret: his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet, under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend cooperation from the sea-side.² This Lacedæmonian cooperation passed for a private levy effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the Great King.³

The body of Greeks, immortalised under the name of the Ten Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected perils—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for the most part persons of established position, and not a few even opulent. Half of them were Arcadians or Achæans.

The Ten
Thousand
Greeks—
their
position
and circum-
stances.

Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honourable and munificent dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as for themselves.³ All calculated on a year's campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 2, 2-3.

² Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 1.

³ Diodor. xiv. 21.

⁴ Xen. Anab. vi. 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλείστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπελευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφοράν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσαγγλωκότες

χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδε-
δρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ
καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς κτήματα
αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἤζοντες πάλιν,
ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ
Κύρου πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν.
Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς τὴν
Ἑλλάδα σωζέσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.

commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both the liberality of Cyrus' and the abundant promise for all men of enterprise.

Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to present him to Cyrus, whom he (Proxenus) "considered as a better friend to him than his own country:"² a striking evidence of the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian patriotism, which we shall recognise more and more as we advance forward. This able and accomplished Athenian—entitled to respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally—was one of the class of Knights, or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at the battle of Delium.³ Of his previous life we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of Sokratês; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokratês, I have made ample use of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his *Anabasis* (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.

On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the Thirty (how far he was personally concerned,

How Xenophon came to join the Cyreian army.

¹ Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (*Theocrit.* xiv. 50-59).

² *Xen. Anab.* iii. 1, 4. Ὑπάρχοντες δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσας· ὃν αὐτὸς ἔφη κραίτω αὐτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.

³ *Strabo*, ix. p. 403. The story that Sokratês carried off Xenophon

wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders, and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful to enter into the narrative.

Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἴππαις of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and great skill, in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as manifested in

we cannot say), it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokratês; who, apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went: but in truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking, "whether he ought to go or refuse,"—he simply put the question, "To which of the Gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?" The reply of the oracle—indicating Zeus Basileus as the God to whom sacrifice was proper—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokratês, though displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.¹ He was thus induced to stay, yet only as volunteer or friend of Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokratês, of rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished, this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban allies—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the sentence.

Though Artaxerxês, entertaining general suspicions of his brother's ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and

B.C. 401,
March or
April.

his published works—but also the fact, that his son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the combat of cavalry

which preceded the great battle of Mantinea (Diogen. Laërt. ii. 54).

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22-24.

Cyrus had masked his preparations so skilfully, that no marches from Sardis intimations were conveyed to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that —Kolossæ Tissaphernês, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person to warn the King; who began his preparations forthwith.¹ That which Tissaphernês had divined was yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the rest, —when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.² Three days' march, a distance stated at 22 parasangs,³ brought him to

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 2, 4; ii. 3, 19.

Diodorus (xiv. 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first revelation to Artaxerxês was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiadês. That the latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorus on more than one occasion confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernês.

² Diodor. xiv. 19.

³ The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia: in some parts, held equivalent to 30 stadia, in others to 40, in others to 60 (Strabo, xl. p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geograph. vol. i. p. 555). This variability of meaning is noway extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between English, Irish, and German miles, &c.

Herodotus tells us distinctly what he meant by a parasang, and what the Persian government of his day recognised as such in their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute (Herod. v. 53; vi.

43). It was 30 Greek stadia = nearly 3½ English miles, or nearly 3 geographical miles. The distance between every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to Susa (which was "all inhabited and all secure," ἐνδὲ οἰκισμένης τε ἀπασα καὶ ἀσφαλὲς), would seem to have been measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the march of Xerxes (vii. 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia and across the river Halys, through Kelênæ and Kolossæ to Sardis; and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from Sardis at least as far as Kelênæ, must have been so measured and marked.

Xenophon also in his summing up of the route (ii. 2, 6; vii. 8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to 30 stadia, while he gives, for the most part, each day's journey measured in parasangs. Now, even at the outset of the march, we have no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander's invasion: see Athenæus, x. p. 442, and Geier, Alexan-

the Mæander: one additional march of eight parasangs after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a

dri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the day's march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between Thapsakus and Pylæ—through the snows of Armenia—and through the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the desert of Arabia they marched 90 parasangs in thirteen days, or very nearly 7 parasangs per day—and that too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us further, that in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched 15 parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, 50 parasangs in seven days, or more than 7 parasangs per day. Such marches, at 30 stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon measure the distance marched over?

The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers—Major Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor Koch, &c., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr. miles: Mr. Ainsworth at 3 geogr. miles: Mr. Hamilton (*Travels in Asia Minor*, c. 42. p. 200) at something less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ geogr. miles: Colonel Chesney (*Euphrat. and Tigris*, ch. 8. p. 207) at 2.008 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at 1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa—at something less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain

basis to proceed upon, even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route of march: he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps 52 geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance 20 parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking upon official authority.

Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenés found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of the country traversed by Cyrus (*Strabo*, ii. p. 73).

Colonel Chesney remarks—"From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over 1265 geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles for each of the 535 parasangs given by Xenophon between these two places."

As a measure of distance, the

flourishing city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites, and 500 peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænians, and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,” with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of 1000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts, and 200 Kretan bowmen: at the same time Sophænetus arrived with 1000 further hoplites, and Sosias with 300. This total of Greeks was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ: 11,000 hoplites and 2000 peltasts.¹

As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight
 Peltæ— towards Pisidia, near the borders of which terri-
 Keramôn- tory that city is situated. So far therefore, the
 Agora, fiction with which he started was kept up. But
 Käystru- on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away
 Pedion. from Pisidia, in a direction nearly northward; first in two

parasang of Xenophon is evidently untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ, he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance: it is probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora and Käystru-Pedion (since I imagine that the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through these two places)—and possibly it may have continued even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs: and when he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called *that length of time* by the name of one, two, or three *parasangs*. Five parasangs seem

to have meant with him a full day's march; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long or very long day.

We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide the day into hours, or into any other recognised fraction. The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, vol. i. p. 239).

This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon's meaning, when he talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of distance.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i. 29, 2; Quint. Curt. iii. 1, 6.

days, ten parasangs, to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of thirty parasangs,¹ to a city called Käystru-Pedion (the plain of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no pay for three months (Xenophon had before told us that they were mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked round his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus by previous disbursements—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for the purpose of popularising himself—that he was

Distress of
Cyrus for
money—
Epyaxa
supplies
him.

¹ These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion—are the longest recorded in the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, Leipzig, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days' march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon's calculation, comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let in here: so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied six days' march instead of three: five parasangs per day. The whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That road (as we see by the march of Xerxes, Herodot. vii. 26; v. 52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion, Cyrus seems to

have left this great road; taking a different route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.

I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon's accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium: though several of the places which he mentions are not otherwise known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over a large region of country, are not of that age: the communications were probably all originally made, between one neighbouring town and another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places.

It was just about this time that

utterly without money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months' pay at once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond their maintenance.

Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army to Thymbrium; two more to Thymbrium
—Tyriæum
review of
the Greeks
by Cyrus. Tyriæum. Each day's march is called five parasangs.¹ It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics, greeves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.² Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on

King Archelaus began to "cut straight roads" in Macedonia—which Thucydides seems to note as a remarkable thing (ii. 100).

¹ Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium), which line of road follows a direction between the mountains called Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the south-west (Koch, *Der Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 21, 22).

² Εἶγον δὲ πάντες πρᾶνῃ χαλκᾷ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ χνῆμίδας, καὶ τὰς δασυδίας ἐκτεκαθαρμένους.

When the hoplite was on march,

without expectation of an enemy, the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with this blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. *Acharn.*, 1085, 1089-1149): it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-waggon (*Xen. Anab. i. 7, 20*). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers, could command attendants to carry their shields for them (*iv. 2, 20*; Aristoph. *l. c.*).

On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened, as before a battle (*Xen. Hell. vii. 5, 20*); then fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left arm, which was

the right; the other generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property—Epyaxa herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his own coming success.¹

Three days of farther march (called twenty parasangs in all) brought the army to Ikonium (now Ikonium—Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia; where Lykaonia Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for —Tyana. five days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like predatory character:² so that Cyrus would be partially realising the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus too approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here sent the Kilikian princess,

passed through the rings or straps attached to its concave or interior side.

Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shield, see a curious stratagem of the Syracusan Agathoklēs (Diodor. xx. 11). The Roman soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27).

It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cyreians, does not mention breastplates; which (though some-

times worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible that some of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms: but Xenophon states only what was common to all.

Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no shield.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 2, 16-19.

² Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 25.

together with Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,¹ in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days' march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana, or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of conspiring against him.²

This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it was yet 3600 feet above the level of the sea, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately defended.³ But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi, or companies, of the division of Menon, having dispersed on

¹ This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli: it led directly to the Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It is laid down in the Pentinger Tables as the road from Iconium to Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 *seq.*; Chesney, *Euphr. and Tigr.* ii. p. 209).

² Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 20.

³ Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 20. See Mr. Kinneir, *Travels in Asia Minor*, p. 116; Col. Chesney, *Euphrates and Tigris*, vol. i. p. 202-204; and Mr. Ainsworth, *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*,

p. 40 *seq.*; also his other work, *Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. ii. ch. 30. p. 70-77; and Koch, *Der Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 26-172, for a description of his memorable pass.

Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus, (Arrian. *E. A.* ii. 4; Curtius, iii. 9, 10, 11).

their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops: in return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were found.¹

It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that the resistance of Syennesis (this was a standing name or title of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown) was a mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus, and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case Artaxerxês should prove victorious.²

At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king. Besides

Syennesis
of Kilikia
—his dupli-
city—he
assists
Cyrus with
money.

Cyrus at
Tarsus—
mutiny of
the Greeks
—their re-
fusal to go
farther.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 2, 23-27.

² Diodorus (xiv. 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of Epyaxa.

So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two

sons of Philip II. of Macedon: "*Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude fraternâ juvenis—adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, ratî, fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adiungunt,*" &c. (Livy, xl. 5).

1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the purpose of the study. It states that the purpose is to determine the effect of the new law on the economy.

2. The second part of the report is a description of the methodology used in the study. It states that the methodology used is a survey of the economy.

3. The third part of the report is a description of the results of the study. It states that the results show that the new law has a positive effect on the economy.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion. It states that the conclusion is that the new law has a positive effect on the economy.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of references. It lists the sources used in the study.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of appendices. It lists the additional information included in the report.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of footnotes. It lists the footnotes included in the report.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of tables. It lists the tables included in the report.

9. The ninth part of the report is a list of figures. It lists the figures included in the report.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of other information. It lists other information included in the report.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

2. Once the problem is identified, the next step is to define the objectives and goals of the project. This helps to clarify what needs to be achieved and provides a clear direction for the team.

3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves breaking down the problem into smaller, manageable tasks and determining the resources needed to complete each task.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the strategy into action and monitoring progress regularly to ensure that the project is on track.

5. Finally, the fifth step is to evaluate the results of the project. This involves comparing the actual outcomes against the objectives and goals to determine the success of the project.

of the Department of the Interior
regard
Bureau of

the resentment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully affected the Spartan king Kleomenês,¹ a century before; most of them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.²

Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias, &c.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathised more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship—yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they could obtain it.³ Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself, with the cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.

On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent,

¹ See Herodot. v. 49.

² Xen. Anab. i. 2, 1.

³ Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 5-15.

and even weeping: a remarkable point in Grecian manners—and exceedingly impressive to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At length he addressed them—"Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor.

He tries persuasion—his discourse to the soldiers.

It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me 10,000 darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say: but I shall stand by you and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies: while you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand me well: I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune."¹

This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions sympathised, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that 2000 of them left their commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the encampment of Klearchus.

His refusal to march farther—well received.

Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered, sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He however at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at last—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer

Deceitful manoeuvres of Klearchus to bring the soldiers round to Cyrus.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I translate the sense rather than the words.

by fresh refusals. He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. "Soldiers (said he), we must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his soldiers, nor he our paymaster: moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged him—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest."

Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency: but their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. "If Klearchus does not chose to conduct us back (said this speaker), let us immediately elect other generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels—or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes." Klearchus here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus either for a guide or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted; which no one

yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their resolution accordingly.

To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphratês, twelve days' march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again consult what step was fit to be taken.

The soldiers agree to accompany Cyrus farther—
increase of pay.

The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.¹

This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal made to their reason and judgement—the habit, established more or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood, against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.

As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days' march—crossing the rivers Sarus² and

March onward—from Tarsus to Issus.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 3, 16-21.

² The breadth of the river Sarus

Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was joined by his fleet of 60 triremes—35 Lacedæmonian and 25 Persian triremes: bringing a reinforcement of 700 hoplites, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan ephors.¹ He also received a farther reinforcement of 400 Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army 14,000, from which are to be deducted the 100 soldiers of Menon's division, slain in Kilikia.

The arrival of this last body of 400 men was a fact of some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be 300,000 men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king's army. So great indeed was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior; abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria; 2, the pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus; 3, the passage of the Euphratês. He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syenesis with the invader.²

Cyrus had expected to find the Gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a

(Sci-hun) is given by Xenophon at 300 feet: which agrees nearly with the statements of modern travellers (Koch, *Der Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 34).

Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir's *Journey through Asia Minor*, p. 135; Col. Chesney, *Euphratês and Tigris*, ii. p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 54.

Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus

is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Ainsworth however differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 21.

² Xen. Anab. i. 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ ἤκουσε Κύρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, ἀναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ βραχυλὴν ἀπέλαυνεν, &c.

division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day's march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side, and the steep cliffs terminating Mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates: midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.¹ And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus, as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas, on the King's side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are successively abandoned: the Persians have no confidence except in vast numbers—or when numbers fail, in treachery.

Five parasangs, or one day's march, from this pass, Cyrus reached the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce, with its harbour full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging a merchant-vessel to carry them away with their property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathised. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added—"I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantman if I chose, and to bring them back. But I

¹ Diodor. xiv. 21.

will do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with me—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages, at Trallês:¹ but even these shall be given up to them, in consideration of their good behaviour down to the present day. Let them go, if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them.” This behaviour, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they were entering.²

At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his fleet,³ and striking with his land-force eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross Mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan, an eminently difficult road, which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have defended it, if he had chosen.⁴ Four days' march brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by the neighbouring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphratês. This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of the river Euphratês close to it, in latitude about 35° 40' N.⁵ The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.

Cyrus
marches
from the
sea to
Thapsakus
on the
Euphratês.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 4, 6.

To require the wives or children of generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen serving under Artaxerxês Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to bring up his son to the King as an hostage, without being demanded (Theopompus, Frag. 135 (ed. Wichers) ap. Athenæ.

vi. p. 252).

² Xen. Anab. i. 4, 7-9.

³ Diodor. xiv. 21.

⁴ See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützell's valuable notes on Quintus Curtius, iii. 20, 13. p. 101.

⁵ Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the Euphratês, can be satisfactorily made out

Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother—which to themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed them, in privy with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly

Practical
reluctance
of the army
—they ford
the
Euphrates.

(Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 36, 37).

Respecting the situation of Thapsakus—placed erroneously by Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed to Col. Chesney's Report on the Euphrates, and by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, *Erdkunde*, part x. b. iii.; *West-Asien*, p. 14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney's last work (*Euphr. and Tigr.* p. 213), in the excellent map accompanying that work; though I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus.

Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a noted point, to which observations and calcu-

lations might be conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers (see Strabo, ii. p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the river near Bir or Bihrejek (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.

The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, &c.

The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) "is celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anazeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side."

promised them five minæ per head (about 19*l.* 5*s.*), equal to more than a year's pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.

But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before the others had given any answer. "By acting thus (said he) you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him." Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, completely: for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately.¹ He passed with his whole army immediately afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.

What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphratês to have been never before fordable—always passed by means of boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of

Separate
manœuvre
of Menon.

Abrokomas
abandons
the defence
of the river
—his double
dealing.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 4, 12-18.

the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favour of Cyrus: "the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre." When we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.¹

After crossing the Euphratês, Cyrus proceeded for nine days' march² southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent the river Araxês or Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to

Cyrus
marches
along the
left bank of
the Eu-
phratês—
the Desert—
privations
of the army.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17) analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the Euphratês, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and the Parthian prince Tiridatês, in the reign of the Emperor Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).

The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphratês, must probably have been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphratês near this part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May: the period when they are lowest; is about the middle of

November (see Colonel Chesney's Report on the Euphratês, p. 5). Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September (Expedition of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a sort of mean height when Cyrus passed.

Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842: the steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphratês and Tigris had passed over it without difficulty in the month of May.

² Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty parasangs (Anab. i. 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus: which latter Xenophon gives

enter, following the banks of the Euphratês still farther southward. It was now that he entered on what may be called the Desert—an endless breadth or succession of undulations “like the sea,” without any cultivation or even any tree: nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.¹ Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’ march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants—probably however leaving the provision-dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;² since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphratês, without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures: efforts, in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.³ After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ, near the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.⁴ There was on the opposite side of

at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 38).

¹ See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the country, even at the present day.

² Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 24.

³ Xen. *Anab.* i. 5, 4-8.

⁴ I infer that the army halted here five or six days from the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his brother would not fight for ten days (i. 7, 16). This sacrifice must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during the distressing march which preceded. The ten days

the river, at or near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers crossed over (by

named by Silanus expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.

It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphratês, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude $35\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ and 34° —that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the Euphratês (p. 2), has the following remarks:—

"The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating aqueducts: these beautiful specimens of art and durability are attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers, and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove that the borders of the Euphratês were once thickly inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about 2 feet or 20 inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried various distances towards the interior, from 200 to 1200 yards.

"But what most concerns the subject of this memoir, is, the existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts. In

general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from four to eight feet high originally: but they are now frequently a bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons."

The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population and industry on the banks of the Euphratês at this part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road

means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.¹

It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division, subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of Menon's soldiers to be misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the river to his own tent, attended by a few

along the Euphratês began then to acquire great importance as the means of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator and his successors in the north of Syria and Asia Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, &c. This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphratês at Thapsakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphratês was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100, speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian's invasion, however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphratês, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well-cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence. (Ammian. Marc. xxiv. 1.) At the time of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, there was nothing to give

much importance to the banks of the Euphratês north of Babylonia.

Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphratês, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched through it—"full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphratês steamer on this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions: so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter." (*Travels in the Track*, &c. p. 81.)

¹ I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107) and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known town with which we can identify it.

followers only, through the encampment of Menon—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon's division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. "Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction—and of your own also, shortly after me. For if *your* force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the King." On hearing this (says Xenophon), Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter.¹

After passing Pylæ the territory called Babylonia began. The hills flanking the Euphratês, over which the army had hitherto been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.² Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of an hostile force moving in their

Entry into
Babylonia
—treason of
Orontês—
preparation
for battle.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 5, 11-17.

² The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and fertile

alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was a town near the pass, and named after it.

Now it appears from Colonel Chesney's survey that this alteration in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes (Euphratês and Tigrie, vol. i. p. 54)—"Three miles below

front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontês, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of 3000 hoplites. Orontês was examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.¹

After three days' march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of Greeks 10,400 hoplites, and 2500 peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, 10,000 men with 20 scythed chariots. The numbers of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of Artaxerxês at 1,200,000 men, besides the 6000 horse-guards commanded by Artagerxês, and 200 scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas, Tissaphernês, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.

In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals along with the lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this narrative are more

Discourse
of Cyrus to
his officers
and
soldiers.

Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through a tract of country almost level." Thereabouts it is that I am inclined to place Pylæ.

Colonel Chesney places it lower down, 25 miles from Hit. Professor Koch (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as 70 geograph-

ical miles lower than Hit (*Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 81): compare Ritter, *Erdkunde*, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi. p. 755-763.

¹ The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is extremely interesting (*Anab.* i. 6). I omit it from regard to space.

striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on other occasions.

"It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find in our native men. Behave well,—like brave men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at home envy you: though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my service to your own homes."

"Some of us are remarking, Cyrus (said a Samian exile named Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when danger is over. . . . As to ability (replied Cyrus), my father's empire reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my brother's friends; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present a wreath of gold."

Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him—"Do you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?" "Yes, by Zeus (was the reply): assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle." All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body.¹ Who shall presently see how this advice was followed.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 7, 2-9.

The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the *Persæ*, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics—but also their fidelity and sense of obligation, which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery of the latter;¹ connecting these superior qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendour of his own position—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus² in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception of free-citizenship—and of orderly self-sufficing courage, planted by a public discipline patriotic as well as equalising—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves, and that there was no man who had any rights of his own over them—that the law was their only master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for themselves.³ Cyrus knew where to touch the

¹ Xen. *Anab.* i. 5, 16.

² See Herodot. vii. 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of the Persian Achæmenès, c. 236.

³ Herod. vii. 104. Demaratus says

to Xerxes, respecting the Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροί γάρ εἰναι, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπειτα γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειαίνουσι πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.

sentiment of Hellenic honour, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once high-toned communities.

Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating the appearance of the King's forces. Nothing of the kind was seen, however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were evident. The day's march (called three parasangs) having been concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic prophet Silanus, and presented him with 3000 darics, or ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time: upon which Cyrus had told him—"If your prophecy comes true, I will give you 3000 darics. My brother will not fight at all, if he does not fight within ten days."¹

In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last day's march, he came to a broad and deep trench (30 feet broad and 18 feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphratēs as to leave an interval of only 20 feet for passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxēs across the plain, for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called the Wall of Media.²

Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—*Δηλοῖ δ' οὐ καθ' ἑνὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσχυροτέρα ὥς ἐστι χρεῖμα σπουδαίων· καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιτοικούντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαγθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῶς πρῶτος ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχό-*

μενοι μὲν ἐβελόκαχεον, ὡς δεσπότην ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐωυτῷ προθυμίοιο ἐργάζεσθαι.

Compare Menander *Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm. Græc. vol. iv. p. 268*—

Ἐλευθερος πᾶς ἐνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμφ·

Δοσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμφ καὶ δεσπότη.

¹ Xen. *Anab. i. 7, 14-17.*

² From Pylæ to the undefended

Present of
Cyrus to the
prophet
Silanus.

Cyrus
passes the
undefended
trench.

It had been dug as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it: so that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of 20 feet. This is

trench, there intervened three entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in the fourth day's march.

Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all. This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontès, who asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter to inform Artaxerxès that he was about to desert with this division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered the treason.

Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of Orontès must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time. And the very trial of Orontès appears to have been conducted under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.

Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks to have got over so much as 30 English miles of ground in the three entire days of march. The fourth day *they must have got over very little*

ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus was in momentary expectation of the King's main army, and of a general battle (i. 7, 14), but because of the great delay necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than 100,000 men), with baggage, chariots, &c., had to pass through the narrow gut of 20 feet wide between the trench and the Euphratès. He can hardly have made more than 5 miles in this whole day's march, getting at night so far as to encamp 2 or 3 miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about 32 miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision: so that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the straight line and the full windings of the river.

I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney's map; so that the triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume, why the trench was dug, was, to defend that portion of the well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay outside of the Wall of Media— which portion (as we shall see hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very considerable.

the first notice of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion—except the precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxès, after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much labour—provided a valuable means of resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers—and occupied it seemingly until the very last moment—throws it up from some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxès would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch that Cyrus himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.¹

On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they were surprised, at a spot called **Kunaxa**,² just when they were about to halt for the midday meal and repose, by the sudden intimation that the King's army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm

Kunaxa—
sudden appearance of the King's army—preparation of Cyrus for battle.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 7, 20.

The account given by Xenophon of this long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxès, and then left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of Diodorus (xiv. 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus. Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage; and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. Here is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this point of view, that it makes out the King to have

acted upon a rational scheme: whereas in Xenophon, he appears at first to have adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after immense labour and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see. Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one. Both the narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were facts of the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.

² Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was 500 stadia (about 58 miles) from Babylon; while Xenophon was informed that

himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks, on their side, halted and formed their line with all possible speed.¹ They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphratês; Ariæus, with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of 600 well armed Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the

the field of battle was distant from Babylon only 360 stadia. Now, according to Colonel Chesney (*Euphratês and Tigris*, vol. i. p. 57), Hillah (Babylon) is distant 91 miles by the river, or 61½ miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias,) we should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah. This seems the most probable supposition.

Bennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (*Mesopotamia and Assyria*, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly: moreover the latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my next chapter, in reference to that Wall.

¹ The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field of Kunaxa would be about 22 miles. First, 8 miles beyond the trench, to the first night-station: next, a full day's march, say 12 miles: thirdly, a half day's march, to the

time of the midday halt, say 7 miles.

The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at 32 miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be about 54 miles.

Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah Castle (two known points) at 48 miles of straight line, and 77 miles, if following the line of the river. Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ—and we shall then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of 44 miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not exactly, the windings of the river) will give 50 miles from Pylæ to Felujah, and 53 or 54 from Pylæ to Kunaxa.

In Plan II., annexed to this volume, will be found an illustration of the marches of the Cyreian army, as described by Xenophon, both immediately before, and immediately after, the battle of Kunaxa: from Pylæ to the crossing of the Tigris.

helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white cloud—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing until the armour began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernês was on the left, opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses: on his right stood the Persian bowmen, with their gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind them: next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front of all, was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.¹

As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front, and desired Klearchus to ^{Last orders} make his attack with the Greeks upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the King in person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxês in number, that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right—and merely replied to Cyrus that he would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked² how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently, that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.³ The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon—one of the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus—rode forth the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 8, 8-11.

² Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes

³ Thucyd. v. 70. See ch. lvi. of this History. this criticism upon Klearchus; and it seems quite just.

everyone that the sacrifices were favourable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was "Zeus the Preserver, and Victory."—"I accept it," replied Cyrus; "let that be the word:" and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.

The vast host of Artaxerxês, advancing steadily and without noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the Greek troops raised the pœan, or usual war-cry, and began to move forward. As they advanced, the shout of the Greeks on their side became more vehement, the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.¹ This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass. The left division of the King's army was thus routed without a blow, and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way of one of the chariots.² Tissaphernês alone—who, with the body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left, close to the river—formed an exception to this universal flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts who stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts, commanded by Episthenês of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any one themselves. Tissaphernês thus got into the rear of the Greeks, who continued on their side to pursue the flying Persians before them.³

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 8, 17; Diodor. xiv. 23.

² Xen. Anab. i. 8, 17-20.

³ Xen. Anab. i. 8, 23; i. 9, 81.

Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field. Artaxerxês, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of the Cyreians.¹ Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed; and received from everyone around him salutations, as if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,² but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse round him, watching the movements of Artaxerxês. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the centre, where Artaxerxês was in person, surrounded by the body-guard of 6000 horse under Artagersês. So vigorous was the attack of Cyrus, that with his 600 horse, he broke and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagersês with his own hand. His own 600 horse rushed forward in pursuit of of the fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few called his "Table-Companions" around him. It was under these circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxês, whose person had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,³ that he lost all thought of safety or prudence—cried out, "I see the man"—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to attack Artaxerxês, in spite of the numerous

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 10, 4-8.

² Xen. Anab. i. 8, 21.

Κύρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας το καὶ ταυτοὺς καὶ διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνοῦμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμφ' αὐτόν, οὐδ' ὡς ἐξήχθη διώκειν, &c.

The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-com-

mand of Cyrus.

³ Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Phæræ in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutias before Olynthus. —Hellenic. v. 3.

Impetuous
attack of
Cyrus upon
his brother
—Cyrus is
slain.

host behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxès did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his defence: Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by order of the King.¹

The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxès, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest was at an end: and so it was understood by Ariæus, who together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 8, 22-29.

The account of this battle and of the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, *Fragm.* c. 58, 59, ed. Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatès, the person who by order of Artaxerxès cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was destroyed by her in the same way.

Diodorus (xiv. 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, partly direct

and partly implied, from Xenophon.

Plutarch (Artaxerxès c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of Justin, v. 11.

Diodorus (xiv. 24) says that 12,000 men were slain of the king's army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus's Asiatic army at 8000 men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great number of peltasts—while hoplites could not have overtaken the flying Persians.

the King and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxês got into the camp, and began to plunder it without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian women—of free condition, good family, and education—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him by force from their parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner, and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxês; the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments,¹ and sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain under all circumstances of a supply.²

While Artaxerxês was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was joined by Tissaphernês and his division of horse, who had charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia, or 3½ miles, between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division; so far had

Plunder of
the Cyreian
camp by
Artaxerxês.
Victorious
attitude of
the Greeks.

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxês, have been exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell what may be the proportion of truth (see *Ælian*, V. H. xii. 1; *Plutarch*, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; *Justin*, x. 2). Both *Plutarch* and *Justin* state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxês and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But as that trans-

action certainly happened at the close of the long life and reign of Artaxerxês, who reigned forty-six years—and as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy, must have been something different.

Compare the description of the fate of *Berenikê* of Chios, and *Monime* of Miletus, wives of *Mithridatês* king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes of that prince (*Plutarch*, *Lucullus*, c. 18).

² Xen. Anab. i. 10, 17.

This provision must probably have been made during the recent halt at *Pylos*.

the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the King's troops had been victorious on the left and centre and were masters of the camp—but not yet knowing the death of Cyrus—Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy's forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position, Artaxerxês again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack him; but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.¹ It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.²

Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along
 Character of Cyrus. with it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and long-sighted combination—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for overcoming them—a dexterity in meeting variable exigences, and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers—a conviction of the necessity, not merely, of purchasing men's service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good faith—a power of repressing displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion and the first conspiracies of Orontês; although usually the

¹ Xen. Anab. i. 10, 18, 19.

² Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.

punishments which he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this portrait by Xenophon, with the description of the Persian satraps by Isokratês.¹ That many persons deserted from Artaxerxês to Cyrus—none, except Orontês, from Cyrus to Artaxerxês—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the judgement of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxês with the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him like a madman against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death two first cousins, because they omitted in his presence an act of deference never paid except to the King in person—this same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in regal families,² blinded him for the moment to all rational calculation.

¹ Isokratês, Orat. iv. (Panegyric.) s. 175-182: a striking passage, as describing the way in which political institutions work themselves into the individual character and habits.

² Diodorus (xiv. 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile brothers, Eteoklês and Polyneikês, as a parallel. Compare Tacitus, Annal. iv. 60. "Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem potentis, et solita fratribus odia, accendebatur invidia, quod mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat," &c.; and Justin, xlii. 4.

Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in

his *Life of Don Pedro of Castile*; a prince commonly known by the name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Trastamare.

At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, "Don Pèdre, qui, pendant le combat, s'était jeté au plus fort de la mêlée, s'acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait galopper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où l'on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le

We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestal the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organisation against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xenophon¹) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspês down to Darius Codomannus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out: none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.

carnage—"Oh est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?" (Histoire de Don Pèdre, p. 504.)


Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed

likely to prevail, if Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander.

This tragical scene (on the night of the 23rd of March, 1369) is graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 5. Ὑπισχεῖτο δὲ αὐτὸν (Ξενοφῶντα Πράξεως) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσας· ὃν αὐτὸς ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.

PLAN ILL IMMEDIATELY AFTER



This Plan is intended to show the Wall of Media, as well as of the
canals from the Tigris, but are accommodated to
the narrative of Herodotus, Vol. VIII.



CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

THE first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxês; and that if Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.¹

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared coming from Artaxerxês; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the service of the Persian king.² Phalinus, an officer of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernês,

Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus offers the throne to Ariæus.

Artaxerxês summons the Greeks to surrender—their reply—language of Phalinus.

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 5-7.

² We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias distinctly

asserted himself to have been present at this interview, and I see no reason why we should not be-

addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the King, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the summons of Phalínus by an emphatic negative. "If the King thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them." "The King (rejoined Phalínus) thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects."—"Our arms and our valour are all that remains to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still to have a fight for *your* treasure."¹ But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalínus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the advice of Phalínus himself; appealing to the common feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgement, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. "If (replied Phalínus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favour, in the event of a contest with the King, I should advise you to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against the King's consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only

lieve him. Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there: but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἣν δ' αὐτῶν Φαλίνοσ εἰς Ἑλλήν (ii. 1, 7) so strictly as to

negative the presence of one or two other Greeks. Phalínus is thus specified because he was the spokesman of the party—a military man.

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 12. μὴ οὖν οἶου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα ὑμῖν παραδῶσιν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μαχοῦμεθα.

quarter where it presents itself." Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined—"That is *your* opinion: now report our answer. We think we shall be better friends to the King, if we are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies—with our arms, than without them." Phalinus, in retiring, said that the King proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position—but war, if they moved, either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he intended to do.¹

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to Ariæus returned; communicating his reply that the Persian grandees would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning-sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the King—a prohibition, of which he now understood the reason, from having since learnt that the King was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach—but that it was favourable for re-joining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphratês, to the station where they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming symptom however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the King at the head of 340 of his countrymen, partly horse, partly foot.

Ariæus refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him for retreat.

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv. 25) is somewhat copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he certainly followed other authorities besides

Xenophon, if even it be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions, a spear.¹ The latter, besides the promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks in good faith down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to chose another road, which though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days' marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of the King's forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

They had now come 93 days' march² from Ephesus, or 90 from Sardis.³ The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, according to Colonel Chesney, about 1265 geographical miles, or 1464 English miles. There had been at least 96 days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been 189 days, or a little more than half a year:⁴ but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 2, 7-9.

Koch remarks however, with good reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in Babylon, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).

² Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab. ii. 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which we should obtain by adding together the separate days' march specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was

three days' journey (Herod. v. 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556; Koch, Zug der Z. T. p. 141.

³ Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii. p. 208) calculates 1265 geographical miles from Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Moham-med.

⁴ For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ, or opposite to Charmandé. I have given some grounds (in the preceding chapter) for believing that it

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious apprehensions.¹ In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphratês, without a blow: nay, the King had shrunk from defending the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very different character. How were they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle, would be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus:—yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or distances—without trustworthy guides—without any one to furnish or even to indicate supplies—and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphratês; nor does he indeed in his heart seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the King.² The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphratês, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30'—will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his course.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult Ariæus; who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised to conduct them

cannot have been less than five well as of provisions.

days. The army must have been ¹ Xen. Anab. i. 5, 9.

in the utmost need of repose, as ² Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 6, 7.

Position of
the Greeks
—to all
appearance
hopeless.

home by another road—longer indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they did;¹ yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy's horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 2, 13. Ἐπει γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐπορεύοντο ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον, λογιζόμενοι ἕξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι εἰς πώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐφύσθησαν.

Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter (Erdkunde, part x. 3. p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euphr. and Tigr. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from which I dissent. "When it was day, the army proceeded onward on their march, having the sun on their right hand"—these words they understand as meaning that the army marched *northward*: whereas in my judgement, the words intimate that the army marched *eastward*. To have the sun on the right hand, does not so much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direction of the day's march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus, iv. 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa, from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians, under the order of Nekos. These Phœnicians said "that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right hand"—ὡς τῇ

Διὸς περιπλύνοντες τὸν ἥλιον ἔσχον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ. Herodotus rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their *right* hand: any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar must, in his judgement, have the sun on the *left* hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See ch. xviii. of this History.

In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphratès (the place where they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and marching *northward*, could not expect to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so, if they marched *eastward*, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been something near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to the Euphratès.

array. Hence they did not reach the first villages before dark; these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamour, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a talent of silver.¹

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot ascertain;² since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy—and even the clamour and shouting of the camp during the night—so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanour. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure: then, having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had come from the King with instructions to propose a truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus replied abruptly—"Well then—go and tell the King, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce,

Heralds
from the
Persians to
treat about
a truce.

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic. See the references in Krüger and Schneiders's notes.

² Diodorus (xiv. 25) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide them towards Paphlagonia: a very loose indication.

without first providing dinner for them." With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the King, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the King thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to im-
 pose upon the Persians, Klearchus concluded
 the truce, and desired that the guides would
 conduct the army to those quarters where pro-
 visions could be had. He was most circum-
 spect in maintaining exact order during the
 march, himself taking charge of the rear guard.
 The guides led them over many ditches and canals, full
 of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation; some so
 broad and deep that they could not be crossed without
 bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the
 occasion, from palm-trees either already fallen, or ex-
 pressly cut down. This was a troublesome business,
 which Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar
 strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand, his stick
 in the right; employing the latter to chastise any soldier
 who seemed remiss—and even plunging into the mud and
 lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.¹
 As it was not the usual season of irrigation for crops he
 suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion
 expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them
 with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was
 anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these diffi-
 culties were no more than Grecian energy could easily
 surmount.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by
 their guides for quarters and provision; and
 here for the first time they had a sample of that
 unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian terri-
 tory, which Herodotus is afraid to describe
 with numerical precision. Large quantities of corn,—
 dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, fresh-
 ness, size, and flavour, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted,
 insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece,
 was disregarded and left for the slaves—wine and vinegar,

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 7, 13.

The heralds
conduct the
Greeks to
villages fur-
nished with
provisions.
March over
the canals.

Abundant
supplies
obtained in
the villages.

both also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quantity, brought upon himself and others.¹

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited by Tissaphernês, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a suite of slaves. Visit of Tissaphernês—negotiations. The satrap began to open a negotiation with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in favour of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate situation; that he had solicited the King's permission to save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the mean time to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty in realising what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favour or assistance. With this answer Tissaphernês departed, and returned on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King's permission to save the Grecian army—though not without great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was unworthy of the King's dignity, to suffer those who had assailed him to escape. "I am now ready

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 14, 17.

(said he) to conclude a covenant and exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country: if I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them." Well were the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their side—and by Tissaphernês with the King's brother-in-law on the other. Tissaphernês then left them, saying that he would go back to the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home; going himself to his own satrapy.¹

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly, and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne—that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who, though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxês, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that she showed favourable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.² It may seem probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernês (as will soon appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible;

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 18-27.

² Ktesias, Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved

by the so-called Demetrius Phalæreus; see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.

especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.¹ And Klearchus might say to his Grecian soldiers—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he afterwards conducted away from Syracuse²—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and well-organised to become at once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxês thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary to conciliate the goodwill of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when Tissaphernês left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so, as Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the King, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were painfully felt, in manifest coldness of demeanour on the part of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the King had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus replied—"I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our tents,

¹ Herodot. i. 193; ii. 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.

² Xen. Anab. v. 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.

it will be a breach of the convention, and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with provisions: we shall have no guides: Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphratês itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry, —while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our enemies. If the King, having all these advantages, really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”¹

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own complete despair of the situation —certainly a very natural despair—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernês.

That satrap however, after twenty days, at last came back, with his army prepared to return to Ionia —with the King’s daughter whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernês took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’ march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of Media, and passed through it,² prosecuting their march onward through the

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 3-8.

² Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 12. Διεθόντες δὲ τρεῖς σταθμούς, ἀφίχοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τείχος, καὶ παρήλθον αὐτοῦ εἰς ω. It ap-

pears to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced their march under the conduct of Tissaphernês. Who-

country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks cemented with bitumen, 100 feet high, and 20 feet broad; it was said to extend a length of 20 parasangs (or about 70 miles, if we reckon the parasang at 30 stadia), and to be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed at eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two great ship-canals, one of them over a permanent bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other. They were 100 feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphratês; or rather perhaps they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphratês to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighbouring bridge.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after supper, a man was brought

ever looks at Plan II., annexed to the present volume, will see that there could not be a distance equal to three days' march between the point from whence Tissaphernês began to conduct them, and any point of the Wall of Media at which they were likely to pass through it. And if the Wall of Media be placed two days' march farther to the southward, it cannot have had the length which Xenophon ascribes to it; since the two rivers come gradually nearer to each other. On the other hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under conduct of Arîæus, we can plainly trace three distinct *resting-places* (αἰθροῦς) before they reached the Wall

of Media. First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii. 2, 13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where they concluded the truce with Tissaphernês, and waited twenty days for his return (ii. 3, 14; ii. 4, 9). Thirdly, one night's halt under the conduct of Tissaphernês, before they reached the Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting-places, between the station (the first station after passing the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their retreat under the conduct of Arîæus,—and the point where they traversed the Wall of Media.

up who had asked for the former at the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from Arisæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them during the night—and also to send and occupy the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernês intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernês intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernês to frighten them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and the Tigris.¹

¹ I reserve for this place the consideration of that which Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall of Media and about different canals in connexion with the Tigris—the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands in my text.

I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across their line

of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphratês; through which gut the whole army passed. Xenophon says, "This trench had been carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four canals, 100 feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the Euphratês, they are distant each from the

Such an island was a defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to

other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them—Παρέτατο δ' ἡ τάφος ἄνω διὰ τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παρασάγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους, ἐνθα δὲ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἐνθα, which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption) εἰσιν αἱ διώρυγες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ ῥέουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὐρος πλεθριαῖται, βαθεῖαι δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγὰ· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ' ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ' ἔκτισιν." The present tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυγες—seems to mark the local reference of ἐνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the actual march of the army.

Major Rennell (*Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus*, p. 79-87, &c.), Ritter (*Erdkunde*, x. p. 16), Koch (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (*Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that the Cyreian army on this day's march (the day but one before the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphratés. They all indeed contest the accuracy of this latter statement; Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris in this part of its course is lower than that of the Euphratés; and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.

It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either

the Wall of Media or these four canals before the battle of Kunaxa, but who says (as Krüger, *De Authentici Anabases*, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the *Anabasis*, rightly explains him) that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until long after the battle, when Tissaphernés was conducting them towards the Tigris, two days' march before they reached Sittaké (*Anab.* ii. 4, 12).

It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see *Journal of the Geographical Society*, vol. ix. p. 446-473, with Captain Lynch's map annexed) discovered a line of embankment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3', and stretches towards the Euphratés in a direction from N.N.E. to S.S.W. "It is a solitary straight single mound, 25 long paces thick with a bastion on its western face at every 55 paces, and on the same side it has a deep ditch, 27 paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity: it is from 35 to 40 feet in height, and runs in a straight line as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the Euphratés, some hours above Felujah: that it is, in places far inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level with the desert" (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).

furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the King's enemies: Tissaphernès calculated that the message now

Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphratès, in the best recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as such by recent inquirers.

Nevertheless subsequent observations, recently made known by Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and have shown that the Wall of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad, undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson, a minute examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds; no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter torrents and drain off the rain-water of the desert into a large reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between the rivers.

From this important communication it results, that there is as yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon itself—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot where Babylonia proper

commences.

Unable as we are to verify by any independent evidences the topographical statements of Xenophon in Babylonia, nothing more can be done than to explain and illustrate clearly these statements as they stand. For this purpose I have given annexed to the present volume a Plan (Plan II.) founded exclusively upon the statements of Xenophon, and destined to render them clear to the reader. I have in this Plan inserted the Wall of Media, not upon any positive knowledge, but in the course which I think it naturally would follow upon Xenophon's narrative of facts.

The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to the Euphratès, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphratès—though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv. 2), in the expedition of the Emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on the left bank of the Euphratès, the ruins of a wall, "which in ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence of Assyria against foreign invasion." It is fair to presume that this was the Wall of Media: but the position of Macepracta cannot be assigned.

It is important however to remember—what I have already stated in

delivered would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position, and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold—and since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernês to conduct them; and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did not however neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single Persian, except Glûs the interpreter and a few others watching their motions.

this note—that Xenophon did not see, and did not cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned, until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.

With regard to the two large canals which Xenophon actually crossed over, after having passed the Wall of Media—and to the four large canals which he mentions as being near to the Wall of Media—I have drawn them on the Plan in such manner as visibly to illustrate his narrative. We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphratês to the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney's map to the Nahr-Malcha or

Regium-Flumen, into which the four great canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the Euphratês, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be said to fall into the Euphratês, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of both was exhausted in fertilising the earth—is difficult to say.

The island wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel canals joining them. It might well be called a large island, containing many cities and villages, with a large population.

Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris—to the Great Zab.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons, the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern side of the Tigris, for four days to the river Physkus; said to be twenty parasangs.¹ The Physkus was 100 feet wide, with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching. An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxês was seen at the head of a numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in passing by the Persian host that their numbers appeared greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian spectators was very imposing.² Here Assyria ended and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of Queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernês, the latter only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence—yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,³ through Parysatis, thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days' march, called

¹ There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be verified. The ruins of a large city were seen

by Captain Lynch near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.

² Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 26.

³ Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.

twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.¹

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days—days of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernês, they had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernês, represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernês also could

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 26-28.

Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators, identify this town of Kavai or Kænæ with the modern town Senn; which latter place Mannert (*Geogr. der Gr. Röm.* v. p. 338) and Rennell (*Illustrations*, p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser Zab instead of the Greater Zab.

To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to Kavai does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is there much real similarity of name between the two; although our erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name *Caenae* creates a delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ains-

worth shows that some modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying the modern town of Sert with *Tigrano-certa*.

It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon's work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v. 52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition, Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two synonymous rivers, mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were only one.

gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandisement and for conquering the Mysians and Pisidians—as Cyrus had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernês with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.¹

Klearchus
converses
with Tissa-
phernês—
and is
talked over.

“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the King or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose: there are wide plains in which you would be starved—besides mountains and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my neighbours the Greeks—and my wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus—which have made me eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, though the King is the only man who can wear his tiara erect *upon his head*, I shall be able to wear mine erect *upon my heart*, in full pride and confidence.”¹

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that he exclaimed—“Surely those informers deserve the severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes (replied Tissaphernês), they deserve nothing less: and if you, with the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined Klearchus), and bring the other generals

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 2-15.

² Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 17-23.

This last comparison is curious, and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν γὰρ

ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθῶν ἔχειν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχου.

with me. I shall tell you at the same time who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against you." The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go to Tissaphernês pursuant to his invitation; in order to re-establish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernês. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and Sokratês—and twenty lochages or captains—went to visit the satrap in his tent; about 200 of the soldiers going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the Persian camp-market.¹

Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals, visit Tissaphernês in his tent.

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernês—distant nearly three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit—the five generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent, betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to come. The lochages, with the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them, were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokratês, were beheaded, after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison (by the hands of her surgeon Ktesias), but used all her influence with her son Artaxerxês to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior influence of

Tissaphernês seizes the Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court and there put to death.

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 30.

Queen Stateira his wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.¹

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernés. But his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and torture—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.² She had already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxês, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it aside.³

Unfortunately for the reputation of Klearchus, no such

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 1. Ktesias Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv. 27.

² Tacit. Histor. i. 45. "Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad prohibendum scelus: jubere jam poterat. Ita, simulatione iræ, vinciri jussum (Marii Celsi) et majores pœnas daturum, affirmans, præsentî exitio subtraxit."

Ktesias (Persica, c. 60: compare Plutarch and Diodorus as referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon, which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself. Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably derived

his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii. 6, 29).

The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different statements consistent and harmonious.

³ Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories current, which he does not credit, to the disparagement of Menon—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ ἔξασιν περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, &c. (Anab. ii. 6, 28).

Athenæus (xi. p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by Tissaphernés.

reasonable excuse can be offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army, taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernês, was disposed to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might have been especially present to *his* mind, since he had served with the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C., and had therefore had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap's real character.¹ On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience—that from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons to trust him—still such misjudgement on the part of an officer of age and experience is difficult to explain.² Polyænus intimates that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,³ it appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been thus brought into previous communication with Tissaphernês, by whom he had been well-received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his (Menon's) command, into the service of the satrap. Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the

¹ Xenophon in the *Cyropædia* (viii. 8, 3) gives a strange explanation of the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in the assurance of the Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the high reputation for good faith, which the Persians had acquired by the undeviating and scrupulous honour of the first Cyrus (or Cyrus the

Great), but which they had since ceased to deserve, though the corruption of their character had not before publicly manifested itself.

This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of his romance.

² Machiavelli, *Principe*, c. 18. p. 66.

³ Polyæn. vii. 18.

scheme by bidding still higher himself for the favour of Tissaphernês. Imagining that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name and dismiss him.¹ Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernês, and therefore, since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.²

Notwithstanding these two great mistakes—one on the present occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus—both committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon was a signal benefit—perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would probably have ended by really committing towards the army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in reference to the seizure of the generals.

The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away—the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphratês, left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia, with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphratês, abandoned without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals which offered such favourable positions for keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort the

Plans of
Tissapher-
nês—im-
potence and
timidity
of the Per-
sians.

¹ *Xen. Anab.* ii. 5, 27, 28.

² Compare *Anab.* ii. 4, 6. 7. ii. 5, 9.

invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them. The plan of Tissaphernês, as far as we can understand it, seems to have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy, Tissaphernês would at least have tried to turn it to account; that he would have poured with all his forces and all his vigour on the Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they were about, —exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a body of about 300 horse, under Ariæus and Mithridatês (the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by the brother of Tissaphernês. These men, approaching the Greek lines as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver from the King. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophænetus with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus then acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honour at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying—“The King calls upon you to surrender

your arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus."¹

The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and Xenophon, which breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.

While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to behold.²

Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new, self-kindled light—and self-originated stimulus—was required, to vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralysed for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of soldierly strength

¹ Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 37, 38.

² Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 2, 3.

and courage was combined with the education of an Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.

It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition) describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse took its rise.¹ Lying mournful and restless like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunderbolt fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by Zeus² the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious—that a great light had appeared to him from Zeus in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the initiative movement.³ “Why am I lying here? Night is advancing;

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατίᾳ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὕτως στρατηγός, &c.

Homer, *Iliad*, v. 9—

Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἄφυστος, ἀμύμων,

Ἰρὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, &c.

Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the *Iliad*.

² Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the necessity of conciliating him, compare various passages in the *Cyropædia*, ii. 4, 19; iii. 3, 21; vii. 5, 57.

³ Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ' εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ τὸ θναρὸν πῇ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὦν καὶ κινδύνοις φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν ἔδοξεν, &c. . . . Ὅσοιόν μιν τοῖς ἐστὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον θναρὸν ἰδεῖν, ἔξαστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ θναρὸν. Γίνεται γὰρ τάδε· εὐθὺς ἀπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔννοια αὐτῷ ἐμπέπτει—Τί κατὰκειται; ἡ δὲ νύξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰκὸς τοῦς πολεμίους ἤξειν, &c.

The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, wherein the like mental talk is put into language

at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence. Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a different city, to begin?"

With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus. He impressed upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the army in a posture of defence. "I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon us at daybreak—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce, under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich possessions of the King, without touching anything except what we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands free: all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prices for the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more enduring, and our spirit more gallant, than theirs. They are easier to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favour of the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.

"Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not wait for any one else to come as monitors to us: let us take the lead, and communicate the stimulus of honour to others. Do you show yourselves now the best among the lochages—more worthy of being generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall obey without pleading my youth as an excuse—accounting myself to be of complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin."

and expanded—such as *Iliad*, xi. 403—and several other passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure's *History of the Language and Literature of Greece*, ch. xiv. vol. ii. p. 25 seq.

A vision, of light shining brightly out of a friendly house, counts for a favourable sign (*Plutarch, De Genio Socratis*, p. 587 C).

¹ *Xen. Anab.* iii. 1, 16-25.

"Vel imperatore, vel milite, me

All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it. One captain alone—Apollonidês, speaking in the Boeotian dialect—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the King as the only chance of safety. "How? (replied Xenophon). Have you forgotten the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in Babylonia when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city, but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage."—"Nay (observed Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece: I myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian." Apollonidês was degraded accordingly.¹

Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous, yet not without hope—on the proper measures to be taken—and especially on the necessity that

utemini" (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinæ*, c. 20).

¹ Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words of Xenophon that Apollonidês had been one of those who had held faint-hearted language (ὕπομαλχιζόμενοι, ii. 1, 14) in the conversation with Phaulinus shortly after the death of Cyrus. Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is the second time of his offering such advice—"Αὐτὸς πάντας εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι καλεῖοντάς

φρουρεῖν φῆς, πείθειν δὲ πάλιν καλεῖται ἰόντας;

This helps to explain the contempt and rigour with which Xenophon here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under the actual circumstances, than for a man "to show his acuteness by summing up the perils around." See the remarkable speech of Demosthenês at Pylos (*Thucyd.* iv. 10).

they, the chief officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian general Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of 700 hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and agree upon their commanders instead of the four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned, and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklēs in place of Sokratēs; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.¹ The captains, who had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division, and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in concert.

At daybreak the newly-constituted Board of generals placed proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed. As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of Cheirisophus (who had been in command before) that general addressed a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernēs and Ariæus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which the emergency required,—and above all extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 30-46.

Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter ruin—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favour of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, continued—"Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who agrees with me hold up his hand." All held up their hands: all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.

This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder, knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen: but men on horseback were after all only men, half occupied in the fear of losing their seats—incapable of prevailing against infantry firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with

Favourable
augury
from a man
sneezing.

Encour-
aging
topics in-
sisted on by
Xenophon.

provisions to buy, they on their side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult to be crossed, in the middle of their course; but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the King's own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. "If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our companions¹—we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi, to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders,

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 25.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ δίδοικα μὴ, ἂν ἀπαξ μά-
θωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιο-
τεύειν, καὶ Μῆδων τε καὶ Περσῶν
καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλας γυναῖξι
καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν, μὴ ὥς-
περ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς
οἰκαδὲ ὁδοῦ.

Hippokratēs (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive, forms of the first,—as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and vigorous, type of the second, trained for movement, action and endurance.

Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty—their eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the con-

stant training and naked exercises of the palestra, boys competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty attracted towards active power and graceful motion.

Οὐ γὰρ φανερόν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐ-
νούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὥπως
αὐτοῖς ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον
διαφέρειν φόντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ θῆλυ-
σχεδὸν καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὰ
μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἐνοεῖν. Κάκειναι
γυναικὸς εἶδος περιτιθέασιν τοῖς ἄν-
δρες, ἄλλως δ' οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐρᾶν-
ταί, ὥς καὶ ἡ τροφή αἰτία τοῖς Πέρ-
σαις, τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ
τε γυναικῶν καὶ εὐνούχων τῶν πρεσ-
βυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ
μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων μὴ πάνυ
συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαι-
στραῖς καὶ γυμνασίοις, &c. (Orat. xxi.
p. 270).

Compare Euripidēs, Bacchæ, 447 seq.; and the Epigram of Strabo in the Anthologia, xxxiv. vol. ii. p. 367 Brunck.

upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one object—the common safety.”

It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed—every man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian, should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers, would command on each flank,—and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would lead the rear guard.

Great impression produced by his speech—the army confirm the new generals proposed.

This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up; proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, every man's superfluous baggage—and then to take their morning meal previous to the march.

Great ascendancy acquired over the army at once by Xenophon—qualities whereby he obtained it.

The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more than one point of view.¹ It exhibits that susceptibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the Grecian character—a resurrection of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendancy, nor anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the superiority

¹ A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv. 27). He does not mention the

name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed throughout all his account of the march.

of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful: Kleanor had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of officers:—he was an elderly man—and he was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and Achæans. Either of these two therefore, and various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military experience:—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was moreover a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only therefore he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own citizens,¹—spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in execution—confidence under circumstances which made

¹ Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at Sparta, prior to the Peloponnesian War, with the eulogistic funeral oration of Periklēs, in the second year of that war (Thucyd. i. 70, 71; ii. 39, 40).

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ (εἰσι), νωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by the Corinthian speaker) καὶ ἐκίνοῦσαι ὅξεις καὶ ἐκίτλίσσαι ἔργῳ δ' ἂν γινώσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ (Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐκίγνωναι μηδέν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τάναντα ἐκίτλίσθαι. Αὐθις δὲ, οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμῶνται καὶ παρὰ γνῶμην κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς θεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς

τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνῶμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαιοῖς πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἰεσθαι ἀπολυθῆσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄσχονοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, &c.

Again, in the oration of Periklēs—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδασθῆναι μάλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ᾧ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸδε ἔχομεν, ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐκίχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι· ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ δυνον, φέρεται.

others despair—persuasive discourse and publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.

If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiadēs—much more was it necessary under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably, except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him. But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would enable him to work on the minds of others¹—of that flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the

Combina-
tion of elo-
quence and
confidence,
with
soldier-like
resource
and
bravery.

¹ Compare the observations of Periklēs, in his last speech to the Athenians, about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if a man had not the power of setting them forth in an impressive manner (Thucyd. ii. 60). Καίτοι ἐμὸι τοιοῦτοι ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς οὐδένος οἶμαι ἥσων εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων πλείων· ὃ τε γὰρ γινούς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἴσῃ καὶ ἐν μὴ ἐνεθυμήθῃ, &c.

The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same language. It was the opinion of

Sokratēs—μόνονος ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυνάμενους (Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, 52).

A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii. Epitaph. s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive speech, as superseding mutual violence (νόμος and λόγος, as the antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokratēs (Or. iv. (Panegy.) s. 53-56).

opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted. Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only to initiate, but to enforce: Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch.

How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Periklēs addressed to the Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable for the occasion, but which neither Periklēs nor Xenophon would have employed at any other moment.¹ Throughout the whole of his speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience, and a given situation, which characterised more or less every educated Athenian. Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.² It was

¹ See the speech of Periklēs (Thuc. ii. 60-64). He justifies the boastful tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which he had to contend on the part of his hearers—*Δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε ὁ μοι δοκεῖτε οὐτ' αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὁμῖν μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, οὐδ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποιήσιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων.*

This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon's tone.

² In a passage of the *Cyropædia* (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets forth in

a striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς—*Ὡς περ καὶ ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος ἀλκιμωτάτος δοξάζεται εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πείσαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος δικαίως ἂν λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος κρινεῖτο ἂν εἶναι. Μὴ μέντοι ὡς λόγον ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἰποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ' ὡς τοὺς πεπισμένους ὑφ' ἑκάστου δῆλους ἐσομένους οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, οὕτω παρασκευάζεσθε.*

In describing the duties of a *Hyparch* or commander of the cavalry,

this tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens; and which the Sophists as well as the democratical institutions—both of them so hardly depreciated by most critics—helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which, in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and comrades of Proxenus,¹ elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.

I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such extraordinary ascendancy, and rendered such eminent service to his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the Athenian democracy and education—because Xenophon himself has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favour of the perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and deferential demeanour, the methodical, though tardy, action—of Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own reputation—were Athenian far more than Spartan.

While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced their march, Mithridatès, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual soldiers to desertion—with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.

Approach of the Persian Mithridatès—the Greeks refuse all parley.

Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the soldiers—Εἰς γὰρ μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομέ-

vous, μέγα μὲν καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν τῷ καὶ θαρσεῖν, &c. (Xen. Mag. Eq. i. 24).

¹ See Xenoph. Anab. v. 6, 25.

Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of 300 hoplites.¹ As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume that they forded the river,—which furnishes a ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little way forward, Mithridatès again appeared with a few hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at 400 feet broad,—and this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any fordable place.² It is to be recollected that the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the river first, and were therefore in possession of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernès did not dare to resist the Greeks, even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only upon sending Mithridatès to harass the rear; which he executed with considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians; and when Xenophon employed his rear-guard, hoplites and peltasts, to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in getting back to rejoin

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 3, 6; iii. 5, 43.

² Xen. Anab. ii. 5, 1. Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor*, &c. vol. ii. ch. 44. p. 327; also his *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 119-134.

Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of Armenia and of the region east of it, observes truly that the

Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).

his own main body. Even when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridatês greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded, and much discouragement.¹

"Thank Heaven," (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge cavalry, whom yet he could not reach), "Thank Heaven, that our enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing us any serious harm." Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a small body of fifty cavalry; with 200 Rhodian slingers, whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones. On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings), but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridatês reappeared in pursuit with a body of 4000 horsemen and darters. Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised, with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in order to strike terror into

Sufferings of the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful precautions taken.

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 3, 9.

the enemy.¹ At the end of the day's march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (25 feet in thickness, 100 feet high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid, 100 feet in breadth, and 200 feet high; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighbouring villages. Another day's march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed the continuation of (or the substitute for) the once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet the country around them was so well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used by the slingers.²

During the next day's march, in a course generally parallel with the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernês, coming up along with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was however so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days along a level country, until on the fifth day they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their men

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 1-5.

² Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 17-18. It is here, on the site of the ancient Nineveh, that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard have brought to light so many curious and valu-

able Assyrian remains. The legend which Xenophon heard on the spot, respecting the way in which these cities were captured and ruined, is of a truly Oriental character.

were wounded. Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six *lochi* or regiments of 100 men each, subdivided into companies of 50, and *enomoties* or smaller companies of 25, each with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.¹ On reaching the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigour by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.² This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double attack.

The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called *Zakhu*³), were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when *Tissaphernês* appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village, and

Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward.

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 19-23.

I incline to believe that there were six *lochi* upon each flank—that is, twelve *lochi* in all; though the words of Xenophon are not quite clear.

² Xen. Anab. iii. 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii. 21, 56, 103.

³ Professor Koch (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 68) is of the same opinion.

when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian assailants began to retire; for they were always in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either saddle or bridle.¹ As soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day after.

On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernês, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible mountain summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a detachment to take possession of it and offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going, or staying with the army. "Choose for yourself," said Cheirisophus. "Well then (said Xenophon), I will go;

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 35; see also *Cyropædia*, iii. 3, 37.

The Thracian prince Seuthês was so apprehensive of night attack, that he and his troop kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 21).

Mr. Kinneir (*Travels in Asia*

Minor, &c., p. 481) states that the horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians.

since I am the younger of the two." Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts to get before the other, —each being encouraged by shouts and clamour from the two armies respectively.

As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him—"You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback:—I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry." Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance under such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when

on the point of being transported across the river; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.¹

Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return back one day's march to those in which they had before halted. Here the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media; that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once destroyed a Persian invading army of 120,000 men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphratès and the Tigris could be crossed near their sources, and from whence they could choose their farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the cities and on the plains.²

¹ Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 38-49; iii. 5, 3.

² Xen. Anab. iii. 5; vi. 1, 3. Probably the place where the Greeks

quitted the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian mountains, was, the neighbourhood of Jesireh ibn

Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that the passes should be occupied beforehand—the generals sacrificed forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a moment's notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while Xenophon, with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise, abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions, comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear-guard were coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by surprise and with considerable success—so that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.¹

Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had to pass, in order to see

They strike into the mountains of the Karduchians.

They burn much of their baggage—their sufferings from the activity and energy of the Karduchians.

Omar, the ancient Bezabde. It is here that farther march, up the eastern side of the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the mountains closing in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, from the eastern bank to the western (Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 72).

¹ Xen. *Anab.* iv. 1, 12.

that their directions were executed. The women however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage was still retained:¹ nor could the army make more than slow advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers. Their attack was renewed with double vigour on the ensuing day, when the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads: among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named Kleonymus and an Arcadian named Basias.² The rear division, more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one occasion however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate) two of their number were made prisoners.

Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the other—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march, which was beset with

Extreme
danger of
their situa-
tion.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 19-30.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 18; iv. 2, 28.

numerous Karduchians—defended himself by saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not succeeded.¹

To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly interrogated apart; and the first of them—having persisted in denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road except that before them—was put to death under the eyes of the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a nightmarch; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway in such a manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.²

Xenophon
finds out
another
road to turn
the enemy's
position.

Meanwhile the detachment of 2000, marching by the circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position (though there was another above yet more commanding) held by the Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At daybreak, and under favour of a mist, they stole silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main

The Kar-
duchians
are defeated
and the
road
cleared.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 21.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 4.

Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets, shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along the regular path; others climbing up as they could and pulling each other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for farther advance.

Xenophon, however, with the rear-guard marched on the circuitous road taken by the 2000, as the most practicable for the baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division—the whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was very narrow. During this interval the dispersed Karduchians had rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the road—from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon's troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But the Karduchiaas, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by such success the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavoured to open a negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named

Danger of
Xenophon
with the
rear
division
and
baggage.

Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both in the retreat.¹

After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at length found themselves in safety among their comrades, in villages with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager however were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide: a heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about the burial.²

For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior indeed, but still highly useful. Their seven days' march through this country, with its free and warlike inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering, and peril; far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from Tissaphernês and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains of Armenia—enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over past miseries.³

Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of 15 miles, was unpeopled and destitute of villages.⁴ But the approach of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus, satrap of

Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the slain.

They reach the river Kentritês, the northern boundary of Karduchia.

Difficulties of passing the Kentritês—dream of Xenophon.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 17-21.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 23.

³ Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had suffered in Karduchia.

Και οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίων ἀπαίχε δὲ τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ῥοταμὸς ἔξ ἣ ἔκτα στάδια τῶν Καρδοουχίων. Τότε μὲν

οὖν ἠύλισθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες· καὶ πολλὰ τῶν παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἑπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσας περ ἐπορεύθησαν διὰ τῶν Καρδοούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διατέλεσαν, καὶ ἔπαθον κατὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης. Ὡς οὖν ἀπῆλλαγμένοι τούτων ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.

⁴ Xen. Anab. iv. 4, 1.

Armenia, the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a precaution, which if Tissaphernés had taken at the Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks nevertheless attempted the passage of the Kentrités, seeing a regular road on the other side. But the river was 200 feet in breadth (only half the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the stream; while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap's troops. After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great alarm, they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared nearly desperate. In the night Xenophon had a dream—the first which he has told us since his dream on the terrific night after the seizure of the generals—but on this occasion, of augury more unequivocally good. He dreamt that he was bound in chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropt off spontaneously; on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims were at once favourable. As the army were taking their morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy's horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.¹

Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on the opposite bank. Having reached the ford,

They discovered a ford and pass the river.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 6-13.

halted, and grounded arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took off his clothes, and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to resume their arms also.¹ Each lochus (company of 100 men) was then arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favourable, all the soldiers shouted the pœan, and all the women joined in chorus with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then, at the head of the army, entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This distracted the attention of the enemy's horse; who became afraid of being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus. As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry, who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry, deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus, pursued and took some valuable spoils.²

As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side who were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage in the crossing of the water.³ The peltasts and bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over,—the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to

Xenophon
with the
rear-guard
repels the
Karduchi-
ans and
effects his
passage.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 17.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 20-25.

³ Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 30.

shoot and sling. But on a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan, upon which the Karduchians took to flight—having no arms for close combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible. By favour of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the whole army with little or no loss, about midday.¹

They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold at the season when they entered it—December. Though the strip of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions, together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in two farther marches they reached the river Teleboas, with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such supplies as they required,—but should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty full days' march; without any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy a fall of snow, that the generals on the next day distributed the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise. Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible, together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here in the night they were overwhelmed by a second fall

March
through Ar-
menia.
Heavy
snow and
severe cold.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 31-34; iv. 4, 1.

of snow, still heavier than the preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms, and to benumb the cattle. The men however lay warm under the snow and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example of rising, and employing himself without his arms in cutting wood and kindling a fire.¹ Others followed his example, and great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of almonds or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout named Demokratês, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain pass lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the Euphratês river²—that is, to its eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it, without having the water higher than the naval; and they were informed that its sources were not far off.

They ford
the Eastern
Euphratês
or Murad.

Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphratês, were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon³), the severity of the wind abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of the slaves and beasts of burthen, and a few even of the soldiers, perished: some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by the snow, others

Distressing
marches—
extreme
misery from
cold and
hunger.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 4, 11.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 2.

The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of various MSS., read here ἵπορῶθησαν—ἐπὶ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν. The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson's edition, παρὰ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.

This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too vague to admit of any certainty.

See my Appendix annexed to this chapter.

³ Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 4.

Ἐνταῦθα δὴ τῶν μαντῶν τις εἶπα σφαγιάζεσθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ καὶ πᾶσι δὴ περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χυλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.

The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv. 28.

again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish, near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard, employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless, answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the order, and was about to bury him alive.¹ Xenophon made a sally, with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in a neighbouring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and went forward; seeing all along the line of march the exhausted soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch. He and his rear-guard as well as the rest were obliged thus to pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in the best way that the case admitted. Meanwhile Cheirisophus with the van division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly, that they found the women fetching water from a fountain outside the wall, and the head-man of the village in his house within. This division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in their arms, into the neighbouring village, those exhausted soldiers who had been left behind.²

Rest in good quarters—subterranean villages well-stocked with provisions.

Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different divisions among them according to lot. Polykratês an Athenian, one of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him, before any of the inhabitants could escape.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 8, 8-11.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 5-22.

Accordingly, running at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the village so suddenly as to seize the head-man with his newly-married daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the King. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they sucked the liquid:¹ Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the head-man (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country, into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent. By such treatment the head-man was won over, promised his aid, and even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care of Episthenês, yet continued to treat him with studied attention and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other officers.²

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 27. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες.

This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies (see Krüger's note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No. 28, ed.

Schneidewin, *Poeta Græc. Minor.*). ὥσπερ αὐλῶ βρύτον ἢ θρηϊεῖ ἀνὴρ ἢ Φρύεῖ βρυζε, &c.

The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and Phrygians is not surprising.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 26-26.

After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the snow. The head-man, whose house After a week's rest, onward—their guide runs away. they had replenished as well as they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not put in chains or under guard: his son remained as an hostage with Episthenês, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As they marched for three days, without reaching a village, Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humour, though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as to beat him—yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this head-man made his escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached Cheirisophus first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon) during the whole march; a fact very honourable to both, considering the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend. Episthenês retained the head-man's youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much attached to him.¹

Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than march up the course of the river; and thus, from the villages which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven day's march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by Grecian geographers: it was 100 feet in breadth.² Two more days' march brought them from this river to the foot of a range of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.

Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm the pass with no greater delay They reach a difficult pass occupied by the Chalybes—raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus about stealing. than was necessary to refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth at night to ascend the mountain at

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 1-3.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 4.

another point and turn the position. "However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that you the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from your boyhood upward;¹ and that it is held noway base, but even honourable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you are found out. Here then, you have an excellent opportunity of displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we *are* found out, we shall be well beaten."

"Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians also, as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money—and that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief: nay, your most powerful men steal most of all—at least if it be the most powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time for *you* to exhibit *your* training, as well as for me to exhibit mine."²

We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially, illustrates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and Athens³—the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 10-14.

Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καλὸν χλέπτειν, &c. The reading καλὸν is preferred by Schneider to ἀναγκαῖον which had been the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are sanctioned by authority or MSS., and either would be admissible: on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider.

² Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 16.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, καὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπόω δεινοὺς εἶναι χλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ κινδύνου τῷ χλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ πράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὦρα καὶ σοὶ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παιδείαν.

³ See Vol. vii. ch. lxi.

But according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil was,—too great a licence of accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the numerous popular *Dikasts* had been exchanged for a select few judges of the same stamp and class as the official men themselves?

Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues that he had just captured a few guides, by laying an ambush for certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured by goats and oxen.

He farther offered himself to take command of the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus, some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and Nikomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station, making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon however saw them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak those two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the Greeks were completely victorious; while Cheirisophus was marching up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy were so dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the conquerors.¹

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 20-27.

Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine days' march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days' march through the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.¹

March through the country of the Taochi—exhaustion of provisions—capture of a hill-fort.

They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen cubits long, with only one end pointed—a helmet, greaves, stuffed corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps—a short sword which they

Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom they had yet seen—the Skythians.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 7, 2-15.

employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the spear required the constant employment of both hands—yet they did not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of march and combat—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their rear—they reached the river Harpasus (400 feet broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the Skythini was level, and contained villages, wherein they remained three days, refreshing themselves, and socking themselves with provisions.¹

Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in Babylonia—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest of the neighbourhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished them with a guide, who engaged to conduct them, after five days' march, to a hill from whence they would have a view of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbours to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain called Thêchês, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.²

An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle, assuring, as it seemed to do their safety and their return home. To Xenophon and to the rear-guard—engaged in repelling the attack of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their territory

They reach
the flourish-
ing city of
Gymnias.

First sight
of the sea
from the
mountain-
top Thêchês
—extreme
delight of
the soldiers.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 7. 18.

² Diodorus (xiv. 29) calls the mountain Xήνιον—Chenium. He seems to have had Xenophon be-

—the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard distinctly crying out *Thalatta, Thalatta* (The sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative trophy; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means afforded—sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides several of the soldiers' rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters—as well as the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrônes.¹

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river Passage
through the
Makrônes. not being fordable, they cut down some neighbouring trees to provide the means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home during his boyhood—he had then made his escape (probably during the Peloponnesian War, to the garrison

fore him in his brief description of this interesting scene.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 7, 23-27.

of Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on receiving such assurances in their own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during the three days' march across their territory.¹

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of 100 men) in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front with only a scanty depth—addressed to them the following pithy encouragement—"Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so."

Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to produce—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and

Through
the Kol-
chians—
who oppose
them and
are
defeated.

Kolchian
villages—
unwhole-
some
honey.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 4-7.

diarrhœa, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.¹

Two more day's march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

Arrival at
Trapezus
on the
Euxine
(Trebizond).

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the massacre of their generals by Tissaphernês. To Zeus the Preserver, to Heraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully accordant

Joy of the
Greeks—
their discharge of
vows to the
Gods—their
festivals
and games.

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the existence, in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous, such as Xenophon describes. They point out the *Asalea Pontica*, as the flower from which the bees imbibe this peculiar quality. Professor Koch, however, calls in question

the existence of any honey thus naturally unwholesome near the Black Sea. He states (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful inquiries he could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, he thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale, or tainted.

with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny recalls that of Patroklos and other Homeric heroes—for he had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom however were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the by-standers. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardour of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses present.¹

¹ Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 23-27.

A curious and interesting anecdote, in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* (c. 41), attests how much these Heteræ accompanying the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A Macedonian of *Ægæ* named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected, and on being

questioned he informed Alexander that he had practised it in order to be able to follow a free Heteræ named Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. "I sympathise with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander): let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa, either by persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to stay behind" (*Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνεπώντας ἔχαις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδὴ περ εἰς ἐλευθερίας ἐστί*).

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.

ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND, AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS, AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.

It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not to present the reader with a map exhibiting the full length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course, and a few negative conditions.

Mr. Ainsworth has given in his Book IV. (*Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 155 *seq.*) an interesting topographical comment on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their probable line of march through Karduchia: but the most important point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of the river Kentritès with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p. 166). In this identification of the Kentritès with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch agrees (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 78).

If the Greeks crossed the Kentritès near its confluence with the Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must have passed. Their two next days of march, assuming a direction nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, *iv.* 4, 2) beyond the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”

Three days of additional march brought them to the river Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (*iv.* 4, 4). There appear sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad or Eastern Euphratès (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, *Erdkunde*, part x. s. 37, p. 682). Though Kinneir (*Journey through Asia Minor and Kurdistan*, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (*Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus*, p. 207) and

Bell (*System of Geography*, iv. p. 140) identify it with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, "is only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of the plain and district."

Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and round Armenia give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes however that the Greeks crossed the Kentritès, not near its confluence with the Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort. From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther, in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is the watershed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those to the Eastern Euphratès, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is one (Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 82-84).

After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to Trebizond.

Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphratès. They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to be fordable, in midwinter, with snow on the ground? Here Professor Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and Colonel Chesney. He affirms that the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the Tscharbahur, about latitude $39^{\circ} 3'$. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus (Khinnis). Koch's authority, as the most recent and systematic investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili: see Bitter, *Erdkunde*, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphratès (*Anab.* iv. 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of the range of mountains called the Bingöl-dagh—in the district called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.

To lay down with any certainty the line which the Greeks followed from the Euphratès to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army across the Araxès to its northern bank, carries them up northward to the latitude of Tiflis in Georgia, then brings them back again across the Harpa-Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxès, which he identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxès itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line of his own, which

appears to me open greatly to the same objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the place where they crossed the Eastern Euphratès, than can be justified by any probability. The Greeks knew well, that in order to get home they must take a westerly direction (see *Anab.* iii. 5, 15).

Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphratès: and the road from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum, to Trebizond would thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it without some proof. I trace upon my map a line of march, much less circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to complete the reader's idea of the entire ground travelled over by the Ten Thousand.

Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that if they had taken a line as straight or nearly as straight as was practicable, they might have marched from the Euphratès to Trebizond in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of the year. Considering that it was midwinter, in that very high and cold country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger; that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the prophet Silanus, for example, having preserved his 8000 darics in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their course to find a ford—considering the intolerable accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modern travellers go over these regions in midwinter: but we may see what travelling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of March (*Travels in Koordhistan*, Letter XV.). Mr. Kinneir says (*Travels*, p. 358)—“The winters are so severe that all communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow.”

Now if we measure on Kiepert's map the rectilinear distance—the air-line—from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphratès—we shall find it 170 English miles. The number of day's journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are 54: even if we include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (*Anab.* iv. 7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their retreat. In each of those 54 days, therefore, they must have made 3·14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages

of their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.

The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the Tchouk-Su, as Colonel Chesney and Professor Koch suppose. At least it is difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be identified.

I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls *Gymnias* (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it *Gymnasia*) was the same as that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh (Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). "Gumisch-Khana (says Mr. Hamilton, *Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p. 234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions." Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr. Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to Erzerum.

Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of situation—but the existence of the silver-mines furnishes a plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange: the existence of this "great, flourishing, inhabited city," inland, in the midst of such barbarians—the Chalybes, the Skythini, the Makrones, &c.

Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after quitting Trebizond; the last two days having been very long and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana, reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers represent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr. Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the winter-road from Erzerum to Trebizond (*Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. ii. p. 394). "The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley: all the others cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mansour and Kodjah Bunar, where they take to the mountains."

Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana 18 hours, or 54 calculated post miles; that is, about 40 English miles (*Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. ii. p. 389).

Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road from *Gymnias* to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days' march which they undertook immediately from *Gymnias* were conducted by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of people hostile to *Gymnias*, in order that they might lay waste the lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches, towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top of the sacred mountain *Thêché*.

Thêché was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place. Mr.

Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned. D'Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge called Tekieh-Dagh to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for the narrative in respect of position: but Koch and other modern travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It stands on Kiepert's map at a distance of full 35 English miles from the sea, the view of which moreover seems intercepted by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion of the ancient Paryadrès, which runs along parallel to the coast. It is to be recollected, that in the first half of February, the time of Xenophon's visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.

There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called Karakaban. This mountain, more than 4000 feet high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond, and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From the Kolath Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley, partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland, who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then again lost.

Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive, and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point from the land side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in his descending route, not in his ascending: and this can hardly be reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian. Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after quitting the mountain summit Théchè, can hardly be reconciled with the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban. It is indeed quite possible (as Mr. Hamilton suggests) that Théchè may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards. This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on Tekieh-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening mountains, the sea might become visible.

CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM
THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO
THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY
IN ASIA MINOR.

WE now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus—then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization—we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthês, as well as against the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra farther westward; each of them receiving an hereditary governor from the mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbour, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day's journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni.

Greek cities
on the
Euxine—
Sinôpê
with her
colonies,
Kerasus,
Kotyôra,
and Tra-
pezus.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighbouring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject in the same manner to the Trapezuntines;¹ and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighbourhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper, in the neighbouring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house-furniture, and native slaves.² The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward—Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the western coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent—since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxês to come up and help in repelling Cyrus³—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without secret designs, which he wanted

Indigenous inhabitants
—their
relations
with the
Greek
colonies.

¹ Strabo, xii. p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 24

² Strabo, xii. p. 545, 546.

³ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 8.

only force to execute, against that city.¹ The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

Though we are told that Periklês had once despatched a detachment of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,² and had expelled from thence the despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of her neighbours appear to have taken part in the Peloponnesian War, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognised as the abode of Kolchians, Ma-krônes, and other analogous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,³ 8600 hoplites, with pel-tasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, &c., making a total of above 10,000 military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and selfconfidence of the Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established government. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the shores

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 5, 23.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

³ Xen. Anab. v. 8, 8; v. 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian force, when mustered at Issus after the

deserted from Abrokomas, was 13,900 men. At the review in Babylon, three days before the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered however only 12,900 (Anab. i. 7, 10).

tion of those 300 men who

of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas the Paphlagonian were meditating war against that city—here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation—but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families.¹ We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered.

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier named Antileon exclaimed—"Comrades, I am

Plans of the army—Oheiriso-phus is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 2, 8; a passage already cited above.

This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of Isokratês (Orat. iv. Panegyrr. s. 170).

In another oration, composed

about fifty years after the Cyreian expedition, Isokratês notices the large premiums which it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokratês, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as

already tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus." This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions accordingly must be put under regulation: neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;¹ so that they would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports.

contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries during his own later time (*Ibid.* s. 142 seq.).

¹ *Xen. Anab.* v. 1, 3-13.

ὅπως δ' ἔγὼ πλοῖα πολλὰ καὶ κατα-

πλέοντα, &c. This is a forcible proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question to the vote. He took upon himself however to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.¹

Adopted by the army—their intense repugnance to farther marching.

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Pericæus, named Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykratês; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became however gradually more and more difficult to supply the camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp; while the Trapezuntines—tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighbourhood—conducted the detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged strong-

Measures for procuring transports. Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Kolchians and the Drilæ.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 1, 15.

hold of the Drilæ—the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighbourhood of the Euxine; well-armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a difficult march and attack, which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a plentiful booty.¹

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board under the command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various light troops.²

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 2.

² Xen. Anab. v. 3, 8. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed, from the analogy of name, that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38° 40') corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards called Pharnakia.

It is remarked both by Dr. Kinneir (Asia Minor, vol. i. p. 281)

and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv. p. 250), that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon having marched with the army from the one place to the other in three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgement of Mr. Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20', as it stands in Kiepert's map of Asia Minor), near

had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these heralds, being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now) any regular road.¹ This march cost the Cyreian army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by the Trapezuntine

March to
Kotyôra—
hostilities
with the
Mosynœki.

a river now called the Kerasoun Dere Sû.

¹ It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land. The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems indeed to have been no regular or trodden road at all: the hills approach close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir "travelled the whole of the way along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes and numerous little bays along the coast;

but the nature of the country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine timber, flowers, and groves of cherry-trees" (*Travels in Asia Minor*, p. 324).

Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry-tree, and the origin of its name.

Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days' march given by Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 115, 116).

Timesitheus, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki and understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have not space to copy.¹ The territory of the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined the presents, preferring to treat them as enemies and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.²

Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry them away by sea. The Sinopian Harmost or governor did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the neighbouring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra, and Sinôpê as the mother-city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or

Long halt
at Kotyôra
—remon-
strance
from the
Sinopians.

Speech of
Hekatony-
mus of
Sinôpê to
the army—
reply of
Xenophon.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 5, 3.

² Xen. Anab. v. 7, 18-25.

any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks.¹ Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Synôpian Harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his auxiliaries.²

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.

Success of the reply—good understanding established with Sinôpê.

Such an interchange of goodwill with the powerful city of Sinôpê was an unspeakable advantage to the army—indeed an essential condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by land, it was only through Sinôpian guidance and mediation that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable neighbours, for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the Sinôpian envoys, the generals convoked the army

Consultation of the army with Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 5, 7-12.

² Xen. Anab. v. 6, 13-22.

in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologising for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would be unable to pass—the Thermôdôn and the Iris, each 300 feet in breadth—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from the latter place either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.¹

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of marching and fighting, in favour of the sea voyage; though there were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body; and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent—Ariston, an Athenian, Kallimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or assembly.²

Envoys
sent by
the army
to Sinôpê
to procure
vessels.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 4-11.

² Xen. Anab. v. 6, 14.

During the absence of the envoys, the army still continued near Kotyôra, with a market provided by the town, and with traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighbouring frontier of Paphlagonia.¹ But they were receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home.² Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world.

It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and colonisation in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many indigenous neighbours. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants—though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.³ He contemplated the employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers,

Poverty and increasing disorganisation of the army.

Ideas of Xenophon about founding a new city in the Euxine, with the army.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 19; vi. 1, 2.

² Xen. Anab. vi. 4, 8; vi. 2, 4.

³ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 15-30; vi. 2, 6; rii. 1, 25, 29.

Hæken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.

might do so without imperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighbourhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even the recognised *Ekist*, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover the sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master Sokratēs,¹ in grave and doubtful cases where the most careful reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation to such persons as they favoured. According to Xenophon, previous

Sacrifice of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods—treachery of the prophet Silanus.

¹ Xen. Memorab. i. 1, 8, 9. Ἐφη δὲ (Sokratēs) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν δὲ δὴ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς κατὰ τῶν θεῶν κυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἀνὴρ ὥσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν.

Compare passages in his *Cyropædia*, i. 6, 8; *De Officio Magistr. Equit.* ix. 2.

"The gods (says Euripidēs, in the Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary comforts of life: in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume to be wiser, than the gods."

Ἄ δ' ἐστ' ἄσημα, καὶ σαφῆ, γινώσκοντες

Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτόχας

Μάντις προσημαίνουσιν ὁλωνῶν τ' ἄπο.

Ἄρ' οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευῆς βίου

Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;

Ἄλλ' ἢ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μείζον σθένειν

Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ' ἐν χερσὶν κεκτημένοι

Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι.

(Supplices, 211).

It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special revelations, through prophets, omens, &c., was (in the view of these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of divine government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the phenomena of the future.

to any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxês would not fight for ten days—and the prophecy came to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus, that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of 3000 darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favourable;¹ Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began to realise, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.²

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among those officers who were jealous of the ascendancy of Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine, and would employ the

Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies against Xenophon. General assembly of the army.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.

² Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of the future pur-

poses of the gods—he nevertheless had very little confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite capable of gross deceit (see Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 2, 3: compare Sophoklès, Antigone, 1085, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 887).

transports when they arrived, not for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition. This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on the rich neighbouringsatrapy of Pharnabazus.¹

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more than one quarter—until the Achæans Philêsius and Lykon had loudly accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into remaining against their will—that the latter rose to repel the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless (he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realising by his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as destitute and unprovided, as you were just now—I should still have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be better: you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who were favour-

Accusa-
tions
against
Xenophon
—his
speech in
defence.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 8, 12-26.

able to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together until we are on safe ground; and let the man, who lags behind or runs off, be condemned as a wrongdoer."¹

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand was held up in its favour. There was no man more disconcerted with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece with the 3000 darics.²

He carries the soldiers with him—discontent and flight of Silanus.

If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonour and peril; for having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.³ Xenophon replied, that they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval,

Fresh manœuvres of Timasion—fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon—renewed discontent of the army.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 30-33.

² Xen. Anab. v. 6, 34; vi. 4, 13.

³ Xen. Anab. v. 6, 36.

I may here note that this *Phasis* in the Euxine means the town of that name, not the river.

the soldiery obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended, as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own—and something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his—that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon's calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate defence¹—Xenophon immediately sent round

Xenophon
convenes
the
assembly
again.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 7, 1-3.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξε αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν αὐτῶν ἀγórην, καὶ μὴ εἶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγórην.

The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting together, and exciting one another to action, without any formal summons.

The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in Thucydides, ii. 22; and in Ch. xlviii. of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians; when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of Athens, burn-

ing and destroying the country. In spite of the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest impatience to go out and fight, Periklès steadily refused to call an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people, even in that state of excitement, though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular assembly.

The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian citizens.

the herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then addressed them—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers.

"Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you to Phasis. Hear me then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward—if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on *this* side, and sets on *that*? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more? Imagine however that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect—a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No—these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without reason—for I neither hinder *them* from outstripping me in your favour, if they can render you greater service—nor *you* from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of this now: I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge."¹

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in his own favour, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army;

His address
in defence
of himself.

His remon-
strance
against the
disorders in
the army.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 7, 7-11.

which he depicted as such, that if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus—the unauthorised and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighbouring village which was in friendly commerce with the army—the murder of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong—the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy.¹ “If such are to be our proceedings (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,² will no longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against any point which he may chose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrages shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast, Cast (*i.e.* darts or stones), may put to death without trial either officer or soldier as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look now what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of wrong towards

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 7, 13-26.

² Xen. Anab. v. 7, 26, 27.

Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται, θεάσασθε οἷα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὐτ' ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε, οὐτε καταλύσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στρατεύματα ἐφ' ὅ,τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ. Κἂν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, κατακταίνοντες τοὺς τοὺς οἱ βουλο-

μενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκούσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς λόγων. Ἐπειτα δὲ, οὐς μὲν ἂν ὑμεῖς ἀπαντες ἐλησθε ἀρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ' ἂν ἐαυτὸν ἐληται στρατηγόν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος ἔσται ἰκανὸς καὶ ἀρχοντα κατακταίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ ἀκριτον—ἂν ὥσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.

you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death have brought matters to such a pass, that you alone, all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us."¹

Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the prophets, to purify the army.²

Vote of the army unanimously favourable to Xenophon—disapproving the disorders, and directing trial.

This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority; the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the

Xenophon's appeal to universal suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of his appeal.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 7, 27-30.

² Xen. Anab. v. 7, 34, 35.

mind of each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. And what is not less important to notice—the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have been sensibly augmented—certainly noway diminished.

The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of Xenophon himself,¹ that the generals themselves should be tried before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains, in case anyone had complaint to make against them for past matters; agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklēs were fined twenty minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus for the transport of the army: Sophænetus, who had the general superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by

Xenophon recommends a trial of the generals before a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of the army with Xenophon.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 7, 35.

Παρανοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντιων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε καὶ καθάραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς δικὴν ὑποσχέσθαι τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.

In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter the eighth is made to begin at the

second ἔδοξε, which seems to me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that the second ἔδοξε, as well as the first, is connected with the words παρανοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence, without an intervening full stop.

far the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out that he had given him blows, because the man, having been entrusted with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty by burying the dying man alive.¹ This interesting debate (given in the *Anabasis* at length) ended by a full approbation on the part of the army of Xenophon's conduct, accompanied with regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.

The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and well-tempered officer. "I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to a man. Sometimes too I struck men who were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others from getting forward: I struck them with my fist,² in order to save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me: you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively well, drink more wine and pass easy days—and yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. There is Boiskus,³ the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended

¹ Xen. *Anab.* v. 8, 3-12.

² Xen. *Anab.* v. 8, 16. *ἔπεισα πύξ, δ' ὥς μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων παύοιτο.*

³ The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in battle, is as old among the Greeks as the *Iliad*. The unrivalled pugilist of

the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own inferiority as a soldier (*Iliad*, xxiii. 667.)

*Ἄσπον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφι-
χόμελλον*
Ἥμιονον δ' οὐ φημί τιν' ἄξιμεν ἄλλου
Ἀχαιῶν,

sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying his shield—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now brought in evidence—I call upon those among you also, to whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my favour.”¹

Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty, was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the extraordinary influence which Xenophon's powers of speaking gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, &c., by having the power of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness—or rather, partly by means of such frankness—his ascendancy as commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people,—it will be found that though particular points may be gained in this way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and long-continued (like that of Periklês² or Demosthenês) it is owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the *sensus communis* of the tenthousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members and fractions. The

Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory.

Ποῦ μὴ νικήσαντ' ἐκεῖ εὐχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.
Ἡ οὐχ ἑλλας, δεῦτε μάχης ἐπι-
δεύομαι; οὐδ' ἄρα πως ἦν

Ἐν πάντεσσι ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 8, 13—25.

² See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii. 65) upon Periklês.

other officers could doubtless speak well enough to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to the soldiers: without this faculty, no man was fit for military command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled multitudes—a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous transitions to work round the minds of the hearers—a command of those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to draw them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted both by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and judgement displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.

The important public proceedings above described not only restored the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp with presents of horses and fine robes,¹ and with expressions of a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents, and

Improved feeling of the army—peace with the Paphlagonian Korylas.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 2. Πίμπει παρὰ τοῦς Ἑλλήνας πρέσβεις, ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλὰς, &c.

The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian: the robes sent were probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and Kotyôra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven and metallic fabrics from Abdera and the other

Grecian colonies on their coast—ὄψαντὰ καὶ λαΐα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, &c. (Thucyd. ii. 96). From the like industry probably proceeded the splendid "regia textilia" and abundance of gold and silver vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with Perseus the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv. 33-35).

promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first, they entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænians, Magnètes, &c., are described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between the army and the Paphlagonians.¹

Not long afterwards—a number of transports, sufficient for the whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê—all the soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the mouth of the rivers, Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia. Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighbouring seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.

It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose absence had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army, and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly, they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the ascendancy of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so

Return of
Cheirisophus—resolution of the army to elect a single general—they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines—Cheirisophus is chosen.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 10-14.

flattering a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which he had already realised, outweighed the opposite inducements. As in other cases of doubt, so in this—he offered sacrifice to Zeus Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate him—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name. His excuse however was repudiated; especially by the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that, if that principle were admitted, he as an Arcadian ought to resign his command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden him to do so.¹

Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook the duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon, if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good thing for Xenophon himself to have declined—since Dexippus had already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, though he (Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.²

On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia, the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued)

The army pass by sea to Herakleia—they wish to extort money from the Herakleots—opposition of Cheirisophus and Xenophon.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 22-31.

² Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 32.

took no measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that they should extort a contribution of no less than 3000 staters of Kyzikus (about 60,000 Attic drachmæ, or 10 talents = £2300) from the inhabitants of Herakleia: another man immediately outbid this proposition, and proposed that they should require 10,000 staters—a full month's pay for the army. It was moved that Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in so unjust an extortion, from a Grecian city which had just received the army kindly and sent handsome presents. Accordingly Lykon with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys, and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and brought in their outlying property.

The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to exclaim that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans, who formed more than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to obey as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here again it is remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command had been vested by formal vote in Cheirisophus. So vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in the army, more than 4500 hoplites in number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three portions—first the Arcadians and Achæans: secondly, 1400 hoplites and 700 Thracian peltasts, who adhered to Cheirisophus: lastly, 1700 hoplites, 300 peltasts, and 40 horsemen (all the horsemen in the army), attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however

Dissatisfaction of the army—they divide into three fractions:—
 1. The Arcadians and Achæans.
 2. A division under Cheirisophus.
 3. A division under Xenophon.

was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavourable sacrifices.¹

The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia, landed at the harbour of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium. From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus, who—afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a week—had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.²

The locality of Kalpê was well-suited for the foundation of a colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions, because the sacrifices were not favourable. Xenophon refused to lead them

Arcadian division start first and act for themselves—they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon—the army re-united at Kalpê—old board of generals reelected, with Neon in place of Cheirisophus.

Distress for provisions at Kalpê—unwillingness to move in the face of unfavourable sacrifices—ultimate victory over the troops of the country.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 2, 11-16.

² Xen. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi. 4, 11.

out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of detention. Neon however, less scrupulous, led out a body of 2000 men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was defeated with the loss of no less than 500 men; a misfortune which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim was at once favourable; so that he led out without delay the greater part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become, that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal, cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive against the Bithynians, and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the country.¹

At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighbouring villages, but also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon, to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that several of the neighbouring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, both with two triremes only.²

Halt at
Kalpê—
comfort-
able
quarters—
idea that
they were
about to
settle there
as a
colony.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 5.

² Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 1-5.

Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the confidence reposed in him, by running away with the ship to Byzantium.

Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium, together with Dexippus.

It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property; though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them, a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best friends of Xenophon—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into violent manifestations, called him a traitor, and pelted him with stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled, in alarm; in spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on the other hand

Disorder in the army: mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus.

controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be interdicted from giving them reception.¹ It was in vain that the generals, well-knowing the formidable consequences of such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on condition that the soldiers who had begun to throw stones, as well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by his order.²

The situation now became extremely critical; since the soldiers would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades—who had a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue violence—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains to set them right upon this point. "Soldiers (said he), it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the cities of Greece: now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in Greece, and not merely their authorised officers, but even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian harmosts in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to Sparta—if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius—we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are at present masters both on land and at sea.³ We must not, for the sake of any one

Indigna-
tion and
threats of
Kleander—
Xenophon
persuades
the army to
submit—
fear of
Sparta.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 6-9.

² Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 32; vi. 4, 11-15.

³ Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 12.

Εἰσι μὲν γὰρ ᾗδ' ἐγγύς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες
πόλεις· τῆς δ' Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι

προσέστηκασιν· ἱκανοὶ δὲ εἰσι καὶ
εἰς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι βούλονται
διαπράττεσθαι. Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶ-
τον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει,

or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command, especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander arraigns ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be debarred from the praise and honour which we anticipated, but should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the Grecian cities."¹

After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon—so significant a testimony of the unmeasured ascendancy and interference of the Lacedæmonians throughout Greece—Agasias rose, and proclaimed, that what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity, of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army: and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous behaviour of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had rescued, and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from overruling, for their own

Satisfaction given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with the mutinous soldier.

ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρμισταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι, ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὕτως ὁ λόγος περὶ ἑμῶν

ἦξει—χαλεπὸν ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ ἀποπλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 12-16.

individual benefit, a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without trial—desired that the persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all the others.¹

The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius the Spartan as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest appeal to Kleander, representing that his honour had been satisfied with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over, by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals belied altogether the representations made to him (doubtless by Dexippus), that they were seeking to alienate the army from the Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them back into Greece.²

The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered, for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious, for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to brave such

Appeal to the mercy of Kleander who is completely soothed.

Kleander takes the command, expressing the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards Xenophon.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 22-28.

² Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 31-36.

auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two triremes.¹

The favourable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium; but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognise a scheme, and a very well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence, would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the latter course.

Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis² (in the territory of Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where they remained seven days, turning into money the slaves and plunder which they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed lest they should invade his satrapy, dispatched a private message to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large

Unfavourable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the command and sail away.

March of the army across the country from Kalpê to Chalkêdon.

¹ Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 36, 37.

² Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian general Lamachus, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War, after he

had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the waters at the mouth of the river Kalix, in the territory of Herakleia (Thucyd. iv. 76).

presents, to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the Bosphorus.¹ Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave them his

Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across the Bosphorus into Europe—false promises of Anaxibius to the army.

assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but Xenophon on his own account said that he should not return; that he should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance of

Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding that he should depart immediately afterwards.

Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home—first proposition addressed to him by Seuthês of Thrace.

Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the Thracian prince Seuthês; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army would cross; that no reward from Seuthês was needful to bring about that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the walls of Byzantium.² Xenophon, who had

come along with them, paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed.

The army cross over to Byzantium—fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out of the town.

In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to induce them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even means of purchasing supplies, he issued

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 2. Πέρσης πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον, ἵκετο διαβιβάζειν τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ἔκρινεν αὐτῷ πάντα κοινῶς αὐτῷ εἶναι.

Compare vii. 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of this promise.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 5-7.

orders that they must go forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army outside of the walls, added—"Go forth as if you were about to march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as soon as you please."¹ Xenophon replied that this matter must be settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory. Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration, noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it with the bar.²

Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside. But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but remained outside among the soldiers. "Take what supplies you want (said Anaxibius) from the neighbouring Thracian villages, which are well furnished with wheat, barley, and other

Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were going out of the gates.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 7-10. Ἄλλ' ἔγω γένηται τὸ στράτευμα, τότε ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγὼ σοι συμβουλεύω ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
ἐξαλθεῖν ὡς πορευόμενον· ἐπειδὴν δ'

² Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 12.

necessaries. After thus providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there Kyniskus will give you pay."¹

This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers. Who Kyniskus was we do not know, nor was he probably known to the Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least 150 English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also whether they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthês, as a friend or an enemy.²

Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed to a long march—through another barbarous country, with chance-supplies to be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of it a lot unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejectment from Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality; contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behaviour could not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were not realised. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give the order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the outside. The

Wrath and
mutiny of
the soldiers,
in going
away—
they rush
again into
the gates,
and muster
within the
town.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 13.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 14.

bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent or resist the ill-usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the march just enjoined—the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement, closed it without a moment's delay, and fastened the bar. The soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamoured loudly to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open to the army.¹ All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon again in Byzantium.

Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved. Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the sea-shore, and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbour, others to the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water, and thus put to sea.²

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 1; 15-17.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 18, 19.

The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium—danger of all within it—conduct of Xenophon.

To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case, when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers, Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was impending: first, the sack of Byzantium—next, horror and antipathy, throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers indiscriminately—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail on him to second and methodise their present triumph. "Now is your time, Xenophon (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have here a city—you have triremes—you have money—you have plenty of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in return can make you powerful."—"You speak well (replied he); I shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything, you must fall into military array forthwith." He knew that this was the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and by great good fortune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses; presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The whole army,—partly from their long military practice, partly under the impression that

Xenophon was really about to second their wishes and direct some aggressive operation—threw themselves almost of their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion; the hoplites eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that Xenophon addressed them as follows.

“Soldiers, I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give way to our wrath—if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for their treachery, and plunder this innocent city—reflect what will be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters of history, may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue, and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe—among them this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all her old allies and Athens besides,—Tissaphernês and the barbaric forces on the coast—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonour and ruin, nor incur the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities which will take arms against us—and will take arms justly, if we, who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth rather than see you do such things! and I exhort *you* too, as Greeks, to obey the leaders of Greece. Endeavour while thus obedient, to obtain your just rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform Anaxibius, that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we

Xenophon musters the soldiers in military order and harangues them.

shall at least prove to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but under our own sense of the duty of obedience."¹

This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army, brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under the Lacedæmonians during the previous war. He had now become a sort of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to command wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians, and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great opportunity of plunder: he farther promised to furnish them with ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned, bearing the reply of Anaxibius; who received the message favourably, promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote their comfort.² He said nothing farther about taking them into pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.

There are a few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted by this speech of Xenophon to

Xenophon calms the army, and persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town—message sent by them to Anaxibius—they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Kœratadas as their commander.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 80, 81.

² Xen. Anab. viii. 1, 82-85.

the army in Byzantium. Nor did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse—first, to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while Anaxibius, the only guilty person, had the means of escaping by sea, even under the worst circumstances—are stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly ejected by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other, yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town. Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury, and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained re-entry, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting, service in Thrace. With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation, chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable reality and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future, and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these

Remarkable effect produced by Xenophon—evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind to persuasive influences.

far-removed dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were overlaid—how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of his own native city—will be seen by all who study his speech. Never did his Athenian accomplishments—his talent for giving words to important thoughts—his promptitude in seizing a present situation and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude—appear to greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the habit of obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even though they had been reluctant—from simple inability to repress it.¹ Again—whatever might have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain that even *he* would not have been able to work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers, —bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies—a part of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were the whole—he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies, combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid presence the half-observed lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.

¹ So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurius (governor of Placentia for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army who marched out to fight the Vitellian generals against his strenuous remonstrance

—“*Fit temeritatis alienæ comes Spurinna, primo coactus, mox velle simulans, quo plus auctoritatis inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret*” (Tacitus, Hist. ii. 18).

After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty; upon which he took leave of the army under the strongest expressions of affection and gratitude on their part,¹ and went into Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a prophet, and beasts to be offered in sacrifice. There followed in his train twenty men carryings sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of garlick and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being unfavourable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice—when Timasion and the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavourable sacrifices may have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason was, the scanty store, inadequate even to once day's subsistence for the army, brought by Kœratadas—and the obvious insufficiency of his means.²

Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Kœratadas is dismissed from the command.

On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to make up its quarters in some Thracian villages so far from Byzantium, under its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future order of march. Kleânor and Phryniskus, who had received presents from Seuthês, urged the expediency of accepting the service of that Thracian prince: Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese, to be under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had rejected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would here obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.

Dissension among the commanders left.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 6, 83.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 34-40.

Though this last plan met with decided favour among the army, it could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place, during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress. Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the neighbouring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius, who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished. By degrees, it would probably have been dissolved altogether, had not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to promote its reorganisation. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral. Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus against the Cyreian army.¹

Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corruptly and fraudulently brought across

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾤσθητο Ἀριστάρχον τε ἔχοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἄρμωσθην καὶ Ἀναξίβιον οὐδέτι νηυσὶ καὶ ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξίβιον μὲν

ἡμέλῃς, πρὸς Ἀριστάρχον δὲ διαπρα-
τετο τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρα-
τεύματος ἅπαν καὶ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον.

to Europe, cast out from Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any might yet be found in that town. He now resolved to bring them back into Asia for the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment's delay to rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that he might reach the army with the greatest speed.¹ Perhaps it would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria, a second proposition from Seuthês to engage the services of the army.

While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede Kleander, he found there no less than 400 of the Cyreians, chiefly sick and

Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia.

Aristarchus hinders the crossing—his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzantium.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 8-25.

Ἐκ τούτου δὴ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα, καὶ συνῆχειν τε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅτι τάχιστα καὶ διδώσιν αὐτῷ τριακόν-

τορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους ὡς τάχιστα Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα.

The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is marked by the strength of Xenophon's language: extreme celerity is enjoined three several times.

wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented with sending these 400 men out of the town; but seized them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were—and sold them all into slavery.¹ Apprised of the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbour, and presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct them—Aristarchus replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you.” On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behaviour of Aristarchus—who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in the afternoon—confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this accidental warning.² It need hardly be added that

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῶν μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κήρου στρατιωτῶν ὑπολειμμένους ἀποδόσθαι. Ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς χάμνοντας ἰατροῦσιν οἰκτεῖρων καὶ ἀναγκάζων οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. Ἀριστάρχος δ' ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 14-16.

³ Ἡδὴ δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῇ τειχί, ἐξαγ-

γέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ εἰσεῖται, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ τι κείσεται, ἢ Φαρναβάζῳ παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προέμπεται, αὐτὸς δ' εἶπεν, ὅτι θύσαι τι βούλοιο. . . . Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ ἤκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν ἀπέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δειλῆς δὲ ἡγεῖν ἐνθα καὶ δὴ μᾶλλον εἶδοι εἶναι ἢ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii. 3, 2.

Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded by all.

We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernês had practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues —and that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Assuredly, had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon would not have escaped falling into this snare; nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence—so fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.

His treacherous scheme for entrapping Xenophon.

At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy Mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about 800 hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthês to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.¹ Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement: for they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on ship-board; it was midwinter—they were encamped in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace—they had neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market had been near.² Xenophon, who had brought them to the

Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of the army—he opens negotiations with Seuthês.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 15; vii. 3, 3; χεῖμων ἦν, &c. Probably the month of December.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 6, 24. μένος δὲ

neighbourhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation; and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with Seuthês. The sacrifices were so favourable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthês, for the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.

Mæsadês, the father of Seuthês, had been apparently a dependent prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthês to recover, by the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus (about 20 Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to each lochage or captain—four times as much to each of the generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on the coast. "I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace."¹ Seuthês farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven days' journey from the sea, at farthest.

These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect; and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians as well as mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiadês, Alkibiadês, and other Athenian leader had obtained before him) as a valuable refuge in case of need.² But even if the promise had been less favourable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had

Position of
Seuthês—
his liberal
offers to
the army.

Xenophon
introduces
him to the
army, who
accept the
offers.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 17-38.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 6. 34.

not even present supplies—still less any means of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthês was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.

They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable tribute. Though the suffering from cold was extreme, during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy mountains of Thrace, the army were nevertheless enabled by their expeditions along with Seuthês to procure plentiful subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthês had made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy; since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthês by importunate demand and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named Herakleidês; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthês.

Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon, both of the relations of the army with Seuthês, and of the warfare carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes—interesting as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint

Service of
the army
with
Seuthês,
who cheats
them of
most of
their pay.

The army
suspect the
probity of
Xenophon
—unjust
calumnies
against him
—he ex-
poses it in
a public
harangue,
and regains
their con-
fidence.

that the soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthês while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and falsehoods against him.¹ Until such suspicions were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly willing to hear both sides—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those of esteem and favour, stands confessed in his own words,² proving that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.

It is hard to say however what would have been the fate of this gallant army, when Seuthês, having obtained from their arms in two months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without pay—had they not been extricated by a change of interest and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just declared war against Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus; sending Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which their harmost Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited—and to take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charminus and Polynîkus, were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthês; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthês and Herakleidês, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavoured to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.³ Joyfully did the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them by Seuthês; which Charminus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.⁴ He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe lecture to Seuthês.⁵ But the

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 6, 9, 10.

² Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 55-57.

³ Xen. Anab. vii. 6, 1-7.

⁴ Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 15.

⁵ Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 21-47.

The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the person to whom, and the circumstances

latter was not found so accessible to the workings of eloquence as the Cyreian assembled soldiers. Nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon the sum due:—together with civil expressions towards himself personally—an invitation to remain in his service with 1000 hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and a grant of lands.

When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions, to 6000 men,¹ was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here he found Eukleidês, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present to Xenophon, Eukleidês had no sooner inspected the entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the statement. "I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced): Zeus Meilichios the Gracious² is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed

Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia—his poverty—he is advised to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios—beneficial effects.

under which, it purports to have been spoken.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 7, 23.

² It appears that the epithet *Meilichios* (the Gracious) is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the denomination *Eumetides* to the avenging goddesses. Zeus is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a disposition to inflict, evil: the sacrifice to him under this surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement, expiation, or purifica-

tion, destined to avert his displeasure; but the surname itself is to be interpreted *proleptice*, to use the word of the critics—it designates, not the actual disposition of Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice is intended to bring about in him.

See Pausan. i. 37, 3; ii. 20, 3. K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus Festis, p. 6 (Utrecht, 1849).

to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?" "Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march." "Do so now, then (said Eukleidês), and it will be for your advantage." The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army, and with dispositions so favourable to himself, that they bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year's pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not stay to earn it. The shortcomings of Seuthês were now made up with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a favourite horse.

Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been admonished by Eukleidês to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events—but also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right reason, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for dispensations favourable or unfavourable.

But the favours of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across Mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast of Lydia, through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia; a hill town overhanging the river and plain of Kaïkus. This district was occupied by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus,

He conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus.

who, having been banished from embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant, another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great hospitality. Hellas acquainted him, that a powerful Persian, named Asidatês, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a tower not far off on the plain; and that a sudden night march, with 300 men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favourable, Xenophon communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many volunteers, to the number of 600, pressed to be allowed to join. But the captains repelled them declining to take more than 300, in order that the booty might afford an ampler dividend to each partner.

Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of 300 reached about midnight the tower of Asidatês. It was large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison. It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around, like a baronial castle in the Middle Ages; but the assailants neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak, yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by Asidatês to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighbourhood; numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little farther off seaward.¹

His unsuccessful attempt to surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidatês.

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 8, 10-19.

Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing Asidatês prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the "previous sacrifices (those which had promised favourably before the first unsuccessful attempt) now came true."¹ The persons of this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;² which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total to be divided.

In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration was paid to Xenophon, in which all the army—generals, captains, and soldiers—and the Lacedæmonians besides—unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. "Here then Xenophon (to use his own language³) had no reason to complain of the god" (Zeus Meilichios). We may add—what he himself ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before put forth—that neither had he any reason to complain of the ingratitude of the army.

As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,⁴ he seems to have executed his

¹ Xen. Anab. vii. 8. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα συμπεριτυχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτόν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· καὶ οὕτω τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη.

² Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 21.

³ Xen. Anab. vii. 8, 23.

⁴ Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾔνιστο δ

Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γάρ καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, ὥστε ἐξαιρέτα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν.

⁴ Xen. Anab. v. 8, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must have been first made on the present occasion.

intention of returning to Athens.¹ He must have arrived there, after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokratês, whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume. That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from Athens;² but whether it had come to his knowledge before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokratês, known by the name of *Memorabilia*, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.

The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron—Xenophon leaves the army, depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus.

That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia—became again their commander—and served for two years under the Spartan general Derkylidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of Sokratês. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernês; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.³

His subsequent return to Asia, to take command of the Cyreians as a part of the Lacedæmonian army.

¹ Compare *Anabasis*, vii. 7, 57; vii. 8, 2.

² Xenoph. *Memorab.* iv. 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence of the work.

³ See Xenoph. *Hellen.* iii. 2, 7—a passage which Morus refers, I think with much probability, to Xeno-

phon himself.

The very circumstantial details which Xenophon gives (iii. 1, 11-28) about the proceedings of Derkylidas against Meidias in the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in person.

But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their Boeotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxês—nor because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has been sometimes erroneously affirmed—but because he was now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.¹ Having thus

¹ That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears plainly from Anabasis, v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August 394 B.C.

Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as to the time of the banishment. Ἐδωχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐκ βασιλείας τῶν Περσῶν, σφίσι δὲ εὐνοὺν ὄντα, στρατείας μετασχὼν Κύρου πολέμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου (iv. 6, 4). Now it was not until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest the least symptoms of goodwill towards Athens; and not until the battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the same year), that he testified his goodwill by conspicuous and effective service. If therefore the motive of the Athenians to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of the king of Persia towards them, the banishment could not have taken place before 395 B.C. and is not likely to have taken place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon himself as above.

Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii. 52)

states, what I believe to be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment to the Lacedæmonians—ἐνὶ Λακωνισμῷ.

Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokratês, when first consulted, was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 5). But it is to be remembered that at this time, the king of Persia was just as much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king. Artaxerxês and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxês, six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards his enemies were altered.

The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as asserting

become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillûs, one of the villages of Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillûs, to be consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the same name Selinûs, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column placed near them was inscribed with the following words—"This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty, the goddess herself will take the omission in hand."¹

He settles at Skillûs near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis.

Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range of meadow, woodland, and mountain—with the still loftier mountain called Pholoë adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses, oxen, sheep, &c., and excellent hunting-ground near, for deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at Ephesus. Residing hard

Charms of the residence—good hunting—annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon.

the main cause of Xenophon's banishment, is in my judgement inaccurate. Xenophon was banished for *Laconism*, or attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a secondary motive.

¹ Xen. Anab. v. 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη

ἔστηκεν παρὰ τὸν ναὸν, γράμματα ἔχουσα — Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ καρποῦμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθῆσιν ἐκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ περιττοῦ τὸν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· εἰάν δὲ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῇ μελήσει. Concerning an ancient copy of this Inscription, see Boeckh. Corp. Inscript. No. 1926;

by on his own property, allotted to him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian¹ settlers at Skillûs, and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognised that place, along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighbouring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;² the game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbours took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.

Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to enjoy society with every variety of Greeks—and to obtain copious information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of his residence at Skillûs implies a state of things not present and continuing,³ but

Later life of Xenophon—expelled from Skillûs after the battle of Leuktra—afterwards restored at Athens.

and Boeckh's Public Econ. of Athens, b. 3. c. 6. not. 101. ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἀλφίτα, ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, &c.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vi. 5, 2.

² Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.

³ Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9. Πασιγὰς δ'

past and gone; other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillús lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.¹ Two of his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantinea, where the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator Deinarchus.²

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v. 6, 4) attests the reconquest of Skillús by the Eleians, but adds (on the authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ or show-guides) that they permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point I apprehend to be incorrect.

The latter works of Xenophon (*De Vectigalibus*, *De Officio Magistri Equitum*, &c.) seem plainly to imply that he had been restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of politics at Athens.

² Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. *De Dinarcho*, p. 664, ed. Reiske. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου πρὸς Σενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also alludes to it—ὡς πρὸς Αἰσχύλου ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σενοφῶντα ἀποστασίῳ.

Schneider in his *Epimetrum* (ad calcem *Anabaseos*, p. 573), respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues

as if the person against whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C.

Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which implies that the latter was a relative of the person against whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as grandson; on that evidence, combined with the identity of name and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C.

Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and character of Xenophon the grandfather: see for an analogy, the

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honour, I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile (in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted, afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.¹ Against such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal antipathy.² And we shall perceive hereafter the military and political leaders of Greece—Agesilaus, Jason of Pheræ,³ and others down to Philip and Alexander⁴—firmly persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed

oration of Isokratēs, *De Bigis*, among others.

¹ Xen. *Anab.* i. 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, *Artaxerx.* c. 20; and Isokratēs, *Panegy.* Or. iv. s. 168, 169 *seq.*

The last chapter of the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon (viii. 8, 20. 21-26) expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not defensible without Grecian aid.

² Isokratēs, *Orat.* v. (Philipp.) s.

104-106. ἤδη δ' ἀρχαυαὶς δοκοῦντας εἶναι (i. e. the Greeks under Klearchus) διὰ τὴν Κύρου προκρίσαν ἀτυχῆσαι, &c.

³ Isokratēs, *Orat.* v. (Philipp.) s. 141; Xen. *Hellen.* vi. 1, 12.

⁴ See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his soldiers before the battle of Issus (*Arrian*, E. A. ii. 7, 8).

ecian force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important to the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the treat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to me—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and enrols herself with the name and the force of Persia, for the purposes of aggrandisement and dominion to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers—which confer such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been devoted to it in this history.

END OF VOL. VIII.







